Successful Market Garden

[loneranger]

Hello!

I was wondering what the effects would be of a successful Operation Market Garden? From what little I know of it, it seems that if the Allies had moved quicker on the various bridges they might've been able to pull it off. However it is done, let us assume that Market Garden is successful for the sake of this thread.

The Allies apparently wanted to end the war in Germany by Christmas 1944. Given that Market Garden is in September 1944, that seems like an extremely ambitious timeframe given that the OTL war lasted nearly another year. Additionally, as this was meant to project the Western Allies further into Germany, how and when would they meet up with the Russians?

To be frank, I'm a bit more interested in the Cold War implications of a unified Germany than the particulars on how this alternate WWII shakes out (given that the Axis will be losing either way), but feel free to discuss whichever portion of the POD most interests you.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Well immediate results would be (probably)

By passing the Siegfried line
Trapping 15th Army (or forcing elements of it to move out of the Scheldt region to avoid being encircled)
Forcing V2 launchers to move further East possible taking them out of range of London
Potentially allowing more Ports in the Netherlands to be captured further easing the Logistical situation
I suspect that the German forces that took part in Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein are instead used to try and block the Allies from driving into the German Plain and 12th US Army Group has a nice relaxing Christmas in and around the Ardennes
The success would 'drag' the Allied focus to the northern German plain - rather than spread between the 4 Army groups and its possible without having to contend with the Battle of the Bulge and large scale river crossing assaults that 21st Army group might threaten an encirclement of large elements of Army group B (forcing an abandonment of the 'West Wall' ) or as likely a stand and fight order is given and many units go into the bag.

As for non partition - this had all been discussed and agreed beforehand - so whether or not Wallied forces take Berlin its irrelevant

Here is a map of the situation on the 14th Sept 44

And another showing the Market garden situation before and after

 

[Aber]

Hello!

I was wondering what the effects would be of a successful Operation Market Garden? From what little I know of it, it seems that if the Allies had moved quicker on the various bridges they might've been able to pull it off. However it is done, let us assume that Market Garden is successful for the sake of this thread.

Objectives of Market Garden:

Second British Army
15. The first task of the Army is to operate northwards and secure the crossings over the RHINE and MEUSE in the general area ARNHEM-NIJMEGEN-GRAVE. An airborne corps of three divisions is placed under command Second Army for these operations.
16. The Army will then establish itself in strength on the general line ZWOLLE-DEVENTER-ARNHEM, facing east, with deep bridgeheads to the east side of the IJSSEL river. From this position it will be prepared to advance eastwards to the general area RHEINE-OSNABRUCK-HAMM-MUNSTER. In this movement its weight will be on its right and directed towards HAMM, from which place a strong thrust will be made southwards along the eastern face of the RUHR.

ie
Cut off the western part of the Netherlands from Germany, trapping the German forces and preventing V2 launches
Capture the eastern bank of the Rhine, allowing more crossings
Move towards isolating the Ruhr
Forcing the Germans to react and thin out forces facing the rest of the Allied front

 

[Geordie]

Having looked at this several times, it isn't necessarily a winning play for the Allies.

The Canadians are still trying to clear the approaches to Antwerp, as well as take the last of the Channel ports, and they're exhausting themselves in the process. The British Second Army is now strung out over a huge stretch of the Netherlands. They have one real road for supply, with innumerable numbers of bridges that can be used to cut the further ends off from the logistical tail. Further South, the US First Army is in a horrendous meatgrinder in the Huertgen Forest. Beyond them, Patton is still knocking on the door at Metz, using his head to do so.

And the supply situation is a complete cluster. The unexpectedly rapid advance from the breakout from Normandy to the French border means that the French road and rail system is still trashed from the efforts of the USAAF, RAF, and the Resistance. Too many of the Channel Ports were wrecked, whether by fighting or German demolition. Antwerp (massive port, captured intact) can't be used, because the German 15th Army and other units hold the northern bank of the Scheldt.

IMHO, the ability to exploit the opening just isn't there.

Where the German backhand is now concentrated on is a question. Does Hitler still go for Antwerp, driving through the Ardennes? Does he try to destroy the British Second Army on the anvil of the German 15th? If the former, does the fact that everybody is stretched even further to compensate for their being at least one British Corps North of the Rhine mean greater German success? If the latter, where does it fall? North of the Rhine, to cut off the head, or is it aimed further south, isolating the head from the body?

