The Great Torpedo Scandal Avoided

[DaveJ576]

It is June, 1923 and the Department of the Navy makes an important decision. Resisting intense political pressure by members of congress from New England, the Navy does not give Naval Torpedo Station Newport sole responsibility for designing, testing, and construction of torpedoes. Instead, NTS Alexandria remains open and commercial involvement, particularly by companies like Bliss-Leavitt is continued and expanded. NTS Newport remains as the principal design agent and retains a construction capacity.

Torpedo development continues apace during the 20’s and 30’s. The Mark 13, 14 and 15 torpedoes are designed, tested, and put into service. The infusion of talent and techniques from Alexandria and the commercial firms results in a remarkably trouble free development period for these weapons. Submarine qualified officers from the fleet are assigned to Newport as fleet liaisons and this results in a close working relationship with the operating forces. Although the Depression places severe limits on the amount of live testing that occurs, several significant problems are found and quickly rectified through innovative testing techniques introduced by technicians at NTS Alexandria. Mass production techniques introduced by the commercial firms lowers the per unit cost and enables the Navy to buy fairly large numbers of the weapons.

Work on the magnetic influence exploder however, ran into serious snags. Working closely with technicians from Sperry and Westinghouse, engineers at Newport came to the conclusion that it would not consistently work under operating conditions in the field. Development work is halted and greater effort was put into ensuring that the Mark 6 contact exploder worked properly.

On 07 December 1941 submarines, destroyers, PT boats, and torpedo planes go into action loaded to the gills with a fully developed and reliable weapon, and…

What happens now?

All other characteristics of these weapons stays the same: range, speed, warhead size, and bubbly wake.

 

[burmafrd]

The torpedo scandal of WW2 is probably the last one that has never had a real movie or major book done on it. And its arguably one of the worst we had. Frankly there should have been several executions for treason, starting with the heads of the Newport factory and going to the local congressmen= they all should have hung. We will never know how many of our submariners died because of faulty torpedoes; we are pretty well aware of all the duds and problems on the surface side of things. The IJN would have taken a lot more casualties early in the war then it did; really hard to say how much could have changed. One thing is for sure: the Japanese cargo ships and maru's would have been whittled down a lot faster and probably would have made a big difference starting in 43.

 

[BernieP2]

Couldn't Agree More!

I couldn't agree more with the previous comment. The impact that the Gato Class boats had on the Pacific War has often been overlooked.

The Captains of the period knew about the problems, and I can't help believe that it influenced their tactical decisions ... "what if I fire and the fish don't detonate????" A faith in the quality of your weapons is one of the underlying backstops of any warrior.

BEP

 

[Alikchi]

Considering the poor areas of operations for USN subs before the torpedo problem was solved, and the continuing resistance of the Japanese for several months even after essentially running out of ships big enough to use a torpedo on.. the war might be a month or two shorter, if that.

 

[mattep74]

The torpedo scandal of WW2 is probably the last one that has never had a real movie or major book done on it. And its arguably one of the worst we had. Frankly there should have been several executions for treason, starting with the heads of the Newport factory and going to the local congressmen= they all should have hung. We will never know how many of our submariners died because of faulty torpedoes; we are pretty well aware of all the duds and problems on the surface side of things. The IJN would have taken a lot more casualties early in the war then it did; really hard to say how much could have changed. One thing is for sure: the Japanese cargo ships and maru's would have been whittled down a lot faster and probably would have made a big difference starting in 43.

Portions of the miniseris War and Remembrance had this problem looked into

 

[dogsbody]

There was a movie that did mention the torpedo problem, but I can't remember what it was called. I haven't seen it in decades. I think it may have had Clark Gable in it.

 

[DaveJ576]

My take on the situation...

As I see it, the end result is somewhere between burmafrd’s and Alikchi’s estimations. It is important to understand that while the torpedo scandal was a prime contributor to the poor performance of our submarines during the first year and a half of the war, there were other very serious problems afoot as well.

