The Possibility of a Change in British Government during WW2

[RangrimRumneheim]

My history class started a new unit a couple of weeks ago on ‘British Political History 1945-1997’ and as a result I’ve been reading (both in and outside classwork) on the immediate post-war governments, particularly Attlee, which has led to me thinking about the possibilities of that Labour government, particularly if it had continued past 1951.

That thinking has led to me considering starting a timeline* about a more left-wing, non-aligned Britain under a Labour-led dominant-party state (a lá Japan’s one-and-a-half party system rather than a Soviet-style government). My ideas for PODs for this has led me to my History class’ previous unit on Churchill, specifically Labour’s popularity from running the home front, and Churchill’s frequent disagreements over strategy and the British Empire, particularly approaching 1943 for the former.

One idea I’ve had is for a POD is a set of alternate military failures (e.g: defeat at 2nd El Alamein**) discrediting Churchill’s Mediterranean Strategy against American and Soviet support for an earlier invasion of France (in OTL Churchill got D-Day delayed in exchange for invading Italy instead), while eroding his reputation sufficiently (many generals including Chief-of-Staff Alan Brooke already disliked him) against this foreign pressure to allow forces led by Labour (perhaps with a leader other than Attlee, such as Stafford Cripps^) and backed by Roosevelt and the Soviets to push Churchill into resigning, with continued rejection of other Conservative candidates bringing an emergency election leading to an early war-time Labour government.

Now I fully realise that what I’ve just described would’ve been a highly unlikely set of events; that in spite of conflicts Roosevelt probably wouldn’t have been that eager to remove Churchill, that even if Churchill resigned that a Conservative like Eden would be his likely successor, and that even if an emergency wartime election was permitted that this set of events would’ve been difficult for Labour to campaign against (very dependent on a hypothetical public’s opinion of Churchill).

Regardless I would still like to ask about and brainstorm any potential for changes of government in wartime Britain, seeing as I haven’t found any previous posts discussing that topic.

* A lá a spiritual successor to this old timeline.
** Perhaps related to a change of strategy or commanders; Churchill removed the first two North African commanders (Wavell and Auchinleck) for military failure (arguably due to diverting forces to failure operations in Greece) and a perceived overly defensive stance respectively, eventually sticking with Montgomery (a friend and tactical brethren of Churchill) whose OTL victory was could be seen as due to Auchinleck’s strategy of cautiously building up an advantage in forces.
^ A leader of Labour’s left-wing faction who was temporarily expelled for attempting to a form an anti-appeasement coalition containing conservatives and communists, who would become popular for his diplomatic work strengthening Allied relations with the Soviets in 1942, before being plunged into failed negotiations with the Indian National Congress. He would eventually become the post-war Chancellor of the Exchequer, maintaining strict rationing and austerity in order to expand exports and maintain trade surpluses while supporting social services and industrial investment.

 

[Sam R.]

Having lost the confidence of the House on the vote for an amendment for the All Dogs Must Be Leashed Every Second Tuesday Act[1], Winston Churchill has attended on the King to allow him to expect that Clement Attlee will attend on His Majesty to inform him that a new War Cabinet will be established with the confidence of the House. Mister Churchill is expected to retain the Ministry of Defence and his position in Cabinet in the new Government.

It'll be a stitch up from the moment Winston loses the confidence of the House. If Winston is particularly dumb an election will be called to emphasise the point. The token confidence bill is in effect part of a stitch up to emphasise rather than demonstrate the loss of confidence. Someone more sensible would directly attend the King without needing the furor of the Dog Leashing Act Amendment.

The crossing of the floor in Australia during WWII would be illustrative here of the general principles and shape.

yours,
Sam R.


[1] The joke Bill as a non-money bill to force the confidence vote. The real confidence issue will be some war fuck-up. The Bill was not floated in the house under the Attlee ministry.

 

[RangrimRumneheim]

[1] The joke Bill as a non-money bill to force the confidence vote. The real confidence issue will be some war fuck-up. The Bill was not floated in the house under the Attlee ministry.

Interesting, do you have the link to anything about this.
Reminds me of how the debate over the Norway Inquiry in 1940 was used a de-facto confidence vote on Chamberlain.

 

[Sam R.]

