USN doctrine and action if carriers are lost instead of battleships in the PH raid?

The historic strike on Pearl Harbor left the USN relying on carriers to a great degree in the Pacific War, but what would the doctrine and plans look like in that war, if somehow the Japanese strike happened upon the majority of their carriers? Leaving the battleship number more or less intact.

Would carrier primacy still come into effect, by the end of the war?
 
Last edited:
Yes, in fact carriers had already proven themselves in the raid on Taranto, and in the sinking of Bismarck. Without carriers the US would've avoided major engagements until it had enough to stand up to the IJN.
 
Without their carriers it doesn't matter what USN doctrine says. The first time the Battleships try to engage the IJN out of the range of land based fighters they'll get sunk, just like Prince of Wales and Repulse.
 
The US Navy was already moving to the carrier as the primary strike arm of the fleet; witness the sheer number of carriers authorized under the Two-Ocean Navy Act - in 1940. (18 carriers versus seven battleships, as I recall) Losing the standing PacFleet carriers would delay things, as with only Yorktown, Hornet, and Wasp on hand the US Navy is not going to want to engage the Japanese if they can help it, but by 1943 they would be getting Essexes and working out the kinks in doctrine.
 
... Losing the standing PacFleet carriers would delay things, as with only Yorktown, Hornet, and Wasp on hand the US Navy is not going to want to engage the Japanese if they can help it, but by 1943 they would be getting Essexes and working out the kinks in doctrine.

Dial down the raids. Not contemplate the WATCHTOWER Operation. But most important, send more long range aircraft to the PTO.

... as with only Yorktown, Hornet, and Wasp on hand ...

Odds are the Saratoga would not yet be there. Tho the Sara was notable by it absence from the 1942 battles so it may not matter either way.
 
The historic strike on Pearl Harbor left the USN relying on carriers to a great degree in the Pacific War, but what would the doctrine and plans look like in that war, if somehow the Japanese strike happened upon the majority of their carriers? Leaving the battleship number more or less intact.

Would carrier primacy still come into effect, by the end of the war?

The Carriers will be sunk in shallow water and as long as they do not go the Oklahoma or Arizona way they are refloated ASAP and put into action around the time OTL Midway
 
The Carriers will be sunk in shallow water and as long as they do not go the Oklahoma or Arizona way they are refloated ASAP and put into action around the time OTL Midway
But, certainly, not in time for Midway? Seems much too quick...
 
The Carriers will be sunk in shallow water and as long as they do not go the Oklahoma or Arizona way they are refloated ASAP and put into action around the time OTL Midway

Saratoga took a torpedo in January 1942 & had that damage repaired in April.

Still this waives away the winter & spring raids, & perhaps the Coral Sea battle. Those gave the US carrier force some war time operating experience. Conversely the Sara may not be torpedoed, the Yorktown and Wasp arrive earlier.

Absent the carrier raids of early 1942 the MI operation may not even be conceived & the FS operation executed earlier.
 
The later RN fleet carriers might have been finished at a higher priority levels.
Possible if they delay the light fleet carriers in favour of completing the two Implacable class armoured carriers. It's possible they could skip from the Colossus class carriers to the Centaurs instead of wasting time building the Majestics as well.
 
I think it's important to note that the USN never anticipated sending battleships out beyond the Hawaiian islands for the first year or so of any hypothetical war against the Japanese. The Battle Force vs Scout Force Fleet Problems had demonstrated several times how dangerous carriers could be to battleships without air cover. Without carrier air cover, the battleships probably wouldn't go beyond the range of land-based aircraft from bases in the Hawaiian Islands.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
I think it's important to note that the USN never anticipated sending battleships out beyond the Hawaiian islands for the first year or so of any hypothetical war against the Japanese. The Battle Force vs Scout Force Fleet Problems had demonstrated several times how dangerous carriers could be to battleships without air cover. Without carrier air cover, the battleships probably wouldn't go beyond the range of land-based aircraft from bases in the Hawaiian Islands.

True and not true. War Plan Orange called for two BB to go to Samoa for 3-6 months as soon as the war started to keep the lines open to the Aussies. So it is probably better to say that we did not plan to operate on a consistent basis within the range of Japanese air cover. It is also important to note that we greatly underestimated the range of Japanese planes.

We had plans for battles in the Marshall Islands and at Truk. It is just that we had just enough fuel to get to Truk, fight for a day or two, and get back on fumes. So no one really thought about these too seriously once the war started. It is also a little appreciated fact that the loss of the BB freed up enough fuel reserves to allow the carriers to be very aggressive early in the war.

