Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka (a New Challenger Emerges)
[Much of this post is me playing catch-up. Sri Lanka has been alluded to a lot over the course of this narrative, but rarely have they gotten the spotlight themselves. Here we go.]
To the broader world, Sri Lanka in the tenth and eleventh centuries CE was often seen either as a peripheral concern, a center of Theravada scholarship, and a place of origin for money and trade ships. This was the heyday of the Kashyapani, a mercantile guild whose travels took them from Watya to Japan. They focused on the transport of cargo and the accumulation of wealth, which they reinvested into their community in the form of shrines, stupa, centers of scholarship, and substantial irrigation works.
For the Chola, of course, Mahatitta in particular and Sri Lanka in general was an obstacle to their imperial hegemony, which stretched as far afield as Sri Vijaya. And by the early eleventh century, the Sri Lankan monarchy, centered in the city of Anuradhapura, had entered into a period of near-terminal decline. The Chola dynasty launched repeated attacks on the northern coast, most notably sacking the mercantile city of Mahatitta in 1066 (although it subsequently recovered). The Chola were able to seize many of coastal cities for a time, including Gokanna and the growing port of Vaddapura. However, the royal mercenary soldiers, many of them South Indian themselves, remained essentially loyal to the wealthy Anuradhapuran regime[1], and continued enforcing royal order. The rural villages and complex irrigation networks that the island depended on were substantially unaffected, and the Chola contented themselves with establishing political dominance over these coastal cities (which perhaps in part explains the retreat of many Sinhalese urban elites towards Vaddapura, which remained outside the scope of Chola conquest).
Notably, there is no evidence that the Chola army ever sacked Anuradhapura[2], nor that there was a violent overthrow of the sacred city, with its great collection of Buddhist relics and monuments. Certainly, the Chola made numerous attempts to redirect trade towards their cities and guilds, and their conquered outposts along the northern rim of the island. And there is substantial evidence that Anuradhapura itself declined precipitously over the next century, even as the hinterlands remained largely intact.
However, the Sri Lankan companies had substantial overseas contacts and major imperial sites like Polonnaruva and Yapahwwa remained in the hands of the inland Sinhalese regime, meaning that by the early twelfth century, after a substantial period of back-and-forth, and series of invasions and counter-invasions, the Chola were largely expelled. The biggest victims of this constant warfare had been the sangha - the powerful monastic communities who had served as landholders for centuries. Their concentrations of wealth had made optimal targets for plunder, compared to rural communities and fortified royal cities. While Anuradhapura would remain a potent religious center, a site of coronations and religious festivals, the monarchy itself transferred its administrative seat to the fortified and defensible Yapahwwa, where it was freed from the sangha. In the thirteenth century, with the Chola preoccupied further afield and the current ruler, Kassapa confident in the security of his regime and the power of his navy, the capital was moved to Polonnaruva.
The thirteenth century marks a period of “cold war” between the Chola and the Sri Lankan monarchy. Sri Lanka had survived the “test” of South Indian imperial aggression. When the two powers next went to war, in 1236, the Sri Lankan fleet actually scored a decisive victory, which they followed up with a raid on the port of Nagapatnam. It had made evident that it was not another kingdom to be humiliated and subsumed - possessed of a powerful fleet and substantial material wealth, it made itself a difficult test for any would-be Tamil conqueror. This was a time of material progress - the expansion and redevelopment of irrigation works damaged in the fighting - increased overseas trade and the increased voyages of Sri Lankan merchants westward beyond Cape Watya.
Perhaps this reversal of fortunes owes much to the gradual shift in the balance of power. The Tamil had profited from a disunited Southeast Asia, where their merchants and guilds could play sides off one another. The unity of Majachaiya was a dangerous threat to their ability to project power - no longer could fleets of Tamil warships “maintain order” in the Malay archipelago. This reduced, in turn, the concessions that the Tamil could extract. Tamil trade companies had to play ball on a relatively even playing field, lacking the ability to force concessions from individual, isolated polities or establish plantations without oversight. While the Majachaiya were happy with the plantation system and the trade networks they had inherited through conquest, they mandated a sort of even playing field - tax revenue had to come in and everyone had to pay their dues.
In this era, Sri Lankan trading guilds began to buy property in the ports of Cape Watya and establish foriegn quarters in cities ranging from China to Bakhtiyar Egypt, where the Canal of Akhsau Mansar still provided a shipping lane for those who wanted to bring their goods overland into the Mediterranean. Although this brought them into direct competition with the Chandratreya and the Tamil, any thought of crushing the expansion of their trade was put aside as the Chandratreya embarked on their half-century long period of warfare against the Pala, plunging the subcontinent into war and changing priorities overnight for many of the great trading and banking houses. The Sri Lankans, like the Tamil, had been excluded from the White Elephant Concordats, and this drove their policy of securing concessions, at times by force. Furthermore, their soldiers and sailors had been honed by decades of on and off war with the Tamil - meaning that when, for example, a Sri Lankan fleet arrived off the coast of Aden in 1339, seeking repayments for the Malik’s debts, their demands were taken very seriously, even when their demands included a fortification near the harbor. A subsequent naval conflict with the Haruniya in 1346 was resolved after the Battle of the Barim, where a fleet of dozens of Haruniya warships were crushed by a force of Sri Lankan perhaps half their size.
