The Continental Navy

No, the problem that the French had in 1779 was waiting for the overdue Spanish fleet to arrive. An extended period at sea has an unfortunate effect on supplies and living conditions, especially when you can't return to port out of concern that the ally(Spain) might finally arrive after you leave.

40+ SOLs were certainly not diverted for more than a month due to any raid by John Paul Jones.



You keep offering ideas which offer wonderful promise, in theory, and not the slightest explanation for how these ideas can come into play. As the new example, if the Continental Congress stops offering Letters of Marque...

1) How the Continental Congress will be willing to do this, given that you've already mentioned the involvment of many key congressmen in privateering, is not given.

2) How the Continental Congress can get all the (financially troubled) state governments to stop issuing such Letters is not given.

3) How you can convince the investors in privateering to divert their wealth and ships(!) into the CN, which is sure to involve higher risks and much lower returns, is not given.

4) How the sailors can be persuaded to take a lower rewards for greater risks is not given.

5) How the British will not be able to respond to the naval buildup, especially now that the reduction in privateering frees up their own ships and sooner than any American benefit is not given.




To make matters worse, your basic premise is that the 20+ frigates which the CN did have during the war achieved little but somehow a few more could prove decisive.

When you take into account the genuine threat briefly presented by the French and Spanish in 1779 plus all the British forces tied down elsewhere, especially at the siege of Gibralter, not to mention the literally hundreds of American privateers at sea, the odds of a few more American raiders making a difference either to North's government or the RN's efforts in North America to a greater degree than all those historical events are pretty much nil.

However, the diversion of thousands of men and hundreds of artillery pieces and desperately need funding for the CN, given the US defeats on land 1779-1781, could well do more damage to the Continental Army than anything a few raiders could repair.



Oh, God, now you're imagining the US somehow developing massive artillery foundries as well, which the British also never notice or never think to take any action against, in complete disregard of the fact that the Continental Congress would have loved to do that, as would the independent United States over the next generation, but could not.:rolleyes:
 
No, the problem that the French had in 1779 was waiting for the overdue Spanish fleet to arrive. An extended period at sea has an unfortunate effect on supplies and living conditions, especially when you can't return to port out of concern that the ally(Spain) might finally arrive after you leave
40+ SOLs were certainly not diverted for more than a month due to any raid by John Paul Jones..


The French got sick plain and simple. The Spanish were late yes but the French got sick, by the time the Spanish got there the French had Cholera in approx. half their ships. Maybe true but if the French don't get sick the diversionary Raid does what it is supposed to do. It was a diversion from the beginning that became famous because the French got sick and the Spanish were late. So at most we are both right.

You keep offering ideas which offer wonderful promise, in theory, and not the slightest explanation for how these ideas can come into play. As the new example, if the Continental Congress stops offering Letters of Marque...

Thanks

1) How the Continental Congress will be willing to do this, given that you've already mentioned the involvment of many key congressmen in privateering, is not given.

Make privateering something the King does and good Republicans surely wouldn't engage in such a heinous practice as outfitting pirates. That is the argument that could be used. I think if you change some early leadership roles and remove those men to less favorable positions privateering may not take off. I.E. Silas Deane never is sent to France, John Hancock not Pres. of 1st Con. Congress

2) How the Continental Congress can get all the (financially troubled) state governments to stop issuing such Letters is not given.

I want to say remove there ability to grant Letters but that doesn't solve the problem. States are much freer to do as they please under the Articles than our current Constitution. I think if the CN is a stronger or at least a better led force from the beginning the states may not feel the need and will support galleys instead

3) How you can convince the investors in privateering to divert their wealth and ships(!) into the CN, which is sure to involve higher risks and much lower returns, is not given.

Remove the privateers high placed sponsors, and instead have the Congress the buy ships and outfit them. A bit impractical but the key is to remove the impetus to divert CN supplies to their privateers instead have the "privateers" operate under CN rules and regs. So instead these private ships are bought from the owners outfitted at a 50/50 rate and the spoils are returned at a 50/50 rate. The investors having no other options takes the rates given them.

4) How the sailors can be persuaded to take a lower rewards for greater risks is not given.

What else will they do? They can join the army

5) How the British will not be able to respond to the naval buildup, especially now that the reduction in privateering frees up their own ships and sooner than any American benefit is not given.

There isn't a reduction so much as a reallocation of forces. If the Congress can take part ownership of the privateers and force them to obey CN rules and Regs. then the British have an even bigger threat coming at them. Motivated and well disciplined crews instead of vultures looking for easy targets.