Capturing the bridge at Arnhem and getting XXX Corps across in strength (and let's not forget, the Paras never held the Southern end of the bridge) means Market Garden succeeds. I'm not sure that the swift envelopment of the Ruhr (which was the aim of MG) is necessarily going to follow as quickly as Monty hoped. And it's a Hell of a long way for supply trucks from Normandy to Arnhem. Even worse when the stretch north of the Albert Canal is in danger of being interdicted by marauding Germans. It might shave a month off the war in Europe. Or it might not.

While not as glamorous, if Robert's 11th Armoured Division had, after seizing Antwerp, sealed off Beveland, that could have trapped the German Fifteenth Army, which was in the process of fleeing across the Scheldt. Even if the Canadians and at least one Corps of Second Army have to smoke them out of Beveland and Walcheren, the Canadians are freed up ahead of OTL, and more importantly, Antwerp is open for business. At that point, supplies to 21st Army Group are on much shorter lines, and relieving the pressure on the French network. Even supplies to the US First Army can probably come in the same way. Suddenly, there's much greater level of supply for everybody, less fighting over who gets what, and the Allies are in a better position for the next part of the fight, which will be breaking into Germany.

It also means that the German counterattack will make far less hay.

So if you want to end the war sooner, I'd have a PoD on the 4th of September, with Roberts pushing on to the Beveland. VIII Corps and the Canucks clear the approaches to Antwerp ASAP. If needs be, have Ike tell Monty that it's his number one priority, rather than just one of them. If the weather allows, a *Market Garden* at the beginning of October might then do the trick.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

So if you want to end the war sooner, I'd have a PoD on the 4th of September, with Roberts pushing on to the Beveland. VIII Corps and the Canucks clear the approaches to Antwerp ASAP. If needs be, have Ike tell Monty that it's his number one priority, rather than just one of them. If the weather allows, a *Market Garden* at the beginning of October might then do the trick.

I'm all for clearing the Scheldt earlier. Tho I don't see it as a panacea. Even after the 2d Army secured Walchern & Beveland it took a couple more weeks to remove the mines and hulks blocking the channel. The first ship did not transit the Scheldt until 19 November & the first cargo convoy did not start unloading until 21 or 22 Nov. In mid December discharge at Antwerp had to be halted as the railways and canal were still to badly damaged to allow prompt clearing of the docks & dry storage was already filled. (re: Ruppenthal 'Logistics in Overlord'.)

Supply requirements to keep a US or a British army of ten divisions in full offensive power in late amounted too over 9,000 tons daily. That included covering all combat support, support services, and tactical air units based in NW Europe. The average in Sept - Oct was closer to half that & in December the forward forces on the Rhine & Sirgfried line were still below the full requirement. This shortage of supply had a lot to do with the problems of the Allied attacks September - November. None of the Army commanders could bring their full combat power to bear. Fuel and ammunition shortages kept a significant part of their combat power side lined until December.

Bottom line is it does not matter how much Eisenhower would allow concentrated to support 21 Army Group in September. The railways needed to suppy it were not operable & the automotive transport completely incapable of substituting.

 

[Archibald]

Antwerp

It is one of this crazy things in History that Wallies fuel supply until November 1944 come from Normandy, and over the beaches, from the PLUTO pipelines linked to Great Britain.
somebody should write a TL where some of France northern ports German strongholds get free, easing the fuel supply nightmare.

 

[Geordie]

I'm all for clearing the Scheldt earlier. Tho I don't see it as a panacea. Even after the 2d Army secured Walchern & Beveland it took a couple more weeks to remove the mines and hulks blocking the channel. The first ship did not transit the Scheldt until 19 November & the first cargo convoy did not start unloading until 21 or 22 Nov. In mid December discharge at Antwerp had to be halted as the railways and canal were still to badly damaged to allow prompt clearing of the docks & dry storage was already filled. (re: Ruppenthal 'Logistics in Overlord'.)

You're right that Antwerp is not a panacea, but it is a major factor in the battle to keep the Allied armies supplied.

If the German 15th Army can be cut off in the first week in September, when they're still in the process of evacuating from south of the Scheldt, it should be simpler to dig them out than it was in OTL. Even if it isn't, it took about three weeks between the fall of Walcheren and the first unload. If the effort to clear the Scheldt is made instead of the dash to the Rhine, then that pushes everything forward a month. Even if that means that Antwerp's dry storage fills up in mid November, that still means that British 2nd Army have more supplies than they did at that point in OTL.

