Wolf of Badenoch
Donor
It is, I think fairly well known that both Wavell and Jumbo Wilson were horrified at the orders from London to send 60,000 troops from North Africa to Greece to support the Greek army which had found the Italians less of a challenge than the Wehrmacht.
I understand from family connections that Wilson threatened to resign rather than accept promotion to 3 star rank. Wavell, subsequently dismissed for losing Tobruk, was well aware that this ill-advised adventure had little hope of success and did protest his instructions. The British Minister Resident, Eden had been convinced by the new Greek PM that British support was essential to prevent the collapse of Greece and its occupation. (The Greeks had asked for 9 divisions).
Can we suppose that Wilson's objections were relayed to Eden by Wavell and that both made urgent submissions to London that the two divisions and an armoured brigade should not be sent to Greece - regardless of Treaty considerations. (The argument offered might consider an analogy reflecting on Dowding's refusal to commit more of fighter command to the defence of a doomed France and the impact of those additional aircraft in the Battle of Britain).
1. Would the retention of the two ANZAC divisions and the 1st armoured brigade (100 tanks) and 200 plus aircraft in North Africa have affected the campaign's outcome over the next few months?
2. Would an easier victory for the Germans in Greece have benefited or affected the timetable for Barbarossa? (Hitler later blamed the Italians' weaknesses for upsetting his plans).
3. Could Wavell's enhanced forces have prevented the IOTL rapid deployment of the Afrika Korps to the extent that the threat to Suez was never as real as it was in the summer of 1942.
4. Could a butterflied campaign see Gott surviving and Montgomery not taking over 8th Army? What might the consequences of this be in late 1942?
I understand from family connections that Wilson threatened to resign rather than accept promotion to 3 star rank. Wavell, subsequently dismissed for losing Tobruk, was well aware that this ill-advised adventure had little hope of success and did protest his instructions. The British Minister Resident, Eden had been convinced by the new Greek PM that British support was essential to prevent the collapse of Greece and its occupation. (The Greeks had asked for 9 divisions).
Can we suppose that Wilson's objections were relayed to Eden by Wavell and that both made urgent submissions to London that the two divisions and an armoured brigade should not be sent to Greece - regardless of Treaty considerations. (The argument offered might consider an analogy reflecting on Dowding's refusal to commit more of fighter command to the defence of a doomed France and the impact of those additional aircraft in the Battle of Britain).
1. Would the retention of the two ANZAC divisions and the 1st armoured brigade (100 tanks) and 200 plus aircraft in North Africa have affected the campaign's outcome over the next few months?
2. Would an easier victory for the Germans in Greece have benefited or affected the timetable for Barbarossa? (Hitler later blamed the Italians' weaknesses for upsetting his plans).
3. Could Wavell's enhanced forces have prevented the IOTL rapid deployment of the Afrika Korps to the extent that the threat to Suez was never as real as it was in the summer of 1942.
4. Could a butterflied campaign see Gott surviving and Montgomery not taking over 8th Army? What might the consequences of this be in late 1942?