To make matters worse, your basic premise is that the 20+ frigates which the CN did have during the war achieved little but somehow a few more could prove decisive.

No my basic premise is that a better lead CN can accomplish more, than OTL's because most of the early captains in 76-77 are fisherman who won't fight and owe there position to political connections. The number of ships is relevant in the sense that more ships is better but a better lead top to bottom CN of 20+ frigates is what we want.

When you take into account the genuine threat briefly presented by the French and Spanish in 1779 plus all the British forces tied down elsewhere, especially at the siege of Gibralter, not to mention the literally hundreds of American privateers at sea, the odds of a few more American raiders making a difference either to North's government or the RN's efforts in North America to a greater degree than all those historical events are pretty much nil.

Privateers are concerned with Financial gain for themselves and their backers and not for winning a war. Yes they will effect commerce, but inspire fear and bring the war to the Home Islands no.

However, the diversion of thousands of men and hundreds of artillery pieces and desperately need funding for the CN, given the US defeats on land 1779-1781, could well do more damage to the Continental Army than anything a few raiders could repair.

Everyone is strapped for funding, the CN being the only show in town (no Privateers may alleviate some of these problems) on the oceans will help them in procurement but will not fix any land war problems significantly although the CN interdicting naval stores as mentioned previously may help more, because they Congress won't have to buy the stores back at inflated prices.

Oh, God, now you're imagining the US somehow developing massive artillery foundries as well, which the British also never notice or never think to take any action against, in complete disregard of the fact that the Continental Congress would have loved to do that, as would the independent United States over the next g
generation, but could not.:rolleyes:

I'm don't need artillery foundries in the US I need better Naval Agents in charge of procurement. As I detailed before, better agents in charge of procurement will go along way to guaranteeing better Naval equipment, which no matter how you slice it will make the CN more successful.
 
GreatScottMarty, I think you're not understanding what a poor nation the United States was, far poorer than any European nation. The entire nation had two million people, comparable to today's one not-so-populous state of New Mexico. And we were condemned by colonial policy to only do things that made little money. Meanwhile, the UK was the richest nation, and had the biggest, most powerful navy all the way until WW2. The shoe of world hegemony lay on the UK's foot.

To win on the sea much, you need a bigger or better fleet than the opposition. We have that now, but we can't send our carriers, subs, and missile ships back in time to then. In 1812, we did well on raiding, but spent most of the war blockaded in by the vastly superior fleet. Nor could we'e possibly caught up 'til WWIish, a century and a half too late.

To get said fleet takes LOTS of money and time. The UK had HUNDREDS of the most powerful kind of ship, a ship of the line, the aircraft carrier of its day. It took us decades to be able to afford and complete ONE ship of the line. And, it took three years from the money starting for the first few frigates to arrive, which would've been almost half the Revolutionary War without them.

Meanwile, losing on the sea didn't cost us the war, while losing on land would've.
 
The OP: asked what would make the CN more effective? I Know how poor and unpopulous the US was. I am a citizen and a student of history.

I am simply trying to give my opinion. I don't think the CN can beat the RN in a stand up fight or compete ship to ship. I just think privateers were a poor use of money and not took away capable sailors and captains from the CN but put US naval development backward at least 20 years. I am not proposing the CN build more ships I am saying they incorporate the privateers more thoroughly (sort of as contract workers not pirates with no one to answer to).

I am not proposing the congress divert money from the army, I think if the CN had better agents in charge of procurement coupled with less corrupt officials and privateers that had to answer to a naval officer and not the ship's owners than the privateers could have been used for more than personal profit of said naval agents and in fact contribute to the war effort by making the materials they take as part govt. property. Therefore elimanting the need to buy back some of the supplies at inflated rates from the same corrupt procurement agents.
 
GreatScottMarty, I think you're not understanding what a poor nation the United States was, far poorer than any European nation. The entire nation had two million people, comparable to today's one not-so-populous state of New Mexico. And we were condemned by colonial policy to only do things that made little money. Meanwhile, the UK was the richest nation, and had the biggest, most powerful navy all the way until WW2. The shoe of world hegemony lay on the UK's foot.

To win on the sea much, you need a bigger or better fleet than the opposition. We have that now, but we can't send our carriers, subs, and missile ships back in time to then. In 1812, we did well on raiding, but spent most of the war blockaded in by the vastly superior fleet. Nor could we'e possibly caught up 'til WWIish, a century and a half too late.


