Thanks! I’m so glad (and a bit floored) that people enjoy what seems like my half-baked ramblings at times.
THE BEATEN PATH: One Bicentennial and Counting
- Thread starter Enigma-Conundrum
- Start date
Don't be so down on yourself, I'd go as far as to say that they're full-baked ramblings.
ACT TWO: Part 4 - When in Soviet Russia...
Nowhere was Jerry Litton more truly populist than on trade. While campaigning for President, he often railed against the ways the free-trading ways of the Republicans hurt those ordinary Americans he was so keenly in tune with. A common refrain in his stump speeches, one often met with thunderous applause from blue-collar voters, was that he was sick and tired of foreign industries gaining manufacturing and agricultural jobs while America’s jobs only decreased. Indeed, once Litton arrived in the White House, one of the ideas expanded upon was the creation of a full cabinet-level department to manage international trade, formed out of portions of the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative’s office. Ultimately, the Litton administration concluded that this department could most efficiently be formed by effectively expanding the duties of the Trade Representative and promoting him to cabinet-level. In general, the proposal received broad support, with even the Chamber of Commerce favoring it. The devil was, as it so often is, in the details, where protectionists similar to Litton worried that the next Republican in office could use it to make a far greater push for free trade and free-traders, often aligned with the aforementioned Chamber of Commerce, worried that this fundamentally-sound idea would give unprecedented control of trade policy to one of Washington’s most powerful protectionists. Regardless of these concerns, when the Congressional whips and Vice President Carey’s stick to the President’s carrot came down to ensure loyalty, only those most ardently opposed to the “unprecedented expansion of government” voted against the Department of International Trade & Investment Authorization Act. Much to the chagrin of the free-trade oriented supporters of the department, Litton and newly-minted Secretary Gephardt immediately began wielding its power heavily in favor of American industry...
NEW DAWN: America Under Jerry Litton, published in 2002
LITTON SIGNS COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID BILL IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA
...Secretary of State George Ball and Secretary of International Trade & Investment Dick Gephardt have stated their departments’ intent to “uphold complete enforcement of the embargo until all conditions are met.” South African Prime Minister Andries Treurnicht is expected to declare a national state of emergency in response...
THE NEW YORK TIMES, December 14th, 1981
FORMER CONGRESSMAN NICHOLAS MASTORELLI DEFEATS PATERSON MAYOR PAT KRAMER IN GUBERNATORIAL BID
...Mastorelli, the Democratic Congressman from the deeply-Republican 9th district who narrowly lost his bid for re-election last year, ran on a platform of government transparency and lower taxes. While tacitly swiping at the tax hike enacted under outgoing Governor Brendan Byrne, his “Littonian” campaign style ultimately attracted many dissatisfied voters…
THE STAR-LEDGER, November 4th, 1981
DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMAN HERMAN BADILLO NARROWLY UNSEATS MAYOR ABZUG IN MAJOR BLOW TO LIBERAL PARTY
...Abzug, while popular with wealthier liberal voters and women, proved unable to surmount Badillo’s strength with working-class, minority, and more moderate voters in the city. Mr. Badillo, who is Puerto Rican, will become the city’s first Hispanic mayor…
THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 4th, 1981
Above: New York City Mayor Herman Badillo.
WARNER DEFEATS ROBB IN CLOSE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION
...Robb’s defeat has been credited to the unpopularity of Governor Howell, who Mr. Warner was able to successfully tie the Lieutenant Governor to…
THE RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, November 4th, 1981
Above: A photo taken of Governor John Warner in 1982.
“Boris Nikolayevich, you are aware of what this is, correct?” Mikhail Suslov, wearing every single one of his seventy-seven years in his expression, was holding a medal in his hand that I knew as the Medal For Courage.
“Yes, Mikhail Andreyevich [Suslov]. That is the Medal For Courage, awarded for outstanding bravery and sacrifice in defense of the Motherland and revolution.”
“Tell me, comrade, do you know how many of these have been awarded for this war in Afghanistan?” The weary General-Secretary asked.
“...no, I do not,” I answered, after a moment of hesitation.
“Nor do I. I have given out hundreds of these, and even I do not know the exact number. Hundreds of these metal trinkets for young men who’ve lost limbs, who’ve lost their minds, who’ve lost blood for the revolution, and some who’ve given far more. All for what? What strides? What gains? We are yet to control anything even resembling a majority of the nation. All we’ve done is throw young men and resources into a bottomless pit, Boris Nikolayevich, then wonder where they’ve all gone.”
“Are you certain that we should be discussing this, comrade? No doubt Yuri Vladimirovich [Andropov] has his men listening in somehow, no?” The KGB director’s post meant that virtually every political office, not to mention residences, such as the one we currently occupied, were tapped by one of his allies.
“Bah! I have served since the Great Patriotic War! Do you think I’ve learned nothing?” The General-Secretary barked in response before wincing.
“I understand. But comrade, surely there is worth in keeping the Americans out, no? They must funnel their own resources into supporting the resistors, after all.” Yes, I opposed the war and aligned myself with the few reformists not behind Andropov, but there was strategic value in Suslov continuing the war.
“Keeping them out of what? A barren wasteland? I never wished to go into the damned desert in the first place, but by the time I had been asked to succeed Leonid Ilyich, I had very little choice. I hoped it would be a quick maneuver, that a small nation like Afghanistan would welcome the revolution with open arms. I had hoped that we would suffer few casualties and that our men would be home within months. Clearly I was incorrect.”
I had no words. This was the man leading the union making the same points as the young reformists misguidedly aligned with Andropov. I had heard Mikhail Gorbachev speaking the same way days before! Here, though, was not just dissent. The General-Secretary meant for action.
“Comrade, do you mean to withdraw?”
“Yes.” That was all he said, and all that he needed to say. Despite this, the barest of world-weary smiles crept onto his face. “I must prepare my speech, Boris Nikolayevich, but before you must leave this meeting that has never occurred, I would like to know: what is your opinion of this?”
“...I cannot say I wholly approve, but I suppose it will be nice to see the expression on Yuri Vladimirovich’s face.” Andropov had been fostering opposition to the war within the Party, supremely ironic given his role in the Hungarian intervention. No doubt his opposition was a ploy to seize power for himself, to convince enough members of the Central Committee to back a coup against Suslov and to instead support the supposed reformist. Sharing these suspicions and likely knowing far more of them, Suslov himself only grimaced.