Supply requirements to keep a US or a British army of ten divisions in full offensive power in late amounted too over 9,000 tons daily. That included covering all combat support, support services, and tactical air units based in NW Europe. The average in Sept - Oct was closer to half that & in December the forward forces on the Rhine & Sirgfried line were still below the full requirement. This shortage of supply had a lot to do with the problems of the Allied attacks September - November. None of the Army commanders could bring their full combat power to bear. Fuel and ammunition shortages kept a significant part of their combat power side lined until December.

Bottom line is it does not matter how much Eisenhower would allow concentrated to support 21 Army Group in September. The railways needed to suppy it were not operable & the automotive transport completely incapable of substituting.

I agree with all of this. Armies had grounded Corps because the simply didn't have the supplies to keep them all moving. The Red Ball Express and it's equivalent were increasingly inefficient as the distances from Normandy to the front increased. At one point, Patton was flying in fuel. I understand 6th Army Group had a much better time of it, for the transport in the south of the country had suffered far less damage.

My reading also suggests that JCH Lee and COMZ didn't help matters by insisting on moving from Cherbourg to Paris.

 

[phx1138]

I'm all for clearing the Scheldt earlier. Tho I don't see it as a panacea. Even after the 2d Army secured Walchern & Beveland it took a couple more weeks to remove the mines and hulks blocking the channel. The first ship did not transit the Scheldt until 19 November & the first cargo convoy did not start unloading until 21 or 22 Nov. In mid December discharge at Antwerp had to be halted as the railways and canal were still to badly damaged to allow prompt clearing of the docks & dry storage was already filled. (re: Ruppenthal 'Logistics in Overlord'.)

Supply requirements to keep a US or a British army of ten divisions in full offensive power in late amounted too over 9,000 tons daily. That included covering all combat support, support services, and tactical air units based in NW Europe. The average in Sept - Oct was closer to half that & in December the forward forces on the Rhine & Sirgfried line were still below the full requirement. This shortage of supply had a lot to do with the problems of the Allied attacks September - November. None of the Army commanders could bring their full combat power to bear. Fuel and ammunition shortages kept a significant part of their combat power side lined until December.

Bottom line is it does not matter how much Eisenhower would allow concentrated to support 21 Army Group in September. The railways needed to suppy it were not operable & the automotive transport completely incapable of substituting.

You're right, but my thinking is, given a choice of operating *Red Ball/White Ball out of Normandy or Antwerp, I'll take Antwerp every time. (I'd also take more ten-tonner tractor-trailers & fewer deuce-and-a-halfs...) And that is the bottom line, whatever other problems may arise.

Beyond that, IMO, it enables the First Canadian Army (& Ike more generally) to keep the Germans on the run, which wasn't possible OTL due to supply shortages. TTL, it wouldn't be "digging out" Fifteenth Army so much as keeping them from digging in to begin with. OTL, the Germans got a chance to get their breath; TTL, that wouldn't happen. How much that shaves off the end of the war, IDK, but I'd bet it's more than a month or two. I'd also bet you've entirely butterflied Wacht am Rhein, 'cause the war is over already; OTOH, you may've led Hitler to draw forces from the East to bolster the fleeing Fifteenth....

 

[Aber]

Beyond that, IMO, it enables the First Canadian Army (& Ike more generally) to keep the Germans on the run, which wasn't possible OTL due to supply shortages. TTL, it wouldn't be "digging out" Fifteenth Army so much as keeping them from digging in to begin with. OTL, the Germans got a chance to get their breath; TTL, that wouldn't happen. How much that shaves off the end of the war, IDK, but I'd bet it's more than a month or two. I'd also bet you've entirely butterflied Wacht am Rhein, 'cause the war is over already; OTOH, you may've led Hitler to draw forces from the East to bolster the fleeing Fifteenth....

Up to a point...

Carl's view of a switch in strategy on 4th September doesn't keep the Germans on the run.

Second British Army cutting off Beveland does not immediately help open Antwerp. It makes it harder for the Germans to evacuate 15th Army units from south of the Scheldt, but Walcheren Island is still going to very difficult to take. It is an island connected to the mainland by a narrow 1km+ causeway, with coastal and AA artillery, Atlantic Wall fortifications and a fortress garrison. It has essentially outerworks on the land ward side provided by canals through Beveland. It cannot be taken on the bounce by an armoured division spread very thinly.

