"Australian counter-insurgency tactics and civic action
Historian Albert Palazzo comments that when the Australians entered the Vietnam War, it was with their own "well considered ...concept of war", and this was often contradictory or in conflict with US concepts.
[62] The 1 ATF light infantry tactics such as patrolling, searching villages without destroying them (with a view to eventually converting them), and ambush and counter ambush drew criticism from some US commanders.
General William Westmoreland is reported to have complained to Major General
Tim Vincent that 1 ATF was "not being aggressive enough".
[63] By comparison, US forces sought to flush out the enemy and achieve rapid and decisive victory through "brazen scrub bashing" and the use of "massive firepower."
[64] Australians acknowledged they had much to learn from the US forces about heliborne assault and joint armour and infantry assaults. Yet the US measure of success—the
body count—was apparently held in contempt by many 1 ATF battalion commanders.
[65]
In 1966 journalist Gerald Stone described tactics then being used by Australian soldiers newly arrived in Vietnam:
The Australian battalion has been described ...as the safest combat force in Vietnam... It is widely felt that the Australians have shown themselves able to give chase to the guerrillas without exposing themselves to the lethal ambushes that have claimed so many American dead... Australian patrols shun jungle tracks and clearings... picking their way carefully and quietly through bamboo thickets and tangled foliage... .It is a frustrating experience to trek through the jungle with Australians. Patrols have taken as much as nine hours to sweep a mile of terrain. They move forward a few steps at a time, stop, listen, then proceed again.
[66]
Looking back on ten years of reporting the war in Vietnam and Cambodia, journalist
Neil Davis said in 1983: "I was very proud of the Australian troops. They were very professional, very well trained and they fought the people they were sent to fight—the Viet Cong. They tried not to involve civilians and generally there were fewer casualties inflicted by the Australians."
[67] Another perspective on Australian operations was provided by
David Hackworth, Vietnam's most decorated US soldier. "The Aussies used squads to make contact... and brought in reinforcements to do the killing; they planned in the belief that a platoon on the battlefield could do anything."
[68]
For some Viet Cong leaders there was no doubt the Australian jungle warfare approach was effective. One former Viet Cong leader is quoted as saying: "worse than the Americans were the Australians. The Americans style was to hit us, then call for planes and artillery. Our response was to break contact and disappear if we could...The Australians were more patient than the Americans, better guerrilla fighters, better at ambushes. They liked to stay with us instead of calling in the planes. We were more afraid of their style."
[69] According to Albert Palazzo, as a junior partner, the Australians had little opportunity to influence US strategy in the war: "the American concept [of how the war should be fought] remained unchallenged and it prevailed almost by default."
[70]
Overall, the tactics used by the Australian Army in Vietnam were not successful. Like the Americans, Australian tactics were focused on seeking to engage the Communist forces in battle and ultimately failed as the Communists were generally able to evade Australian forces when conditions were not favourable. Moreover, the Australians did not devote sufficient resources to disrupting the logistical infrastructure which supported the Communist forces in Phước Tuy Province and popular support for the Communists remained strong. After 1 ATF was withdrawn in 1971 the insurgency in Phước Tuy rapidly expanded.
[71]
Meanwhile, although the bulk of Australian military resources in Vietnam were devoted to operations against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces, a civic action program was also undertaken to assist the local population and government authorities in Phước Tuy. This included projects aimed at winning the support of the people and was seen as an essential element of Australian counter-revolutionary doctrine.
[72] Australian forces had first undertaken some civic action projects in 1965 while 1 RAR was operating in Biên Hòa, and similar work was started in Phước Tuy following the deployment of 1 ATF in 1966.
[73] In June 1967 the 40-man
1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit (1 ACAU) was established to undertake the program.
[74] By 1970 this unit had grown to 55 men, with detachments specialising in engineering, medical, education and agriculture.
[73]
During the first three years of the Australian presence civic action was mainly an adjunct to military operations, the unit taking part in the cordon and search of villages and resettlement programs, as well as occasionally in directly aiding and reconstructing villages that had been damaged in major actions. In the final years of the Australian presence it became more involved in assistance to villages and to the provincial administration. While 1 ACAU was the main agency involved in such tasks, at times other task force units were also involved in civic action programs. Activities included construction and public works, medical and dental treatment, education, agriculture development and youth and sports programs.
[75]
Although extensive, these programs were often undertaken without reference to the local population and it was not until 1969 that villagers were involved in determining what projects would be undertaken and in their construction. Equally, ongoing staff and material support was usually not provided, while maintenance and sustainment was the responsibility of the provincial government which often lacked the capacity or the will to provide it, limiting the benefit provided to the local population.
[74] The program continued until 1 ATF's withdrawal in 1971, and although it may have succeeded in generating goodwill towards Australian forces, it largely failed to increase support for the South Vietnamese government in the province. Equally, while the program made some useful contributions to the civil facilities and infrastructure in Phước Tuy which remained following the Australian departure, it had little impact on the course of the conflict.
[76]"
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Why not quote the whole section from Wikipedia rather than just a small part? Yes, the Australians didn't devote sufficient resources to Vietnam but then, it had other responsibilities in the region. At the same time as it was intervening in Vietnam, it was fighting Indonesia in Borneo, the CTs in Malaysia. It was also responsible for PNG's defence as well as the defence of it's own homeland, the continent of Australia. When the Army was sent to Vietnam, it was just accepting Conscripts. Before this, until 1965, it had consisted of only one reinforced brigade (or "Task Force" in its Pentropic vernacular), which was basically three infantry battalions plus supporting elements. It was fully committed, to Malaysia, Borneo and Vietnam as well as elsewhere. By 1969, the forces in Vietnam consisted of a Task Force plus supporting elements, over 8000 men. This was sufficient to allow it to not only subdue Phuoc Tuy but also operate in the surrounding provinces.
The use of the word "Tactics" in this context is mistaken. It should use the word "Operational Strategy" or just "strategy". Tactically, the NLF/PAVN acknowledges that the Australians were their superiors. Strategically, they were their inferiors. There is a difference there which is should be acknowledged.
The forces devoted to Vietnam consisted of both regular and conscript forces. The conscripts were mixed with the regulars and fought just as effectively. The US used conscripts very differently. Very differently. Sending entire units made up of conscripts, with only professional NCOs/Officers.
Australian forces according to Ross, Hall and Griffin in "The Search for Tactical Success in Vietnam: An Analysis of Australian Task Force Combat Operations", the Australians invariably won all their direct combat engagements with the NLF and PAVN. They dominated the battlefield and the NLF and PAVN found operating in Phuoc Tuy more expensive than operating elsewhere, so they tended to operate elsewhere. Compare that to the US Army's performance, flitting around from place to place. Yes, they defeated the NFL/PAVN forces they encountered but they then vacated the battle area leaving it to the enemy to allow them to rebuild. The US's idea of how to conduct a COIN operation differed markedly from the Australian one.
