US Victory in Vietnam

Could the US have won in Vietnam in the sense of leaving behind a permanent, anti-communist government in South Vietnam with a permanent force roughly comparable to the US force in South Korea incurring very few casualties once the war was over?
I have read about plans to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail and it seems at least conceivable that it might work. It would involve entering Laos and perhaps going as far are the Mekong River. It would definitely provoke a heavy fight with the North Vietnamese regular army but this might give us the opportunity to blast them with our fire power without killing neutral civilians. By forming a defensive line we would force them to concentrate forces in order to attack and that would present an attractive target for our firepower.
There has also been discussion of the "ink blot" strategy - essentially a strategy of "hold and secure" rather than a strategy of "search and destroy". Perhaps the two could be combined with the US having the primary responsibility for cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail and the South Vietnamese army being largely responsible for the ink blot part of the plan.
These two strategies could also be combined with a more aggressive (but risky) bombing program which would include hitting sites all the way up to the Chinese border and bombing the Red River dikes at least when they were being used for the placement of munitions or anti-aircraft weapons.
I am just not sure whether there would be much of a chance of success even with these strategies.
The one thing I am pretty convinced of was the the "search and destroy" strategy of Westmoreland was idiotic and self-defeating. We were allowing the enemy to pick the time and place of battle and we were engaged in a war of attrition in which the stakes for them were much higher than the stakes for us.
 
Options.

1. Keep it small, avoid killing Diem and relearn COIN and train the ARVN in it.

2. Go big in the South after starting the process of relearning COIN. Stage spoiling incursions by air and/or land into the North.

You want to beat insurgents you need to relearn population centric strategies and the war of the flea. You want to compel North Vietnam to come to the peace table that is a different matter.
 
Do it in the Philippines instead. Abandon Vietnam to national unification. Prop up your fuckwits in Laos and Cambodia. Go down the pub for a pint.

You need start with “The Catholic compradors don’t seize control of the RVN,” manage to get the national liberation movement monopolised by non-Stalinoids, and achieve real land redistribution before 1960. Without the US executing the president of the day for suspected leftism.

There may be a way to achieve US grand strategic goals in the RVN but you’d need to give control over US forces to the south koreans and accept that the international consequences in, for example Europe, Canada, domestic insurrection, will be counter posed to the point of ensuring US control over the RVN. Should provide alternative data points for Browning’s thesis in _Ordinary Men_.

On the other hand the state apparatus hunting down white armed liberal moralists for terrorism should allow armed Black food aid associations to prosper in urban areas.

The general problem with this solution is that hat it doesn’t involve strategic air power, until 1989 a precondition for acts of this scope and type in the post 1900 US
 
What would victory consist of, exactly?

Would it have been US forces standing over the rubble of Hanoi, on the borders with China?

Would it have been the US propping up a corrupt regime in the south?

The first would surely involve the Chinese as happened per Korea. The Chinese did not, still doesn't like non-Communists on their borders, if they can help it.

The second would see a continuous US occupying force, propping up a succession of increasingly corrupt regimes in Saigon with the NLF slowly gaining strength and control of the rural areas. Saigon would have been under siege as as Phnom Penh was before the end. With a competent government and and increasingly incompetent military, South Vietnam was essentially finished. America didn't know nor care to fight counter insurgency operations properly. Dropping bombs is no substitute to winning the hearts and minds of the people.
 
What would victory consist of, exactly?

Would it have been US forces standing over the rubble of Hanoi, on the borders with China?

Would it have been the US propping up a corrupt regime in the south?

The first would surely involve the Chinese as happened per Korea. The Chinese did not, still doesn't like non-Communists on their borders, if they can help it.

The second would see a continuous US occupying force, propping up a succession of increasingly corrupt regimes in Saigon with the NLF slowly gaining strength and control of the rural areas. Saigon would have been under siege as as Phnom Penh was before the end. With a competent government and and increasingly incompetent military, South Vietnam was essentially finished. America didn't know nor care to fight counter insurgency operations properly. Dropping bombs is no substitute to winning the hearts and minds of the people.
I would define victory as a result comparable to what we wound up with in South Korea. A prosperous country, some light violence along the border, gradual reduction of US presence, no major insurgency that cannot be handled by local troops. We would man the "McNamara Line" at first and gradually hand off some of the responsibility to local troops. We would bribe Cambodia not to allow infiltration and if they failed to do so we would blockade and search every incoming vessel. We would offer the country favorable trade terms and they might wind up with a substantial trade surplus.
 
