Vickers VC-7 in RAF service

[Just Leo]

With better decision making

And without a change of decision makers with diametrically opposed visions every few years. Plans and schemes don't work so well when the planners and schemers are replaced by men with a different agenda.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Beverley and Argosy to 1964 IOTL
Plans to 1957

In the early 1950s a force of 24 V.1000 (in 3 squadrons of 8 aircraft) and 32 Beverleys in (4 squadrons of 8 aircraft) was proposed to fly out one Army division to the Far East in one month. The total number of aircraft required to maintain the front-line of 32 Beverleys fluctuated between 50 and 54 aircraft.

The Radical Defence Review of 1954 cut the Beverley force from 32 aircraft in 4 squadrons to 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons. However, the total number of Beverleys to be built was increased from 50 in the February 1953 version of Plan K (when a front line of 32 aircraft in 4 squadrons was still planned) to 52 in the January 1955 version of Plan L (which is the first plan I have that shows a projected front line of 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons).

The planned front-line remained at 24 Beverleys in 3 squadrons in the January and September 1957 versions of Plan L. However, the total number of Beverleys required had decreased to 46. In the end 47 Beverley C Mk 1 aircraft were actually built.

In the RAF squadron pattern documents I have seen the intention up to and including the January 1957 version of Plan L was to deploy all the Beverley squadrons in the UK under Transport Command. That version of Plan L covered the period to 31st March 1963, when there were to be 24 Beverleys in 3 squadrons of 8 in Transport Command.

That changed in the September 1957 version of Plan L. Under that plan a mixed MRT/Heavy Freighter squadron with 6 Hastings and 4 Beverleys was to be based in the Arabian Peninsular. The squadron was to be formed between 1st October 1957 and 31st March 1958. The squadron was to be at half-strength with 6 Hastings on 31st December 1957 and be at full strength with 6 Hastings and 4 Beverleys by 31st March 1958. To compensate the Beverley force in RAF Transport Command was to be reduced from 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons of 8 aircraft on 31st December 1958 to 20 in 2 squadrons of 10 aircraft on 31st March 1958.

Under the September 1957 version of Plan L the total MRT/Heavy Freighter force of the RAF on 31st March 1963 was to consist of 68 aircraft (24 Bevereleys and 44 Hastings) in 7 squadrons deployed as follows:

Transport Command 36 aircraft in 4 squadrons

20 Beverleys in 2 squadrons
16 Hastings in 2 squadrons​

Near East Air Force

10 Hastings in one squadron​

Air Forces Middle East 10 aircraft in one mixed squadron

6 Hastings in half a squadron
4 Beverleys in half a squadron​

Far East Air Force

12 Hastings in one squadron​

There were to be no Argosys and no Valettas.

What Actually Happened

The reality was somewhat different. 4 RAF squadrons were equipped with the Beverley as follow:

• No. 47 Squadron in Transport Command converted from the Hastings to the Beverley in March 1956;
• No. 53 Squadron in Transport Command converted from the Hasting to the Beverley in October 1956. It remained in Transport Command until 30th June 1963 when it was disbanded. The squadron was reformed on 1st January 1966 as the first (and only) Belfast squadron;
• No. 30 Squadron in Transport Command converted from the Valetta to the Beverley in April 1957. It was transferred to Air Forces Middle East in November 1959. It was based at RAF Eastleigh in Kenya until October 1964 when it moved to RAF Muharraq in Bahrein.
• No. 84 Squadron in MEAF converted from the Valetta to the Beverley in May 1958. This was an all Beverley unit rather than the mixed squadron of Beverleys and Hastings projected in the September 1957 version of Plan L;
• No. 34 Squadron (formerly a Hunter squadron that had disbanded on 15th January 1958) was reformed with Beverleys in FEAF on 15th January 1960.

Although there is no mention of the Argosy in RAF plans up to September 1957 the Service bought 56 of them and they equipped 6 transport squadrons as follows:

• No. 114 Squadron in Transport Command converted from Hastings to the Argosy in October 1961. This squadron had only been in existence as a Hastings squadron since April 1959. It had briefly existed as the only Chipmunk squadron from November 1958 to March 1959. Before that it had been a transport squadron in MEAF operating Dakotas and then Valettas from August 1947 to December 1957;
• No. 105 Squadron (formerly a Mosquito squadron disbanded in February 1946) was reformed with the Argosy in AFME on 21st February 1962;
• No. 267 Squadron (formerly a Pioneer squadron disbanded in November 1958) was reformed with the Argosy in Transport Command on 1st November 1962;
• No. 215 Squadron (formerly a Pioneer squadron disbanded in September 1959) was reformed with the Argosy in FEAF on 1st May 1963;
• No. 70 Squadron in FEAF converted from the Hastings to the Argosy in October 1967.

However, this force of 5 squadrons only lasted for a few months because No. 215 Squadron disbanded on 31st December 1957 and No. 105 Squadron disbanded on 1st February 1968.

The RAF's MRT force at 31st March 1963 was rather larger than the force planned for that date in September 1957. Instead of the 68 aircraft in 7 squadrons (3 Beverley and 4 Hastings) there were actually 14 (4 Argosy, 5 Beverley, 4 Hastings and one Valetta), but I don't know the number of aircraft per squadron. However, a year later (on 31st March 1964) I do know that there were 130 MRT aircraft (48 Argosy, 28 Beverley, 48 Hastings and 6 Valetta) in 13 squadrons (4 Argosy, 4 Beverley, 4 Hastings and one Valetta).