“Ah yes, Yuri Vladimirovich will not be pleased to learn that his grievances are slipping away. No doubt that his request that I take power for the stability of the union was a farce. He was correct, though - I did need to take this duty for the union’s stability, because his leadership would be far more destabilizing. Boris Nikolayevich, there is little room for trust here. It may be an old man’s folly, but I do feel that I can afford you that small amount of trust. I will not be here forever, and while you may not be the one to take my place, we must ensure that the union does not go down the path of Yuri Vladimirovich. His path is one of ruin and disaster, one of endless war and strife. Preserving the revolution must come first. If I could have continued in my duties under Leonid Ilyich for the rest of my days, I would have. But that is not what the people demanded of me. You do understand me, Boris Nikolayevich?”
“...yes, comrade, I understand and agree.” While I did not agree with Suslov‘s conservatism, the fact that he had taken a liking to me allowed me to ascend through the party, so I agreed. He was correct where Andropov was concerned, the prospect of a union ruled by that butcher wearing the guise of a reformist petrified me. “We will ensure that such a man is kept from power.”
“Good, good. Thank you, Boris Nikolayevich. This will not be simple, but it is long overdue,” Suslov replied. “No doubt there is suspicion of what is occurring, this meeting has gone on for far too long. You must leave.” And so I did, thinking of what the General-Secretary had said. The KGB Director was certainly a ruthless man, and one with many allies amongst the young reformists of the Politburo. With them, and with his own conversion towards them, he was practically the leader of all opposition to Suslov. However, perhaps in a stroke of good fortune, fate turned in my favor. Unbeknownst to myself or Suslov, while we discussed him, Andropov’s kidneys had given in to a lifetime of chemical abuse. His body was discovered slumped over his desk in his own dacha the next day.
AGAINST THE GRAIN: The Unauthorized Autobiography of Boris Yeltsin, smuggled out of the USSR in 2002 following Yeltsin’s death
USSR BEGINS GRADUAL MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
LE MONDE, December 7th, 1981
SOVIET GENERAL-SECRETARY MIKHAIL SUSLOV PRONOUNCED DEAD, SUCCESSION UNCLEAR FOR NOW
...his most likely potential successor, Yuri Andropov, was also declared deceased in November…
THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 25th, 1982
When Suslov passed on, the Soviet Union entered something of a succession crisis. Yuri Andropov was, to many, the natural successor, but he had died two months prior to Suslov. With this in mind, the internal politicking and backstabbing that comes with a leadership vacuum in the CPSU began in full force. The first man to make his intent to govern known was the conservative old guard’s man in the game - Nikolai Tikhonov, Alexei Kosygin’s successor and an avowed communist. Suslov himself had expressed great praise of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, but reformists were quite wary of the man who would, in their eyes, drive the Soviet Union over the cliff in pursuit of ideological purity. As such, one of the few young men with any semblance of notability made his own play for the post - Mikhail Gorbachev, the Politburo’s youngest member. The birthmarked diplomat had been a close ally of Yuri Andropov and was often seen as emblematic of reformist tendencies amongst younger CPSU members. Amongst the reformists, reportedly Boris Yeltsin, then a Central Committee member and surprising ally of the late General-Secretary Suslov - Yeltsin’s career is nothing if not founded on contradiction - attempted to make the all-too-audacious leap to the General-Secretaryship before he was, according to his memoir, strongarmed by the Andropov-loyal KGB. Of course, any citation from Yeltsin’s memoir should be taken with a grain of salt, given his penchant for the dramatic, but the considerable attempts at stymying its release by the Soviet government demonstrate that there is at least a basis of truth in his accounts. Regardless, with the stage set between Tikhonov and Gorbachev for a bitter succession battle, it appeared that Tikhonov was likely to succeed. To many in Moscow, without Yuri Andropov, it appeared that the reformist bloc was one of angry young men, not that of serious government or the majority. Gorbachev, sensing this, made a move that would turn out to be one of the most tremendous backfires in Soviet history. He turned to Andrei Gromyko, the longtime foreign minister and on-and-off ally of his, for assistance in beating back Tikhonov. Gorbachev seemed to believe that “Mr. Nyet,” as pundits of the days of Harry Truman dubbed him, would, in his relentlessly pragmatic style, back up the man least likely to allow the Union to collapse in on itself. As it turns out, Gromyko did just that. Gromyko announced his intent to lead the Soviet Union the next day, and with the entry of such a political titan who was neither a hardliner on domestic policy nor one of the young reformists who so many Soviet gerontocrats looked down upon, nearly all opposition fell away. While condemning Suslov’s weakness - despite continuing the arch-dove's withdrawal from Afghanistan, sensing an opportunity to not sacrifice resources in the region, as Gromyko was nothing if not a masterful pragmatist - Gromyko gave mention to the Solidarity movement in Poland as a threat to the integrity of the Union. While insignificant at the time, the aged diplomat’s focus on the stability of the Union as a whole would ultimately come down on Poland...
THE MODERN SOVIET UNION, published in 2004
Above: Soviet General-Secretary Andrei Gromyko in 1982.
NEW DAWN: America Under Jerry Litton, published in 2002
LITTON SIGNS COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID BILL IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA
...Secretary of State George Ball and Secretary of International Trade & Investment Dick Gephardt have stated their departments’ intent to “uphold complete enforcement of the embargo until all conditions are met.” South African Prime Minister Andries Treurnicht is expected to declare a national state of emergency in response...
THE NEW YORK TIMES, December 14th, 1981
FORMER CONGRESSMAN NICHOLAS MASTORELLI DEFEATS PATERSON MAYOR PAT KRAMER IN GUBERNATORIAL BID
...Mastorelli, the Democratic Congressman from the deeply-Republican 9th district who narrowly lost his bid for re-election last year, ran on a platform of government transparency and lower taxes. While tacitly swiping at the tax hike enacted under outgoing Governor Brendan Byrne, his “Littonian” campaign style ultimately attracted many dissatisfied voters…
THE STAR-LEDGER, November 4th, 1981
DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMAN HERMAN BADILLO NARROWLY UNSEATS MAYOR ABZUG IN MAJOR BLOW TO LIBERAL PARTY
...Abzug, while popular with wealthier liberal voters and women, proved unable to surmount Badillo’s strength with working-class, minority, and more moderate voters in the city. Mr. Badillo, who is Puerto Rican, will become the city’s first Hispanic mayor…
THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 4th, 1981
Above: New York City Mayor Herman Badillo.
