The Sapphire Throne: A Swedish Timeline
- Thread starter Sarthak
- Start date
The next two chapters are regarding Russia. The chapter's title should be hint enough.
Not to be crude, but whenever I read the title of the timeline i sometimes mistake Sapphire for "Sapphic", so it becomes The Sapphic Throne, which elicits a chortle. Though I suppose that it wouldn't be inuccurate, as Chrisitina who reigned from 1632-1654 is rumored/thought to have been lesbian by some historians.
Interesting timeline so far, the mentions of a "Swedish Empire" are especially intriguing.
Even if it maintain its hold on the Baltics and Finland, Sweden will eventually face significant challenges against other and larger players. Quality can only do so much for so long when faced against the multitudes of Russia next door.
If it is to be even a regional power in the 20th century, Swedish demographics will need to be far more dynamic than they were OTL. Even a Swedish led Scandinavia lacks the critical mass to be a great power.
The good news is that the combined territories of Sweden+Finland+Estonia+Livonia could probably support a population of 30 to 50M inhabitants with the right agricultural package. How we get there is the question ...
Even if it maintain its hold on the Baltics and Finland, Sweden will eventually face significant challenges against other and larger players. Quality can only do so much for so long when faced against the multitudes of Russia next door.
If it is to be even a regional power in the 20th century, Swedish demographics will need to be far more dynamic than they were OTL. Even a Swedish led Scandinavia lacks the critical mass to be a great power.
The good news is that the combined territories of Sweden+Finland+Estonia+Livonia could probably support a population of 30 to 50M inhabitants with the right agricultural package. How we get there is the question ...
Really can't wait for the next chapter, the situation in Russia will be the most crucial for Charles' range of action. Given the title I think it might be bye-bye Peter, though I'm unsure if that's enough...
As for this chapter, I don't know if it's in Sweden's best interests to rent out soldiers to foreign conflicts, manpower is a very precious resource for a low-population Empire like Sweden.
As for this chapter, I don't know if it's in Sweden's best interests to rent out soldiers to foreign conflicts, manpower is a very precious resource for a low-population Empire like Sweden.
I'm a bit late to the party, but the Swedish parliament has no jurisdiction in Estonia and Livonia at this time. Both were their own Duchies with their own parliaments called Lantdag, in which the nobility, burghers and clergy (but not the peasants) were represented. Karl XI was Duke of Estonia and Duke of Livonia, but he could not make fundamental changes in the legal system of either Duchy without the approval of the parliament . including abolishing serfdom.
Karl XI abolished serfdom by decree in Ingria and Kexholm since these provinces were not under under the Swedish estates parliament and attempted to end it by pushing motions through the parliaments of each Duchy, but these motions were defeated, and by the 1690s, it seems Karl XI was content to end serfdom de facto rather than de jure. Karl XI had removed the right to "hand and neck"for the Estonian and Livonian nobility, meaning they no longer had the exclusive right to mete out justice on their estates (effectively being police, prosecutor, judge and executioner in one person) and at least in theory giving the serfs equality before the law, He also re-introduced the moving week, allowing the serfs to pick another landlord one week er year and move. Combined with the reduction of noble estates to crown land, at which the crown treated their serfs like tenants, it practically ended serfdom, as the Estonian and Livonian nobility had to treat their serfs like tenants as well or see their estates depopulated in favour of crown estates during the moving week.
1694 Karl XI established himself as an absolute monarch in Livonia by abolishing the Livonian parliament's role in ruling the Duchy, and things were coming to head, but the OTL Great Nordic War came before things could escalate. However, Erik Dahlberg had Livonia pretty well secured in his role as General-Governor, and 1700 the Livonian nobility largely accepted his call to war, raised their cavalry regiment and broke through the Saxonian siege lines to join him at Riga while there certainly was discontent, at least part of the Livonian nobility was loyal OTL.
Estonia was more difficult, as Sweden had made certain promises to respect local laws and autonomy when the Duchy joined Sweden in 1560.
While it is likely that Sweden would rent its German garrison to the naval powers (the Dutch and English) or the Emperor, renting forces to France is unlikely - Karl XI maintained a strong anti-French policy since 1680, and renting troops to both sides was not something you did in this era - it woudl be considered a gigantic diplomatic faux pas. There are no specific Swedish naval forces located in Pommerania at this time - there's a west coast squaron in Göteborg, the main base of the fleet in Karlskrona and a squadron based in the traditional base of Stockholm, where most of the shipbuilding is still done.