The Sri Lankan elite, having inherited memories of Tamil occupation and several decades of warfare, was not slow to react when the Tamil launched their major intervention in Siddhapura. A few months after that intervention, Sri Lankan ships under the command of one Prince Vatta showed up on the Watyan coast, arriving at the town of Ankaramena [OTL Cape Town]. There, against the (ineffectual) objections of the local Randryan, they established a fortified harbor in the previously sleepy shipping village. Imported Mahratta mercenaries set to work erecting shore batteries and fortresses. The Sri Lankan sailors christened the the new fortification Sihanuwara, and set to work expanding and fortifying the harbor.
The town of Watya itself [OTL Van Dyk’s Bay] was equally incapable of responding to this new provocation. The Randryan had always been rural in their focus - settlers and farmers, primarily, they had relied on the protection of Kapudesan and Chandratreyan fleets and soldiers to defend them. But the fleets had been recalled, and the soldiers based in Watya refused to risk open war without orders which would take time to filter down. Kapudesa in particular was bought off with certain diplomatic promises and assurances that the favorable status of their merchants would be maintained. The Sri Lankan coup over Watya was completed over the course of a few years. The few other coastal towns, such as Tandrano [Port Elizabeth] and Antsiranama [Durban], were able to mount more effective resistance - gathering soldiers from the hinterland and digging in cannons along the shore - but by 1342, there was an understanding that the conquest of Watya was essentially a foregone conclusion, although the Sri Lankan soldiers never made any attempt to disrupt the Randryan in the hinterlands - and indeed acknowledged their property rights and offered them gifts.
The seizure of Watya essentially brought an end in fact, if not in law, to the fiction that trade in the Indian Ocean and beyond could be regulated by the agreement of local monarchies and trade councils. In a matter of a few years, the Yapahwwa monarchy demonstrated that they could, and would, project power without the consent of their peer competitors, and due to the distraction of their principal rivals in Thana, their power would grow unchecked by any adversary except the Pandya - who, to their immense detriment, still had to guard against Pala and Chandretreya incursions from the north.
[1] A major divergence from OTL.
[2] This is actually as OTL.
[Much of this post is me playing catch-up. Sri Lanka has been alluded to a lot over the course of this narrative, but rarely have they gotten the spotlight themselves. Here we go.]
To the broader world, Sri Lanka in the tenth and eleventh centuries CE was often seen either as a peripheral concern, a center of Theravada scholarship, and a place of origin for money and trade ships. This was the heyday of the Kashyapani, a mercantile guild whose travels took them from Watya to Japan. They focused on the transport of cargo and the accumulation of wealth, which they reinvested into their community in the form of shrines, stupa, centers of scholarship, and substantial irrigation works.
For the Chola, of course, Mahatitta in particular and Sri Lanka in general was an obstacle to their imperial hegemony, which stretched as far afield as Sri Vijaya. And by the early eleventh century, the Sri Lankan monarchy, centered in the city of Anuradhapura, had entered into a period of near-terminal decline. The Chola dynasty launched repeated attacks on the northern coast, most notably sacking the mercantile city of Mahatitta in 1066 (although it subsequently recovered). The Chola were able to seize many of coastal cities for a time, including Gokanna and the growing port of Vaddapura. However, the royal mercenary soldiers, many of them South Indian themselves, remained essentially loyal to the wealthy Anuradhapuran regime[1], and continued enforcing royal order. The rural villages and complex irrigation networks that the island depended on were substantially unaffected, and the Chola contented themselves with establishing political dominance over these coastal cities (which perhaps in part explains the retreat of many Sinhalese urban elites towards Vaddapura, which remained outside the scope of Chola conquest).
Notably, there is no evidence that the Chola army ever sacked Anuradhapura[2], nor that there was a violent overthrow of the sacred city, with its great collection of Buddhist relics and monuments. Certainly, the Chola made numerous attempts to redirect trade towards their cities and guilds, and their conquered outposts along the northern rim of the island. And there is substantial evidence that Anuradhapura itself declined precipitously over the next century, even as the hinterlands remained largely intact.
However, the Sri Lankan companies had substantial overseas contacts and major imperial sites like Polonnaruva and Yapahwwa remained in the hands of the inland Sinhalese regime, meaning that by the early twelfth century, after a substantial period of back-and-forth, and series of invasions and counter-invasions, the Chola were largely expelled. The biggest victims of this constant warfare had been the sangha - the powerful monastic communities who had served as landholders for centuries. Their concentrations of wealth had made optimal targets for plunder, compared to rural communities and fortified royal cities. While Anuradhapura would remain a potent religious center, a site of coronations and religious festivals, the monarchy itself transferred its administrative seat to the fortified and defensible Yapahwwa, where it was freed from the sangha. In the thirteenth century, with the Chola preoccupied further afield and the current ruler, Kassapa confident in the security of his regime and the power of his navy, the capital was moved to Polonnaruva.
