The Continental Navy

[fernerdave]

What if the Continental Navy been more Competently run? If they had put more resources into Whale boats and row-galleys and less into frigates and such to harrass and burn British shipping, maybe a gallant rescue from the prison hulks? With less supplies, the British might give up sooner.
B. Arnold never switches sides? more of canada for the US?

 

[mowque]

(Just read a book on the topic)

The RN is just too strong to make much of a difference.

 

[wemayberry]

While the Continental Navy could have been more effective, the biggest problem it faced during the war was not the Royal Navy but the draw of privateers. Considering the fortunes many privateers and their backers made, many naval resources that could have been used to build up the Navy were instead used to back privateering ventures. Plus it didn't help that privateers could often pay for their materials up front, while navy quartermasters would often have to wait until the materials were delivered & Congress approved before paying. This meant that many Navy ships sat in their shipyards waiting for supplies while the local privateers sailed out.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Whale boats and galleys wouldn't have the firepower to survive an RN brig or sloop, even in groups, and would also have no way of boarding prison hulks or any other British ships barring absurd odds and/or unlikely carelessness on the part of the British. It sounds like an early version of Jefferson's gunboat plan, which wasted valuable resources and achieved nothing.

 

[fernerdave]

well i am reading "If By Sea" by George C. Daughan right now which is why i have been thinking about this. He keeps going on about how if the Continental Navy had been run more competently (Commanders getting along, building more of the cheaper/smaller/ maneuverable row-galleys) they would have been very effective at fighting the RN. and the British were worried about them, after an action in the Delaware Bay between 13 row-galleys of the Pennsylvania state navy and the 44gun Roebuck, and 20gun Liverpool, the Roebucks Captain Hamond wrote "if the commanders of the galleys had acted with as much judgment as they did courage, they would have taken or destroyed the ship" . I guess i was just curious as to what others thought about this idea.

 

[fernerdave]

This meant that many Navy ships sat in their shipyards waiting for supplies while the local privateers sailed out.

But if the money and materials went towards row-gallys instead of frigates, and then they were used smartly?

 

[danwild6]

I think the frigates were the right way to go. First reason they gave Americans great expeience in the construction of warships. But if you want a more successful Continental Navy you really just need a few single ship action to go the Americans way such as USS Randolph vs HMS Yarmouth. You could also have had better organization on behalf of the Continental Navy which would go along way towards its success.

As far as effecting the course of the war there is a couple opportunities namely Canada in 1775, the Bahamas in 1778, and Bermuda in 1779. I 1775 a couple of Continental warships were supposed to sail into the St. Lawrence and capture shipping in support of the attack on Quebec but their commander choose instead to raid St. Johns then leave. If these two ships capture the supply ships heading to Quebec and a couple RN warships (a sixth rate named HMS Lizard and a sloop...forgot the name). It should be noted that the HMS landed crew and a carronade to aid in the defense of Quebec. It was this carronade that killed Gen. Montgomery and doomed the American attack. Even if the attack still fails Gen. Montgomery may survive and be exchanged later. Having a General as experienced as Montgomery at Washington's sidemay lead to a more successful defense of Philadelphia and/or a successful attack on Newport Rhode Island in 1778.

Anyways thats all for now.

 

[GreatScottMarty]

well i am reading "If By Sea" by George C. Daughan right now which is why i have been thinking about this. He keeps going on about how if the Continental Navy had been run more competently (Commanders getting along, building more of the cheaper/smaller/ maneuverable row-galleys) they would have been very effective at fighting the RN. and the British were worried about them, after an action in the Delaware Bay between 13 row-galleys of the Pennsylvania state navy and the 44gun Roebuck, and 20gun Liverpool, the Roebucks Captain Hamond wrote "if the commanders of the galleys had acted with as much judgment as they did courage, they would have taken or destroyed the ship" . I guess i was just curious as to what others thought about this idea.

I just finished the Biography of John Paul Jones of the same title by Evan Thomas.

It depends upon what you the CN to accomplish. If you want to interdict supplies going to the British Army you need a better Deep Sea Fleet (sloops, Frigates etc) if you wanna break a blockade I suspect Gallies would do the trick. Either way the CN needs to put its eggs in one basket or the other and can't because of lack resources do both.

One thing needed all the way around is more competent captains and a better command structure. Part of the problem when the CN did get good ships and good crews they were incompetently lead. JPJ was one of the few captains to engage on open ocean with the British let alone win a sea battle. A surprising number were either outmanuvered or actually sunk themselves on their own accord. In terms of command structure one of JPJ's issues was the politicization of the Seniority list. JPJ not being of notable family or having good connections was relagated to crank (basically badly designed) ships or ships that were poorly outfitted and equipped and so was immensely frustrated with his role.