Two million inhabitants? Not quite around two million supporters of independence but a overall populace of around six million (Though many of the loyalists left post war) America was rather rich in resources and in several fields one of which was shipbuilding/shipping.

Concerning the WW2 bit the USN was stronger by a decent degree more than a decade before WW2.
 
The Last Marylander, the total population was @2.5 million during the ARW, including Loyalists and neutrals who made up 40-50% of the total population, not to mention Native Americans and slaves who were understandably of questionable commitment to the ARW.



GreatScottMarty, the Continental Congress does not have a fraction of the money to buy all or even half the privateers, let alone outfit them, nor are the ship owners under the slightest obligation to sell their ships. They can sit back and await a change in congressional plans or just take a state-issued Letter of Marque instead. Likewise the sailors who chose the safer and more lucrative service on privateers are not under the slightest obligation to join the CN or the Continental Army, least of all for the scanty and unreliable wages paid.

One also must wonder if an effort by the Continental Congress to take away the last acceptable livelihood of thousands of sailors might have dangerous repercussions for the US.

Your plan to reduce the use of privateering by erasing key figures like John Hancock from their roles in history could erase the ARW itself, which would rather defeat the purpose of the operation.



I see you're sticking with this idea that different procurement agents would permit the Continental Congress to either purchase or simply confiscate huge fleets of ships and acquire naval artillery sufficient to equip them, although since you've already spit on French armaments and obviously British aren't available one must wonder what nation has sufficient naval artillery to equip the entire expanded CN AND is willing to go to war with the British for the privilege.

This doesn't even consider how thousands of sailors, whose motives for joining privateers you repeatedly malign, will suddenly discover the patriotic virtue of serving on poorly paid warships intended to be put in harm's way to a much greater degree. They won't.

And a return to fleets of galleys as well...:rolleyes:
 
The Last Marylander, the total population was @2.5 million during the ARW, including Loyalists and neutrals who made up 40-50% of the total population, not to mention Native Americans and slaves who were understandably of questionable commitment to the ARW.



GreatScottMarty, the Continental Congress does not have a fraction of the money to buy all or even half the privateers, let alone outfit them, nor are the ship owners under the slightest obligation to sell their ships. They can sit back and await a change in congressional plans or just take a state-issued Letter of Marque instead. Likewise the sailors who chose the safer and more lucrative service on privateers are not under the slightest obligation to join the CN or the Continental Army, least of all for the scanty and unreliable wages paid.

One also must wonder if an effort by the Continental Congress to take away the last acceptable livelihood of thousands of sailors might have dangerous repercussions for the US.

Your plan to reduce the use of privateering by erasing key figures like John Hancock from their roles in history could erase the ARW itself, which would rather defeat the purpose of the operation.



I see you're sticking with this idea that different procurement agents would permit the Continental Congress to either purchase or simply confiscate huge fleets of ships and acquire naval artillery sufficient to equip them, although since you've already spit on French armaments and obviously British aren't available one must wonder what nation has sufficient naval artillery to equip the entire expanded CN AND is willing to go to war with the British for the privilege.

This doesn't even consider how thousands of sailors, whose motives for joining privateers you repeatedly malign, will suddenly discover the patriotic virtue of serving on poorly paid warships intended to be put in harm's way to a much greater degree. They won't.

And a return to fleets of galleys as well...:rolleyes:

Really? I thought it was two million Patriots,Two million loyalists and two million neutrals.
 
GreatScottMarty

The French got sick plain and simple. The Spanish were late yes but the French got sick, by the time the Spanish got there the French had Cholera in approx. half their ships. Maybe true but if the French don't get sick the diversionary Raid does what it is supposed to do. It was a diversion from the beginning that became famous because the French got sick and the Spanish were late. So at most we are both right.

As Grimm says, the French got sick because they had to wait for the Spanish. It was very difficult keeping sizeable forces of men packed into cramped and unsanitary conditions with poor diets healthy. If the Spanish hadn't been late, although co-ordinating fleets at the time was virtually impossible, it might as said have gone very badly for Britain.