When expressed by type the MRT force of 130 aircraft in 13 squadrons consisted of:

The 48 Argosys in 4 squadrons (Nos. 105, 114, 215 and 267) deployed as follows:

24 in 2 squadrons (Nos. 114 and 267) in Transport Command
14 in one squadron (No. 105) in AFME
10 in one squadron (No 215) in FEAF​

The 28 Beverleys in 4 squadrons (Nos. 30, 34, 47, and 84) deployed as follows:

8 in one squadron (No. 47) in Transport Command
12 in 2 squadrons (Nos. 30 and 84) AFME
8 in one squadron (No. 34) in FEAF​

The 48 Hastings in 4 squadrons (Nos. 24, 36, 48 and 70) deployed as follows:

30 in 2 squadrons (Nos. 24 and 36) in Transport Command
6 in one squadron (No. 70) in NEAF
12 in one squadron (No. 48) in FEAF​

The 6 Valettas in one squadron (No. 52) were in FEAF with a UE of 6 aircraft.​

When expressed by RAF command the MRT force of 130 aircraft in 13 squadrons consisted of:

Transport Command had 62 aircraft 5 squadrons, that is:

24 Argosies in 2 squadrons (Nos. 114 and 267)
8 Beverleys in one squadron (No. 47)
30 Hastings in 2 squadrons (Nos. 30 and 36)​

Near East Air Force (formerly AHQ Levant) had 6 aircraft in one squadron, that is:

6 Hastings in one squadron (No. 70)​

Air Forces Middle East (formerly British Forces Arabian Peninsular) had 26 aircraft in 3 squadrons, that is:

14 Argosies in one squadron (No. 105)
12 Beverleys in 2 squadrons (Nos. 30 and 84)​

Far East Air Force - 36 aircraft in 4 squadrons

10 Argosies in one squadron (No. 215)
8 Beverleys in one squadron (No. 34)
12 Hastings in one squadron (No. 48)
6 Valettas in one squadron (No. 52)​

 

[Just Leo]

I love it when a plan comes together. I guess the Argosy was an unplanned pregnancy resulting from some unauthorized jiggery-pokey.

 

[Riain]

The Argosy fascinates me from a procurement and fleet management perspective. I still think the best thing from Britain too do from 1964 with the Sterling crisis would be:

• defer the NMBR22 requirement
• build 30 Belfasts to replace the Beverlys and Hastings'
• retain the Argosys until 1970 or so
• replace the Argosy with something like the Buffalo, G222 or maybe the C160 if bigger is better

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

And without a change of decision makers with diametrically opposed visions every few years. Plans and schemes don't work so well when the planners and schemers are replaced by men with a different agenda.

I don't necessarily disagree with any of that. Furthermore it doesn't help when the suppliers are unable to deliver the kit on time and at cost AND when there's an economic crisis roughly once every 5 years made worse by an underperforming economy.

I love it when a plan comes together. I guess the Argosy was an unplanned pregnancy resulting from some unauthorized jiggery-pokey.

In this case the jiggery pokery was the change of strategy following the 1957 Defence Review.

At the time of the review the UK had armed forces of about 750,000 personnel (about 370,000 Army, 270,000 RAF and 120,000 RN) and the UK was spending about 10% of its GNP on its armed forces. Rightly or wrongly the British Government decided that it couldn't afford to maintain defence spending at that level.

Duncan Sands had the Army cut to an all-professional force of about 180,000 by 1962, but made it more mobile to increase it's effectiveness. That's the reason why the RAF's transport force was expanded (including the purchase of the Argosys) while the fighter, ground attack and maritime patrol forces were cut back drastically. The reason why the Argosy looks like "an unplanned pregnancy" is because there is a 7-year gap (1957-64) in my research.

 

[Riain]

In this case the jiggery pokery was the change of strategy following the 1957 Defence Review.

Even without the knock to confidence of Suez and rapid decolonisation the British (and Australia, but I don't know how much the two can be separated at the time) were coming to the conclusion that a massive WW3 was becoming unlikely due to nuclear weapons and the future of warfare would be 'limited war'. If Sandys had not declared manned aircraft obsolete the British armed forces would still have been reformed to do without conscription and fight these limited wars.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Beverley and Argosy to 1964 IOTL
Plans to 1957

In the early 1950s a force of 24 V.1000 (in 3 squadrons of 8 aircraft) and 32 Beverleys in (4 squadrons of 8 aircraft) was proposed to fly out one Army division to the Far East in one month. The total number of aircraft required to maintain the front-line of 32 Beverleys fluctuated between 50 and 54 aircraft.

The Radical Defence Review of 1954 cut the Beverley force from 32 aircraft in 4 squadrons to 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons. However, the total number of Beverleys to be built was increased from 50 in the February 1953 version of Plan K (when a front line of 32 aircraft in 4 squadrons was still planned) to 52 in the January 1955 version of Plan L (which is the first plan I have that shows a projected front line of 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons).

The planned front-line remained at 24 Beverleys in 3 squadrons in the January and September 1957 versions of Plan L. However, the total number of Beverleys required had decreased to 46. In the end 47 Beverley C Mk 1 aircraft were actually built.

In the RAF squadron pattern documents I have seen the intention up to and including the January 1957 version of Plan L was to deploy all the Beverley squadrons in the UK under Transport Command. That version of Plan L covered the period to 31st March 1963, when there were to be 24 Beverleys in 3 squadrons of 8 in Transport Command.

That changed in the September 1957 version of Plan L. Under that plan a mixed MRT/Heavy Freighter squadron with 6 Hastings and 4 Beverleys was to be based in the Arabian Peninsular. The squadron was to be formed between 1st October 1957 and 31st March 1958. The squadron was to be at half-strength with 6 Hastings on 31st December 1957 and be at full strength with 6 Hastings and 4 Beverleys by 31st March 1958. To compensate the Beverley force in RAF Transport Command was to be reduced from 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons of 8 aircraft on 31st December 1958 to 20 in 2 squadrons of 10 aircraft on 31st March 1958.

Under the September 1957 version of Plan L the total MRT/Heavy Freighter force of the RAF on 31st March 1963 was to consist of 68 aircraft (24 Bevereleys and 44 Hastings) in 7 squadrons deployed as follows:

Transport Command 36 aircraft in 4 squadrons

20 Beverleys in 2 squadrons
16 Hastings in 2 squadrons​

Near East Air Force

10 Hastings in one squadron​

Air Forces Middle East 10 aircraft in one mixed squadron

6 Hastings in half a squadron
4 Beverleys in half a squadron​

Far East Air Force

12 Hastings in one squadron​

There were to be no Argosys and no Valettas.