Operationally, an ink blot strategy, being more aggressive at cutting the land supply lines, and even the McNamara lines would have been better than what was tried. There is a chance that this would have been enough.

I think with hindsight, the big problem was the use of American troops to fight a domestic insurgency in another country. That gave a huge amount of credibility to the Communists and a corresponding decrease in the legitimacy of the Republic of Vietnam. That was not worth any increased capability the American army and marines, and even the Koreans, brought to the table, over the South Vietnamese army.

So the successful, hindsight driven (because the war did provide lessons on how not to support a friendly government fighting an insurgency) is that the Americans will provide air support to the South Vietnamese, and provide training in the Philippines. No American soldiers in country outside of provinces bordering North Vietnam and a the liaison in Saigon.

I'm leaving the air campaign and naval blockade against North Vietnam out of this. Even the OTL one can be done as a means of pressuring the North Vietnamese over aggressions against South Vietnam and to interdict the supply lines. I'm also agnostic about keeping American troops in the three northernmost provinces, to combat any conventional attacks launched by the North Vietnamese army. I think neither would hurt, but neither would be necessary absent a full scale North Vietnamese invasion.

Also, all air missions are conducted from bases in the Philippines or Thailand, or by carrier based aviation, so no American air bases in South Vietnam itself and therefore no excuse to put in ground forces.
 
No Watergate, Nixon is able to keep logistics and air support going to the RVN. With the collapse in Chinese-Vietnamese relations coming, South Vietnam will make it.
 
I would define victory as a result comparable to what we wound up with in South Korea. A prosperous country, some light violence along the border, gradual reduction of US presence, no major insurgency that cannot be handled by local troops. We would man the "McNamara Line" at first and gradually hand off some of the responsibility to local troops. We would bribe Cambodia not to allow infiltration and if they failed to do so we would blockade and search every incoming vessel. We would offer the country favorable trade terms and they might wind up with a substantial trade surplus.

Easier said than actually done. South Vietnamese troops were often handed responsibilities that they failed to fulfill either through incompetence or corruption. While some South Vietnamese were as good and well disciplined as Westerners, they were unfortunately in a minority. US (and Allied) troops would be required to be there for far longer than you might appreciate.
 

marathag

Banned
I think with hindsight, the big problem was the use of American troops to fight a domestic insurgency in another country.
But by 1970, there wasn't much 'domestic' left in that insurgency, and the country was conquered with a 2nd blitzkrieg from an adjacent land, years after the 1st attempt was crushed in 1972 bu US airpower and ARVN ground forces.
 
1) Get rid of Diem, but not necessarily kill him. Replace him with a liberal but still anti-communist civilian.
2) JFK must live.
3) Replace McNamara as SecDef.
4) US combat troops never exceed 100k in country.
5) Rid ARVN of corruption.
 
But by 1970, there wasn't much 'domestic' left in that insurgency, and the country was conquered with a 2nd blitzkrieg from an adjacent land, years after the 1st attempt was crushed in 1972 bu US airpower and ARVN ground forces.

The North Vietnamese were Vietnamese. They were not foreigners. They haled from the same ethnicities as the Southerners did. The NLF may have suffered a temporary defeat but they were still active as an underground, just not an overtly active one. The southerners did not support the Southern regime. This was obvious from the collapse in 1972. The northerners represented the genuine aspirations of the country. The southerners did not.
 

marathag

Banned
The northerners represented the genuine aspirations of the country.
So that's why so many were sent to re-education camps or allowed to flee with nothing as Boat People, two decades after many were expelled from the North to the South by Uncle Ho when 'Land Reform' wasn't going so well?

As far as ethnicities being the same, tell me on your opinion on Serbians and Croatians and what that having the same ethnicities played with that Civil War

And there were differences between those in the North and South, and the Hmong and many other groups besides those in the North that had been parts of the Cham and Khmer Empires
Ethnolinguistic_map_of_Indochina_1970.jpg

The DMZ was placed where it was as no mere accident of Fate, that's close to Annam Gate, a historic pass beween two areas that were rarely unified.

It's not far off from stating that the English, Welsh and Scottish were all the same ethnicities, and was natural for the English to be ruling over the others, since represented the genuine aspirations of the land. Think about Vietnam really only 'unified' in 1802
 
The Northerners were Vietnamese. Vietnamese are the majority of the population in Vietnam. All the others are minorities. Their rights should be respected but they are not allowed to overrule the affairs of the majority of the population. In 1956, Ho, won the war against the French Imperialists. He defeated them at Dien Bien Phu. The French declared enough was enough and turned the country over to the Vietnamese. At the Geneva Peace Accords the agreement was to divide the country temporarily. Note that, temporarily until elections took place. Neither side allowed those elections to occur, fearing the possible outcome. The US could not allow elections to occur.