OTL, the burghers in the cities of Estonia and Livonia were loyal and had no reason to side with the nobility - their lands were not being taken and their status as part of the Swedish Empire was quite good - Dahlberg mobilised the burghers of Riga 1700, and their militia (well prepared, armed and trained, partially due to the burghers themselves, partially due to Dahlberg's efforts) came out and fought well in repelling the Saxonian siege.
Sweden had a navigation act since 1647, in which Swedish and Finnish peasants were only allowed to trade at Stockholm and Åbo and foreign merchants being restricted to Göteborg, Narva, Nyen, Reval, Stockholm, Riga and Åbo.
Your navigation act would completely and utterly devastate the economy of Sweden, as a majority of the trade (and thus income from tolls for the state) in the Baltic Sea was carried on English and Dutch ships, who carried colonial goods, salt and salpetre to Swedish ports and returned with local produce (and Russian goods, tolled by Sweden) essential for the naval powers, such as lumber, mast wood, tar, hemp and wool.
While Estonia, and most of Livonia was under the jurisdiction of the Reval and Riga Landtag, whenever major decisions were made, they mostly bent to whatever the Riksdag wanted. When the initial decrees were turned around by Reval and Riga, Charles XI began pushing and von Buxhoeveden and Patkul both expressed worries otl that the Landtags were about to acquiesce OTL, just before Charles XI died. The GNW and Charles XI's death, much to their relief, stopped such legislations from taking place.
Ah thanks, will change.
The situation is not OTL though. The emancipation of the Serfs reduces the capital flowing throughout the region by exponential amounts for a short period of time, which negatively impacts the merchant class. Considering there was already pre-existing dissatisfaction with pre-1696 funds going to Stockholm instead (which was ignored by the 1697 Riksdag), the loss of significant capital wont take long to turn the merchant class angry.
This does not make economic sense though. Generally speaking, in line with the Law of Demand and Supply, with market demand increasing for colonial shipments, the prices rise through the proxies, such as England and Netherlands, which made prices of goods and wages in shipping areas to increase exponentially, leaning on one part of the demand curve heavily, making the economy slightly unwieldy. Instead by focusing on pushing the proxies away and trading through their own cargo, it creates a short time blip in the time interval to transfer the proxies to their own ports of origins, which is temporarily a bad situation for the economy, losing a few hundred monetary resources for the transition, but after that prices for goods will start to lower and wages grow due to expanded demand for crates and shipping material. Speaking as a macroeconomist your statement makes no sense, especially considering the growth in wage-demand in maritime trade in Sweden & Denmark-Norway historically during this time period. What it will do instead, is create a new mixed economy in the trading apparatus instead, bringing mercantilism and protectionism's elements together by driving prices low but increasing demand and wages.
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The problem with this reasoning is that it is based in modern economy, with modern supply and demand and time to target systems and modern economic thinking - and tax systems.
Sweden did not have a wage tax until 1901. The state had revenue from land rent (commonly called taxes), fees for forestry and mining and tolls. And state run enterprises. Land rents and fees were fixed, and increased economic activity will do very little to change this - there might be a slight uptick in forestry fees as the demand for lumber increases, but it will be largely marginal.
Tolls were the big coin maker in this era, especially since the Swedish state had signed away a large part of its land rents with the allotment system, letting peasants keep soldiers in lieu of paying land rent.
The tolls were directly related to the value and amount of goods that passed the toll point - the city walls or the river mouth in Sweden's case. Denying foreign shipping the right to trade in Swedish ports means the state will lose the income from those tolls, as the trade will not be immediately replaced. Much of the trade that did happen in the Baltic ports were also Russian or Polish-Lithuanian goods (coming through Nyen, Narva and Riga). Closing the ports to foreign traders means this flow of goods will find other paths - for Russia, this might mean Archangelsk, for Poland-Lithuania through Danzig, which will mean that the Swedish state misses out on those tolls even when it has constructed a merchant navy (which will take decades to replace the English and Dutch in the Baltic Sea trade). More than half the shipping in the Baltic Sea was done by the Dutch, and a third of the ships that came to Nyen were Russian (Russian merchants sailed small ships from Ladoga, down the Neva and to Nyen to trade or sail onwards with their cargo to Reval, Riga or Stockholm).