After cutting off Beveland, Second British Army will still need to fight its way north, to give some defensive depth beyond Antwerp - certainly as far as Nijmegen.

First Canadian Army still has the job of clearing Le Havre, Calais, Boulogne, which are far more important for British supply than Antwerp.

The US Army consider 11th September the end of the pursuit phase. To continue the pursuit needs logistics to be sorted out well before then.

 

[edgeworthy]

We still need to make Market Garden successful in the first place!

Some of which is fairly elementary:
Drop-sites south of Arnhem Bridge. (If the originally intended DZ for the Polish Brigade was SE of the bridge why wasn't it for anyone else?)
Insisting on two drops on the first day ... even if that means a maintenance stand-down on the 18th, and no drops on the second day?
82nd Airborne including Nijmegen Bridge in its initial objectives.
XXX Corps launching its attack on the 17th before Noon!*
VIII & XII Corps launching supporting attacks at the same time, or even a few days earlier, instead of waiting until several days after the operation began. (If I Corps attacks as well it would help clear the Scheldt anyway) None of these other attacks have to make any progress to be successful, just keep some of the units that thwarted Market Garden busy.

If the entire operation does nothing except trap the Fifteenth Army in Western Holland and capture, and open Rotterdam, which makes Walcheren less of an issue, then it justifies itself.

(* No, seriously it did not start its advance until 1435, over an hour after the 101st landed)

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Regarding drops on the first day - Brownings Corps HQ used enough aircraft and gliders for half a Brigade or more - so scrap that straight away as they are not needed - thin down the Div HQ on day one - each AB Division or Brigade comes under command of XXX Corps anyway as soon as the ground forces reached them. - No Need for AB Corps to be on the ground - they could follow on behind XXX Corps once the op is finished. So 4th Brigade or additional 101/82 units could have been dropped in the first wave.

There should have been 2 drops on day one

The 3 Ground Corps should Kick off at dawn and the landings should have been made at or after first light to give time for the 2nd landing to take place in the afternoon

Each Bridge objective should have been the responsibility of an entire Parachute Brigade in the first drop and the Bridges under attack/secured before the enemy knows what is occurring - if possible Pegasus Bridge style attacks (From Both ends)

Once secured then places like Groesbeek heights could be invested not the other way round

 

[Aber]

XXX Corps launching its attack on the 17th before Noon!*
(* No, seriously it did not start its advance until 1435, over an hour after the 101st landed)

IIRC Horrocks justification was that he needed to be certain that the airborne operation was taking place, and to avoid causing a general German alert before the airborne had a chance to take the bridges.

VIII & XII Corps launching supporting attacks at the same time, or even a few days earlier, instead of waiting until several days after the operation began. (If I Corps attacks as well it would help clear the Scheldt anyway) None of these other attacks have to make any progress to be successful, just keep some of the units that thwarted Market Garden busy.

The position on the flanks was different to that in front of XXX Corps. The start line was a canal obstacle which needed a night infantry assault, followed by a pause to build the necessary bridges to get armour and artillery across. The reason for the delay was that the units needed to launch the flank attacks and their supplies were not in position. eg 3rd Division were resting on the Seine (280 miles away) when they got the warning order on the 10th. They then had to do a transport run back to the beachhead to load up with supplies, before 9 Brigade started to move north on the 16th, arriving on the 17th. The assault area recce took place on the 18th with the operation starting that night, and the class 40 bridge was completed by 5pm on the 19th.

 

[Geordie]

Are there enough supplies for VIII Corps and XII Corps to launch simultaneous attacks?

There were plenty of mistakes, some listed, others not - the fact that a tiny number of the Arnhem drop were tasked with taking the bridges, prioritising Grosbeek>Neijmegen bridges - but maybe some of the mistakes were caused by things beyond Browning and co's ability to rectify. For instance, could Browning have insisted on 2nd TAF supporting worth ground attack immediately, or would the request be denied because the RAF were worried about air space cockups when adding them to the heady mix of transports, gliders and tugs?

 

[Bob in Pittsburgh]

The attack eastward slowed down due to a shortage of supplies. I do not see how Market Garden would have changed that.