WARNER DEFEATS ROBB IN CLOSE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION
...Robb’s defeat has been credited to the unpopularity of Governor Howell, who Mr. Warner was able to successfully tie the Lieutenant Governor to…
THE RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, November 4th, 1981
Above: A photo taken of Governor John Warner in 1982.
“Boris Nikolayevich, you are aware of what this is, correct?” Mikhail Suslov, wearing every single one of his seventy-seven years in his expression, was holding a medal in his hand that I knew as the Medal For Courage.
“Yes, Mikhail Andreyevich [Suslov]. That is the Medal For Courage, awarded for outstanding bravery and sacrifice in defense of the Motherland and revolution.”
“Tell me, comrade, do you know how many of these have been awarded for this war in Afghanistan?” The weary General-Secretary asked.
“...no, I do not,” I answered, after a moment of hesitation.
“Nor do I. I have given out hundreds of these, and even I do not know the exact number. Hundreds of these metal trinkets for young men who’ve lost limbs, who’ve lost their minds, who’ve lost blood for the revolution, and some who’ve given far more. All for what? What strides? What gains? We are yet to control anything even resembling a majority of the nation. All we’ve done is throw young men and resources into a bottomless pit, Boris Nikolayevich, then wonder where they’ve all gone.”
“Are you certain that we should be discussing this, comrade? No doubt Yuri Vladimirovich [Andropov] has his men listening in somehow, no?” The KGB director’s post meant that virtually every political office, not to mention residences, such as the one we currently occupied, were tapped by one of his allies.
“Bah! I have served since the Great Patriotic War! Do you think I’ve learned nothing?” The General-Secretary barked in response before wincing.
“I understand. But comrade, surely there is worth in keeping the Americans out, no? They must funnel their own resources into supporting the resistors, after all.” Yes, I opposed the war and aligned myself with the few reformists not behind Andropov, but there was strategic value in Suslov continuing the war.
“Keeping them out of what? A barren wasteland? I never wished to go into the damned desert in the first place, but by the time I had been asked to succeed Leonid Ilyich, I had very little choice. I hoped it would be a quick maneuver, that a small nation like Afghanistan would welcome the revolution with open arms. I had hoped that we would suffer few casualties and that our men would be home within months. Clearly I was incorrect.”
I had no words. This was the man leading the union making the same points as the young reformists misguidedly aligned with Andropov. I had heard Mikhail Gorbachev speaking the same way days before! Here, though, was not just dissent. The General-Secretary meant for action.
“Comrade, do you mean to withdraw?”
“Yes.” That was all he said, and all that he needed to say. Despite this, the barest of world-weary smiles crept onto his face. “I must prepare my speech, Boris Nikolayevich, but before you must leave this meeting that has never occurred, I would like to know: what is your opinion of this?”
“...I cannot say I wholly approve, but I suppose it will be nice to see the expression on Yuri Vladimirovich’s face.” Andropov had been fostering opposition to the war within the Party, supremely ironic given his role in the Hungarian intervention. No doubt his opposition was a ploy to seize power for himself, to convince enough members of the Central Committee to back a coup against Suslov and to instead support the supposed reformist. Sharing these suspicions and likely knowing far more of them, Suslov himself only grimaced.
“Ah yes, Yuri Vladimirovich will not be pleased to learn that his grievances are slipping away. No doubt that his request that I take power for the stability of the union was a farce. He was correct, though - I did need to take this duty for the union’s stability, because his leadership would be far more destabilizing. Boris Nikolayevich, there is little room for trust here. It may be an old man’s folly, but I do feel that I can afford you that small amount of trust. I will not be here forever, and while you may not be the one to take my place, we must ensure that the union does not go down the path of Yuri Vladimirovich. His path is one of ruin and disaster, one of endless war and strife. Preserving the revolution must come first. If I could have continued in my duties under Leonid Ilyich for the rest of my days, I would have. But that is not what the people demanded of me. You do understand me, Boris Nikolayevich?”
“...yes, comrade, I understand and agree.” While I did not agree with Suslov‘s conservatism, the fact that he had taken a liking to me allowed me to ascend through the party, so I agreed. He was correct where Andropov was concerned, the prospect of a union ruled by that butcher wearing the guise of a reformist petrified me. “We will ensure that such a man is kept from power.”
“Good, good. Thank you, Boris Nikolayevich. This will not be simple, but it is long overdue,” Suslov replied. “No doubt there is suspicion of what is occurring, this meeting has gone on for far too long. You must leave.” And so I did, thinking of what the General-Secretary had said. The KGB Director was certainly a ruthless man, and one with many allies amongst the young reformists of the Politburo. With them, and with his own conversion towards them, he was practically the leader of all opposition to Suslov. However, perhaps in a stroke of good fortune, fate turned in my favor. Unbeknownst to myself or Suslov, while we discussed him, Andropov’s kidneys had given in to a lifetime of chemical abuse. His body was discovered slumped over his desk in his own dacha the next day.
