Sweden joined Allied Powers after German invasion of Denmark 1940

[von Adler]

Rather than saying that the Germans were anti-Finland, I'd rather say that they considered Finland a mere pawn to be first traded, and then utilized. Their stance during the Winter War was to hold on to their bargain with the Soviets, as you said, and thus stop aid to Finland, etc. But as soon as Finland could come out of the war (more or less) intact, Germany started recruiting the Finns to their side against the USSR. With regards to Finland, in 1939-41 the Nazi leadership then arguably managed what is perhaps not entirely known as the hallmark of Hitler's diplomacy - cool, calculated pragmatism as to how the Finns might best serve the wider Nazi goals.

I'd argue that the Germans kept that position until late Summer/early Autumn 1940 - it was not until they had defeated France and knew the Soviets would be next that they started courting Finland, selling captured French arms at cut-rate prices, asking for transit rights for troops from Norway and releasing a lot of the impounded Hungarian and Italian arms.

The Finns pursued the potential union with Sweden as late as September 1940, when Jarl Wasastierna officially made a request for a union with the Swedish foreign minister. German troops arrived in February 1941 (although transit had been agreed in September 1940) after the Soviets declared the union a breach of the March peace in December 1941.

 

[von Adler]

Wait, Germany would have declared war on Sweden if Sweden had sent sizable forces to help Finland? This smells like a great timeline material.

I'd assume it would have been a calculated threat, mainly a bluff Berlin thought Stockholm would not have the guts to call. After all, it boils down to the Germans trying to avoid Sweden straying away from neutrality and getting more entangled in the war by threatening, well, to get them more entangled in the war. But it would be interesting if @von Adler can provide a source and some closer context.

That was what the German military attaché in Sweden, Bruno von Uthmann said in February 1940. It was most likely a bluff, and connected to the planned Allied expeditionary corps - von Uthmann informed his contacts in the Swedish army that Germany would not sit idly if Sweden failed to maintain its neutrality - this was a combined threat over the plan to send II. Armékåren (roughly 100 000 men) as "volunteers" and the Allied expeditionary corps that the Germans knew would occupy the iron ore railroad and the mines first, and perhaps go to Finland as a distant second.

At this time, Sweden faced potential war with all three grand power blocs - the Soviets, the Allies and the Axis over Finland, as the Soviets were smarting over Swedish aid to the Finns and Swedish public opinion demanded a direct intervention on the Finnish side, the Allies had publically stated that they would send aid to Finland over Norway and Sweden regardless whether these nations agreed to transit or not and the Germans stated that they would intervene if the Allies entered Sweden with or without Swedish permission.

The Swedish government was sweating bullets and took von Uthmann's warning seriously enough to can the plan to send II. Armékåren.

I think my source is "Det svenska vinterkriget" ("The Swedish winter war") by Leif Björkman, but I will need to double-check tonight when I am back home from work. I will get back to you.

 

[DrakonFin]

I'd argue that the Germans kept that position until late Summer/early Autumn 1940 - it was not until they had defeated France and knew the Soviets would be next that they started courting Finland, selling captured French arms at cut-rate prices, asking for transit rights for troops from Norway and releasing a lot of the impounded Hungarian and Italian arms.

The Finns pursued the potential union with Sweden as late as September 1940, when Jarl Wasastierna officially made a request for a union with the Swedish foreign minister. German troops arrived in February 1941 (although transit had been agreed in September 1940) after the Soviets declared the union a breach of the March peace in December 1941.

Yes, there was a short gap after the Winter War in political and practical military rapprochement between Germany and Finland. Actual diplomatic discussions about cooperation between the two countries started in July 1940. Before that, all the way since April, Finland was approaching Germany in trade issues, though - after to the German occupation of Denmark, and after the fighting started in Norway, British trade policies towards Finland changed, and Finnish options for crucial imports were becoming very scarce. Germany was increasingly looking like the only realistic source for material support since early summer, and a new trade deal between Finland and Germany was agreed upon and signed in June. In early July, the Finnish government relayed a message to the German envoy, von Blücher, that the Finnish public opinion was turning more positive towards Germany, as people were hoping for a chance to regain the land lost in the Winter War. In late July, the Germans sent an SD agent to Finland to make soundings about potential Finnish involvement in a future attack against the USSR. In mid-August, Hitler ordered the planning to begin for Operation Renntier, the capture of the Petsamo nickel mine in the case of war, and on August 17th, Göring's envoy Joseph Veltjens arrived to start negotiations for a transit agreement for German troops, through Finland to Finnmark, as well as the weapons deals you mentioned. The practical transit agreement for German troops through Finland was signed by military representatives on September 12th, and the first German transport ships (carrying Luftwaffe AA troops en route to Finnmark) arrived to the Finnish waters on September 21st.