A previous poster made a good point about privateers, JPJ on numerous occasions had to deal with losing quality sailors to privateers simply because privateers got regular paychecks. JPJ once captured a privateer and actually boarded a ship impressed the crew as sailors because he found numerous ex-CN sailors in the crew.

No matter how you slice it the CN was incapable of going toe-toe with the British Navy simply because they lacked the disciplined tradition that the RN built up over centuries.

I think if you want them to even have a chance you need this competent Admiral/Commodore level leadership (not necessarily JPJ but he certainly thought he was a good candidate) along with almost all of there available resources going to frigates and sloops and commerce raiding vessels. Then this new CN needs to attack English commerce and the home islands in force. By using the tactical speed of smaller ships to raid and hold hostage British towns they could conduct psychological warfare and scare the Home Islands into an earlier peace. At all costs this CN must avoid a major fleet actions.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

In fact a majority of the CN's frigates wound up reinforcing the RN and a few won't make much difference.

It is certainly doubtful that a few frigates could do more to British supplies and shipping than all the privateers sent out did.

There is also the small detail of a mere six frigates requiring more men and, far more important, more artillery than many Continental Army forces that did battle during the war and if the choice is a few more failed frigates or a large portion of his army I have a good idea which Washington will choose.

Galleys could not possibly break the blockade and requiring large crews but minimal firepower such galleys are going to be easy kills for the RN on the coasts. Also the RN had plenty of experience with other navies with much larger fleets of galleys than the US could field and none gave any sign of defeating or even concerning the RN.


danwild6, it was a miracle that Yarmouth-Randolph encounter went as well as it did, which is to say modest damage being done to HMS Yarmouth(64)before the Randolph exploded. Since the Yarmouth was still in good shape when the Randolph went down it's going to take little short of a miracle or, at minimum, a US frigate, to win that encounter.

 

[Father Maryland]

Whale boats and galleys wouldn't have the firepower to survive an RN brig or sloop, even in groups, and would also have no way of boarding prison hulks or any other British ships barring absurd odds and/or unlikely carelessness on the part of the British. It sounds like an early version of Jefferson's gunboat plan, which wasted valuable resources and achieved nothing.

One of the many many reasons I dislike that SOB.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

The Last Marylander, you should treat yourself to Six Frigates by Ian Toll.

http://www.amazon.com/Six-Frigates-Epic-History-Founding/dp/0393058476

 

[Father Maryland]

The Last Marylander, you should treat yourself to Six Frigates by Ian Toll.

http://www.amazon.com/Six-Frigates-Epic-History-Founding/dp/0393058476

I will most definitely do as such. Thanks for the link.

 

[danwild6]

In fact a majority of the CN's frigates wound up reinforcing the RN and a few won't make much difference.

It is certainly doubtful that a few frigates could do more to British supplies and shipping than all the privateers sent out did.

There is also the small detail of a mere six frigates requiring more men and, far more important, more artillery than many Continental Army forces that did battle during the war and if the choice is a few more failed frigates or a large portion of his army I have a good idea which Washington will choose.

Galleys could not possibly break the blockade and requiring large crews but minimal firepower such galleys are going to be easy kills for the RN on the coasts. Also the RN had plenty of experience with other navies with much larger fleets of galleys than the US could field and none gave any sign of defeating or even concerning the RN.


danwild6, it was a miracle that Yarmouth-Randolph encounter went as well as it did, which is to say modest damage being done to HMS Yarmouth(64)before the Randolph exploded. Since the Yarmouth was still in good shape when the Randolph went down it's going to take little short of a miracle or, at minimum, a US frigate, to win that encounter.

Yeah I'm thinking the powder magazine doesn't get set off and/or a lucky shot from Randolph takes out a mast along with a few senior officers.

 

[wemayberry]

Actually what was advocated in "If By Sea" by George C. Daughan , to use the galleys/whaleboats to capture larger British ships as stepping stone. Capture Sloops A & B with the whaleboats ( Marine Boarders). Then use the sloops to capture frigate C, which inturn could be used to help capture more or bigger ships.

Of course there were only a few occassions where that could have or would have occured.
1. the Battles on the St.Lawerence river.
2.Battle of Charleston, when the Brits were trying to get their ships across the sandbar.
3. There were a few others but I can't recall them off hand.