Also, if the US had got a force of frigates together and started raiding British coastal settlements it might well have had a big effect on feeling in Britain. However not necessarily the way you think. A lot of people were rather lukewarm about the conflict but if you start burning their homes and businesses you might find a strong reaction. Not to mention the problem of putting so many expensive eggs into a single basket.;)


Make privateering something the King does and good Republicans surely wouldn't engage in such a heinous practice as outfitting pirates. That is the argument that could be used. I think if you change some early leadership roles and remove those men to less favorable positions privateering may not take off. I.E. Silas Deane never is sent to France, John Hancock not Pres. of 1st Con. Congress

Privateering was attractive because it was relatively cheap, it attracted private funds and ships and hence was even cheaper for the desperately underfunded rebels and since it gave potentially rich returns for the sailors made it much easier to recruit them. If you're seeking to appeal to their better nature you will find it won't waste much for men in such conditions. Especially considering as Grimm points out, the problems of equipping and paying the regular navy. Not to mention the fears a lot of the sailors will understandably have that if their in a regular warship their commander might start getting ideas about fighting enemy warships rather than seeking undefended merchantmen.

Similarly its very attractive for the men paying for it and supply the ships and equipment because there are the chances of rich returns and the ships will be avoiding combat like the plague. If you deny them that opportunity they will look to invest elsewhere but that's very unlikely to be in the regular navy because the risks will be higher and the rewards less.

This is presuming your trying an appeal to their principles. If you try and compel such actions your likely to see loyalism becoming a lot more popular as your just undermined the claimed reason for the rebellion, to restore/maintain the rights of the individuals. [Since your virtually talking about conscription and also forced allocation of private resources for the state's purposes].

I want to say remove there ability to grant Letters but that doesn't solve the problem. States are much freer to do as they please under the Articles than our current Constitution. I think if the CN is a stronger or at least a better led force from the beginning the states may not feel the need and will support galleys instead

It is difficult to see a way the CN can be stronger and better led from the beginning, because it takes time, money and knowledge to build up a professional naval force. Also even if it is better that still doesn't remove the attraction of privateering.

Remove the privateers high placed sponsors, and instead have the Congress the buy ships and outfit them. A bit impractical but the key is to remove the impetus to divert CN supplies to their privateers instead have the "privateers" operate under CN rules and regs. So instead these private ships are bought from the owners outfitted at a 50/50 rate and the spoils are returned at a 50/50 rate. The investors having no other options takes the rates given them.

AS said above the attraction of privateering is the personal advantages, for both sponsors and crews, of the option. If you remove that option, somehow, then the resources go elsewhere but in a relatively poorly orgainised [because brand new] system with little communication, organisation and experience and the stress of a major war your unlikely to be able to successfully compel them to go where you want. Not to mention making the rebel government deeply unpopular. Also there are a couple of other difficulties with the 50/50 proposal. Since privateers were private ventures the state didn't have to put resources into them. Your now got it paying half the bill. Which it doesn't have the money for. Also who decides and records what the costs and rewards are. Can see plenty of options for both dispute and skulduggery in arguments over that.


What else will they do? They can join the army

Do you know how difficult it was getting recruits for the regular army? Talking people away from home, imposing them to military discipline, giving them poor and irregular pay and expecting them to get shot at! I think they would like that no more than being in the regular navy. At this point most disappear, finding other work in peacetime activities. In the turmoil of war the weak rebel government has no hope of getting in place the regulatory structure to keep track of and compel numbers of its population into such unpleasant and dangerous work. Not to mention the widespread hostility it will generate if it tries.

There isn't a reduction so much as a reallocation of forces. If the Congress can take part ownership of the privateers and force them to obey CN rules and Regs. then the British have an even bigger threat coming at them. Motivated and well disciplined crews instead of vultures looking for easy targets.


See above. Apart from the markedly higher expenses for the government, why would the crews be motivated and well disciplined? Also if their not looking for easy targets their likely to run into warships, which will be highly expensive. [In blood, money and moral].


No my basic premise is that a better lead CN can accomplish more, than OTL's because most of the early captains in 76-77 are fisherman who won't fight and owe there position to political connections. The number of ships is relevant in the sense that more ships is better but a better lead top to bottom CN of 20+ frigates is what we want.

The problem is that the rebels lack the time, experience and resources to build up such a force. [At least early on and probably not really at all in the midst of a bitter conflict like this]. Also if somehow they managed to get such a expensive force, without crippling themsleves elsewhere trying, the last thing they can afford to do is lose much of it in battle. Attacks on trade were done because they were the only way the rebels could have any noticable impact.

Privateers are concerned with Financial gain for themselves and their backers and not for winning a war. Yes they will effect commerce, but inspire fear and bring the war to the Home Islands no.

Not if its not in their interest. However if a regular force of say 6-10 frigates is sailing in British waters what do you think the RN reaction will be. One converted merchantman can hide fairly easily but a sizeable force. Let alone the problem of maintaining it and operating and co-ordinating it so far from home. Its a very good way of possibly losing the war for the rebels.