What Actually Happened

The reality was somewhat different. 4 RAF squadrons were equipped with the Beverley as follow:

• No. 47 Squadron in Transport Command converted from the Hastings to the Beverley in March 1956;
• No. 53 Squadron in Transport Command converted from the Hasting to the Beverley in October 1956. It remained in Transport Command until 30th June 1963 when it was disbanded. The squadron was reformed on 1st January 1966 as the first (and only) Belfast squadron;
• No. 30 Squadron in Transport Command converted from the Valetta to the Beverley in April 1957. It was transferred to Air Forces Middle East in November 1959. It was based at RAF Eastleigh in Kenya until October 1964 when it moved to RAF Muharraq in Bahrein.
• No. 84 Squadron in MEAF converted from the Valetta to the Beverley in May 1958. This was an all Beverley unit rather than the mixed squadron of Beverleys and Hastings projected in the September 1957 version of Plan L;
• No. 34 Squadron (formerly a Hunter squadron that had disbanded on 15th January 1958) was reformed with Beverleys in FEAF on 15th January 1960.

Although there is no mention of the Argosy in RAF plans up to September 1957 the Service bought 56 of them and they equipped 6 transport squadrons as follows:

• No. 114 Squadron in Transport Command converted from Hastings to the Argosy in October 1961. This squadron had only been in existence as a Hastings squadron since April 1959. It had briefly existed as the only Chipmunk squadron from November 1958 to March 1959. Before that it had been a transport squadron in MEAF operating Dakotas and then Valettas from August 1947 to December 1957;
• No. 105 Squadron (formerly a Mosquito squadron disbanded in February 1946) was reformed with the Argosy in AFME on 21st February 1962;
• No. 267 Squadron (formerly a Pioneer squadron disbanded in November 1958) was reformed with the Argosy in Transport Command on 1st November 1962;
• No. 215 Squadron (formerly a Pioneer squadron disbanded in September 1959) was reformed with the Argosy in FEAF on 1st May 1963;
• No. 70 Squadron in FEAF converted from the Hastings to the Argosy in October 1967.

However, this force of 5 squadrons only lasted for a few months because No. 215 Squadron disbanded on 31st December 1957 and No. 105 Squadron disbanded on 1st February 1968.

The RAF's MRT force at 31st March 1963 was rather larger than the force planned for that date in September 1957. Instead of the 68 aircraft in 7 squadrons (3 Beverley and 4 Hastings) there were actually 14 (4 Argosy, 5 Beverley, 4 Hastings and one Valetta), but I don't know the number of aircraft per squadron. However, a year later (on 31st March 1964) I do know that there were 130 MRT aircraft (48 Argosy, 28 Beverley, 48 Hastings and 6 Valetta) in 13 squadrons (4 Argosy, 4 Beverley, 4 Hastings and one Valetta).

When expressed by type the MRT force of 130 aircraft in 13 squadrons consisted of:

The 48 Argosys in 4 squadrons (Nos. 105, 114, 215 and 267) deployed as follows:

24 in 2 squadrons (Nos. 114 and 267) in Transport Command
14 in one squadron (No. 105) in AFME
10 in one squadron (No 215) in FEAF​

The 28 Beverleys in 4 squadrons (Nos. 30, 34, 46, and 84) deployed as follows:

8 in one squadron (No. 47) in Transport Command
12 in 2 squadrons (Nos. 30 and 84) AFME
8 in one squadron (No. 34) in FEAF​

The 48 Hastings in 4 squadrons (Nos. 24, 36, 48 and 70) deployed as follows:

30 in 2 squadrons (Nos. 24 and 36) in Transport Command
6 in one squadron (No. 70) in NEAF
12 in one squadron (No. 48) in FEAF​

The 6 Valettas in one squadron (No. 52) were in FEAF with a UE of 6 aircraft.​

When expressed by RAF command the MRT force of 130 aircraft in 13 squadrons consisted of:

Transport Command had 62 aircraft 5 squadrons, that is:

24 Argosies in 2 squadrons (Nos. 114 and 267)
8 Beverleys in one squadron (No. 47)
30 Hastings in 2 squadrons (Nos. 30 and 36)​

Near East Air Force (formerly AHQ Levant) had 6 aircraft in one squadron, that is:

6 Hastings in one squadron (No. 70)​

Air Forces Middle East (formerly British Forces Arabian Peninsular) had 26 aircraft in 3 squadrons, that is:

14 Argosies in one squadron (No. 105)
12 Beverleys in 2 squadrons (Nos. 30 and 84)​

Far East Air Force - 36 aircraft in 4 squadrons

10 Argosies in one squadron (No. 215)
8 Beverleys in one squadron (No. 34)
12 Hastings in one squadron (No. 48)
6 Valettas in one squadron (No. 52)​

I wrote all that to compare it against this:

The Short Bermuda to 1964 (Replaced by Post 97)

ITTL the Air Ministry stuck to its early 1950s plan to buy 42 V.1000s to support a front-line of 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons of 8. It was named the Cardiff a name which followed the RAF's tradition of naming its bombers, maritime patrol aircraft and transports after towns and cities in the UK and Commonwealth. The Cardiff C Mk 1 entered service at the same time as the 20 Britannia C Mk 1 aircraft of OTL. IOTL the Ministry of Supply bought 3 Britannia C Mk 2 aircraft which later joined the RAF brining its total up to 23. ITTL the MoS bought 3 Cardiff C Mk 2 which later joined the RAF, which brought the total number of first-generation V.1000s operated by the RAF up to 45.

The 45 VC.7 C Mk 1/2 aircraft equipped 3 RAF squadrons. That is the 2 OTL Britannia squadrons (Nos. 99 and 511) and it replaced the Comet C.2s and T.2s in No. 216 Squadron. ITTL the redundant Comets were passed on to the communications squadrons and the RAF might still have bought 5 Comet C Mk 4 in the 1960s to replace them.

Meanwhile (sometime between 1947 and 1952) the Operational Requirements Branch of the Air Staff decided that a tactical transport powered by 4 Proteus engines with much better performance (take-off and landing distances, cruising speed, range and payload) than the Beverley could be delivered in the same timescale. For the sake of argument the winner was a Proteus powered version of @Just Leo's Shorts Bermuda. (However, as Beverley was a town in Yorkshire, I'd prefer to have it named after another Yorkshire town like Ripon.)

54 Shorts Bermuda C Mk 1 were built for the RAF. They initially equipped 4 squadrons (Nos. 30, 47, 53 and 84) which became operational on the type between March 1956 and May 1958. Each squadron had a U.E. of 8 aircraft so the total U.E. was 32 aircraft.

