What If: Franco-German reconciliation in 1871?

Today, the Alliance of France and Germany stands at the core of the EU. This alliance came about after the end of WW2, in circumstances that should be known to most people. One might say that there was an earlier attempt at an alliance made by the Vichy regime, although nobody today wants to talk about it. (But more about Petain and the Vichy French below)

Now my question is: what if there was a much earlier reconciliation between France and Germany, right after the end of the Franco-Prussian war. Historically, it was the anexation of Alsace Lorraine to Germany that poisoned the relationships between the two states. Otherwise, there is noo reason why the two nations should hate eachother.
The Germans didn't need to annex the region. Bismark himself didn't want it. And the Germans had gained enough from the war: they had fought off foreign agresion and achieved national unity. It is not inconcievable that they could have behaved as gracous winners and leave the contested region to France.
As for the French, they had no other reason to hate Germany. The war was never really popular. The German's quarrel had been with Napoleon III, the now deposed and despised "tyrant" not with the French people as a whole. In time, they might even have come to regard the Germans as "liberators".
As it was, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine created a revanchist feeling that would last for several generations, compromising any attempt at reconciliation. WW1 didn't improve things. The French took back the contested region, but they were not content with this. The victory had made them overconfident. They once again started to see themselves as a potential superpower. As late as 1935, de Gaulle was drawing up plans of world domination. And there was no place for Germany in these plans. However, that dream had in fact died with the first Napoleon.
This is what Petain recognised after the German victory in 1940. He might be reviled today, and for good reason, but some of his ideeas were actually sound in principle. He figured out that if France can't be the number 1 power in eruope, it can still be the nr.2, by cuting a deal with the nr. 1. His plan went wrong due to two factors: a) Hitler wasn't going ot make any deal with the French, which he despised as he despised all non-aryans, and b) he went out of his way to antagonise more and more powerfull foes, so even in an alliance with France, he was still doomed.
But Bismark was not Hitler. If the French had offered the same terms 70 years earlier, he might have accepted, and if he could have convinced the Germans to be lenient towards the French in 1871, both nations could have profited in the long run.
So, what do you think: how plausible is a Franco-German reconciliation in 1871 and subsequent alliance? And how would this change history?
Personally I think such an alliance would be exceedingly powerfull, and I don't see any realistich combintion of powers that could defeat it in a conflict.
 
I wonder if nationalists wouldn't have to be thrown at least a small bone, since the Germans won so spectacularly? Perhaps instead of outright grabbing those areas, a plebiscite could be arranged instead? That seems like a proper solution between equals, which is really the only way I could see the arrangement you're going for working. Having it be a plebiscite should also cause much less anger among revanchists, and take a lot of the wind out of their sails when communicating with the public.

The idea about intertwining the French and the German economy, like they did after WW2, would probably also work here. Just create a customs union initially, and a guarantee of (German/French) minority rights, as part of an effort to "create a smoother transition for the border regions". You could later expand that to greater cooperation, to cement the connection between the two. The upper class probably wouldn't mind either, later on, having a whole other country to help them suppress various leftist groups.

According to what I can find, Article 5 of the Austro-Prussian Peace of Prague stipulated that there should be a plebiscite in Schleswig to find out if the people wanted to stay German or rejoin Denmark, which was to be held within 6 years. The two plebiscites could be settled at the same time, which would would be a good way for Germany to show it had no intention of forcing its ambitions upon Europe, but could function as a partner in peace. That would be a pretty useful propaganda victory at the birth of this new nation state, wouldn't it? The Danes could join the customs union at the same time, because why the hell not? The Belgians and Dutch might as well too, "to further stabilize the ancient battlefields of Europe".
 
The problem with a plebiscite is that it risks returning the "wrong" answer (which would be in this case pro-Germany). I'm not saying that the Germans don't have a claim, I think their claim was as good as the French one, but my reasoning is that the German's can live without Alsace-Lorraine, while the French wouldn't be able to get over the loss. maybe in the euphoria of victory, the Germans can forget about demanding terittory. Afte all, their war aims did not include annexing terttory. Theoretically they had been fighting a defensive war and their main goals were to end foreign intervention in german affairs and to achieve national unity. Both these goals were met and this should make the nationalists happy enough.

