Wavell Persuades Churchill Not to Intervene in Greece: Operation Lustre, March 1941

[Wolf of Badenoch]

It is, I think fairly well known that both Wavell and Jumbo Wilson were horrified at the orders from London to send 60,000 troops from North Africa to Greece to support the Greek army which had found the Italians less of a challenge than the Wehrmacht.

I understand from family connections that Wilson threatened to resign rather than accept promotion to 3 star rank. Wavell, subsequently dismissed for losing Tobruk, was well aware that this ill-advised adventure had little hope of success and did protest his instructions. The British Minister Resident, Eden had been convinced by the new Greek PM that British support was essential to prevent the collapse of Greece and its occupation. (The Greeks had asked for 9 divisions).

Can we suppose that Wilson's objections were relayed to Eden by Wavell and that both made urgent submissions to London that the two divisions and an armoured brigade should not be sent to Greece - regardless of Treaty considerations. (The argument offered might consider an analogy reflecting on Dowding's refusal to commit more of fighter command to the defence of a doomed France and the impact of those additional aircraft in the Battle of Britain).

1. Would the retention of the two ANZAC divisions and the 1st armoured brigade (100 tanks) and 200 plus aircraft in North Africa have affected the campaign's outcome over the next few months?
2. Would an easier victory for the Germans in Greece have benefited or affected the timetable for Barbarossa? (Hitler later blamed the Italians' weaknesses for upsetting his plans).
3. Could Wavell's enhanced forces have prevented the IOTL rapid deployment of the Afrika Korps to the extent that the threat to Suez was never as real as it was in the summer of 1942.
4. Could a butterflied campaign see Gott surviving and Montgomery not taking over 8th Army? What might the consequences of this be in late 1942?

 

[arctic warrior]

Would the Yugoslav coup go off if no Commonwealth troops are present in Greece! If not the Germans should have an earlier jump off date for Barbarossa.

Regarding 1.-4.
1. It should; the extra troops ought to help the Commonwealth stall Rommels advance. Fed with the deciphered Bonner Fellers reports Rommel should still do well.
2. Without Commonwealth aid the Germans will have a walkover in Crete that will make Airborne look a wonder weapon and incline Student to dream up even more phantastic plans for his boys use. Perhaps Operation Hercules will jump off. At least the Commonwealth will look feverishly as to the whereabouts of the Fallschirmjäger. It may tie up substantial forces to guard for any contingency. Don't know how many weeks less delay the absence of Commonwealth troops will account for.
3. With regards to 1. it should though Rommel will still benefit from Fellers reports.
4. Have no idea though guess it might happen. Depends upon the mood of the PM I think; if his generals aren't sufficiently aggressive he may substitute. Without Greece and Crete he may like to see something being done to chase the Axis out of NA.

 

[Kevin Renner]

Goddamn Churchill and his "Soft underbelly of Europe".

 

[pjmidd]

1. Would the retention of the two ANZAC divisions and the 1st armoured brigade (100 tanks) and 200 plus aircraft in North Africa have affected the campaign's outcome over the next few months?
2. Would an easier victory for the Germans in Greece have benefited or affected the timetable for Barbarossa? (Hitler later blamed the Italians' weaknesses for upsetting his plans).
3. Could Wavell's enhanced forces have prevented the IOTL rapid deployment of the Afrika Korps to the extent that the threat to Suez was never as real as it was in the summer of 1942.
4. Could a butterflied campaign see Gott surviving and Montgomery not taking over 8th Army? What might the consequences of this be in late 1942?

1) Certainly, its still Rommel but that's a lot of equipment and supplies. Rommel had logistic issues so anything slowing him down will cause large butterflies.
2) Hitler did say that but the weather meant that not a lot would have changed, the delay meant that the terrain was more dried out and so more suitable to rapid maneuvering.
3) Lots of ships and aircraft further south would mean heavier losses on crossing so delaying the deployment. Again Rommel was on a bit of a shoe string initially so not a lot is needed to start the butterflies flapping.
4) Depends on what happens but Monty is going to turn up somewhere as his ability was noted . No Greece could mean more forces in the Far East and definitely more equipment ( no need to rebuild divisions ). Think Fester ended up with Monty as field commander in Malaya in his TL, you could have interesting butterflies.

Of course there is the possibility that whilst mainland Greece is not helped , Crete is reinforced as it would act as a forward defense for North Africa. Could totally discredit paratroopers as well as big post war butterflies in Greece ( Government having part of Greece left to hold greatly increases its legitimacy v the communists )

 

[UCB79]

Goddamn Churchill and his "Soft underbelly of Europe".