Prewar doctrine had our boats out ahead of the battle line as the eyes and ears of the fleet. They were to scout and report on the enemy’s composition and movements, then conduct whittling down attacks prior to the main fleet engagement. This same doctrine greatly overestimated the ability of destroyers and escorts to detect and attack submarines, and the lethality of their depth charges. Submariners had been bullied into a supporting role for the battle line, and had been mistakenly cowered into a position of impotency in the face of destroyer opposition by the “Gun Club” admirals, mostly to preserve the idea of the battleship as the queen of the fleet.

Thus, when they suddenly found themselves in the midst of a formerly morally repulsive anti-shipping war (thanks to the Huns), only a few submariners knew what to do and the rest did a lot of flopping and twitching. There was no doctrine, training, or structure in place for this and when faced with the down and dirty reality of war, many of our sub skippers simply washed out.

The command, control, and communications for the boats was also not suited for the shit storm they found themselves in. It wasn’t until “Uncle Charlie” Lockwood took over as COMSUBPAC in January, 1943 that the right man was in place at the top who could straighten out the mess and get the force going.

New tactics had to be worked out. All the prewar stuff was thrown out the window and new ideas were worked up. The end around, the down the throat shot, night surface attacks, and the integration of radar into the tactical environment were all tactics that had to be developed, taught, and put into practice.

Lastly, there was a shortage of boats. It wasn’t until late 1942 when sizable numbers of the Gato class were in theater and the Balao class boats were sliding down the ways that we had enough boats to go out and really start doing a Rocky Marciano on the Japanese merchant marine.

So how does all this play out? Actually, until late 1942 the strategic picture would not dramatically change. Sure enough, there would be additional sinkings. There were some really good skippers out there in the early days like Chester Smith, Joe Grenfell, Lew Parks, and “Moon” Chapple who would have come home with the broom lashed to the periscope, signaling a clean sweep. USS Nautilus would have certainly sunk the Kaga at Midway instead of denting her with a dud and may have very well dispatched the Kirishima too. If enough tankers and freighters could have been sunk in the right places, Japanese tactics in the Solomons could have been disrupted as well.

My area of expertise is submarines and I will defer to CalBear, Markus, or one of the other guys to expound on the implications for the destroyers, PT boats, and the VT squadrons.

The aforementioned problems though, would have taken time to overcome and this would have to a large extent nullified the advantage of having a good torpedo.

Starting in late 1942 however (approximately 9-10 months earlier than the OTL), the maru slaughter would have begun. The lack of tankers and the fuel they transport would have serious implications for the Japanese responses to the Philippines and the Marianas operations. I would estimate that by January, 1945 at the latest the entire Japanese economy, their industry, and their war making potential would have come to a complete standstill, idled by a universal lack of fuel, spare parts, food, and other essentials brought on by the utter destruction of the Japanese merchant marine and could very well have ended the war right there.

Dave

www.pigboats.com

 

[Mike Stearns]

There was a movie that did mention the torpedo problem, but I can't remember what it was called. I haven't seen it in decades. I think it may have had Clark Gable in it.

I will assume that you are thinking of Run Silent, Run Deep.

 

[Torqumada]

I will assume that you are thinking of Run Silent, Run Deep.

Actually the John Wayne movie, Operation Pacific had scenes dealing with them testing the torpedoes. It came out about 7 years before Run Silent, Run Deep.

Torqumada

 

[mattep74]

Maybe if the torpedo problem was fixed before 1942 the americans sent out their subs in a Wolfpack tactic at Midway.

Imagine this, they runt silent as the might of the japanese fleet surrounds them and know there are american airplanes coming soon.

They watch the torpedoeplanes fail and then prepare for their own torpedoattacks.

They then see the divebombers taking out the carrriers.

Then the subs join the party and attack all ships above destroyerstrength.

 

[David S Poepoe]

If US torpedoes were functioning better at the beginning of the war, when there are fewer US submarines operating in the Pacific, why shouldn't it be expected that the Japanese would begin adopting anti-submarine tactics earlier?

