I don't understand that when they said "we want a stealthy, ground support plane", they weren't laughed out of the room.
The US air force is not created, the USAAC remains
- Thread starter Gukpard
- Start date
The USAAF operated more or less as a separate service by 1942. Hap Arnold was part of the proto-Joint Chiefs, neither he nor the USAAF reported to Marshall for much except some very very general (no pun intended) matters. If anything, they reported more to Lehey.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Because they did not want a stealthy ground support plane. They wanted a stealthy multirole aircraft that among the missions it would perform was ground attack, along with air superiority, combat air patrol, maritime strike, battlefield interdiction, reconnaissance and more
A branch of the service controlled by ground pounders and with the lowest budget of the four though the way to go was a high end stealthy multirole aircraft. That should say something about how ground support is looked at in the PGM era
The F-35 is a red herring anyway because that approach isn't viable until the 1990s (or maybe the 1980s) whereas the biggest effects, if any, from keeping the Air Force part of the army are going to come in the 1940s and 1950s. And at that time there weren't PGMs, so you needed a different approach to providing ground support (assuming that providing ground support is considered a first-tier mission for the Air Force ITTL).
Dropped a couple of stitches here, Carl.
The Army Air Corps was not disestablished as such, but remained legally intact as a paper organization only until 1947. The Army Air Forces, created in 1941, and later made co-equal with Army Ground Forces and Amy Service Forces, co-existed with the Army Air Corps. As required by federal law, all air personnel were notionally enrolled in the Army Air Corps, but for operationally assigned to the Army Air Forces.
As for the creation of the United States Air Force, this occurred on September 18th, 1947, by order of the very first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947.
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I'm personally curious about the aircrafts that were desired but never purchased by the US Army and NATO for CAS, as in the light subsonic/transonic fighter-bombers ala Etendard/Skyhawk.
CAS is less reliant on supersonic aircrafts since they have to operate at lower altitudes. Light aircrafts may have smaller payloads and avionics individually, but they are easier to maintain and more suitable for rough field handling and can be bought in larger numbers. An army may prefer to have as many CAS aircrafts as possible to provide CAS everywhere.
This was stuff they put in to ensure that it got approved. In an era of declining budgets, cancelled programs galore and a fascinations with all things “stealthy”.
First off in the real timeline the USAAC was turning I yto the USAAF which was fast heading towards the USAF, so was in many ways becoming it’s own branch of the military by 1941. We are talking about a world we’re it stays as part of the Army. Assuming this is a real par t of the army and not a paper only situation…. Then ultimately it is subservient to the Army Joint chief.
As for the A10. It has needed to be upgraded or replaced for a while. As for taking hits and being shot down. ground support is perhaps the most dangerous mission and as such som aircraft will be shot down. Desert Storm was a brilliantly fought war but it I think gave a very false and dangerous impression that you can fight a war with extremely minimal casualties. And if the US/West ever gets into a war with a roughly equal enemy it /they are going to. be in for a horrible surprise. Kind of like what happened to GB when it was fighting colonial wars against inferior enemies. Then they had a run in against folks on pare with them and surprise surprise…
And yes the F111 were useful but you need a few asterisks to that. First off the ground support they supplied was not exactly the same thing you would have needed in a WW3 or close equivalent situation. And the F111 being harder to shoot down because of range/speed that also would have been a bit different against the USSR and more importantly that was then this is now.
Also the F111 is a good example of an aircraft was was pulled without having a replacement that was good enough/bought in enough nuMoers. In part this was due to the latest craze in the AF for all things steath. In part because it was not a fighter as such.
As for the F35. I don’t get the red harring comment. The F35 has nothing to do with the creation of the AF but is a good example of how the purchasing of aircraft is out of control, And while the F35 was the bastard child of many a parent. The AF sure bares a larg part of the blame. And in a world we’re the Air Corp is a true subset of the Army it very well may not happen. As the Air Corp will probably have a smaller budget overall and as I said the influence of the rest of the Army will be impossible to completely ignore like the AF does now. So some sort of close ground support and an increase in Transportation will eat in to what Budget the Air Corp. does have.. So the extreme cost may stop the USAAC from buying to the F35. All signing and all dancing aircraft. Who knows maybe they will learn from the F111/F14 mess that the combine everything into one plane is A) very very very expensive and B) just does not work.