AGAINST THE GRAIN: The Unauthorized Autobiography of Boris Yeltsin, smuggled out of the USSR in 2002 following Yeltsin’s death
USSR BEGINS GRADUAL MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
LE MONDE, December 7th, 1981
SOVIET GENERAL-SECRETARY MIKHAIL SUSLOV PRONOUNCED DEAD, SUCCESSION UNCLEAR FOR NOW
...his most likely potential successor, Yuri Andropov, was also declared deceased in November…
THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 25th, 1982
When Suslov passed on, the Soviet Union entered something of a succession crisis. Yuri Andropov was, to many, the natural successor, but he had died two months prior to Suslov. With this in mind, the internal politicking and backstabbing that comes with a leadership vacuum in the CPSU began in full force. The first man to make his intent to govern known was the conservative old guard’s man in the game - Nikolai Tikhonov, Alexei Kosygin’s successor and an avowed communist. Suslov himself had expressed great praise of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, but reformists were quite wary of the man who would, in their eyes, drive the Soviet Union over the cliff in pursuit of ideological purity. As such, one of the few young men with any semblance of notability made his own play for the post - Mikhail Gorbachev, the Politburo’s youngest member. The birthmarked diplomat had been a close ally of Yuri Andropov and was often seen as emblematic of reformist tendencies amongst younger CPSU members. Amongst the reformists, reportedly Boris Yeltsin, then a Central Committee member and surprising ally of the late General-Secretary Suslov - Yeltsin’s career is nothing if not founded on contradiction - attempted to make the all-too-audacious leap to the General-Secretaryship before he was, according to his memoir, strongarmed by the Andropov-loyal KGB. Of course, any citation from Yeltsin’s memoir should be taken with a grain of salt, given his penchant for the dramatic, but the considerable attempts at stymying its release by the Soviet government demonstrate that there is at least a basis of truth in his accounts. Regardless, with the stage set between Tikhonov and Gorbachev for a bitter succession battle, it appeared that Tikhonov was likely to succeed. To many in Moscow, without Yuri Andropov, it appeared that the reformist bloc was one of angry young men, not that of serious government or the majority. Gorbachev, sensing this, made a move that would turn out to be one of the most tremendous backfires in Soviet history. He turned to Andrei Gromyko, the longtime foreign minister and on-and-off ally of his, for assistance in beating back Tikhonov. Gorbachev seemed to believe that “Mr. Nyet,” as pundits of the days of Harry Truman dubbed him, would, in his relentlessly pragmatic style, back up the man least likely to allow the Union to collapse in on itself. As it turns out, Gromyko did just that. Gromyko announced his intent to lead the Soviet Union the next day, and with the entry of such a political titan who was neither a hardliner on domestic policy nor one of the young reformists who so many Soviet gerontocrats looked down upon, nearly all opposition fell away. While condemning Suslov’s weakness - despite continuing the arch-dove's withdrawal from Afghanistan, sensing an opportunity to not sacrifice resources in the region, as Gromyko was nothing if not a masterful pragmatist - Gromyko gave mention to the Solidarity movement in Poland as a threat to the integrity of the Union. While insignificant at the time, the aged diplomat’s focus on the stability of the Union as a whole would ultimately come down on Poland...
THE MODERN SOVIET UNION, published in 2004
Above: Soviet General-Secretary Andrei Gromyko in 1982.
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Raises eye brows...well I always did want to see a surrviving USSR-Cold War TL... And now I remember what you posted regarding a surrviving Soviet Union and Poland and I get the uneasy feeling I'm about to have my heart ripped out as JP2 and solidarity get stamped
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Methinks the next something horrible in their history is about to happen to the Polish again.
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Hmmm, I can't find anything about Mastorelli aside from an obituary from Union City. What did he end up doing in OTL, @Enigma-Conundrum?
Great update, by the way. Love the turn into Soviet affairs!
Also as a devoted free trade helps all people believer, Littion’s protectionism gives me an uneasy feeling.
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He was the Democratic candidate for NJ-9 in 1978 following a contentious primary that was linked above by @Electric Monk. OTL he lost to Hollenbeck, but ITTL due to vote-splitting and anti-Reagan sentiment he just barely pulls it off, then loses to Hollenbeck in a rematch in 1980. Finding him took a lot of work, but he seemed just right for an early Littonite candidate.
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Well, it looks like the Soviet Union survives ITTL--wonder what else has changed...
Hope Anwar Sadat survives (IOTL, he was assassinated the day before I was born (October 8th, 1981) and my mom (RIP) liked him and wanted to name me Anwar, but my dad (RIP) said no and named me after him (I'm a Junior))...
On a side note, without Reagan's election in 1980, this special (which I found on YouTube--it's interesting what you find on there) is butterflied away (note who the narrator is):
Hope Anwar Sadat survives (IOTL, he was assassinated the day before I was born (October 8th, 1981) and my mom (RIP) liked him and wanted to name me Anwar, but my dad (RIP) said no and named me after him (I'm a Junior))...
On a side note, without Reagan's election in 1980, this special (which I found on YouTube--it's interesting what you find on there) is butterflied away (note who the narrator is):
AnActualFan
Banned
A surviving Soviet Union and a more protectionist America. I wonder if we shall see Japan's boom end early thanks to this, or even see the Asian Tigers not even come close to OTL levels.
Not necessarily. @Wolttaire is correct that relations were normalized and the PRC was recognized under Carter IOTL - Nixon opened China, but embargoes and whatnot remained in force until Carter and Deng Xiaoping (while not premier yet, he was the chief negotiator) resolved those key issues. Needless to say, Reagan didn’t do that, and Jerry isn’t quite Scoop Jackson but skews hawkish relative to the rest of his party. What happens with China from here will appear... eventually.
ACT TWO: Part 5 - The Used-Car President
By the time the economy was well and truly recovering from the recession Reagan left in our laps, we knew that it was time to start fulfilling our more ambitious campaign pledges, starting with labor reform. While Jerry had always been an ally of the unions, the push for this was, as Tim Kraft put it, “a gift to the nice fellows who gave us the damn election.” It was more a convenience that Jerry happened to be relatively supportive of the reform efforts to begin with. Regardless, when myself, Ed Turner, the President, the Vice President, Secretary Fraser, and Tim Kraft - normally Secretary Volcker would’ve been invited to a meeting of this sort, but in this case he’d have poured cold water on the notion at best - met in a White House side office, we all had two agreements: our first target should be the Taft-Hartley Act, and whatever we did needed to be specific and targeted. It simply couldn’t be like the near-full repeal that we lobbed at Ronald Reagan’s desk a few years back, because, in Hugh’s words, “correct me if I’m wrong, but that never seemed like a serious proposal, just a political potshot at Reagan.” Nobody corrected him as we began outlining the specific goals of this bill…
THE LONG EIGHTIES: A Memoir, written by Robert Morgado in 2003
WHITE HOUSE UNVEILS LABOR LEGISLATION, TAKES AIM AT TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
…in broad terms, the “American Work Protection Bill” revises and outright eliminates portions of the 1947 law. Most notably, two sections which have served as sore spots for supporters of labor reform ever since the law was passed, 8c and 14b, are stricken in the Litton proposal. Section 8c, known as the “employer free speech clause,” protects employers’ “expression of any views, arguments, or opinion” and ensures that these arguments “shall not constitute … an unfair labor practice if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” Section 14b, by far the most well-known and controversial portion of the Taft-Hartley Act, allows for the creation of “right-to-work laws,” laws which 20 states have adopted that prohibit union security agreements. In addition to these key repeals, the President’s proposal loosens regulations placed on strikes and other union tactics...