So, generally the entire period from April to September 1940 included a slow build-up in Finland and Germany approaching each other, first in heavily politized trade issues and early diplomatic overtures in April-July, and then in practical military matters in August-September. With this background, from mid-September onwards Finland was so deep in Germany's pocket that since that time, I believe the union with Sweden would not have IOTL been practical anymore, even if it might have been before that time.

That was what the German military attaché in Sweden, Bruno von Uthmann said in February 1940. It was most likely a bluff, and connected to the planned Allied expeditionary corps - von Uthmann informed his contacts in the Swedish army that Germany would not sit idly if Sweden failed to maintain its neutrality - this was a combined threat over the plan to send II. Armékåren (roughly 100 000 men) as "volunteers" and the Allied expeditionary corps that the Germans knew would occupy the iron ore railroad and the mines first, and perhaps go to Finland as a distant second.

At this time, Sweden faced potential war with all three grand power blocs - the Soviets, the Allies and the Axis over Finland, as the Soviets were smarting over Swedish aid to the Finns and Swedish public opinion demanded a direct intervention on the Finnish side, the Allies had publically stated that they would send aid to Finland over Norway and Sweden regardless whether these nations agreed to transit or not and the Germans stated that they would intervene if the Allies entered Sweden with or without Swedish permission.

The Swedish government was sweating bullets and took von Uthmann's warning seriously enough to can the plan to send II. Armékåren.

I think my source is "Det svenska vinterkriget" ("The Swedish winter war") by Leif Björkman, but I will need to double-check tonight when I am back home from work. I will get back to you.

Interesting, thank you.

 

[Changundramon]

Wow. My mind is now entering big fantasy territory. Like, how do the Sverige-class coastal battleships fare against the Kriegsmarine or Red Navy? The geopolitical consequences, later on, of Sweden actually coming to Finland's rescue on request.

On the German side, I think they would consider the danger of an Allied Sweden if they reacted too harshly to Sweden defending Finland. Moreover, the time period in which this plays out is still winter, and thus presents logistical issues. Then again, Hitler has been known to explode in rage and declare wars at a moment's notice (Yugoslavia).

 

[DrakonFin]

Wow. My mind is now entering big fantasy territory. Like, how do the Sverige-class coastal battleships fare against the Kriegsmarine or Red Navy? The geopolitical consequences, later on, of Sweden actually coming to Finland's rescue on request.

On the German side, I think they would consider the danger of an Allied Sweden if they reacted too harshly to Sweden defending Finland. Moreover, the time period in which this plays out is still winter, and thus presents logistical issues. Then again, Hitler has been known to explode in rage and declare wars at a moment's notice (Yugoslavia).

The winter of 1939/40 was one of the coldest on record, and one of the few winters in the last century when the entire Baltic Sea has iced up. Naval warfare would not have been easy in February-April 1940 even in the southern Baltic Sea.

 

[Changundramon]

The winter of 1939/40 was one of the coldest on record, and one of the few winters in the last century when the entire Baltic Sea has iced up. Naval warfare would not have been easy in February-April 1940 even in the southern Baltic Sea.

If that is true, then Sweden could have safely intervened in Finland by sending 2. Army Corps overland, because Soviets could not touch them. Germans could maybe bomb them. Maaaybe, but I assume that such a cold winter had frequent blizzards which prohibit flights. Also, Denmark still existed by this time. Now, the Swedish decision to stay neutral looks like a missed opportunity.

 

[von Adler]

The winter of 1939/40 was one of the coldest on record, and one of the few winters in the last century when the entire Baltic Sea has iced up. Naval warfare would not have been easy in February-April 1940 even in the southern Baltic Sea.

Quite right.

This is how Öresund looked on the 24th February 1940.

 

[von Adler]

If that is true, then Sweden could have safely intervened in Finland by sending 2. Army Corps overland, because Soviets could not touch them. Germans could maybe bomb them. Maaaybe, but I assume that such a cold winter had frequent blizzards which prohibit flights. Also, Denmark still existed by this time. Now, the Swedish decision to stay neutral looks like a missed opportunity.

There's no reason to believe the war would end before the ice conditions cleared. And with half the line army and most of its equipment in Finland, Sweden would be hard-pressed to resists. Sweden was unprepared fro war in 1940, and the combination of "topping up" 2. Armékåren and sending a lot of aid to Finland seriously drained the ammuniution and equipment reserves of Sweden, which clearly showed with the general mobilisation in April 1940.