As for an economic union, I fear this would be too much ahead of it's time. After all, German protectionists, ike Friedrich List, were just as afraid of France as of Britain. (But List did however want to bring Belgium and Netherlands into the Zollverein).
I was talking more about cooperation in foreign affairs, for exemple in colonial matters, where they could present an united front against England.
Historically, the English took the lion's share of colonies in Africa, and they got away with it due to the rivalry between France and Germany, who were left to fight for scraps. Here, things might be different.
 
The problem with a plebiscite is that it risks returning the "wrong" answer (which would be in this case pro-Germany). I'm not saying that the Germans don't have a claim, I think their claim was as good as the French one, but my reasoning is that the German's can live without Alsace-Lorraine, while the French wouldn't be able to get over the loss.
Perhaps a short period where the Germans deliberately sabotage their reputation in the region, along with planning the plebiscite properly, could prevent this? They could even test in in Schleswig first if they wanted. Gerrymandering shouldn't be too hard should it? Probably can't prevent some adjustments, but they needn't be that great. Weren't the Alsatians pretty happy in France? How much territory would the French have to lose before becoming mad? Any at all, or could Germany grab some bits?

As for an economic union, I fear this would be too much ahead of it's time. After all, German protectionists, ike Friedrich List, were just as afraid of France as of Britain. (But List did however want to bring Belgium and Netherlands into the Zollverein).
Perhaps just a guarantee of minority rights then, with the Germans paying for German schools in France and vice versa. That shouldn't threaten anyone, and make nationalists have less to be angry about.

I was talking more about cooperation in foreign affairs, for exemple in colonial matters, where they could present an united front against England.
Historically, the English took the lion's share of colonies in Africa, and they got away with it due to the rivalry between France and Germany, who were left to fight for scraps. Here, things might be different.
Yeah, I get that, but making a "permanent peace" between France and Germany would be part of that. You kind of have to settle matters in Europe first before looking at the colonies don't you?
 
The problem with a plebiscite is that it risks returning the "wrong" answer (which would be in this case pro-Germany).

In 1871, a plebiscite would have a 95% (at least) in favor of France. In 1874, the autonomist party (in fact french rattachists) got 96.9% of the votes.
 
In 1871, a plebiscite would have a 95% (at least) in favor of France. In 1874, the autonomist party (in fact french rattachists) got 96.9% of the votes.
I was pretty sure they were okay with being in France, but that's just amazing. Unless you make the plebiscite cover areas that are so small that you'll occasionally get one that supports joining Germany, you're not gonna see any change of the border at all. If you did, the whole thing would practically be invisible on a map, just a line next to the original border. I'm assuming even French revanchists could learn to live with that.

Of course, there were people who didn't vote in that election. Let's assume they did:

  • All vote for France: No adjustments.
  • Half vote for Germany: 15% of total votes. Maybe the Germans get some border areas? Depends on the way the votes are distributed and the lines drawn.
  • All vote for Germany: 26,6% of total votes. Assuming that the votes aren't split across the whole region, but are clustered near the border, the Germans probably pick up some border areas
Perhaps the split vote is the most likely? Given that these people didn't care one way or the other? On the other hand, they might just decide to stay with the France they know instead of the Germany they don't. All of this assuming that these people would vote if it is was a plebiscite, which they would probably have to be forced into doing. Have the Germans do the forcing, and you ensure that most of them stay French.

So yeah, odds are looking pretty good for the French to be fine with a plebiscite result.
 
In 1871, a plebiscite would have a 95% (at least) in favor of France. In 1874, the autonomist party (in fact french rattachists) got 96.9% of the votes.
Well, that certainly simplifies things.