The thirteenth century marks a period of “cold war” between the Chola and the Sri Lankan monarchy. Sri Lanka had survived the “test” of South Indian imperial aggression. When the two powers next went to war, in 1236, the Sri Lankan fleet actually scored a decisive victory, which they followed up with a raid on the port of Nagapatnam. It had made evident that it was not another kingdom to be humiliated and subsumed - possessed of a powerful fleet and substantial material wealth, it made itself a difficult test for any would-be Tamil conqueror. This was a time of material progress - the expansion and redevelopment of irrigation works damaged in the fighting - increased overseas trade and the increased voyages of Sri Lankan merchants westward beyond Cape Watya.
Perhaps this reversal of fortunes owes much to the gradual shift in the balance of power. The Tamil had profited from a disunited Southeast Asia, where their merchants and guilds could play sides off one another. The unity of Majachaiya was a dangerous threat to their ability to project power - no longer could fleets of Tamil warships “maintain order” in the Malay archipelago. This reduced, in turn, the concessions that the Tamil could extract. Tamil trade companies had to play ball on a relatively even playing field, lacking the ability to force concessions from individual, isolated polities or establish plantations without oversight. While the Majachaiya were happy with the plantation system and the trade networks they had inherited through conquest, they mandated a sort of even playing field - tax revenue had to come in and everyone had to pay their dues.
In this era, Sri Lankan trading guilds began to buy property in the ports of Cape Watya and establish foriegn quarters in cities ranging from China to Bakhtiyar Egypt, where the Canal of Akhsau Mansar still provided a shipping lane for those who wanted to bring their goods overland into the Mediterranean. Although this brought them into direct competition with the Chandratreya and the Tamil, any thought of crushing the expansion of their trade was put aside as the Chandratreya embarked on their half-century long period of warfare against the Pala, plunging the subcontinent into war and changing priorities overnight for many of the great trading and banking houses. The Sri Lankans, like the Tamil, had been excluded from the White Elephant Concordats, and this drove their policy of securing concessions, at times by force. Furthermore, their soldiers and sailors had been honed by decades of on and off war with the Tamil - meaning that when, for example, a Sri Lankan fleet arrived off the coast of Aden in 1339, seeking repayments for the Malik’s debts, their demands were taken very seriously, even when their demands included a fortification near the harbor. A subsequent naval conflict with the Haruniya in 1346 was resolved after the Battle of the Barim, where a fleet of dozens of Haruniya warships were crushed by a force of Sri Lankan perhaps half their size.
The Sri Lankan elite, having inherited memories of Tamil occupation and several decades of warfare, was not slow to react when the Tamil launched their major intervention in Siddhapura. A few months after that intervention, Sri Lankan ships under the command of one Prince Vatta showed up on the Watyan coast, arriving at the town of Ankaramena [OTL Cape Town]. There, against the (ineffectual) objections of the local Randryan, they established a fortified harbor in the previously sleepy shipping village. Imported Mahratta mercenaries set to work erecting shore batteries and fortresses. The Sri Lankan sailors christened the the new fortification Sihanuwara, and set to work expanding and fortifying the harbor.
The town of Watya itself [OTL Van Dyk’s Bay] was equally incapable of responding to this new provocation. The Randryan had always been rural in their focus - settlers and farmers, primarily, they had relied on the protection of Kapudesan and Chandratreyan fleets and soldiers to defend them. But the fleets had been recalled, and the soldiers based in Watya refused to risk open war without orders which would take time to filter down. Kapudesa in particular was bought off with certain diplomatic promises and assurances that the favorable status of their merchants would be maintained. The Sri Lankan coup over Watya was completed over the course of a few years. The few other coastal towns, such as Tandrano [Port Elizabeth] and Antsiranama [Durban], were able to mount more effective resistance - gathering soldiers from the hinterland and digging in cannons along the shore - but by 1342, there was an understanding that the conquest of Watya was essentially a foregone conclusion, although the Sri Lankan soldiers never made any attempt to disrupt the Randryan in the hinterlands - and indeed acknowledged their property rights and offered them gifts.
The seizure of Watya essentially brought an end in fact, if not in law, to the fiction that trade in the Indian Ocean and beyond could be regulated by the agreement of local monarchies and trade councils. In a matter of a few years, the Yapahwwa monarchy demonstrated that they could, and would, project power without the consent of their peer competitors, and due to the distraction of their principal rivals in Thana, their power would grow unchecked by any adversary except the Pandya - who, to their immense detriment, still had to guard against Pala and Chandretreya incursions from the north.
[1] A major divergence from OTL.
[2] This is actually as OTL.
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