Peasants with their small sailing vessels they used to sell their surplus is not big enough a factor to replace the Dutch and English, especially since that trade have been supressed by the 1647 navigation act limiting them to trade in a few specific ports.
You are removing about 20% of the Swedish state's income, and most of it will never come back. Getting a lot of people employed in shipbuilding and merchant activity will not replace it, since Sweden does not do income taxes.
Sweden already had a HUGE advantage since 1660 in which Swedish merchant vessels were exempt from the Sound dues to the Danish state, yet most of the Swedish merchant shipping at this time consisted of Dutch shippers who bought a business in a Swedish city to become a burher and able to flag his ships with the Swedish flag and avoid the Sound dues. The ships were built in the Netherlands, captained by Dutchmen and mosty crewed by Germans, Norwegians, Danes, Swedes and Dutch.
Then you misunderstand the act then. The Act does not restrict foreign merchants, nor does it restrict trade through the tolls and into Russia through Ingria, but it restricts foreign trade into Sweden for imports for the Swedish state itself. Much like the Swedish Navigation Act of 1724, the Dutch Navigation Act of 1691, the Act forces Sweden to rely on its own merchants and traders and shipping for imports for Sweden, whilst still remaining open to foreign trade passing through the country, on the basis that their transactions are recorded. There is a difference. It does not forbid foreign trade within the country at all, especially for the tolls, and inland trade into Courland, Poland, and Russia, but makes the country rely on itself and its own resources for its own national imports, whilst still remaining open to cross-national transactions such as Tolls.
Spanish and German salt were carried on Dutch and English ships. along with colonial goods (sugar, tea, tobacco mainly), spices, salpetre, wine, double beer (ie not small beer), cheese and many other things not produced in England or the Netherlands. The problem is that if they are not allowed to bring goods to trade on the inbound journey, you are removing a shitton of the economic incentive to actually come and trade. If they can go to Danzig or Archangelsk instead and get the same goods they get in Riga, Stockholm, Reval and Narva, but at a slightly higher price, that will still make them more profit.
The Swedish state imported blue dyes for uniform cloth, silver for coinage, salpetre (for the crown gunpowder mills) and the needs (mostly wine, some musical instruments and silk cloth) of the royal court. That trade was miniscule and if the act only affects what the Swedish state itself imports, it is completely and utterly irrelevant, since two shipsloads per year can cover that.
No it does not. As shown in 1724, when Sweden dropped the Dutch and English as proxies for imported salt from the Med, traders easily swapped over to Swedish ships for the natural imports into Sweden without any complaint. Dutch traders enlisted into Sweden and and used Swedish ships to conduct trade. This increased Swedish maritime income, becoming one of the more key facets of the post GNW economy recovery for the nation. Furthermore, the custom dues that Sweden charged was significantly less than ether Danzig and Arkhangelsk. The English Exchequer records the Swedish Customs being at least 14% cheaper than Danzig and 4% cheaper than Arkhangelsk, which meant that per single ship journey, every English trader stood to save around 70 pounds from a normal cargo trade through Sweden than Danzig and 20.28 pounds than Arkangelsk. The economic attraction, both due to Ingria, Riga and the lower custom dues lies with Sweden at the time squarely.
It does not. The growing trade from the orient, the sugar trade from the Caribbean, the proxy Swedish company businesses in the Slave Trade, the export of Swedish iron, the barter of ore, etc are not 'irrelevant'. Far from it.
Yeah, as I wrote, Dutch traders had a tendency to become Swedish burghers. Still, the men themselves were Dutch, the ships were built in the Netherlands, the captains and officers were Dutch and the crews a mix, mainly because the Dutch paid very well. 20-25% of the crews of Dutch merchant ships plying the European trade were non-Dutch. The percentage on ships flagged in other countries but in reality Dutch were probably slightly larger. Even if more Dutch shippers become Swedish burghers on paper, the trade will still be controlled by the Dutch.
After the Great Nordic War, Sweden was largely irrelevant for the Baltic trade, so switching to Swedish ships was possible, due to the much smaller amount of outgoing trade and the fact that the Dutch and British could keep importing their tar, hemp, lumber and wool through the Baltic ports, just now paying their tolls to the Russians instead of the Swedes. That switch would not have been possible had Sweden still controlled the Baltic ports.