 

[Matt Wiser]

If memory serves from reading various books on the subject, the IJN had exactly two officers working full time on ASW before the war. Two. The IJN was so offensive minded that matters that both the USN and RN worked on prewar, such as convoy protection and ASW, were neglected. Oh sure, invasion forces had ample cover, as did battle force units such as Kido Butai, but convoys as a matter of routine, no. Only in forward areas, like the Solomons, was convoying a requirement. Only in mid 1943 did convoys begin regular trips to the Mandates (Marshalls, Carolines), the NEI, and Malaya. But it wasn't until 1945 that both the Army and Navy established a joint shipping board to coordinate shipping schedules and cargoes, and by that time it was too late. (before then, if a Navy transport was headed to, say, Manila, and Army cargo needed to be shipped there, the Navy wouldn't ship the cargo in any empty space and the Army has to use one of its own chartered ships to do the job, and vice versa) More effective torpedoes, though is only part of the problem; clearing out the deadwood among the skippers, and leadership in both SUBPAC and SUBSOWESPAC that's willing to listen to the skippers and hear their (justified) complaints are the other issues needing to be addressed.

 

[David S Poepoe]

If memory serves from reading various books on the subject, the IJN had exactly two officers working full time on ASW before the war. Two. The IJN was so offensive minded that matters that both the USN and RN worked on prewar, such as convoy protection and ASW, were neglected. Oh sure, invasion forces had ample cover, as did battle force units such as Kido Butai, but convoys as a matter of routine, no. Only in forward areas, like the Solomons, was convoying a requirement. Only in mid 1943 did convoys begin regular trips to the Mandates (Marshalls, Carolines), the NEI, and Malaya. But it wasn't until 1945 that both the Army and Navy established a joint shipping board to coordinate shipping schedules and cargoes, and by that time it was too late. (before then, if a Navy transport was headed to, say, Manila, and Army cargo needed to be shipped there, the Navy wouldn't ship the cargo in any empty space and the Army has to use one of its own chartered ships to do the job, and vice versa) More effective torpedoes, though is only part of the problem; clearing out the deadwood among the skippers, and leadership in both SUBPAC and SUBSOWESPAC that's willing to listen to the skippers and hear their (justified) complaints are the other issues needing to be addressed.

You are very much right. However, the US Navy initially had its own deadwood of officers that it had to weed out.

 

[burmafrd]

But there were good captains out there early on; who knows some of them might have been great ones but got sunk due to bad torps- we will never know. To this day in the cases of several of the subs sank in 1942 we know very little about what happened to them; the IJN lost so many ships logs and many of them made few reports - I firmly believe some of them were lost due to bad torps. And has been mentioned the numerous duds that WERE reported could have made a significant difference in 1942. I disagree that the sub situation is as bad as Dave describes- the subs were not that badly trained or led/

 

[DaveJ576]

But there were good captains out there early on; who knows some of them might have been great ones but got sunk due to bad torps- we will never know. To this day in the cases of several of the subs sank in 1942 we know very little about what happened to them; the IJN lost so many ships logs and many of them made few reports - I firmly believe some of them were lost due to bad torps. And has been mentioned the numerous duds that WERE reported could have made a significant difference in 1942. I disagree that the sub situation is as bad as Dave describes- the subs were not that badly trained or led/

Being a submariner myself, it always pains me to criticize the Submarine Service. But if we are to learn from our mistakes, it is necessary. The situation was indeed as bad as I described. It has been thoroughly researched and noted in depth by numerous authors including Clay Blair, Edward L. Beach, and Thomas Parrish, among others. Dozens of skippers were relieved of command for lack of aggressiveness or failure to perform. Two were relieved due to nervous breakdowns. Admiral English argued with Withers, who argued with Wilkes, who argued with Carpender, who argued with Lockwood, etc., etc. Admiral Withers and Christie in particular, hardcore members of the Gun Club who developed the Mk 6 exploder, steadfastly refused to admit that there was anything wrong with the damn thing until it was almost too late. The boats were deployed poorly, and the list goes on and on.

In all of this doom and gloom, however, several heartening things are apparent. Yes there were some good C.O.'s out there as I previously mentioned. There was also an excellent corps of junior officers on the boats that were not wedded to the old ways and were very adaptable. These J.O.'s rapidly fleeted up, some to command, and most proved quite successful.

In addition, with the exception of the torpedo mechanical problems, the submarine force learned very quickly. From the top down they recognized their mistakes and problems and developed workable solutions to them almost on the fly. By the summer of 1943, most of this crap had been done away with, and once the Great Maru Slaughter began, the Japanese Merchant Marine and a large portion of the IJN was swept from the seas in less than 18 months. This rapid progress up a very steep learning curve is remarkable and is what I am most proud of.