The CIA decided to sabotage the outcome as much as possible. They could not accept the peaceful creation of a stable society in Vietnam. So they so they attempted to foment a campaign of unrest against the Communists in the North. Lansdale, the head of the CIA mission created lies and innuendo against the Communists. People, primarily Catholics from the North fled from that region and moved to the South. They formed another political grouping and seized control of the South's regime.

The result was the creation of an unstable, corrupt regime in the South. The North created a semi-stable Communist regime in the North. President Eisenhower remarked that he couldn't allow elections in Vietnam because the country would vote overwhelmingly for the Communists under Ho. The majority of the Southerners were indifferent to the politics and the war. They just wanted to go on living off of the land. Which is why in 1972, in order to stop the mayhem and the destruction they turned their back in overwhelming numbers against the South. The Southern regime was venal, it was corrupt and it failed to win support amongst the people. The South crumbled in the face of overwhelming force from the North.

I am unsure why Americans keep up this falsehood that the Communists were not popular in the South when the evidence demonstrates otherwise.
 

Deleted member 140587

Victory in Vietnam... tricky (I'm going to assume these PODs are post Diem's execution). There are a few ways but it would involve the U.S. being much more aggressive:

1. Read this thread. https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/westmoreland-invades-the-north.223495/. It pretty accurately details how the U.S. could cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail if they'd invaded Laos and the trail terminus at Vinh. If you cut the trail, you cut the ability of the North to fight in the South. If General Westmoreland gets the nod, the war is over by 1968/1969 on American terms. You'd need to change the way LBJ thought about the war, but if you could convince him, it's a pretty solid victory for the U.S.

2. Contrary to popular belief, before the Tet Offensive a lot of Americans were quite supportive of the war in Vietnam. If you butterfly away the Cronkite report and you have U.S. leadership spin it as a last ditch attempt by the Viet Cong/be more honest about it, then the U.S. public won't turn so hardly against the war effort.

3. Duck Hook. It would wreck North Vietnam and essentially destroy it's ability to fight the war for a solid ten years. By that time, the South Vietnam would probably be capable of fending for itself. It would hurt America's perception around the world, but if they'd done it, it would've ended the war.
 

marathag

Banned
Their rights should be respected but they are not allowed to overrule the affairs of the majority of the population.
But those Rights were not respected-- at all.

I am unsure why Americans keep up this falsehood that the Communists were not popular in the South when the evidence demonstrates otherwise.
If they were popular, would have not needed an invasion and then re-education camps and expulsions
 

marathag

Banned
If they'd fought Vietnam in the way Britain fought Malaya and Borneo...
Easy, since the Chinese minority was easily identified and controlled, and they didn't have land link to Red China for easy supply
Harder to swim in 100mm Howitzers.

And guess what--'Search and Destroy' Internment/'Strategic Hamlets' and chemical defoliants were first used in that 'Emergency', US was using the British methods

Emergency took what, 12 years, 1948 to 1960?

US had the VC problem taken care of from 1964 to 1970, 6 years
 

SwampTiger

Banned
Accept Ho Chi Minh in 1944 as a useful, if socialist/Communist follower. Deny aid to recolonization by France. Support education and capitalist efforts in the three proto-nations of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Support Thailand and the Philippines efforts at free trade economies.

Send advisors, in advisory roles only! Do not send troops!
 

marathag

Banned
Send advisors, in advisory roles only! Do not send troops!
Ho takes over the North in 1951, and does his Land 'Reform' as OTL, just years sooner.
Refugees stream to the South.
British are fighting Communists in Malaya, and not doing well.

So Truman 'Lost' China, Korea is a mess, and is seeing SEAsia going fast. McCarthyism at its zenith.

Not a good time to see as being soft on North Vietnam
 
But by 1970, there wasn't much 'domestic' left in that insurgency, and the country was conquered with a 2nd blitzkrieg from an adjacent land, years after the 1st attempt was crushed in 1972 bu US airpower and ARVN ground forces.
Agreed. So cutting off the inflow from the North should have left a manageable situation in the South with little domestic insurgency. We cannot hope for a perfect South Vietnamese government but with lots of aid and a bit of nudging they probably would not be any worse than many many third world governments that have survived and slowly moved toward more prosperity. So the key is stopping infiltration from the North.
 
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