Everyone is strapped for funding, the CN being the only show in town (no Privateers may alleviate some of these problems) on the oceans will help them in procurement but will not fix any land war problems significantly although the CN interdicting naval stores as mentioned previously may help more, because they Congress won't have to buy the stores back at inflated prices.

Only if you get those naval stores in considerable amounts, avoid corruption in the officials seeking to sell them back to the CN, since prize rules will still apply, and most of all get the large amount of naval stores and time to assemble them into a fleet in the 1st place.

I'm don't need artillery foundries in the US I need better Naval Agents in charge of procurement. As I detailed before, better agents in charge of procurement will go along way to guaranteeing better Naval equipment, which no matter how you slice it will make the CN more successful.

From where? Apart from the reluctance of other nations initially to risk angering Britain by openly arming the rebels and your doubts on the quality of foreign stores you need to find the money to purchase them and to move them to where their required. If your talking solely of US based stores then you still have to persuade the potential sellers to part with their products for the dodgy rebel currency. If your thinking mainly of stealing from Britain, apart from the vagaries of supply but such a route you need a large stock to build the ships to get started in the 1st place.

Marty - your assuming that the disparate and initially disorganised rebel organisations can suddenly start governing the colonies, in may areas of whiich their writ doesn't run, like say Imperial Germany or Britain in WWII. They lack both the knowledge and bureaucratic structure to do that, let along the resources to build a [for them] huge fleet quickly and efficiently. Nor would have have the popular support for such actions.

Steve
 
I think the best way to get a more successful Continental Navy is build the ships the same as OTL but be better organized and led. If the Americans can keep their ships and capture quite a few RN ships then the Continental Navy could be built up into quite a respectable force. It would be interesting to see the CN pull off a raid similar to the raid of St. Eusteis that the RN pulled off. Combining this with greater raids on the home isles you may see the North Government fall and a pro-American government last longer rather than falling relatively soon after its inception.
 
The Last Marylander, actually the US in 1800 had barely 5 million people and that was quite a jump from 1776. Of course, the colonies only had 250K in 1700 so who's complaining?

Other than the Native nations. Oops.
 
I should have elaborated but I was tired, Edinburgh could have been one in a series of raids to shock England. I agree one raid wouldn't do the trick. Several repeated raids for going from 1779-1782 very well could do the trick. If English Seaside towns feel as though their "Wooden Wall" is ineffective, they will be less convinced of the purpose of North's war in the colonies.
To think that M. le duc de Choiseul, and M. de Sartine overlooked so simple (and cheap) a means of winning a naval war with Great Britain.

A few frigates raiding English seaside towns , and the Royal Navy is negated. And of course the raiders are sure of impunity, both by land and by sea.

If you have privateers sailing under letter of marquee than you are sending out pirates to do as they please and to capture ships to pay their crews

Privateers are not pirates. Quite a different thing.

As to the use of galleys, galleys can only operate close in shore. The RN blockades were based on interception of vessels on the high seas, well beyond the range of galleys (there were exceptions of course).

The correct use of galleys was to defend coastal shipping - ie fishing boats and ships that hugged the coast line. Not to engage with Men of War. I do not know if coastal shipping was strategically important to the rebel colonies.
 
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Nikephoros

Banned
The Continental Navy wasn't really designed to decisively engage the British.

But considering the resources available to it, I'd say that they did one hell of a job.

But I'm not knowledgeable enough to comment further on the OP.
 
Actually what was advocated in "If By Sea" by George C. Daughan , to use the galleys/whaleboats to capture larger British ships as stepping stone. Capture Sloops A & B with the whaleboats ( Marine Boarders). Then use the sloops to capture frigate C, which inturn could be used to help capture more or bigger ships.

Of course there were only a few occassions where that could have or would have occured.
1. the Battles on the St.Lawerence river.
2.Battle of Charleston, when the Brits were trying to get their ships across the sandbar.
3. There were a few others but I can't recall them off hand.
why only those places? My idea was that butterflies/handwaving get more row-galleys/whaleboats built and used to harass/capture/burn brittish shipping in the rivers and bays, more competent leaders onto the frigates etc, they dont have to be horatio nelson, but not abject cowards and or bitter rivals. So by making it harder for the British to land troops and then supply and support them, and maybe some CN victories ala Constitution v Java? With the Americans doing better all around, Dutch funding and or the French Alliance comes sooner? what would a 1780 Treaty of Paris or its equivalent look like?
 
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