I see your points, but I still believe that while sinkings would have increased, they would not have been enough to dramatically alter the OTL. The problems that I mentioned would have unfortunately virtually nullified the advantage of having a good torpedo, had it been available.

Dave

www.pigboats.com

 

[Matt Wiser]

You're right about the skipper problem; too much deadwood to clean out before the aggressive ones really get going. Not to mention Withers, Christie, and Fife, who were very involved in the Mark-6 exploder's design and very, very reluctant to admit that they'd made any kind of mistake. It took Tommy Kinkaid taking over 7th FLT to finally get rid of the Mark-6 exploder. He was under a ton of pressure from both Nimitz and King to get rid of it, and that was one of the first things he did after taking command. One author had this to say about the torpedo scandals in both the USN and the Kreigsmarine: "In the USN, those who sent faulty torpedoes to sea were promoted. In the Kreigsmarine, those who did the same thing went to prison." Admiral Lockwood said it this way: "No one will ever get a court-martial out of this fiasco." He was right.

One other question: how many of the idiots at BuOrd who kept disregarding what the sub skippers, destroyer captains, and the torpedo aviators were saying about the lamentable performance of their weapons had been in combat after 7 Dec 41? Someone needed to remind these folks (without being insubordinate) that what works fine on the test range doesn't always work in combat. And if that meant sending someone from BuOrd (or two, or three) out to WestPac on a war patrol to see with their own eyes what's really happening, so be it. Maybe, just maybe, some of these gents from D.C., seeing how bad things were, might have lit a fire at BuOrd to get something done.

 

[burmafrd]

To me its always been on both Nimitz and King to force action as regards the torpedo problem. It was very clear after only the first couple of months of the war that something was wrong with our torpedoes. A rigourous set of tests should have been immediately ordered by either one of them= and it did not happen. Eternal shame on both of them.

 

[pacifichistorian]

Christie, Withers, English, & Fife should all've been busted & retired for this fiasco. And even Lockwood didn't do enough, IMO, despite his good rep.

The effect? Changing nothing else (the impact of knowing the fish are reliable is impossible to measure, but it's likely to be noticeable), I'd expect to see Japan's economy brought to a halt in about June '44, rather than OTL January '45, & war's end in January '45. If English or Lockwood can be persuaded to change targeting priorities to put tankers & DDs #1 & #2, the Japanese could be bottled up in their harbors for lack of fuel, & convoys rendered even more defenseless than the feckless IJN ASW already made them, & the war shortened still more, say October '44. Add in a pullback of all subs to Pearl, say August '44. Throw in a gift from Customs, when that nitwit in San Fran doesn't copy the Japanese maru code from Nisshin Maru II, & it's over at the end of '43.

 

[burmafrd]

Certainly it would have made a big difference. Getting rid of the magnetic disaster and a stronger striker makes our torpedoes respectable at least.
Even some of the dud captains would have sunk ships and the good ones would have really gone to town. If that could have been done by say March 42 (and since we knew by 1 Jan at the latest that there were problems, an immediate order by King for an investigation then would have turned up the problems no later then the end of January) and say 6 weeks or so to figure out and fabricate the striker solution- so by 1 March the torp problem is solved. That means before the end of the Phillipine Campaign we are hurting the IJN by subs in a much more substantial way.

 

[pacifichistorian]

If that could have been done by say March 42 (and since we knew by 1 Jan at the latest that there were problems, an immediate order by King for an investigation then would have turned up the problems no later then the end of January) and say 6 weeks or so to figure out and fabricate the striker solution- so by 1 March the torp problem is solved. That means before the end of the Phillipine Campaign we are hurting the IJN by subs in a much more substantial way.

Agreed. I have small doubt, given support from ComSubPac (Withers at the time, IIRC; maybe English by this time), a program officer (I'd nominate Tyrrel D. Jacobs) could've solved it much as it was historically, in a quite short time. Maybe not even 6 wk, unless you want to allow time to analyse statistics & patrol reports. I'm thinking of the quick and dirty methods used: net shots to test depth keeping, cherry picker drops to test the impact exploder, & simply dewat the magnetic feature entire.