THE WASHINGTON POST, January 16th, 1982
“The simple fact of the matter is that Jerry Litton is trying to impose his liberal fantasies on the states, businesses, and even the workers he says he supports. He’s trying to take away state rights, he wants to make sure businesses are required to repeat the union script, and he wants to stop workers from choosing if they’re involved in a union at all. That’s what this bill does!”
Rep. Carroll Campbell (R-SC-4) on the American Work Protection Bill, January 16th, 1982
“The President is making sure Americans can work together for better wages instead of competing amongst themselves. I commend this effort, absolutely.”
Rep. Donald Fraser (D-MN-5) on the American Work Protection Bill, January 16th, 1982
“I’ll get back to you on that one, I haven’t read the bill yet and I’d like to do that before I make any judgments. We’ll see what happens.”
Rep. Richard Shelby (D-AL-7) on the American Work Protection Bill, January 16th, 1982
The Litton administration had found its first true hurdle in Congress with the fight over labor reform. So far, the measures they had pushed for - anti-corruption reforms, responses to the economic crisis intended to drop inflation without triggering a recession, and the energy initiatives spearheaded by Secretary Carter to ensure that another set of oil shocks like the 1979-1980 pair couldn’t cripple the nation - were all broadly popular within the Democratic Party. Labor reform, however, stood in lockstep with the President’s “Northern Strategy,” as nearly every Boll Weevil was deeply opposed to the bill. Most of the right-to-work laws and even right-to-work constitutional amendments were in the south, after all. In a congressional sense, the stratagem selected by the leadership was a simple carrot-and-stick. The carrot would be relentless bargaining and hints of pork by Tip O’Neill and Robert Byrd. The stick would be the first true usage of the advertising tactics that gave Jerry Litton the derisive nickname “President Used-Car…”
NEW DAWN: America Under Jerry Litton, published in 2002
[Muted clip of Harry Truman speaking before Congress]
NARRATOR: When Congress first passed the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Harry Truman vetoed it. He believed it would be devastating for American workers. He feared that they would have one arm tied behind their back in the fight for fair wages. History has shown that President Truman was right. These current trying times, with millions of Americans out of work and wages lower than before, have proven that it was worse than even he imagined.
[Images of closed-down manufacturing plants, current poverty]
Though their supporters insist that the freedom to work is the reason for right-to-work, these laws only protect the freedom to work for less. The American Work Protection bill would end this predatory practice.
[Images of Litton campaigning in manufacturing towns and such]
President Litton supports this bill. He stands for protecting every American’s right to a fair wage and against right-to-work’s attacks on the middle class. He’s fighting for you.
[Cut to Jerry Litton standing in a field at his ranch]
PRESIDENT LITTON: Go call your Congressman about American Work Protection, and when you’re done, call them again!
A transcript of the “Truman” ad played in support of the AWPA, February 1982
For the first time, a President had done more than work within Congress for the passage of a piece of legislation. Members of Congress reported a torrent of letters and phone calls to their office asking (and sometimes demanding) their support for the AWPA. He had effectively weaponized the public and his supporters to ensure that a bill made it to his desk. Not only that, he had caught the old guard of Washington off-guard, as few current members understood the power of television the way Jerry Litton and his staff did. However, the side-effects of Litton’s use of advertisements as a call to arms directly resulted in both the polarization of the sixth party system. While many conservatives, both then and today, insist that Litton cheapened the office of the president by appearing in these advertisements, that isn't what we refer to in this case. Rather, the incessant calls to Republican legislators only irritated them, so much so that any who may have been convincible at one point were turned away from such, driving more and more party-line votes. Meanwhile, conservative Democrats who listened to the calls were often defeated by conservative Republicans who claimed that the incumbents had betrayed their principles, further narrowing the ideological breadth of both parties. Unknowingly, Jerry Litton’s tactical use of a medium that nobody outside of his circle truly saw the value in aided in the ideological shifts in each party substantially…
A NEW PATH FOR AMERICA: The Creation of the Sixth Party System, published in 2009
We only had about 200 votes on our side for the American Work Protection Act. It was more votes than anyone, especially Speaker O’Neill, likely expected, but I didn’t care - as far as I was concerned, the only number that mattered was 218. While the Liberals were friendly enough to us when it came to reforms, their tendencies on economics still lied with corporate America. The Republicans would rather be crucified on the steps of the Capitol than face the rare wrath of Bob Michel for that vote. The only option this left us were conservative Democrats, largely southerners. Their form of resistance - or I suppose massive resistance, it’s only tradition - was largely led by the very man I had defeated for my job, Jim Wright, now the chairman of House Rules. Wright was one part furious that he had lost his chance to ascend to the speakership in the future and one part deeply opposed to the bill. He had gathered a bloc of “Boll Weevils,” a term I’ve never really liked for them, as I feel that geriatric seat-fillers is far more fitting, and knew that he and his boys could block the bill. Ultimately, the handful of us trying desperately to get the tally to where Jerry Litton’s gaggle of staffers breathing down our necks wanted it decided that we needed to undermine Wright’s support base. Tip sent myself and John Brademas to have a couple of chats with senior members of each state delegation behind Wright. In a rare moment of shortsightedness, he had recruited largely by state delegation, specifically from states that leaned towards right-to-work. This left his ranks large but his actual power fleeting, as myself and Brademas leaving them with the taste of pork in their mouths was enough to peel them off. Agricultural subsidies, infrastructure funds, defense construction, you name it and we likely gave it to some fifteen-term gentleman from below the Mason-Dixon line. It wasn’t as brutal as the compromises required in the Senate, but it was enough. By the time Tip himself had gone to Wright, the resistance had lost enough support that his threats - only sizable due to his viselike grip over the Texans - had lost their credibility in stopping the bill. While Tip never told me what happened behind closed doors with Jim, he ultimately decided to abstain and cut his troops loose to vote as they pleased. Many still voted against, a handful from Texas joined their fearless leader in abstention, but we had secured the bill and ended the last major fight of my time in Congress.
STEPPING ON TOES: An Autobiography, published by former House Majority Leader Richard Bolling in 1990
Above: House Majority Leader Richard Bolling. Bolling was a frequent ally of the Litton White House and, while known for being highly abrasive, was also a masterful parliamentarian.