The Bermuda C Mk 1 also performed better than the C-130A Hercules which led to the RAAF buying 12 of them instead of the 12 C-130A that they acquired IOTL. That brought the total built up to 66.

ITTL Vickers was too busy building VC.7s to design and build the Vanguard. Therefore Bristol won the BEA and TCA contracts by default with a Type powered Britannia. Bristol and Shorts also proposed a Tyne powered version of the Bermuda and the first of these might have been the 17 civil Bermudas built by Shorts instead of the 17 civil Argosys of OTL. They brought the total number of Bermudas built up to 83.

The RAF also bought 56 Bermuda C Mk 2 powered by Tyne engines instead of the 56 Argosies of OTL. That brought the total bought by the RAF up to 110 and the grand total up to 139. I think the RAAF would have bought 12 Bermuda C Mk 2 instead of the 12 C-130E Hercules they bought IOTL and the RNZAF 5 instead of the 5 C-130H that they bought to replace the Hastings operated by No. 40 Squadron, RNAF. That would bring the total up to 156. IOTL the SAAF bought 7 C-130B in the early 1960s before the arms embargo was imposed and took delivery of 9 C-160 Transalls in the late 1960s. ITTL it would have bought 7 Beverley C Mk 2 in place of the C-130Bs and would have preferred to buy 9 more in place of the Transalls. That brings the total built up to 163-172.

On 31st March 1964 the RAF's Medium Range Transport Force of OTL had 130 aircraft (48 Argosy, 28 Beverley, 48 Hastings and 6 Valetta) in 13 squadrons (4 Argosy, 4 Beverley, 4 Hastings and one Valetta). ITTL there would have only been 119 aircraft (48 Bermuda Mk 1, 48 Bermuda Mk 2 and 23 Hastings) in 14 squadrons as follows:
Transport Command had 55 aircraft in 6 squadrons instead of 62 aircraft in 5 squadrons:

24 Bermuda C Mk 2 in 3 squadrons (Nos. 36, 114 and 267)
16 Bermuda C Mk 1 in 2 squadrons (Nos. 24 and 47)
15 Hastings in one squadron (No. 53)​

Near East Air Force had 6 aircraft in one squadron

8 Hastings in one squadron (No. 70)​

Air Forces Middle East had 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons instead of 26 aircraft in 3 squadrons

8 Bermuda C Mk 2 in one squadron (No. 105)
16 Bermuda C Mk 1 in 2 squadrons (Nos. 30 and 84)​

Far East Air Force had 32 aircraft in 4 squadrons instead of 36 aircraft in 4 squadrons:

8 Bermuda C Mk 2 in one squadron (No. 215)
24 Bermuda C Mk 1 in 3 squadrons (Nos. 34, 48 and 52)​

Although this is 11 aircraft fewer than the total of OTL the 96 Bermudas of TTL should be able to carry a larger payload, further and faster than the 107 aircraft (48 Argosies, 28 Beverleys, 25 Hastings and 6 Valettas) that existed IOTL.

The RAF planned to recondition its Bermuda C Mk 1 and C Mk 2 to extend their airframe lives until at least 1975. However, the 110 aircraft (54 Mk 1 and 56 Mk 2) so far delivered did not provide enough backing to maintain a front-line of 96 aircraft (and a second-line that included 12 aircraft in an OCU) until then. IOTL 7 HS 681 (one prototype and 6 production aircraft) and 37 Andovers (31 C Mk 2 and 6 CC Mk 2) were on order. ITTL 38 Bermuda C Mk 3 with more powerful Tyne engines were on order instead of the 31 Andover C Mk 1 and 7 HS 681s. 8 of these aircraft were to replace the 8 Hastings in No. 70 Squadron and the other 30 were to provide the backing required to maintain a front-line of 104 Bermudas in 13 squadrons of 8 (and an OCU with 12 aircraft) until 1975. The Hastings in No. 53 Squadron were scheduled to be replaced by the Short Glasgow C Mk 1 strategic transport in 1966.

Shorts built up to 210 Bermudas ITTL plus prototypes from the middle of the 1950s to the end of the 1960s. That is 148 for the RAF (54 Mk 1, 56 Mk 2 and 38 Mk 3); 45 for export (24 RAAF, 5 RNZAF and 16 SAAF) and 17 civil sales. Edit I forgot to add that IOTL Canadair had a licence on the Britannia, which it used to build 33 Argus maritime patrol aircraft and 40 Tyne powered CL-44s. ITTL there is a good chance that the RCAF would buy Canadair built Bermudas powered by Tyne engines instead of the C-130s that it bought IOTL.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For your delectation this is a summary of the RAF's projected front line from 31st March 1964 to 31st March 1975 at March 1964. Source the Plan P Squadron Patterns.

 

[PMN1]

How about what if instead of the OTL Beverley and Argosy designs the RAF gets an aircraft equivalent to the OTL Blackburn B.107?

Not the clamshell door version but the one that looks more like what transport aircraft became and with a wing only as thick as it need to be.

 

[Riain]

Given the state of the British economy I don't think developing new aircraft is even close to a solution for Britain's transport aircraft problems. Indeed I'd suggest that there were too many designs and the requirements were unrealistically tough for the stated aims of the Government.

NMBR4/NMBR22 VTOL transport requirement arose from the need to support NMBR3 VTOL strike aircraft doing dispersed operations away from airfields and lead to the AW681 with vectored thrust and BLC flaps and leading edges, the BAC 222 Tyne Hercules with BLC/blown flaps and BAC 208 with thrust vectoring and lift engines. Once the P1154 wasn't selected as the sole winner of NBMR3a the British should have dropped it and the supporting NBMR4/22 like hot spuds to focus immediately on the NBMR3b subsonic light attack requirement that the P1127 was perfect for, without the transport backup. This would have left Britain free to concentrate on more conventional transport aircraft, at much lower cost and much greater scope for large fleets able to be amortised over long periods.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As I understand it the requirement was for 30 but the sterling crisis of 1965 caused the initial order to be reduced to 10. Given Shorts had calculated 30 as the break even point that makes sense.