Not really. I assimilated it as conventional knowledge about convention. The thing is there's a bally war on, we're not going to block supply (a money bill), or formally vote no confidence, it'd look bad. So when Someone doesn't listen to the back-channels, Someone is going to get a proxy no-confidence vote, but we better pick something ridiculous so it doesn't affect the war, and something that won't really be passed anyway. It is kind of a hierarchy of conventions: 1) the state must continue, can't do that commonwealth thing again or a civil war, 2) try to not embarrass the Crown, or HM's person if you can afford to, 3) if there's a sideways way of doing things which avoids formalising the substantive, do it, 4) even if you have to do something, try to reduce the levels of antagonism surrounding it, 5) if in doubt, ensure the outcome and call an election.

While Labour was still controversial, their ability to ensure the UK wouldn't have a civil war over beating the Germans was pretty solid, and eventually they'll lose the House, so if you have to let them.

In Australia Labor to power was slightly more controversial because the coalition of nationalists and imperialists were crap at governing and had financially blocked the expansion of capital. So in Australia Labor had to "unblock" elements of Australian capitalism during the war as well as keep Australia usefully in the war. This pissed off some of the people who owned Australia because they wanted the right to mismanage their capital. But Labor did so well at ensuring Australian capitalism's long term survival that the nationalist and imperialist vague coalition learnt how to run a real party off Labor and kept most of the policy core of the centre of the Labor government's positioning, even when Labor as a coalition of vibes collapsed for 20 years post war.

One of the central conventions of running post-interregnum British government has been the use of indirection, to avoid bringing things to a crisis where some bloke will march in and dissolve parliament. So there are conventionally a whole host of "reserved" actions which are only used to unblock ordinary parliamentary business. Winston, being somewhat conceited, would require a proxy confidence bill to get the attention that Tories won't back him in the house due to that horrible scandal overseas. Given Greece and Crete and Singapore and Burma, I'm having difficulty imagining what overseas scandal would animate though. Or how an existing scandal could be caused to animate backbench outrage. I also suspect Attlee and Labour wanted HM's Churchill cabinet to wear the scandals of the war and privation rather than themselves.

yours,
Sam R.

 

[RangrimRumneheim]

Not really. I assimilated it as conventional knowledge about convention. The thing is there's a bally war on, we're not going to block supply (a money bill), or formally vote no confidence, it'd look bad. So when Someone doesn't listen to the back-channels, Someone is going to get a proxy no-confidence vote, but we better pick something ridiculous so it doesn't affect the war, and something that won't really be passed anyway. It is kind of a hierarchy of conventions: 1) the state must continue, can't do that commonwealth thing again or a civil war, 2) try to not embarrass the Crown, or HM's person if you can afford to, 3) if there's a sideways way of doing things which avoids formalising the substantive, do it, 4) even if you have to do something, try to reduce the levels of antagonism surrounding it, 5) if in doubt, ensure the outcome and call an election.

While Labour was still controversial, their ability to ensure the UK wouldn't have a civil war over beating the Germans was pretty solid, and eventually they'll lose the House, so if you have to let them.

In Australia Labor to power was slightly more controversial because the coalition of nationalists and imperialists were crap at governing and had financially blocked the expansion of capital. So in Australia Labor had to "unblock" elements of Australian capitalism during the war as well as keep Australia usefully in the war. This pissed off some of the people who owned Australia because they wanted the right to mismanage their capital. But Labor did so well at ensuring Australian capitalism's long term survival that the nationalist and imperialist vague coalition learnt how to run a real party off Labor and kept most of the policy core of the centre of the Labor government's positioning, even when Labor as a coalition of vibes collapsed for 20 years post war.

One of the central conventions of running post-interregnum British government has been the use of indirection, to avoid bringing things to a crisis where some bloke will march in and dissolve parliament. So there are conventionally a whole host of "reserved" actions which are only used to unblock ordinary parliamentary business. Winston, being somewhat conceited, would require a proxy confidence bill to get the attention that Tories won't back him in the house due to that horrible scandal overseas. Given Greece and Crete and Singapore and Burma, I'm having difficulty imagining what overseas scandal would animate though. Or how an existing scandal could be caused to animate backbench outrage. I also suspect Attlee and Labour wanted HM's Churchill cabinet to wear the scandals of the war and privation rather than themselves.

yours,
Sam R.