LITTON LABOR BILL NARROWLY PASSES HOUSE, 223-202
THE WASHINGTON POST, February 12th, 1982
“Today, I stand on this floor to discuss the proposal this body has decided to take up. This proposal, which the majority has taken up in full force, is nothing short of a denial of the freedoms afforded to the people of this country. It denies employers their freedom of speech. It denies Americans their right to work where they please. It is a law based on the absence of freedom, not on the promotion of freedom. This cannot stand. As such, I will be speaking as long as is necessary to ensure that this unconstitutional bill dies in this chamber.”
Sen. Robert Taft Jr. (R-OH) on the Senate floor, February 27th, 1982
The Taft filibuster presented a dilemma that even Bob Byrd’s immense legislative nous could barely break through. Shaking fifty votes loose for the AWPA was an effort as is, securing sixty was nigh impossible. Byrd, with his inherent awareness of how to ensure that the trains ran on time, dragged me along with him as not Jerry’s chief of staff but “a personal representative of President Litton for this bill.” As he told me while we shuffled around the halls of the Capitol, he knew that getting fifty Senators to vote for the bill would be hard enough. Getting sixty to support it simply wouldn’t happen. However, he knew the way each and every one of the nays voted, and more importantly, what could be dangled in front of them to drive them to vote for cloture and then vote their conscience on the AWPA itself. The pledge to support a broad oil deregulation bill that made Jerry wince when I told him about it secured the support of David Boren, Lloyd Bentsen, and Bob Krueger, each of whom had their own proposals to add to the hypothetical bill. While Max Baucus was unwilling to join us no matter what, his Montanan compatriot John Melcher was more than willing to, no doubt because of pressure from the miner’s unions in his state. David Pryor and Dale Bumpers both wanted something to sell back to Arkansas, and after a talk with their former Governor-turned-Secretary of Agriculture Bill Clinton, an agreement on, among other things, poultry farm regulations were reached. Chickens may have honestly saved our labor legislation, funny enough. So these conversations continued, with a handful of unconditional nays, but also quite a few conditional yeas to make up for them. Despite all of that, Bob Byrd still seemed dejected as he tallied up to fifty-six total votes for cloture. Quite a lot, but still not sixty. Two key events changed the fate of the AWPA. First was the Liberal Party. While already branded by Republican partisans as “Democrat enablers,” they were determined to stand by principle, as their party was founded on rigorous adherence to said principle. While they and their Rockefellerite business-government synergism led them to oppose the bill in full, Bob Taft’s filibuster was quite another matter. Mathias may have disliked the law, but he despised the alliance between arch-conservative Democrats and Republicans to ensure that no vote was even held. His laser-focus on the “conservative consensus” drove him to believe that, if he allowed this to go on, he would be allowing the very same sort of partisanship that drove him to run and found the party in the first place. Once he convinced Richardson and Weicker to vote yea-nay solely to thumb their noses at everything Taft stood for, we had hit fifty-nine votes without even realizing it. The second event was Ted Stevens overplaying his hand. Our next target, Nebraska’s Ed Zorinsky, had never been a particularly reliable Democrat. He had a bipartisan voting record and had even joined the Democrats solely because he was locked out of the Republican primary when he first ran for his seat. As I later learned, Stevens remembered this and knew that this bill would upset Zorinsky, so he went to him to convince him to not just vote nay but to switch parties. Zorinsky was actually rather open to the prospect and spent a large portion of the time we were discussing oil deregulation with Oklahoma and Texas’ finest working out the details. Fortunately for us, we had given Zorinsky the chairmanship of Senate Agriculture, and he enjoyed that post and the funds he was able to redirect to Nebraska with it quite a lot. When he requested that his seniority remain intact on that committee, Stevens, sensing that current ranking member Jesse Helms would be furious and might even launch a hard-right challenge to the Alaskan moderate’s leadership, denied that request. From there, the talks only degraded, and by the time we met with Zorinsky as a last-ditch effort, he was furious with the Republican leadership for wasting his time - the most partisan he had ever been in years - and was open to discussions of further subsidies that could flow directly from his gavel to his constituents. Though part of me expected a grand betrayal by Zorinsky on the floor, one where he flashed a thumbs-down and walked over to shake Ted Stevens' hand, the sheer volume of compromises made ultimately ensured that this did not come to pass.
CAMELOT IN CHILLICOTHE: Life With Jerry Litton, written by Ed Turner in 1997
Above: Senator Ed Zorinsky in 1982. Zorinsky was ultimately the deciding vote in ending Robert Taft Jr.’s 22-hour filibuster of the American Work Protection Act, allowing for a final vote on the bill.
AMERICAN WORK PROTECTION BILL PASSES SENATE 50-49, TO BE SIGNED BY PRESIDENT LITTON
...the abstention of retiring Liberal Senator Lowell Weicker ensured that Vice President Carey’s tie-breaking vote was unnecessary...
THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 28th, 1982
Cheney often referred to the 1982 midterms as “a lost opportunity.” After the battle over the AWPA, he saw a major opportunity to get the country on board with his brand of pragmatic conservatism. Litton’s popularity had taken a serious dent for the first time since his inauguration, and that had primarily come from economic issues. If Cheney and his troupe, by now a bloc of twenty-odd relatively young Republicans, could get more candidates of their ideological leanings through primaries in swing districts, there was a major opening to run as the party of reasonable economics, national security, and common family values. However, his chance to consolidate and grow his deceptively-large faction was hindered by the national security portion of the equation. The impending Polish crisis and the Litton administration’s reaction to Soviet aggression both largely erased the AWPA’s hits to his approval rating, as well as made it far, far harder to portray the President as soft on communism…
THE POLITICS OF POWER: the Rise and Fall and Rise of Dick Cheney, published in 2017
THE LONG EIGHTIES: A Memoir, written by Robert Morgado in 2003
WHITE HOUSE UNVEILS LABOR LEGISLATION, TAKES AIM AT TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
…in broad terms, the “American Work Protection Bill” revises and outright eliminates portions of the 1947 law. Most notably, two sections which have served as sore spots for supporters of labor reform ever since the law was passed, 8c and 14b, are stricken in the Litton proposal. Section 8c, known as the “employer free speech clause,” protects employers’ “expression of any views, arguments, or opinion” and ensures that these arguments “shall not constitute … an unfair labor practice if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” Section 14b, by far the most well-known and controversial portion of the Taft-Hartley Act, allows for the creation of “right-to-work laws,” laws which 20 states have adopted that prohibit union security agreements. In addition to these key repeals, the President’s proposal loosens regulations placed on strikes and other union tactics...