Yeah, I get that, but making a "permanent peace" between France and Germany would be part of that. You kind of have to settle matters in Europe first before looking at the colonies don't you?
Of course, european matters would have to be solved first. Fortunately, except for the tiny strip of Alsace-Lorraine, there were no other sources of conflict between Germany and France.
If they wanted, they might have even managed to divide Belgium between themselves.
 
Well, that certainly simplifies things.


Of course, european matters would have to be solved first. Fortunately, except for the tiny strip of Alsace-Lorraine, there were no other sources of conflict between Germany and France.
If they wanted, they might have even managed to divide Belgium between themselves.

I could certainly see something along the lines of 'we'll let you have Wallonia, we'll grab Luxembourg and have a puppet in Flanders.' Perhaps a minor gain for the Dutch as well to bring them into the sphere and.
 
So, what do you think: how plausible is a Franco-German reconciliation in 1871 and subsequent alliance? And how would this change history?
Personally I think such an alliance would be exceedingly powerfull, and I don't see any realistich combintion of powers that could defeat it in a conflict.

I think Franco-German reconciliation in 1871 is impossible. If Prussia/Germany didn't annex Alsace-Lorraine there would still be just the general defeat, invasion and occupation of portions of France to deal with. The Treaty of Frankfurt was also imposing, tho the French paid it off pretty fast. However, France's position as a major power on the continent was certainly shattered and I don't see why any 'reconciliation' would be possible.
 
I think Franco-German reconciliation in 1871 is impossible. If Prussia/Germany didn't annex Alsace-Lorraine there would still be just the general defeat, invasion and occupation of portions of France to deal with. The Treaty of Frankfurt was also imposing, tho the French paid it off pretty fast. However, France's position as a major power on the continent was certainly shattered and I don't see why any 'reconciliation' would be possible.
What if the defeat is less severe? Just enough that the French get the message about them not being able to boss Germany around anymore, but not anything more than that? Have it be Napoleon III's defeat, not France's, and you might have something to work from.
 
Deutsches Elsass

The French always thought they were masters of Europe (and for a long time they were) and Nappy III was simply acting like "everyone" expected a French monarch to act.

Over the centuries the Germans were castigated for their "Drang nach Osten" but the French were 'excused' for trying to make the Rhine their eastern border ... another example of applying a double standard.

The reason that the King and v. Roon wanted the territory was to set up a defensive border on the western crest of the Vosges (Vogesen) and the fortifications around Metz. A defensible border with a nation that has continually entangled itself in German affairs since before the "Sun King".

Sorry but French chauvinism wouldn't have allowed any kind of cooperation after 1871 even if no territory was taken back. Since they were damned if they did, and damned if they didn't cant blame them for doing it.

Nappy 1 thought nothing of moving his border to the Rhine (that was OK ... after all it was Napoleon) but when the shoe is on the other foot, well that's different.

Well anyway, my two cents.....

BernieP2
 
The defeat and ocuppation happened because Napoleon III attacked first. The Germans were just defending themselves. If they leave after defeating Napoleon, then the new regime in France might even be grateful to be rid of the "tyrant".
I allso asume that this time the German leadership will have the foresight ot recognize the necessity of an alliance with France, so the entire peace treaty will be more lenient: no anexations and fewer reparations. The peace with Austria was lenient too, and France could be a much more usefull as an ally than Austria ever was.
As for France's status as a great power being shattered: yes, but this is not something that happened because of the war, and it's not something that can be fixed by another war. The war just exposed the new reality in the european balance of power. If the French leadership of 1871 would have recognized (As Petain did 70 years later) that France doesn't have the potential, in population and industry, to be as strong as Germany, then maybe they would have setteled for second place. And perhaps a weaker revanchist movement would have allowed such a realisation.
 
What if the defeat is less severe? Just enough that the French get the message about them not being able to boss Germany around anymore, but not anything more than that? Have it be Napoleon III's defeat, not France's, and you might have something to work from.
And how do you do that? A defeat of Napoleon III is a defeat of France since he is the Emperor of the french. I could see a reconciliation post WWI but not in 1871.
 