A source to check for how privateers effected the Navy and the war in general is "Patriot Pirates" by Robert Patton. It makes a few points on how privateers effected the American economy for both good and bad.

 

[GreatScottMarty]

In fact a majority of the CN's frigates wound up reinforcing the RN and a few won't make much difference.

It is certainly doubtful that a few frigates could do more to British supplies and shipping than all the privateers sent out did.

The question isn't about Privateers vs. CN its about perception. If you have privateers sailing under letter of marquee than you are sending out pirates to do as they please and to capture ships to pay their crews. You send the CN out to do this it is a military mission carried on by a nation capable of raiding the British Isles. This is something the French and Spanish couldn't accomplish but JPJ did. Imagine what this does to North's credibility if a CN fleet of 6 Frigates appears of Edinburgh and holds the city hostage. It's not about win a major engagement its about destroying North's credibilty which is what Yorktown eventually did.

There is also the small detail of a mere six frigates requiring more men and, far more important, more artillery than many Continental Army forces that did battle during the war and if the choice is a few more failed frigates or a large portion of his army I have a good idea which Washington will choose.

Agreed it is an expense but instead of wasting money, authority, and diverting the Naval Agents' procurement expertise into Privateers the Congress forces them to sell only to the CN it means there are more supplies of better quality. Thomas writes about who Jones got poor ships like the Ranger and the Bonhomme Richard (yes it captured the Serapis but it was a converted Indiamen and was chosen because of the large captain's cabin); these ships procured by the Naval Agent of Portsmouth, NH and the Duc de Charmont respectively were poorly outfitted because both men were skimming naval stores and diverting the store to privateers and the French Navy respectively.

As for Washington's thoughts. It was not Washington's decision it was the Marine Committee's and later the Admiralty Board's decision. The Board/Comittee contained people like Robert Morris and John Adams, they were entirely capable of getting the funding to pay for the venture. Morris is credited with personally bankrolling a significant part of the ARW. The truth is most people thought Privateers were a better investment, but these same people never really gave the CN the proper tools to carry out the job. The reason privateers were given such an extensive role was because of corruption among some of the people in Congress. John Hancock, Silas Deane among others got even wealthier outfitting privateers to sail and capture prizes. Imagine instead if the CN is given these resources and sells the prizes in France or the Netherlands, I suspect they would come closer to breaking even. The idea of privatizing the navy is like hiring mercenaries to fight the as the Continental Army.

 

[jkay]

Small ships can't stand up to incoming shot atall. Maybe with alot of drill and work on tactics and doctrine. But we had NONE of that in '76 (or in 1812...).

And, there simply was no money or time to build six frigates like later. Build ing good warships takes plenty of both. And, even those six could only've acted under plenty of limitations as in the war of 1812. Meanwhile, America was a small nation, and used to being the lightest-taxed region in the world. And, the land was the key theater; maybe we should've done LESS at sea. Though, the privateers, at least, used existing, privately-managed and -risked investments.

 

[hzn5pk]

Does "If By Sea" cover the Penobscot Expedition in 1779? This was the USN worse defeat up until Pearl Harbor.

Basically, Mass wanted to thart a British advance in Maine. The Brits wanted to establish another colony, New Ireland. The Baystaters wanted Maine for themselves. A few USN ships in Boston were added with a force of Massachusetts Navy ships and they went up to Maine never to return.

One question that I have is how strong would the USN be if all of the state navies were added together for a concentrated effort? Could they mount one limited campaign successfully like what the Penobscot appeared to be or would it still be considered bringing a knife to a gun fight when going against the RN?

 

[Andrew Hudson]

Admiral Arnold?

The continental navy was heavily outnumbered and being a much weaker naval power was only capable of commerce raiding like the Elizabethen sea dogs Drake and Hawkins with the exc eption that Jones was a privateer rather than a pirate. The only fleet action was the Battle of Valcour Island which although the continetal navy lost held up the British advance. Chesepeake Bay, the most significant naval battle was a French victory.The officer in charge at Valcour Island was Benedict Arnold but just suppose he was put in charge of the navy to get him out of the other generals hair?

 

[Grimm Reaper]

GreatScottMarty, all of John Paul Jones' efforts were nothing compared to the shock the British received in 1779 from a combined Spanish-French fleet led by Admiral d'Orvilliers with Don Luis de Cordova as his second. Not only was an army of 40,000 threatening to invade but the allied fleet was superior to available RN forces while the RN's forces were out of position.

Making sure THAT never happened again, plus breaking the desultory siege of Gibralter were far more important than anything John Paul Jones did. Since a genuine risk of invasion and naval disaster didn't bring down North in 1779, a hypothetical raid on Edinburgh certainly isn't.