In Feb the same year the (expensive ) AW/HS681 development was cancelled and the Hercules was selected under some controversy to (not) meet the OR 351.

Edit: How does the Sterling crisis 1964-67 effect buying aircraft? Does it become more important to buy home made aircraft, or does the bad exchange rate make buying US aircraft particularly attractive?

I thought the Sterling Crisis was in the aftermath of the Six Day War of 1967 and the closing of the Suez Canal. That must have contributed to the cost increases that led to the cancellation of the F-111K. It probably contributed to the cost increases in the Spey-Phantom. Some of the Phantoms ordered were also cancelled. However, none of the Hercules that got as far as receiving serial numbers were cancelled. In fact after the initial 48 ordered in 1965 another 18 were ordered later. However, I don't know if more were planned, but not ordered because of the Sterling Crisis.

The 67 Sterling crisis was the straw that broke the camels back and lead to devaluation, the break up of the sterling area when Australia (and I imagine others) didn't devalue their pound(s) as well and the acceleration of the withdrawal East of Suez.

But there was another sterling crisis in late 64 where devaluation might and perhaps should have occurred but didn't for various political reasons, including a belief in a world role. However in 1965 Britain cancelled the AW681 and P1154 in Feb, the TSR2 in April, raised taxes and then secured a $1.4 billion loan from the IMF July. I don't know exactly when the plan for 30 Belfasts was dropped to an order for 10, but I'm pretty sure it was in this timeframe, the Herc order was placed somewhere in 1965 as well.

I can't help but think a reasonable course of action could be to buy 30 domestically produced Belfasts with pounds and retain the Argosy for a few more years until the sterling crisis had passed; after all, accepting the Herc meant abandoning the VTOL requirement that drove NMBR4-OR351 in the first place.

The Stirling crisis had been brewing for years certainly before Wilson was elected, there was a school of thought that Wilson should have bitten that particular bullet when he was elected but didn't for a mix of reasons including internal Labour politics and worries about giving the Tories more ammunition. There was a surprisingly fascinating program on BBC R4 a few weeks ago that discussed these issues, normally I avoid economics but this was quite interesting.

I think a more powerful Belfast was mooted as a tactical aircraft, but I think it would be better to ditch the 3 tier transport aircraft model for a 2 tier model.

I think the best way to react to the 64-65 Sterling crisis would be to ditch the entire NBMR22 requirement when the AW681 is cancelled and expand the Belfast buy. Then extend the Argosy fleet out for a few years while organising something to cover the tactical spectrum as the RAF would have a surfeit of heavy lift, I suggest the G222 or DHC5 Buffalo with good STOL characteristics.

The Argosy fascinates me from a procurement and fleet management perspective. I still think the best thing from Britain too do from 1964 with the Sterling crisis would be:

• defer the NMBR22 requirement
• build 30 Belfasts to replace the Beverlys and Hastings'
• retain the Argosys until 1970 or so
• replace the Argosy with something like the Buffalo, G222 or maybe the C160 if bigger is better

I think that's all the posts that refer to the Sterling Crisis.

AFAIK in the period 1945-70 HM Treasury wasn't as hostile to the British aviation industry as is often thought because it earned foreign currency. There's also the, "Jobs for British workers," argument. BAC, Hawker Siddeley and Rolls Royce paid British corporation tax. Their employees paid British income tax. Boeing, Pratt & Whitney and their employees paid the American equivalents of these taxes.

E.g. in the late 1960s BEA wanted to buy some Boeing 727s and 737s, but because HM Treasury didn't want to spend the Dollars it made BEA buy 26 Trident 3s (plus an option on 10) and 18 BAC-111-500s (plus an option on 6) but paid the airline compensation for forcing it to buy British.

I don't have the evidence to back it up, but I suspect that Sea Dart was developed because the Treasury wouldn't let the Royal Navy buy Tatar. I also suspect that the Treasury mandarins were very unhappy about the failure of the Avro Tudor and the subsequent purchase of Boeing Stratocruisers and Lockheed Constellations. I suspect that BOAC purchase of Canadian Canadair DC-4Ms instead of more American airliners was because the Treasury had more Canadian Dollars than American Dollars. Similarly I think the Treasury officials were rather upset when BOAC decided that it wanted to buy 15 Boeing 707s instead of 15 VC.7s in the 1950s and then in the 1960s reduced its VC.10 order from 45 to 29 in favour of more Boeing 707s (even if 19 of the 31 Boeing 707s eventually bought by BOAC had British RR Conway engines). Finally I suspect that it wanted the FAA to buy the P.1154RN rather than the Phantom, which (AFAIK) the RN wanted in the first place. I also suspect that once both versions of the P.1154 were cancelled it tried to have the British content of the F-4K and M maximised to reduce the Dollar spend. However, that backfired on them because it increased the absolute cost.

The OP is that the VC.7 wasn't cancelled and that several hundred airliner versions were sold, which would have improved the British balance of payments in the 1960s. The extra tax paid by Vickers/BAC, Rolls Royce and their employees would have helped to pay the for the VC.7s and Shorts Bermudas bought for the RAF to 1964 ITTL, which would have cost more to buy than Andovers, Argosys, Beverleys and Britannias purchased IOTL.

It's not in the OP, but I would have thought (probably naively) that if BOAC had bought the VC.7 then BEA would have ordered the Big Trident powered by Medway engines which would have sold better against the Boeing 727 than the Small Trident powered by Spey engines IOTL. That would have had the knock on effect of the BAC-111 having Medways instead of Speys enabling it to compete more successfully against the Boeing 737 and DC-9. That would have helped the balance of payments too. The extra tax revenue would have provided HMG with some useful "pocket money."

It's beyond the scope of the OP to avoid the cancellation of the P.1154 and TSR.2 in favour of the Phantom and F-111. However, 148 of @Just Leo's Short Bermudas have been built for the RAF instead of the 47 Beverley, 56 Argosy, 7 (cancelled) HS 681s and 31 Andover C Mk 1s so there is no need to buy 66 C-130K Hercules. I suspect that the money saved on the Hercules would have been used to pay for the 53 Phantoms that were cancelled and delay the cancellation of the F-111K.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Belfast was also very slow compared to its contemporaries earning the nickname Belslow in RAF service.

Yes, but it was faster than its contemporaries in one way.