As for the A10. The reality is it is probably not the best design in 2021 for a close support air raft, but it sadly the best option we currently have available. And frankly in a true war you will have to risk and lose some aircraft. Somet the US will have to learn if they ever get into a real war again. Perhaps a very advanced Helicopter (think a modern design along the lines of a AH-53. ). Or perhaps it is a drone or a stealthy A10 or just an upgraded A10. I really don’t know but I do know that the current way the AF is handling Close support is a cruel joke.
As for the A10. It has needed to be upgraded or replaced for a while. As for taking hits and being shot down. ground support is perhaps the most dangerous mission and as such som aircraft will be shot down. Desert Storm was a brilliantly fought war but it I think gave a very false and dangerous impression that you can fight a war with extremely minimal casualties. And if the US/West ever gets into a war with a roughly equal enemy it /they are going to. be in for a horrible surprise. Kind of like what happened to GB when it was fighting colonial wars against inferior enemies. Then they had a run in against folks on pare with them and surprise surprise…
And yes the F111 were useful but you need a few asterisks to that. First off the ground support they supplied was not exactly the same thing you would have needed in a WW3 or close equivalent situation. And the F111 being harder to shoot down because of range/speed that also would have been a bit different against the USSR and more importantly that was then this is now.
Also the F111 is a good example of an aircraft was was pulled without having a replacement that was good enough/bought in enough nuMoers. In part this was due to the latest craze in the AF for all things steath. In part because it was not a fighter as such.
As for the F35. I don’t get the red harring comment. The F35 has nothing to do with the creation of the AF but is a good example of how the purchasing of aircraft is out of control, And while the F35 was the bastard child of many a parent. The AF sure bares a larg part of the blame. And in a world we’re the Air Corp is a true subset of the Army it very well may not happen. As the Air Corp will probably have a smaller budget overall and as I said the influence of the rest of the Army will be impossible to completely ignore like the AF does now. So some sort of close ground support and an increase in Transportation will eat in to what Budget the Air Corp. does have.. So the extreme cost may stop the USAAC from buying to the F35. All signing and all dancing aircraft. Who knows maybe they will learn from the F111/F14 mess that the combine everything into one plane is A) very very very expensive and B) just does not work.
As for the A10. The reality is it is probably not the best design in 2021 for a close support air raft, but it sadly the best option we currently have available. And frankly in a true war you will have to risk and lose some aircraft. Somet the US will have to learn if they ever get into a real war again. Perhaps a very advanced Helicopter (think a modern design along the lines of a AH-53. ). Or perhaps it is a drone or a stealthy A10 or just an upgraded A10. I really don’t know but I do know that the current way the AF is handling Close support is a cruel joke.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Or they don't have a dedicated ground attack aircraft at all and go into multirole earlier than OTL
Because when you look at nations with limited budgets, they have a single multirole fighter and that's it, because that is cheaper than having a dedicated ground attack aircraft and air superiority aircraft, because of greater economies of scale in purchasing, maintenance and training. Note how many nations only operate 1 type of combat aircraft, and that outside the US no one in the west operates ground attack aircraft, the PLAAF got rid of theirs. Even if the Army kept control, the pressure is going to be to merge ground attack into other aircraft as soon as possible
Desert Storm shows the point, aircraft designed to fight insurgencies, like the A-10 was designed based on Vietnam experience, do not do well against peer foes. Against an enemy as incompetent as the Iraqis, without fighters to contest things, the A-10 alone took unacceptable casualties. Against enemies with active air forces and SAM envelopes that aren't stupid enough to get destroyed early on, things will be a lot harder and aircraft like the A-10 will take massively more casualties. Whereas aircraft like the F-16, F-15E and especially F-35 are survivable in those sorts of environments with better kinematics and much better electronics
The best option available is generally a B-1B loaded with SDB's, enormous endurance, good dash speed and lots of munitions
Or that was just what the USMC thought they needed to be a useful aircraft in the 21st century
It's a red herring because the F-35 was procured beginning in the 1990s, fifty years after the USAAC was transformed into the USAAF (and longer than that since the USAF becoming independent had become all but inevitable). The same is only slightly less true of the A-10, which was procured beginning in the 1960s, twenty years later. And this was, importantly, after years of evolution of the U.S. air forces that were heavily influenced by heavy bomber and (later) air dominance proponents, and who found the phrase "not a pound for air to ground" to be a sensible sentiment. It's just plain meaningless to discuss those procurements in the context of a continuing USAAC, because achieving that requires so many changes to the development and evolution of the U.S. air forces that those aircraft simply not going to exist in anything like their OTL form. You might as well discuss whether a Britain that wins the American Revolutionary War will still procure the SA80, it makes about as much sense.