And you can get an interesting insight here. Moving the fleet to Pearl was strictly diplomatic move since we were moving it from a well supplied base to what in many ways was still a base under construction when one thinks of logistics/supplies. We might well have had better fleet range if we fuel everything in San Diego, sent the fleet to Pearl for quick top off. The tankers could likewise fuel up in San Diego and top off in Pearl.

So what happens if the carriers die but the BB live. Like all things, it depends a lot on the POD. The BB out at sea is different from BB at San Diego is different from the BB being luckier and better air defense. But let's take the easiest POD that is closest to the date. The USA gets a few hours warning, and gets the fleet formed up to fight. The Japanese do the initial attack on Pearl air defenses and port, but it is mostly empty. Later that morning, Japanese air and USA air engage. We lose both carriers (two were in region if memory serves me). Have Japan lose two carriers too as Japan expected. Japan air crew losses will be much higher than OTL. The initial raid will be worse since our fighters will be up and the AAA is manned. We then have Japanese losses on second strike which is over the ocean. Japanese losses on CAP on USA strike, plus more crew losses when two CV go down. Say Japan leaves the day with less than two full CV aircrews. Or three if you like. Here we have the nice scenario in the thread of the the CV being gone and the BB reputation being intact.

What happens? We get a rescue mission to Wake Island. My guess is 4 BB with 2 BB being prepped for move to Samoa, two BB damage in port. Probably successful since Japan is roughly at half OTL aircrew strength an 2/3 CV hull strength. We see aggressive BB action up the Solomon Islands if Japan still comes down fast. We have put a crimp in the Japanese war Plans, so their time table may be off. We lack the land forces to attack the Marshall Islands. If the Pow and Repulse still die the same way (not a given), then we will know to stay away from Japanese land base air. So we may well keep the 6 BB Pearl, 2 BB SW pacific force structure. As BB are damage or sunk in or around Australia, we may well send replacements.
 
Acelerate the Essex class, switch to increased submarine warfare untill the Essex come out. Probably no invasion of Guadalcanal. Reinforce north of Australia with land-based bombers & fighters.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Acelerate the Essex class, switch to increased submarine warfare untill the Essex come out. Probably no invasion of Guadalcanal. Reinforce north of Australia with land-based bombers & fighters.

True, and that brings up another point. If we have to wait on the Essex class ships, we probably just do the Central Pacific push in 1943. Not so sure we have a big fight in the Solomons. We have to write the rest of the ATL to see if it makes sense for the Japanese in mid 1942 to do the push. Also, the Marine attack on Guadalcanal was barely approved IOTL due to conflicts with Torch. USA might well just let the Japanese push as far down this direction as Japan wants to.
 
... Probably no invasion of Guadalcanal. ....

Yep. The Japanese build the intermediate air base and attempt to execute Operation FS to Fiji & Samoa. The few USN carriers remaining are less important as the network of land based air wings fight the Japanese carriers. That is the IJN is trying to fight several Guadalcanals simultaneously. & If they have not secured all of New Guinea the the US 5th AF is raiding their supply hub and naval base at Rabaul as it did OTL.
 
How many carriers would be lost?

I count upto 3 (remembering that they were all very busy during this period and its unlikely that they would all be in port at the same time)

Yorktown
Enterprise
Lexington

And given the near miracles that US Ship builders achieved on the 'salvaged' sunken battleships and unless utterly destroyed (and without an embarked airgroup far less to burn) I could see any sunken carrier raised and recommissioned inside 2.5 years or so?

As for the rest

Saratoga was just finishing a refit and was collecting her airgroup on the 7th Dec @ Diego Garcia so is unlikely to be at Pearl
Hornet is nearing completion so could take part in ops 2nd half of 42 if not sooner given that the crews of her sisters would be available
Wasp was getting ready to duff up the Vichy French in the West Indies (it was feared that they were about to break their internment - not true as it turned out)
Ranger also mincing about in the Atlantic

So the USN would I expect send most if not all the West coast CVs to the Pacific and join Saratoga and any survivors from the Pacific fleets CVs

Going forwards the Sangramons are ready late 42 and likely all sent to the Pacific and more effort is made on getting the Essex's and an increased focus on the Independence class light carriers which could all be ready for 43

I can see Britain focusing more effort on getting their 2 Implacable fleet carriers ready earlier and improved efforts on getting the Light fleets built sooner

Obviously this would change the USNs pacific strategy in 1942 and I can see it being one of greater caution with no CV reserves realistically until 43
 
Top