Further, since a majority of the OTL US frigates were seized by the British or burned by the US to prevent such seizure, unless you can explain how the US can build these ships without the British noticing and taking action, which doesn't even take in to account crews, arms and equipment and supplies, British vessels waiting outside to meet ships which have literally never left port...

You also fail to explain how the Continental Congress, which couldn't even be relied on to supply/pay Washington's army, suddenly could seize most of the resources private individuals put in to the privateers. It couldn't find the financial resources to attempt what you suggest without cutting or gutting other vital interests. Certainly there was little fat to cut from Washington's army! And let Washington hear about resources being wasted after the way the first 13 frigates plus purchases failed while his army is on the verge of coming apart and he will have something to say.

As for this assumption that the US could reliably find the funds needed, given the fact that for much of the war the US was on the edge of bankruptcy and would have failed without the French...



Incidentally the CN did acquire an assortment of ships including frigates from foreign sources, primarily the French, and there's no evidence that any of the 65 ships to serve in the CN, only 11 of which survived the war, made any great difference.

 

[GreatScottMarty]

GreatScottMarty, all of John Paul Jones' efforts were nothing compared to the shock the British received in 1779 from a combined Spanish-French fleet led by Admiral d'Orvilliers with Don Luis de Cordova as his second. Not only was an army of 40,000 threatening to invade but the allied fleet was superior to available RN forces while the RN's forces were out of position.

They were out position because Jones Raid on Selkirk. the fleet unsuccessful because the French Navy was notorious for their filthy ships and living quarters. The fleet was doomed because of an outbreak of cholera

Making sure THAT never happened again, plus breaking the desultory siege of Gibralter were far more important than anything John Paul Jones did. Since a genuine risk of invasion and naval disaster didn't bring down North in 1779, a hypothetical raid on Edinburgh certainly isn't.

I should have elaborated but I was tired, Edinburgh could have been one in a series of raids to shock England. I agree one raid wouldn't do the trick. Several repeated raids for going from 1779-1782 very well could do the trick. If English Seaside towns feel as though their "Wooden Wall" is ineffective, they will be less convinced of the purpose of North's war in the colonies.

Further, since a majority of the OTL US frigates were seized by the British or burned by the US to prevent such seizure, unless you can explain how the US can build these ships without the British noticing and taking action, which doesn't even take in to account crews, arms and equipment and supplies, British vessels waiting outside to meet ships which have literally never left port...

They don't have to not notice. Jones is the distraction. I will admit that the RN won't completely abandon the seas of the colonies but force more ships back to England and you have an opportunity for a more daring captain than some of the captains involved (Saltonstal, Manley among others) to break out.

You also fail to explain how the Continental Congress, which couldn't even be relied on to supply/pay Washington's army, suddenly could seize most of the resources private individuals put in to the privateers. It couldn't find the financial resources to attempt what you suggest without cutting or gutting other vital interests. Certainly there was little fat to cut from Washington's army! And let Washington hear about resources being wasted after the way the first 13 frigates plus purchases failed while his army is on the verge of coming apart and he will have something to say.

The private investors don't get Letters of Marquee granted therefore no Privateers, so they sell/invest in CN ships for a cut of the prize money, therefore more revenue. This won't stop the debt but will certainly help pay some of it down.
At the battle of Flamborough Head (the Serapis Fight) Jones had in his sights a convoy of 50 merchat ships returning fully laden from Sweden. Sweden was the main seller of RN Naval stores during the ARW. If Jones/any captain can capture this convoy or take parts of similar convoys all of a sudden the COngress has its own supplies and saves money by not buying overpriced, poorly built stores from corrupt naval agents.

As for this assumption that the US could reliably find the funds needed, given the fact that for much of the war the US was on the edge of bankruptcy and would have failed without the French...
Incidentally the CN did acquire an assortment of ships including frigates from foreign sources, primarily the French, and there's no evidence that any of the 65 ships to serve in the CN, only 11 of which survived the war, made any great difference.

A more successful Naval war may have brought in Dutch loans earlier. With a more competently lead and aggressive CN we may see earlier and greater loans from other foreign powers. Most of the Great Powers were unwilling to provoke England. If the CN can win a few more fights on the RN's turf we may see more funds sooner. As for the foreign ships, I addressed this already most were crank and in poor condition; most with poorly cast cannon and bad sails. Most CN cannon were bought from France, the French naval cannons were notorious for misfiring. Jones was a victim of this himself.