Is it Swedish trade, or Swedish crown/state trade? The Swedish crown/state did very little trading - most of it was to export copper. Sweden did not have crown monopolies that handled the import of colonial goods or salt in this era.
If it is all goods imported to Sweden or Swedish Empire ports must be carried by the ships of the nationality that produced that good or a Swedish ship, you have gutted trade in the Baltic Sea completely, as the English and Dutch, who operate the vast majority of ships in the Baltic trade will be unable to bring the traditional Swedish (and Russian) imports to sell and exchange for Russian, Polish and Swedish goods to bring back. It does not matter if it is 14% cheaper if half the journey has to be made with empty cargo holds and half the revenue is lost. It will be a much better deal to sail to Danzig or Archangelsk.
If it is goods imported by the Swedish crown/state directly it is roughly two shiploads per year in this era, and thus completely irrelevant.
The bottom line is that this policy does not fit the mercantilistic thinking of the era nor the need for profit. It belongs in the late 19th century's protectionism to safeguard the building of a national industry.
That much is true, but if it increases local wages and lowers prices, then the government in Stockholm really won't care about it.
Not really. Despite increasingly lowered trade and destruction due to the GNW, Sweden represented ~35% of the maritime in the Baltic Sea from 1721 - 1809, and was still an important trading partner for countries in the region. As evidenced by the Porto Novo Affair, Sweden was still considered a player in the global trading nexus, and even more so in the Baltic.
Local figures, apparently, according to the English and Scottish exchequers.
No it does not. Going to Danzig instead of Riga puts a loss of £25 pounds and going to Arkhangelsk puts a loss of £9 pounds per ship, which is why Riga became so important to Sweden during its empiredom phase otl. If majority of ships going to Riga and Stockholm go to Danzig and Arkangelsk, then the Anglo-Duch stand to be £3,000 to £10,000 in the Red, depending on the year, something that is not feasible by English and Dutch standards. Taking the 1705 Toll records as base, the act would serve to reduce each Ship's profit by £1.2 Pounds, but it still yields English and Dutch traders a profit of £4.9 instead of being in the red.
Such acts would make Sweden catch up, Denmark, Norway, France, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Scotland, even Brandeburg-Prussia & the Ottomans had passed similar acts before Sweden by 1700. By 1700, pure mercantilism is dead everywhere except Venice. Sven-Erik Åström's Scandinavian Economic Review even laments, in agreement with Economic historians, that at this time, Sweden had fallen behind in maritime shipping administration due to their late reaction to the growing mixed economies cropping up in Europe at the time. Furthermore the acts furthers mercantilism by introducing competition between domestic and international traders, and is a highly valued system of shipping economics in the 18th century as per A History of Economic Theory and Method's 6th Edition.
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Swedish state does not really care about local wages or prices, unless the prices are enough to to cause actual social disorder (which only salt really could). In fact, higher prices usually meant higher tolls. The Swedish state does not tax wages, so higher wages means nothing really, except the fact that regular people can start compete with the nobility on luxury items and fine clothing, meaning the nobility will have to step up, which either they cannot or imports have to increase (which is considered REALLY bad in this era). There had been repeated attempts to ban burgher wives from wearing jewelry and lace in the latter years of the 1680s and 1690s to reduce the stress on the nobility in keeping up.
The age of mercantilism is really only starting. In 1756 , Sweden banned the import of coffee and ordered the 50 or so coffee houses in Stockholm to close. A profitable business venture was closed down and lots of people made unemployed.
But that is not the peak of it. 1731 Sweden attempted to ban the change of fashion - the Queen was asked to set a fashion for women that would last forever and the current male fashion.
Could you walk me through the numbers, from taking a cargo of say, 100 tons of Spanish salt in Amsterdam and sailing to Danzig and bringing back a cargo of 100 tons of hemp back versus taking no cargo in Amsterdam and sailing to Riga and bring back a cargo of 100 tons of hemp, please? I can't make sense of your numbers.
A much better way to let Sweden catch up is to release the heavy restrictions on peasant sailing - when it was done OTL in the 1800s, the peasant sailers immediately started a whole group of small merchant empires, with the Ålanders being expecially prominent.