Well, I wouldn't damm Churchill- but his
idea that Europe had a soft underbelly was
about as stupid as you can get- sorry!

 

[History Learner]

Goddamn Churchill and his "Soft underbelly of Europe".

Ultimately, it was probably the best decision available.

The resources and time the Germans were forced to expend in both Yugoslavia and Greece, then followed by Crete, probably saved the Soviet Union. Equipment losses and such delayed the overall start of the invasion by about two weeks, which ultimately was very decisive given how near run the fighting was in October of that year. Even before that, Army Group South was forced to detach 11th Army for occupation duties in Yugoslavia, which left them seriously undermanned and ultimately lead to the "Kiev or Moscow" issue of August. Later on in the War, Italy was the best move the Allies could make to support the Soviets, given the lack of landing craft, divisions, and experience to do France at that point; Italy already being on the rope was a bonus.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Ultimately, it was probably the best decision available.

The resources and time the Germans were forced to expend in both Yugoslavia and Greece, then followed by Crete, probably saved the Soviet Union. Equipment losses and such delayed the overall start of the invasion by about two weeks, which ultimately was very decisive given how near run the fighting was in October of that year. Even before that, Army Group South was forced to detach 11th Army for occupation duties in Yugoslavia, which left them seriously undermanned and ultimately lead to the "Kiev or Moscow" issue of August. Later on in the War, Italy was the best move the Allies could make to support the Soviets, given the lack of landing craft, divisions, and experience to do France at that point; Italy already being on the rope was a bonus.

I thought rain delayed play? Principly heavy rains flooded the Airfields! No? And that German forces were coming south regardless?

Anyway nice POD from the OP - I have two ways for this to happen

The ANZAC leadership smells a rat and asks for confirmation from home rather than just accept the orders - and ultimately those forces are not released and the invasion of Greece by Germany goes ahead.

The other - HUMINT resources reveal that Rommel is ready to attack earlier than expected and Wavell / HMG uses this knowledge to keep more of the better forces in Libya rather than stand up a corps to go to Greece.

In both cases Crete is held by British forces (with a complete TOE this time) and used as a base to assist the Greek armed forces and Government to withdraw too and Sonnenbaum is met by a far stronger Desert force than OTL

 

[Look More Closely Later]

Wasn't the German attack on Crete costly in terms of transport plane losses? I thought I'd seen that mentioned somewhere before on one of these threads?

 

[Errolwi]

...

The ANZAC leadership smells a rat and asks for confirmation from home rather than just accept the orders - and ultimately those forces are not released and the invasion of Greece by Germany goes ahead.

...

I realise that you are just using 'ANZAC' as shorthand, but the two countries had separate command structures (as well as Governments) before deployment to Greece, and different attitudes. That said, if either government becomes aware of the level of deception applied by the Brits they will talk to each other. I'm not sure if it was practical for Freyberg and Blamey to talk privately to each other at the crucial time? The third NZ brigade had only just arrived in Egypt before deployment, and the NZ Division had not being made available for operations as a matter of policy until it was entire - I'm sure this made it harder to refuse permission for deployment.

 

[Kevin Renner]

Ultimately, it was probably the best decision available.

The resources and time the Germans were forced to expend in both Yugoslavia and Greece, then followed by Crete, probably saved the Soviet Union. Equipment losses and such delayed the overall start of the invasion by about two weeks, which ultimately was very decisive given how near run the fighting was in October of that year. Even before that, Army Group South was forced to detach 11th Army for occupation duties in Yugoslavia, which left them seriously undermanned and ultimately lead to the "Kiev or Moscow" issue of August. Later on in the War, Italy was the best move the Allies could make to support the Soviets, given the lack of landing craft, divisions, and experience to do France at that point; Italy already being on the rope was a bonus.

Yes taking Italy out of the war was politically important. Taking Rome was too. But to advance all the way north I'm not sure about. But then every German soldaten in Italy or Norway or Greece or Yugoslavia wasn't in Normandy or in the East

 

[Riain]

The ANZAC leadership smells a rat and asks for confirmation from home rather than just accept the orders - and ultimately those forces are not released and the invasion of Greece by Germany goes ahead.