What if the defeat is less severe? Just enough that the French get the message about them not being able to boss Germany around anymore, but not anything more than that? Have it be Napoleon III's defeat, not France's, and you might have something to work from.
Yep, good point!. Maybe if Napoleon (or one of his generals) does a little bit better, then the Germans might be content with staying on their side of the Rhine, and the defeat will be less humiliating for France.
But it would be nice if Napoleon still falls in the end, so that partisans of a Franco-German alliance can play the "liberators" angle.
 
Yep, good point!. Maybe if Napoleon (or one of his generals) does a little bit better, then the Germans might be content with staying on their side of the Rhine, and the defeat will be less humiliating for France.
But it would be nice if Napoleon still falls in the end, so that partisans of a Franco-German alliance can play the "liberators" angle.
Yeah sure in your dreams.:rolleyes:
 
And how do you do that? A defeat of Napoleon III is a defeat of France since he is the Emperor of the french. I could see a reconciliation post WWI but not in 1871.
Reconciliation post WW1 is impossible. The Franco-German rivalry has had almost 50 years to grow and develop. It needs to be nipped in the bud (that means reconciliation in 1871).
Also, in 1918 the French were overconfident. They started again to dream obout utterly crushing Germany and expending to the Rhine, which was unrealistic. Any realistic project of alliance between France and the German empire must be based on the understanding that France will be the junior partner, so this means that the French must be humbled a bit (but not too much).

Yeah sure in your dreams.:rolleyes:
What a masterfully argued thesis. I remain speechless.
 
Reconciliation post WW1 is impossible. The Franco-German rivalry has had almost 50 years to grow and develop. It needs to be nipped in the bud (that means reconciliation in 1871).
Also, in 1918 the French were overconfident. They started again to dream obout utterly crushing Germany and expending to the Rhine, which was unrealistic. Any realistic project of alliance between France and the German empire must be based on the understanding that France will be the junior partner, so this means that the French must be humbled a bit (but not too much).


What a masterfully argued thesis. I remain speechless.
France and Prussia were enemy for years as well reconciliation in 1871 is a pipe dream. Or maybe if the war is stamelate who end up in statut quo maybe it is possible then again I am not sure etheir.
 
German distrust of France was a very old idea in 1871 dating back at least to the French meddling in the 30 years war. For centuries the French were the major source for wars on German soil, directly or indirectly by financing Habsburgs enemies. And the French actions were what really started (during the Napoleonic wars) and fueled the German nationalism (Thiers demand for the Rhine border). I really can´t see the Germans being lenient enough in 1871 that France can accept it and become a friend afterward.
 
Sorry but French chauvinism wouldn't have allowed any kind of cooperation after 1871 even if no territory was taken back. Since they were damned if they did, and damned if they didn't cant blame them for doing it.
Yeah, I think you might be right. Nationalist fervor was a hell of a thing in the period, and people were clearly not thinking straight. Just look at the insane overconfidence we had in Denmark going into the war of 1864. We honestly expected to kick the asses of two great powers at once, just with good old-fashioned Danish grit. We did get over that rather dramatically after the war though.

Can't imagine how hard you would have to defeat the French to get the same effect.

And how do you do that? A defeat of Napoleon III is a defeat of France since he is the Emperor of the french. I could see a reconciliation post WWI but not in 1871.
Napoleon III starts a war. -> Germans end it and get him kicked out -> Germans play nice with Republican France.

There, now you have the Germans defeating Napoleon, since he's the only one being punished. That was the basic idea after the Napoleonic Wars as well as far as I'm aware. It's a way to show the French that the Germans acknowledge the French nation as a cohesive whole that shouldn't be butchered, even if they had to cut out its diseased heart. It's just a matter of selling the story properly.

This wouldn't necessarily stop the French from going back to their usual attempts at "establishing a natural border" though, as others have said.
 
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