THE WASHINGTON POST, January 16th, 1982
“The simple fact of the matter is that Jerry Litton is trying to impose his liberal fantasies on the states, businesses, and even the workers he says he supports. He’s trying to take away state rights, he wants to make sure businesses are required to repeat the union script, and he wants to stop workers from choosing if they’re involved in a union at all. That’s what this bill does!”
Rep. Carroll Campbell (R-SC-4) on the American Work Protection Bill, January 16th, 1982
“The President is making sure Americans can work together for better wages instead of competing amongst themselves. I commend this effort, absolutely.”
Rep. Donald Fraser (D-MN-5) on the American Work Protection Bill, January 16th, 1982
“I’ll get back to you on that one, I haven’t read the bill yet and I’d like to do that before I make any judgments. We’ll see what happens.”
Rep. Richard Shelby (D-AL-7) on the American Work Protection Bill, January 16th, 1982
The Litton administration had found its first true hurdle in Congress with the fight over labor reform. So far, the measures they had pushed for - anti-corruption reforms, responses to the economic crisis intended to drop inflation without triggering a recession, and the energy initiatives spearheaded by Secretary Carter to ensure that another set of oil shocks like the 1979-1980 pair couldn’t cripple the nation - were all broadly popular within the Democratic Party. Labor reform, however, stood in lockstep with the President’s “Northern Strategy,” as nearly every Boll Weevil was deeply opposed to the bill. Most of the right-to-work laws and even right-to-work constitutional amendments were in the south, after all. In a congressional sense, the stratagem selected by the leadership was a simple carrot-and-stick. The carrot would be relentless bargaining and hints of pork by Tip O’Neill and Robert Byrd. The stick would be the first true usage of the advertising tactics that gave Jerry Litton the derisive nickname “President Used-Car…”
NEW DAWN: America Under Jerry Litton, published in 2002
[Muted clip of Harry Truman speaking before Congress]
NARRATOR: When Congress first passed the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Harry Truman vetoed it. He believed it would be devastating for American workers. He feared that they would have one arm tied behind their back in the fight for fair wages. History has shown that President Truman was right. These current trying times, with millions of Americans out of work and wages lower than before, have proven that it was worse than even he imagined.
[Images of closed-down manufacturing plants, current poverty]
Though their supporters insist that the freedom to work is the reason for right-to-work, these laws only protect the freedom to work for less. The American Work Protection bill would end this predatory practice.
[Images of Litton campaigning in manufacturing towns and such]
President Litton supports this bill. He stands for protecting every American’s right to a fair wage and against right-to-work’s attacks on the middle class. He’s fighting for you.
[Cut to Jerry Litton standing in a field at his ranch]
PRESIDENT LITTON: Go call your Congressman about American Work Protection, and when you’re done, call them again!
A transcript of the “Truman” ad played in support of the AWPA, February 1982
For the first time, a President had done more than work within Congress for the passage of a piece of legislation. Members of Congress reported a torrent of letters and phone calls to their office asking (and sometimes demanding) their support for the AWPA. He had effectively weaponized the public and his supporters to ensure that a bill made it to his desk. Not only that, he had caught the old guard of Washington off-guard, as few current members understood the power of television the way Jerry Litton and his staff did. However, the side-effects of Litton’s use of advertisements as a call to arms directly resulted in both the polarization of the sixth party system. While many conservatives, both then and today, insist that Litton cheapened the office of the president by appearing in these advertisements, that isn't what we refer to in this case. Rather, the incessant calls to Republican legislators only irritated them, so much so that any who may have been convincible at one point were turned away from such, driving more and more party-line votes. Meanwhile, conservative Democrats who listened to the calls were often defeated by conservative Republicans who claimed that the incumbents had betrayed their principles, further narrowing the ideological breadth of both parties. Unknowingly, Jerry Litton’s tactical use of a medium that nobody outside of his circle truly saw the value in aided in the ideological shifts in each party substantially…
A NEW PATH FOR AMERICA: The Creation of the Sixth Party System, published in 2009
We only had about 200 votes on our side for the American Work Protection Act. It was more votes than anyone, especially Speaker O’Neill, likely expected, but I didn’t care - as far as I was concerned, the only number that mattered was 218. While the Liberals were friendly enough to us when it came to reforms, their tendencies on economics still lied with corporate America. The Republicans would rather be crucified on the steps of the Capitol than face the rare wrath of Bob Michel for that vote. The only option this left us were conservative Democrats, largely southerners. Their form of resistance - or I suppose massive resistance, it’s only tradition - was largely led by the very man I had defeated for my job, Jim Wright, now the chairman of House Rules. Wright was one part furious that he had lost his chance to ascend to the speakership in the future and one part deeply opposed to the bill. He had gathered a bloc of “Boll Weevils,” a term I’ve never really liked for them, as I feel that geriatric seat-fillers is far more fitting, and knew that he and his boys could block the bill. Ultimately, the handful of us trying desperately to get the tally to where Jerry Litton’s gaggle of staffers breathing down our necks wanted it decided that we needed to undermine Wright’s support base. Tip sent myself and John Brademas to have a couple of chats with senior members of each state delegation behind Wright. In a rare moment of shortsightedness, he had recruited largely by state delegation, specifically from states that leaned towards right-to-work. This left his ranks large but his actual power fleeting, as myself and Brademas leaving them with the taste of pork in their mouths was enough to peel them off. Agricultural subsidies, infrastructure funds, defense construction, you name it and we likely gave it to some fifteen-term gentleman from below the Mason-Dixon line. It wasn’t as brutal as the compromises required in the Senate, but it was enough. By the time Tip himself had gone to Wright, the resistance had lost enough support that his threats - only sizable due to his viselike grip over the Texans - had lost their credibility in stopping the bill. While Tip never told me what happened behind closed doors with Jim, he ultimately decided to abstain and cut his troops loose to vote as they pleased. Many still voted against, a handful from Texas joined their fearless leader in abstention, but we had secured the bill and ended the last major fight of my time in Congress.
STEPPING ON TOES: An Autobiography, published by former House Majority Leader Richard Bolling in 1990
Above: House Majority Leader Richard Bolling. Bolling was a frequent ally of the Litton White House and, while known for being highly abrasive, was also a masterful parliamentarian.