The Belfast had a wider and deeper freight hold than the C-130 and C-141. The extra headroom meant it could accommodate the RAF's helicopters without removing the rotors. The time saved from not having to remove them before loading and putting them back on afterwards more than made up for the aircraft's slower cruising speed.

Had either of them been built it looks as if the BAC.222 and HS.681 would have had wider and deeper freight holds than the C-130 and C-141 too. The following page on Secret Projects mentions that OR.351 specified a 10ft x 10ft x 40ft length freight-hold and that in consequence the BAC.222 would have had a longer and deeper fuselage than the C-130E upon which it was based. https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=555.0

The SC.5/45 which Shorts proposed to meet AST 364 for a Britannia replacement would have had a wider and deeper freight hold than the C-130 and C-141 because it was a development of the Belfast with new wings, a new tail and RB.178 jet engines replacing the Tynes.

As they were based on the Belfast @Just Leo's Short Bermuda would also have had a wider and deeper cargo bay than the Hercules.

 

[Crowbar Six]

Oh it had a very useful hold which is why they survived for so long with Heavilift, the MoD leased them on multiple occasions for all sort of tasks including the Falklands and iirc GW1.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Oh it had a very useful hold which is why they survived for so long with Heavilift, the MoD leased them on multiple occasions for all sort of tasks including the Falklands and iirc GW1.

But not as useful as this...

https://www.bing.com/images/search?...ectedIndex=15&qpvt=THUNDERBIRD+TWO&ajaxhist=0

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Strategic Transports to 1964 IOTL

In the early 1950s the RAF planned to buy 42 V.1000s which were scheduled to be delivered by 31st March 1958 when the aircraft would equip 3 squadrons with 8 aircraft each.

This was cut to 12 aircraft to equip one squadron of 8 V.1000s as part of the 1954 Defence Review. The January 1955 version of the Plan L squadron patterns shows a strategic transport force of 14 aircraft in 2 squadrons on 31st March 1960. That is 8 V.1000s in one squadron and 6 Comet 2s in the second squadron. The aircraft requirements section showed 7 Comets by March 1957 and 12 V.1000s by March 1960.

However, later in 1955 the V.1000 was cancelled altogether and replaced by plans to acquired 20 Britannias, which would equip 2 squadrons of 8 aircraft.

The January 1957 version of the Plan L squadron patterns show a strategic transport force of 22 aircraft in 3 squadrons at 31st March 1960. That is 16 Britannias in 2 squadrons of 8 and 6 Comet 2s in a single squadron. At 31st March 1963 there would still be 16 Britannias in 2 squadrons of 8, but the Comet squadron was to be disbanded between 31st December 1960 and 31st March 1961. The aircraft requirements section showed 13 Comets (8 C Mk 2 and 2 T Mk 2 for Transport Command and 3 R Mk 2 for elint) by March 1958 and 20 Britannias by March 1961.

The September 1957 version of the Plan L squadron patters show a slightly larger strategic transport force. The number of Britannias at 31st March 1960 and 31st March 1963 was the same as in the January 1957 version, i.e. 16 Britannias in 2 squadrons of 8. However, there would be 8 rather than 6 Comets in one squadron on 31st March 1960 which instead of disbanding in the first quarter of 1961 would be retained until 31st March 1963 with its Unit Equipment reduced from 8 aircraft to 6 by attrition. The aircraft requirements section still showed 20 Britannias but deliveries were to be completed by 31st March 1960 instead of 31st March 1961. The 13 of Comets were still to be delivered by March 1958.

In the end 23 Britannias and 15 Comets were bought for RAF Transport Command. 20 Britannia C Mk 1 aircraft were bought for the RAF as planned, but the Ministry of Supply also bought 3 Britannia C Mk 2 aircraft which later joined the RAF, brining its total up to 23. The RAF also bought an attrition batch 5 Comet C Mk 4 aircraft which entered service in 1962.

Three strategic transport squadrons were formed as follows:

• No. 216 Squadron exchanged its Valettas for Comets in June 1956.
• No. 99 Squadron exchanged its Hastings for Britannias in June 1959.
• No. 511 Squadron with Hastings disbanded in September 1958 became the second Britannia squadron when it reformed in December 1959.

On 31st March 1964 the RAF actually had 34 strategic transport aircraft in 3 squadrons. That is 23 Britannias (20 C Mk 1 and 3 C Mk 2) in 2 squadrons (Nos. 99 and 511) and 11 Comets (6 Mk 2 and 5 Mk 4) in No. 216 Squadron.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Strategic Transports to 1964 ITTL

ITTL the RAF still acquired 13 Comet 2s in the middle of the 1950s and still used 10 of them to convert No. 216 Squadron from Valettas to Comets in June 1956.

However, it also stuck to the plan to buy 42 V.1000s instead of reducing the planned order to 12 aircraft in 1954 and then cancelling the type altogether in 1955 in favour of 20 Britannia C. Mk 1s.

A grand total of 50 V.1000s were acquired by the RAF. IOTL the Ministry of Supply ordered 3 Britannia C Mk 3 aircraft, which later joined the RAF. ITTL the Ministry of Supply ordered 3 V.1000s, which later joined the RAF. IOTL the RAF ordered 5 Comet C Mk 4 aircraft as an attrition batch for No. 216 Squadron which entered service in 1962. ITTL the RAF ordered 5 additional V.1000s. All 50 aircraft were fitted with Rolls Royce Conway engines producing 20,000lbs thrust.

In 1955 the V.1000 was named the Cardiff. This followed the tradition of naming the RAF's bombers, maritime patrol and transport aircraft after towns and cities in the UK and Commonwealth.

The RAF formed 5 Cardiff squadrons with 8 aircraft each between 1959 and 1962 as follows:

• No. 99 Squadron converted from the Hastings to the Cardiff in June 1959;
• No. 511 Squadron reformed on Cardiffs in December 1959;
• No. 53 Squadron converted from the Hastings to the Cardiff in the middle of 1960;
• No. 297 reformed on Cardiffs at the end of 1960. However, No. 10 Squadron in Bomber Command was disbanded on 1st March 1964 and No. 297 was renamed No. 10 Squadron the same day;
• No. 216 Squadron converted from the Comet C Mk 2 to the Cardiff in 1962.

