Chapter I: The Sino-Soviet Split and Early Hostilities, March 1969.
I've been working on another TL concerning an escalation of the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969. It will delve into a "limited" nuclear war and its consequences, political, ecological and otherwise. Dystopias are best observed and not practiced. Enjoy.
The Sino-Soviet split was the deterioration of political and ideological relations between the neighbouring states of the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the Cold War. In the 1960s, China and the Soviet Union were the two largest communist states in the world. The doctrinal divergence derived from Chinese and Soviet national interests, and from the governments’ different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. Mao, for example, criticized Khrushchev’s emphasis on material development, believing it would make people soft and un-revolutionary; Khrushchev responded that people would be alienated from communism if it had nothing to offer but revolution. Since 1956 (when Nikita Khrushchev denounced the legacy of Stalin), China and the USSR had progressively diverged about Marxist ideology, and, by 1961, when the doctrinal differences proved intractable, the Communist Party of China formally denounced the Soviet variety of communism as a product of “Revisionist Traitors.”
In the 1950s and the 1960s, ideological debate between the communist parties of the USSR and China also concerned the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West. Yet, to the Chinese public, Mao Zedong proposed a belligerent attitude towards capitalist countries, an initial rejection of peaceful coexistence, which he perceived as Marxist revisionism from the Soviet Union. Mao, for example, lambasted Khrushchev for not responding much stronger to the U-2 spy plane incident. Further incidents that strained Sino-Soviet relations were Soviet moral support for Tibetan rebels in 1959 and support for India during the Sino-Indian War in 1962. By the late 1960s Sino-Soviet relations were in fact worse than Soviet-American Cold War relations, but few could imagine that this would culminate in the worst humanitarian disaster in recent human history.
By 1969, Soviet troops had been increasing on the border for several years. Soviet leaders were worried about growing Chinese power and were terrified by the prospect of a large scale intrusion by China into Soviet territory despite their superiority in weaponry. They knew the Chinese with their gigantic population of around 800 million people could bring to bear overwhelming amounts of troops. Moreover, they knew the People’s Liberation Army’s had great expertise in asymmetric warfare and that the Soviets could get mired in an endless war if conflict erupted. The Soviets didn’t know that this numerical advantage was rather theoretical given that parts of the country were in outright civil war due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. During 1968, the Soviet Army had amassed along the 4.380 kilometre border with China – especially at the Xinjiang frontier, in north-west China, where the Soviets might readily induce Turkic separatists to insurrection. Militarily, in 1961, the USSR had 225.000 men and 200 aeroplanes at that border; in 1968, there were 375.000 men, 1.200 aeroplanes and 120 medium-range missiles. Moreover, China had 1.5 million men stationed at the border and it had already tested its first nuclear weapon (the 596 Test in October 1964, at Lop Nur basin).
On March 2nd 1969, a group of People’s Liberation Army troops ambushed Soviet border guards on Zhenbao Island. The Soviets suffered 58 dead, including a senior colonel, and 94 wounded. The Chinese suffered 29 dead. They retaliated on March 15th by bombarding Chinese troop concentrations on the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River and by storming Zhenbao Island, sending four then-secret T-62 tanks to attack the Chinese patrols on the island from the other side of the river. One of the leading tanks was hit and the tank commander was killed. On March 16th 1969, the Soviets entered the island to collect their dead and at that point a Chinese soldier’s weapon misfired, prompting the Soviets to start shooting, believing they’d been fired upon first. When the news reached Brezhnev, he was infuriated, and the day thereafter Pravda printed an article on the front-page detailing how Chinese soldiers had attacked troops that had no intent but to collect the dead. It became known as the March 16th 1969 Incident.[1]
[1] This is the PoD. IOTL the Chinese allowed the Soviets to collect their dead.
The Bear vs. the Dragon
Chapter I: The Sino-Soviet Split and Early Hostilities, March 1969.
Chapter I: The Sino-Soviet Split and Early Hostilities, March 1969.
The Sino-Soviet split was the deterioration of political and ideological relations between the neighbouring states of the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the Cold War. In the 1960s, China and the Soviet Union were the two largest communist states in the world. The doctrinal divergence derived from Chinese and Soviet national interests, and from the governments’ different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. Mao, for example, criticized Khrushchev’s emphasis on material development, believing it would make people soft and un-revolutionary; Khrushchev responded that people would be alienated from communism if it had nothing to offer but revolution. Since 1956 (when Nikita Khrushchev denounced the legacy of Stalin), China and the USSR had progressively diverged about Marxist ideology, and, by 1961, when the doctrinal differences proved intractable, the Communist Party of China formally denounced the Soviet variety of communism as a product of “Revisionist Traitors.”
In the 1950s and the 1960s, ideological debate between the communist parties of the USSR and China also concerned the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West. Yet, to the Chinese public, Mao Zedong proposed a belligerent attitude towards capitalist countries, an initial rejection of peaceful coexistence, which he perceived as Marxist revisionism from the Soviet Union. Mao, for example, lambasted Khrushchev for not responding much stronger to the U-2 spy plane incident. Further incidents that strained Sino-Soviet relations were Soviet moral support for Tibetan rebels in 1959 and support for India during the Sino-Indian War in 1962. By the late 1960s Sino-Soviet relations were in fact worse than Soviet-American Cold War relations, but few could imagine that this would culminate in the worst humanitarian disaster in recent human history.
By 1969, Soviet troops had been increasing on the border for several years. Soviet leaders were worried about growing Chinese power and were terrified by the prospect of a large scale intrusion by China into Soviet territory despite their superiority in weaponry. They knew the Chinese with their gigantic population of around 800 million people could bring to bear overwhelming amounts of troops. Moreover, they knew the People’s Liberation Army’s had great expertise in asymmetric warfare and that the Soviets could get mired in an endless war if conflict erupted. The Soviets didn’t know that this numerical advantage was rather theoretical given that parts of the country were in outright civil war due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. During 1968, the Soviet Army had amassed along the 4.380 kilometre border with China – especially at the Xinjiang frontier, in north-west China, where the Soviets might readily induce Turkic separatists to insurrection. Militarily, in 1961, the USSR had 225.000 men and 200 aeroplanes at that border; in 1968, there were 375.000 men, 1.200 aeroplanes and 120 medium-range missiles. Moreover, China had 1.5 million men stationed at the border and it had already tested its first nuclear weapon (the 596 Test in October 1964, at Lop Nur basin).
On March 2nd 1969, a group of People’s Liberation Army troops ambushed Soviet border guards on Zhenbao Island. The Soviets suffered 58 dead, including a senior colonel, and 94 wounded. The Chinese suffered 29 dead. They retaliated on March 15th by bombarding Chinese troop concentrations on the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River and by storming Zhenbao Island, sending four then-secret T-62 tanks to attack the Chinese patrols on the island from the other side of the river. One of the leading tanks was hit and the tank commander was killed. On March 16th 1969, the Soviets entered the island to collect their dead and at that point a Chinese soldier’s weapon misfired, prompting the Soviets to start shooting, believing they’d been fired upon first. When the news reached Brezhnev, he was infuriated, and the day thereafter Pravda printed an article on the front-page detailing how Chinese soldiers had attacked troops that had no intent but to collect the dead. It became known as the March 16th 1969 Incident.[1]
[1] This is the PoD. IOTL the Chinese allowed the Soviets to collect their dead.
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