LITTON LABOR BILL NARROWLY PASSES HOUSE, 223-202
THE WASHINGTON POST, February 12th, 1982
“Today, I stand on this floor to discuss the proposal this body has decided to take up. This proposal, which the majority has taken up in full force, is nothing short of a denial of the freedoms afforded to the people of this country. It denies employers their freedom of speech. It denies Americans their right to work where they please. It is a law based on the absence of freedom, not on the promotion of freedom. This cannot stand. As such, I will be speaking as long as is necessary to ensure that this unconstitutional bill dies in this chamber.”
Sen. Robert Taft Jr. (R-OH) on the Senate floor, February 27th, 1982
The Taft filibuster presented a dilemma that even Bob Byrd’s immense legislative nous could barely break through. Shaking fifty votes loose for the AWPA was an effort as is, securing sixty was nigh impossible. Byrd, with his inherent awareness of how to ensure that the trains ran on time, dragged me along with him as not Jerry’s chief of staff but “a personal representative of President Litton for this bill.” As he told me while we shuffled around the halls of the Capitol, he knew that getting fifty Senators to vote for the bill would be hard enough. Getting sixty to support it simply wouldn’t happen. However, he knew the way each and every one of the nays voted, and more importantly, what could be dangled in front of them to drive them to vote for cloture and then vote their conscience on the AWPA itself. The pledge to support a broad oil deregulation bill that made Jerry wince when I told him about it secured the support of David Boren, Lloyd Bentsen, and Bob Krueger, each of whom had their own proposals to add to the hypothetical bill. While Max Baucus was unwilling to join us no matter what, his Montanan compatriot John Melcher was more than willing to, no doubt because of pressure from the miner’s unions in his state. David Pryor and Dale Bumpers both wanted something to sell back to Arkansas, and after a talk with their former Governor-turned-Secretary of Agriculture Bill Clinton, an agreement on, among other things, poultry farm regulations were reached. Chickens may have honestly saved our labor legislation, funny enough. So these conversations continued, with a handful of unconditional nays, but also quite a few conditional yeas to make up for them. Despite all of that, Bob Byrd still seemed dejected as he tallied up to fifty-six total votes for cloture. Quite a lot, but still not sixty. Two key events changed the fate of the AWPA. First was the Liberal Party. While already branded by Republican partisans as “Democrat enablers,” they were determined to stand by principle, as their party was founded on rigorous adherence to said principle. While they and their Rockefellerite business-government synergism led them to oppose the bill in full, Bob Taft’s filibuster was quite another matter. Mathias may have disliked the law, but he despised the alliance between arch-conservative Democrats and Republicans to ensure that no vote was even held. His laser-focus on the “conservative consensus” drove him to believe that, if he allowed this to go on, he would be allowing the very same sort of partisanship that drove him to run and found the party in the first place. Once he convinced Richardson and Weicker to vote yea-nay solely to thumb their noses at everything Taft stood for, we had hit fifty-nine votes without even realizing it. The second event was Ted Stevens overplaying his hand. Our next target, Nebraska’s Ed Zorinsky, had never been a particularly reliable Democrat. He had a bipartisan voting record and had even joined the Democrats solely because he was locked out of the Republican primary when he first ran for his seat. As I later learned, Stevens remembered this and knew that this bill would upset Zorinsky, so he went to him to convince him to not just vote nay but to switch parties. Zorinsky was actually rather open to the prospect and spent a large portion of the time we were discussing oil deregulation with Oklahoma and Texas’ finest working out the details. Fortunately for us, we had given Zorinsky the chairmanship of Senate Agriculture, and he enjoyed that post and the funds he was able to redirect to Nebraska with it quite a lot. When he requested that his seniority remain intact on that committee, Stevens, sensing that current ranking member Jesse Helms would be furious and might even launch a hard-right challenge to the Alaskan moderate’s leadership, denied that request. From there, the talks only degraded, and by the time we met with Zorinsky as a last-ditch effort, he was furious with the Republican leadership for wasting his time - the most partisan he had ever been in years - and was open to discussions of further subsidies that could flow directly from his gavel to his constituents. Though part of me expected a grand betrayal by Zorinsky on the floor, one where he flashed a thumbs-down and walked over to shake Ted Stevens' hand, the sheer volume of compromises made ultimately ensured that this did not come to pass.
CAMELOT IN CHILLICOTHE: Life With Jerry Litton, written by Ed Turner in 1997
Above: Senator Ed Zorinsky in 1982. Zorinsky was ultimately the deciding vote in ending Robert Taft Jr.’s 22-hour filibuster of the American Work Protection Act, allowing for a final vote on the bill.
AMERICAN WORK PROTECTION BILL PASSES SENATE 50-49, TO BE SIGNED BY PRESIDENT LITTON
...the abstention of retiring Liberal Senator Lowell Weicker ensured that Vice President Carey’s tie-breaking vote was unnecessary...
THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 28th, 1982
Cheney often referred to the 1982 midterms as “a lost opportunity.” After the battle over the AWPA, he saw a major opportunity to get the country on board with his brand of pragmatic conservatism. Litton’s popularity had taken a serious dent for the first time since his inauguration, and that had primarily come from economic issues. If Cheney and his troupe, by now a bloc of twenty-odd relatively young Republicans, could get more candidates of their ideological leanings through primaries in swing districts, there was a major opening to run as the party of reasonable economics, national security, and common family values. However, his chance to consolidate and grow his deceptively-large faction was hindered by the national security portion of the equation. The impending Polish crisis and the Litton administration’s reaction to Soviet aggression both largely erased the AWPA’s hits to his approval rating, as well as made it far, far harder to portray the President as soft on communism…
THE POLITICS OF POWER: the Rise and Fall and Rise of Dick Cheney, published in 2017
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Oh yes. Buckle up, because it’s a bumpy ride to Warsaw.
In some circles, yes - almost a liberal version of the Koch brothers to some, yknow? Stronger organized labor will tend to mean more New Right Fear (tm) because the godless socialists have a better funding and turnout organization behind them, at the cost of balancing their opinions with that of so many others platform-wise. We can safely call the death of right-to-work a massive W for a certain strain of the Democratic Party, at the expense of royally pissing off conservatives and to a degree moderates.
Works for me, idk what’s up with your computer