Thanks, that's quite useful.

My idea for a war-time Labour government in my (potential) timeline was, among other things:

1. To affect an alteration in wartime strategy by installing a prime minister^ more amenable to other Allied positions such as Operation Round-Up (i.e: D-Day in 1943).
2. Installing a prime minister^ more suspicious of the United States (and Soviet Union as OTL) who might decide to bear the costs of continuing Tube Alloys, leading to a British bomb by at the latest 1948*.

^ Perhaps not Clement Attlee but someone more radical such as Stafford Cripps, presumably by adding pre-war PODs to result in his accession to the Labour leadership..
* The relevant section of the Tube Alloys article describes a report of the programs continuation, specifically that a necessary plutonium reactor would take five years to construct. The described reactor however was larger than the reactor eventually built for the UK's later OTL nuclear weapons programme, which is why I imagine the possibility for an earlier completion date.

 

[RangrimRumneheim]

My idea for a war-time Labour government in my (potential) timeline was, among other things:

1. To affect an alteration in wartime strategy by installing a prime minister^ more amenable to other Allied positions such as Operation Round-Up (i.e: D-Day in 1943).
2. Installing a prime minister^ more suspicious of the United States (and Soviet Union naturally) who might decide to bear the costs of continuing Tube Alloys, leading to a British bomb by at the latest 1948*.

The idea vis-a-vis Tube Alloys is to facilitate an idea I have for the timeline regarding an early push for civilian nuclear energy.

 

[RangrimRumneheim]

bump

 

[HexWargamer]

Time-line is difficult .. also during ww2 the Brits had a 'Government of National Unity' as I recall, with the party political system suspended for the duration ..

If the Soviets are to play a part, it has to be after Hiter invades the Soviet Union, June 1941, since before that date Stalin is not exactly 'flavour of the month' == remember, he has a deal with Hiter, allowing him to invade eastern Poland, annex Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and invade Finland (not very successfully) in exchnage for supplying the Nazis with the all oil and other rfesources needed to keep their military forces rolling ...

Then after December 1941 the Japanese attack and Hitler declares war on the USA. With the Americans in the war, who runs Britain doesn't really matter very much anyway.

Although it COULD be argued that without Churchil to insist on Med/Italy front, D Day could have been June 1943 ... with who knows what knock on effects...

 

[Aber]

My idea for a war-time Labour government in my (potential) timeline was, among other things:

1. To affect an alteration in wartime strategy by installing a prime minister^ more amenable to other Allied positions such as Operation Round-Up (i.e: D-Day in 1943).

You need to be slightly careful on the balance between political and military influence on strategy. Churchill was careful not to go against military advice.

Churchill's low point was post Gazala and was saved by Alam Halfa (after he had changed the British generals). A loss of Alam Halfa followed by a loss of Egypt would have been a major crisis that he might not have survived.

The direction of the war will be driven by US reactions - in these circumstances Torch is unlikely so do they go Pacific First leaving Britain to struggle to hold the Middle East and support Russia via Persia, or do they go on the defensive in the Pacific and fully commit to Roundup in 1943 (it is unclear if the US can get actually enough forces to the UK).

EDIT: Churchill did not really insist on Italy; he just asked awkward questions of the US. In mid 1942 - do we not take any action against Germany until Roundup in May 1943, leading to Torch?; in early 1943 - do we not take any action between clearing Africa and a May 1944 D-Day? In both cases the answer was "something must be done".

 

[Gannt the chartist]

To affect an alteration in wartime strategy by installing a prime minister^ more amenable to other Allied positions such as Operation Round-Up (i.e: D-Day in 1943).

Which will never happen, its basically Marshal's (not the US Government) idea that the British should launch an invasion of France and then wait for a year or so until the US turns up. The decision to do this has to be made in 1942it is immeasurably stupid.

My idea for a war-time Labour government in my (potential) timeline was, among other things

Not going to happen unless you want to go back a long way. The 1935 election gives an absolute conservative majority, add to that the National Liberal and Labour in the coalition. Labour has 154 seats. And the Projections for the non election of 1940 was that labour would lose seats - according to labour.