You want to discuss what an Air Force (or Air Corps) that, dominated by the army, focuses more on logistics and ground support looks like. That's perfectly reasonable, but the changes here will begin way earlier than the A-10 program. A continuing USAAC probably means that you have to kill the focus on heavy bombing and an independent Air Force that developed there in the 1930s somehow, but if you do that then U.S. procurement priorities during the Second World War are going to look a lot different. There's going to be a lot less work on heavy bombers during the 1930s, maybe to the point of not having a B-17 at all (there might be some prototypes or experimental aircraft a la the XB-15, but no production-scale work), and a lot more work on single-engine and two-engine aircraft that can provide close air support or interdiction support. There would be some work on building heavy bombers during the war, if only because the U.S. has few other practical options for hitting the enemy, but that might well end up just being copying British bombers and working on something like the B-29. Doctrinally, the U.S. would be focusing more on fighters and shorter-ranged bombers that are more suitable for supporting army units, so the heavy bomber program would probably be relatively neglected.
You're going to see even more differences in the post-war era. The early Air Force was laser-focused on two things: fast fighters and jet bombers. Hence the B-47 and B-52, hence the F-86, F-100, in fact the whole Century Series. They did build some aircraft that were more tactical bombing-focused--the F-84, F-84F, and F-105, for instance--and shunted other designs into the role--the F-100--but it was always a secondary priority. Here, those are the top priority, and they probably won't be as obsessed with nuclear delivery as IOTL (or maybe they will be). Fast fighters will certainly also be critical to ensure air superiority for the tactical bombers, but aircraft like the B-47 and B-52 will be distinctly secondary in priority. So instead of the 1950s being something of a wasteland for tactical air, there will be a robust program of development focusing on actually filling the Army's needs instead of doing what the Air Force wants and maybe that's useful for the Army.
By the time the 1970s roll around, the U.S. will have a robust tactical support arm. The A-10 will probably never be procured, because there will not be a crash "oh, wait, conventional tactical air is important" moment with only an obsolescent turboprop aircraft to fill it; rather, it will have been a critical task from the start and there will be existing aircraft that fill all of the niches presented by it (close air support, interdiction, night fighting, day fighting, etc.). Additionally, the Air Force would not have a turf issue with the Army developing fast anti-tank helicopters, since they're one service...at least, not as much of a turf issue. Maybe things will move in a more multirole direction from there--it does seem likely to me--maybe not, but the whole landscape is totally different and the decisions being made are totally different and so this will not have any impact on the Air Force's handling of the A-10 program, much less the F-35 program, since neither will exist ITTL.
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Someone declared that the OP's premise would result in the idea of the F-35 being used for CAS being discredited and the A-10 being replaced, even though neither aircraft is likely to exist (as I outlined above).