Wow. My mind is now entering big fantasy territory. Like, how do the Sverige-class coastal battleships fare against the Kriegsmarine or Red Navy? The geopolitical consequences, later on, of Sweden actually coming to Finland's rescue on request.

On the German side, I think they would consider the danger of an Allied Sweden if they reacted too harshly to Sweden defending Finland. Moreover, the time period in which this plays out is still winter, and thus presents logistical issues. Then again, Hitler has been known to explode in rage and declare wars at a moment's notice (Yugoslavia).

Against the Soviets, at least decent. 1940 the Soviets have two Ganguts that make 17-18 knots and together deliver 11 304kg of shells per minute at 23 230 meters. Sweden has three Sveriges that make 20-21 knots and together deliver 14 640kg of shells per minute at 29 000 meters.

 

[Emperordelafayette]

Finland didn't "surrender" in March 1940. It accepted a peace offer by the Soviets, by which it lost some territory, but kept its state, government, and military intact and in control. There was no Soviet occupation, which surely would have resulted from a bona fide surrender.

Semantics. Finland asked for peace and accepted Soviet demands in return for it. There’s a difference between conditional surrender and unconditional surrender. Conditional surrender is just a admission of defeat through the establishment of acceptable terms. Usually in the form of signing a treaty.

 

[DrakonFin]

Semantics. Finland asked for peace and accepted Soviet demands in return for it. There’s a difference between conditional surrender and unconditional surrender. Conditional surrender is just a admission of defeat through the establishment of acceptable terms. Usually in the form of signing a treaty.

In making arguments, we choose words to use to better help other people understand the gist of what we are saying. Here, your choice of "Finland surrenders" to describe the end of the Winter War drew critical comments from yours truly and @Karelian, who both are among the most active participants in discussions about Finland in WWII in this forum, for over a decade now. My own first interpretation upon reading your post was to think that you are describing an alternate ending to the war, instead of the OTL peace deal. Upon understanding that you are in fact describing the OTL outcome of the war, I thought that your choice of words did not fit.

Both of those two critical comments to your message had a very similar point: as most WWII era conflicts ended in an actual surrender, with a losing nation's army laying down its arms in capitulation and its country getting occupied by enemy forces, it does not help understanding the nature of the Finno-Soviet peace of 1940 (which led to the Finnish military keeping its arms and the Finnish government staying in power, with no occupation of Finland) to use the same term to describe it. Paraphrasing Karelian's comment above, in this context terminology matters, as it helps people who participate in the discussion understand what we are in fact talking about.

I'd suggest that your choice of words was then not ideal to communicate your argument, in this instance. In general, too, I think that it would be needlessly simplistic to say that a war between nations can only end in two outcomes: a totally white peace, or a surrender by one of the sides. Clearly, there are many different outcomes between a white peace and a surrender. To say that the Vietnam War ended by a surrender by South Vietnam and the US would probably lead to several people, likely especially Americans, to argue that for the US the choice of the word "surrender" is not entirely accurate, either, even if the US *was* on the losing side of that war. By and by, I would agree with those critics.

It is of course your prerogative to choose to consider this as just a matter of semantics. Alternatively, you could also use this as an opportunity to gain further insight into the Winter War and its outcome, and the Finnish role in WWII in general.

 

[von Adler]

Interesting, thank you.

Finally remembered to check. The statement is actually from the man himself. In his postwar writings on his time in Sweden, von Uthmann writes (my translation from Swedish, probably translated from German):

"When the Finns after a while ended up in trouble, the Swedes considered giving active military assistance. To ensure that Sweden was not dragged into the war they imagined sending soldiers from army units over the border in civilian clothing. They would travel under cover to be volunteers while weapons and equipment would follow by train transports. When rumours of the Swedish plans started circulating Berlin instructed the ambassador and military attaché in Stockholm to nform the Swedes of the dire consequences such an action could have for the nation. The pact between Germany and Russia was used as a means of exerting pressure."

Original text in Swedish:

"När finnarna efterhand hamnade i svårigheter övervägde svenskarna att aktivt lämna militär hjälp. För att Sverige inte skulle dras in i kriget tänkte man skicka soldater från arméförband över gränsen i civila kläder. De skulle resa under täckmantel för att vara frivilliga medan vapen och utrustning skulle följa via tågtransporter. När rykten om de svenska planerna började cirkulera instruerade Berlin ambassadören och militärattachén i Stockholm att informera svenskarna om de ödesdigra konsekvenserna ett sådant handlande kunde få för nationen. Pakten mellan Tyskland och Ryssland användes om påtryckningsmedel."