Menzies did go to a War cabinet meeting in early 41 where Greece was discussed, because of him the discussion went for 45 minutes rather than the 10 allotted in the agenda. But there was a fair bit of deception going on so this and other things didn't cause Australia to smell a rat and withhold its forces.

the two countries had separate command structures (as well as Governments) before deployment to Greece, and different attitudes. That said, if either government becomes aware of the level of deception applied by the Brits they will talk to each other.

If either pulls out the whole Greek thing is over given these 2 divisions are the bulk of the force, however will one go to Crete and hold there?

Would the retention of the two ANZAC divisions and the 1st armoured brigade (100 tanks) and 200 plus aircraft in North Africa have affected the campaign's outcome over the next few months?

With the AIF division not in Greece maybe the 9th AIF Div stationed in Benghazi could have 3 rather than 2 brigades which should help it with its defensive withdrawal along the coast.

Supply was a massive problem for the British during this period, the 2nd ArmdDiv at less than 1/2 strength was reduced from moving from supply dump to supply dump, so maybe it could be held back closer to its source of supplies.

I still think Rommel will do a number on the full strength 2nd AD but that it won't be destroyed or pushed back as far, maybe he will be held forward of the Egyptian border. TTL Brevity will be launched with more tanks and once the Tiger Convoy gets through Battleaxe will be launched with far more tanks that OTL. All in all it should provide a higher start point for the see-sawing that followed.

 

[History Learner]

I thought rain delayed play? Principly heavy rains flooded the Airfields! No? And that German forces were coming south regardless?

Yeah, rain played a role in it but by June 10th the floodwaters had sufficiently receded to allow operations to begin but they were still in the process of replacing equipment and such.

 

[Ian_W]

Yeah, rain played a role in it but by June 10th the floodwaters had sufficiently receded to allow operations to begin but they were still in the process of replacing equipment and such.

So if Yugoslavia and so on dont happen, they still wait until June 10 ...

 

[Wolf of Badenoch]

Thanks for some very informed and interesting contributions. I'm thinking that there is a lot more to explore here....not least the consequences of Britain abrogating a previous promise.

 

[Riain]

I'm thinking that there is a lot more to explore here....not least the consequences of Britain abrogating a previous promise.

May I suggest familiarising yourself with the 2nd Armoured Division and the Tiger convoy, these are the British counterpart to Rommel arriving in Libya.

 

[History Learner]

So if Yugoslavia and so on dont happen, they still wait until June 10 ...

Indeed, but then they have nearly two additional weeks of movement and Army Group South has 11th Army, which means that there is a strong chance of them taking Moscow in August or almost certainly in October, presuming everything plays out roughly as OTL.

 

[Ian_W]

Indeed, but then they have nearly two additional weeks of movement and Army Group South has 11th Army, which means that there is a strong chance of them taking Moscow in August or almost certainly in October, presuming everything plays out roughly as OTL.

Bullshit.

The exact same problems that hit them in OTL, which are 'German logistics are shit, especially on Soviet roads. If there is a resisting Soviet army in front of them, they slow down. A lot. And the Soviets kept putting armies in front of Moscow'.

I understand there are a lot of Axis wank fantasies about two weeks and Moscow and so on but ...

1. German logistics are shit. Spare parts are always a problem. Trucks burn out.

2. It's worse with tanks.

 

[Normal for Norfolk]

Thanks for some very informed and interesting contributions. I'm thinking that there is a lot more to explore here....not least the consequences of Britain abrogating a previous promise.

Would the UK not upholding its commitment to Greece have any impact on the progress of the Lend-Lease Act in the Senate? I've understood that British intervention went down favourably here.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Yes the only German Generals who were not drinking the whole Rotten Structure kool aid where those responsible for logistics - they were all boringly warning of supply issues and logistics virtually impossible beyond IIRC 700 KMs making the whole enterprise suspect!

An Extra Army only confounds this problem.

Also what was the trigger for German forces entering the Balkans and then invading Greece?

They already had units and logi in position well before the Coup and from what I have read over the years my understanding is that they were always intending to attack Greece and could not allow the British to have an Airbase on Crete as it made the oil fields in Romania vulnerable.

 

[Geordie]

Would the UK not upholding its commitment to Greece have any impact on the progress of the Lend-Lease Act in the Senate? I've understood that British intervention went down favourably here.

Would putting, and keeping a force on Crete have gone down as favourably as failing to save Greece?

I am, admittedly, assuming that committing to Crete alone would result in it being held, but I think that the chances of doing so and holding are greater than losing a "just Crete" campaign.