RamscoopRaider
Donor
Honestly even owned by the Army they will probably have to go in nearly as heavy as OTL into strategic bombers and interceptors in the late 40's/early 50's. Nukes are going to be a thing, and to deliver them until the late 50's you need bombers, and to stop the bombers you will need interceptors. Public pressure will be for a nuclear force, because that is cheaper than trying to match the Soviets conventionally, and if the Army ignores it they are likely to get an independent air force. So something like the B-47 and B-52 have to exist, and something like the Century series, and the huge tanker fleet to support them. Probably less is wasted on super high end projects like the XB-70 and XF-108, and maybe the bomber force is slightly smaller, but still the Army ITTL can't devote that much more of the aviation budget to tacair, and at this point was heavily into nukes themselves as the solution. So ground support in the 50's is still likely to mean a supersonic jet with a nuclear payload more often that not
I don't see all that much changing in the grand scheme of things
I don't see all that much changing in the grand scheme of things
What do you expect lower and slower?
The Strike and Pursuit aviation was not liked or pushed by the AAC for a very good reason, for an isolationist neutral state separated by oceans from any possible aggressor does not need short range fast light bombers, or point defence fighters ( though they would be good models to export to a rearming Europe, if only Uncle Sam would pay the development costs). Up to the Oscar and Zero the Pursuit types are entirely adequate for their defensive mission and with the P40 - which is not that great early on the issues are inherent to US engine production.
Now a long range fast heavy bomber is a direct strike weapon at the real enemy, the naval budget.
The other issue is these things are really expensive, in WW2 about half of expenditures of kit in WW2 by value was on aircraft. keeping the AAC as subordinate to the Army and no WW2 means the Army is relegated to base guards for the Air Corps because the Air Corps gets all the money or falls into utter obsolescence. Post WW2 the main defence issue is ofc nuclear deterrence not small wars in obscure places, where the US would probably have need better served by having less lavish air support and more contact with the local population.
marathag
Banned
Not as much emphasis on dropping bombs into pickle barrels, no B-17(or fewer) means the USAAC doesn't get Curtis LeMay showing off with the intercept of the Italian Roma at sea, meaning that there isn't the misconception that level bombers can do something about ships moving at sea towards the USA.
That all got combined with Billy Mitchell's earlier bombing anchored ships at his leisure, supposed Norden accuracy at 25k+ and long range of the B-17 being some kind of shield for the USA.
So what would the USA build?
Twin engine bombers.
Lucky the US still would be able to do that well.
Something like the Neptune could have been built much sooner, a long range Navy Patrol Bomber, and or Flying Boat bombers, similar to what the Mars turned out to be
That all got combined with Billy Mitchell's earlier bombing anchored ships at his leisure, supposed Norden accuracy at 25k+ and long range of the B-17 being some kind of shield for the USA.
So what would the USA build?
Twin engine bombers.
Lucky the US still would be able to do that well.
Something like the Neptune could have been built much sooner, a long range Navy Patrol Bomber, and or Flying Boat bombers, similar to what the Mars turned out to be
They are however very good at intercepting Japanese Ships at sea moving around SWPOA in 43, training training training. Its suprising but this actually works at a time and in a theatre noone really looks at .
Yep surprised me too. Mainly medium altitude level bombing from the B24 nd B17 squadrons in the absence of AA fire no need to go high. Skip bombing and gunships get the stories but the heavies were there as well. And effective.
But apart from air races and cargo hauling what is the USAAC in the interwr period supposed to do ofc it going to do long range heavy bomber stuff until it works or war starts. nothing else for it.
Balance is always good. There was some in the 1920s inspite of fiscal conservation. Depression era budgets forced some harsh choices & the Army focused on size & range. There's a lot of variables forking to that outcome.
One variation being more attention to engine development. There's no fundamental reason a Merlin equivalent, or other routes to higher power could not occur in US industry. Dolittle in his bio drops some bits on why the extra mile was not flown in that regard. The Depression put limits on what the AAC could do, but not to the point of a Greek Tragedy with the outcome foreordained by the Gods.
Yes. With the advent of the Atomic bomb strategic bombing was clearly a nation's primary offensive force and warranted a separate service. Also even with conventional weapons the USAAF had grown so large and powerful that it needed it's own command structure, civilian bureaucracy and governmental oversight.