Thus there were 40 Cardiff C. Mk 1 aircraft in 5 squadrons (Nos. 10, 53, 99, 216 and 511) in RAF Transport Command on 31st March 1964 instead of 23 Britannias in 2 squadrons (Nos. 99 and 511) and 11 Comets in one squadron (No. 216). Furthermore some of the 10 remaining aircraft were formed into a training flight and the rest formed a reserve to cover major overhauls and attrition so that the 5 squadrons could be kept at full strength. Whereas the Britannia and Comet aircrew had to do their conversion training "on the job" in the operational squadrons and there was no reserve to maintain the squadrons at full strength.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Short Bermuda to 1964 (Revision of Post 87)
The Bermuda in RAF Service

Sometime between 1947 and 1952 ITTL the Operational Requirements Branch of the Air Staff decided that a tactical transport powered by 4 Proteus engines with much better performance (take-off and landing distances, cruising speed, range and payload) than the Beverley could be delivered in the same timescale. For the sake of argument the winner was a Proteus powered version of @Just Leo's Shorts Bermuda. (However, as Beverley was a town in Yorkshire, I'd prefer to have it named after another Yorkshire town like Ripon.)

54 Shorts Bermuda C Mk 1 were built for the RAF. They initially equipped 4 squadrons (Nos. 30, 34, 47 and 84) which became operational on the type between March 1956 and May 1958. Each squadron had a U.E. of 8 aircraft so the total U.E. was 32 aircraft.

ITTL Vickers was too busy building VC.7s to design and build the Vanguard. Therefore Bristol won the BEA and TCA contracts by default with a Type powered Britannia.

Bristol and Shorts also proposed a Tyne powered version of the Bermuda and the first of these might have been the 17 civil Bermudas built by Shorts instead of the 17 civil Argosys of OTL. They brought the total number of Bermudas built up to 71.

The RAF also bought 56 Bermuda C Mk 2 powered by Tyne engines instead of the 56 Argosies of OTL. That brought the total bought by the RAF up to 110 and the grand total up to 127.

On 31st March 1964 IOTL the RAF's Medium Range Transport Force had 130 aircraft (48 Argosy, 28 Beverley, 48 Hastings and 6 Valetta) in 13 squadrons:

Transport Command had 62 aircraft 5 squadrons, that is:

24 Argosies in 2 squadrons (Nos. 114 and 267)
8 Beverleys in one squadron (No. 47)
30 Hastings in 2 squadrons (Nos. 24 and 36)​

Near East Air Force (formerly AHQ Levant) had 6 aircraft in one squadron, that is:

6 Hastings in one squadron (No. 70)​

Air Forces Middle East (formerly British Forces Arabian Peninsular) had 26 aircraft in 3 squadrons, that is:

14 Argosies in one squadron (No. 105)
12 Beverleys in 2 squadrons (Nos. 30 and 84)​

Far East Air Force - 36 aircraft in 4 squadrons

10 Argosies in one squadron (No. 215)
8 Beverleys in one squadron (No. 34)
12 Hastings in one squadron (No. 48)
6 Valettas in one squadron (No. 52)​

On 31st March 1964 ITTL the RAF's Medium Range Transport Force had 104 aircraft (48 Bermuda Mk 1, 48 Bermuda Mk 2 and 8 Hastings) in 13 squadrons as follows:

Transport Command had 40 aircraft in 5 squadrons:

40 Bermudas in 5 squadrons (Nos. 24, 36, 47, 114 and 267)​

Near East Air Force had 8 aircraft in one squadron:

8 Hastings in one squadron (No. 70)​

Air Forces Middle East had 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons:

24 Bermudas in 3 squadron (Nos. 30, 84 and 105)​

Far East Air Force had 32 aircraft in 4 squadrons:

32 Bermudas in 4 squadrons (Nos. 34, 48, 52 and 215)​

Although there were 20% fewer MRT aircraft ITTL than OTL they could carry more passengers and freight further and faster than the OTL force.

The Bermuda C Mk 1 and C Mk 2 had airframes that would last until 1975 and with reconditioning would last even longer. However, the 110 aircraft (54 Mk 1 and 56 Mk 2) so far delivered did not provide enough backing to maintain a front-line of 96 aircraft (and a second-line that included 12 aircraft in an OCU) until 1975.

Therefore 38 Bermuda C. Mk 3 with more powerful Tyne engines were on order to replace the 8 Hastings in No. 70 Squadron and provide the backing required to maintain a front-line of 104 Bermudas in 13 squadrons of 8 (and an OCU with 12 aircraft) until 1975. These aircraft took the place of the 7 HS 681 (one prototype and 6 production aircraft) and 31 Andover C Mk 1 aircraft that were on order IOTL.

The 38 Bermuda C. Mk 3 brought the total number of Bermudas built for the RAF up to 148, which with the 17 civil aircraft brought the total built up to 165.

Bermuda Exports

73 Bermudas were exported to the end of the 1960s as follows:

• 12 Bermuda C. Mk 1 were purchased by the RAAF instead of the 12 C-130A that they acquired IOTL.
• 12 Bermuda C. Mk 3 were purchased by the RAAF instead of the 12 C-130E Hercules they bought IOTL.
• 28 Bermudas (4 Mk 2 delivered in 1960 and 24 Mk 3 delivered 1964-68) were purchased by the RCAF instead of the 4 C-130B and 24 C-130E they acquired IOTL.
• 16 Bermudas (7 C. Mk 2 and 9 C Mk. 3) were purchased by the SAAF in place of the 7 C-130B Hercules and 9 C-160 Transalls they acquired IOTL.
• 5 Bermuda C. Mk 3 were purchased by the RNZAF instead of the 5 C-130H they acquired IOTL.

This brought the number of Bermudas built upto 238 plus prototypes.

Reason for Revision

This requires a revision because I had written in that post that the RAF had 24 V.1000s in 3 squadrons (Nos. 99, 216 and 511) with 8 aircraft each on 31st March 1964. However, I changed this in Post 96 to 40 V.1000s in 5 squadrons (Nos. 10, 53, 99, 216 and 511) with 8 aircraft each on that date. In Post 87 No. 53 Squadrons was a MRT squadron equipped with 15 Hastings at the end of March 1964 and was scheduled to remain one until 1966.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

View attachment 361795
British procurement policy wasn't always just right. Transall C.160 might have come with considerable benefits for industry vs Hercules. A slightly biased Belfast specification could very well have turned into a better Hercules, maybe. A tactical Belfast vs a strategic Belfast. Can a strategic transport do it on the dirt?

According to the Putnams on Short aircraft the company's entry to OR.351 was the S.C.5/21 (P.D.47) which was...

...a Belfast with blown flaps and control surfaces, giving V/STOL capability equivalent to that of the Breguet 941, for which Shorts later acquired the British agency and offered as P.D.71. The air for boundary-layer control in the SC.5/21 was supplied from a removable pack of three lightweight Rolls Royce turbocompressors installed in a fairing behind the centre-plane box-spar; the main landing-gear would have had 12-wheel bogies to permit take-off fro grass. As a tactical freighter, the S.C.5/21 would have been somewhat larger than its rivals in the O.R.351 competition, which was won by the Hawker Siddeley HS.681 with vectored-lift engines, only to be cancelled in 1965 after a substantial share of the sub-contract world had been allocated to Queen's Island.

 

[Riain]

The British went from deciding manned aircraft were obsolete to deciding that they shouldn't use runways, thus making the job of developing them extra hard (read: expensive).

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The British went from deciding manned aircraft were obsolete to deciding that they shouldn't use runways, thus making the job of developing them extra hard (read: expensive).

If that's a comment what I wrote in Post No. 99 I don't see the relevance.

In any case the British didn't decide that manned aircraft were obsolete. Instead it was decided that they needed fewer fighters and that the types they already had were adequate for the new "East of Suez" strategy.

• Yes they did cut back the number of fighters drastically. There were 1,058 in 69 squadrons at the end of 1956 (not counting the 160 in 20 RAuxAF squadrons) which was reduced to 255 in 20 squadrons at the end of March 1964.
• Yes the number of maritime reconnaissance aircraft was cut back by about half from 134 in 18 squadrons at the end of 1956 to 65 in 11 squadrons at the end of March 1964.
• However, the number of bombers and photographic reconnaissance aircraft only declined from 373 in 36 squadrons to 286 in 34 squadrons and that was offset because there were 138 medium bombers in 17 squadrons instead of 48 in 6 squadrons.

According to Freidman in the late 1940s the British chiefs of staff decided that the UK had to be prepared to fight 3 types of war.

1. Cold Wars - low intensity guerrilla wars like Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and the Indonesian Confrontation;
2. Warm Wars - high intensity regional wars like Korea, Suez and the Falklands;
3. Hot Wars - high intensity global war against the Soviet Union and its allies - i.e. World War III. In the late 1940s they calculated that the USSR would have enough atom bombs to deter an American first strike in 1957 which became known was the "Year of Maximum Danger."

This is an extract from a post I wrote about the Supermarine Scimitar for a discussion group called British Empire and Commonwealth Forces (BEC Forces for short) in 2003.

There was another Defence Review in 1957. The USSR hadn't started World War III and the prospect of a full-scale world war was becoming increasingly unlikely because of nuclear deterrence. Therefore there was little point in spending huge amounts of money to maintain the standing forces and reserves needed to fight a war that was unlikely to happen. And the British economy was unable to continue supporting armed forces of that size in the first place.

The armed forces were restructured to fight guerrilla wars in the Third World, which became known as the "East of Suez" strategy.

Furthermore had World War III broken out it would probably have gone nuclear before the reserves could have been mobilised.

The UK gave up the capability to fight a conventional Hot War in the 1954 and 1957 Defence Reviews.

• The Royal Navy lost most of the Reserve Fleet which was being maintained to fight the next Battle of the Atlantic.
• The Army lost Anti-Aircraft Command, the peacetime strength BAOR was reduced from 85,000 men to 55,000 men and plans to reinforce BAOR with up to 10 TA divisions in wartime were abandoned.
• Fighter Command was cut back from 544 fighters in 35 squadrons (not counting the 160 fighters in the 20 RAuxAF squadrons) at the end of 1956 to 102 in 9 squadrons (88 in 7 interceptor squadrons in Fighter Command and 24 in 2 ground attack squadrons in Transport Command) at the end of March 1964. The remaining interceptors existed to protect Bomber Command's bases and to reinforce the RAF "East of Suez". The 2 GA squadrons were also for overseas reinforcement.
• RAF Germany was cut back from 466 aircraft in 33 squadrons at the end of 1956 to 138 aircraft in 12 squadrons (including a helicopter squadron of 12 aircraft) at the end of March 1964. This was mainly done by cutting the number of fighter squadrons from 330 aircraft in 23 squadrons to 32 in 2 squadrons. The residual fighter force existed to protect RAF Canberra interdictor force which had 48 aircraft in 3 squadrons at the end of 1956 and 48 aircraft in 4 squadrons at the end of March 1964. The number of reconnaissance aircraft (FR and PR) declined from 88 in 7 squadrons to 56 in 6 squadrons (including a squadron of 10 Canberras that was stationed in Malta in peaceitme) by the end of the period.

The number of fighters in the overseas commands (Malta, MEAF/NEAF/AFME and FEAF) was also reduced, but not as drastically as in Fighter Command and RAF Germany. Furthermore the quality of the remaining squadrons improved by re-equipping them with Hunters, Javelins and Lightnings surplus to the requirements of Fighter Command and RAF Germany and by Canberras that were being replaced by V-bombers in Bomber Command. These aircraft could bomb and strafe guerrillas just as well as an Avro 730, SR.177, Fairey Delta 2 and Hawker P.1121. In qualitative terms they were also adequate to fight a "warm war" against any potential adversary "East of Suez" until well into the 1960s.

However, I will admit that by 1964 the Air Staff thought the force of interceptors and ground attack aircraft had been cut back too far in terms of numbers. In January 1964 it wanted the number of GA and FR aircraft increased from 99 in 8 squadrons to 120 in 10 squadrons and felt it could justify a further increase to 144 in 12 squadrons. It also thought that the current plan to cut back the number of interceptors from 156 aircraft in 11 squadrons to 120 in 10 squadrons was a minimum force.