 

[viperjock]

I am going to go with the scenario that Market-Garden plays out the same as OTL but in the end XXX Corps manages to cross the Rhine at Driel. A POD could be that the ferry is captured intact.
-1st Airborne Division is still shot to hell but not as bad. The Division should be available by early spring for a Operation Varsity type mission with the 6th Airborne.
-I say XXX Corps will bog down in the Arnhem area basically retaking parts of the city lost to the Germans and clearing the north bank.
-Follow on British troops will have to hold Hell's Highway. Instead of an Ardennes offensive the Germans could launch an attack to once again cut the highway.
-No Ardennes offensive could also mean the 82nd and 101st Airborne actually get to rest in the winter of 44 or they could end up returning to Holland fighting an alternate offensive.

 

[phx1138]

We still need to make Market Garden successful in the first place!

Some of which is fairly elementary:
Drop-sites south of Arnhem Bridge. (If the originally intended DZ for the Polish Brigade was SE of the bridge why wasn't it for anyone else?)
Insisting on two drops on the first day ... even if that means a maintenance stand-down on the 18th, and no drops on the second day?
82nd Airborne including Nijmegen Bridge in its initial objectives.
XXX Corps launching its attack on the 17th before Noon!*
VIII & XII Corps launching supporting attacks at the same time, or even a few days earlier, instead of waiting until several days after the operation began. (If I Corps attacks as well it would help clear the Scheldt anyway) None of these other attacks have to make any progress to be successful, just keep some of the units that thwarted Market Garden busy.

If the entire operation does nothing except trap the Fifteenth Army in Western Holland and capture, and open Rotterdam, which makes Walcheren less of an issue, then it justifies itself.

(* No, seriously it did not start its advance until 1435, over an hour after the 101st landed)

All correct, & it makes me wonder why Monty & SHAEF couldn't see it...

That said, I have to come back to the one thing IMO should've put paid to Market-Garden: requiring XXX Corps to advance up a single road, with polder on both sides... That's the kind of situation, were I the Germans, I would pray for: a company could hold up the advance interminably, with a couple of AT guns & a handful of Panzerfauste.

Up to a point...

Carl's view of a switch in strategy on 4th September doesn't keep the Germans on the run.

Second British Army cutting off Beveland does not immediately help open Antwerp. It makes it harder for the Germans to evacuate 15th Army units from south of the Scheldt, but Walcheren Island is still going to very difficult to take. It is an island connected to the mainland by a narrow 1km+ causeway, with coastal and AA artillery, Atlantic Wall fortifications and a fortress garrison. It has essentially outerworks on the land ward side provided by canals through Beveland. It cannot be taken on the bounce by an armoured division spread very thinly.

After cutting off Beveland, Second British Army will still need to fight its way north, to give some defensive depth beyond Antwerp - certainly as far as Nijmegen.

First Canadian Army still has the job of clearing Le Havre, Calais, Boulogne, which are far more important for British supply than Antwerp.

The US Army consider 11th September the end of the pursuit phase. To continue the pursuit needs logistics to be sorted out well before then.

You're right, & I'm revealling my ignorance of the details. The final remark is key...but First Canadian's task is one Monty, or somebody, should've realized was going to be a lot harder than (it seems) they expected; it's as if nobody anticipated the Germans would fortify ports, or blow up harbor facilities...

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

There is a misapprehension the Germans were still on the run in latter September. I disabused myself of that many year ago. The terrain of eastern France, Belgium and souther Netherlands offered to many defensive advantages. The old fortification/defense zone lay there, there were sign

ificant reinforcements collecting in that zone, To break the coagulating German defense the Allies need supply sufficient for full offensive power across the board, for all three army groups. The German railways system is largely intact at this point & it is far easier for them to shift reinforcements to threatened points than it is for the Allies to concentrate. As the Red Army found, its better to go for multiple breakthroughs & deny the Germans the ability to concentrate their effort to counter. A single breakthrough isn't going to get it, that works against armies with a very poor command. This was not the German army of 1944, they still had a good operational command echelon, fully capable of coping with a single axis attack. Even Hitler had enough focus to deal with such a thing.

Even in early September the Germans were not so much running from the Allied armies as into their best location for halting the enemy advance. Preventing them from coalescing in and west of the Siegfried Line requires rather more effort that the Allies could muster in early Sept.

As Aber put it:

The US Army consider 11th September the end of the pursuit phase. To continue the pursuit needs logistics to be sorted out well before then.

In other points:
Opening the Dutch ports may not be practical. Every time 21 AG attempted to advance in that direction the defenders opened the dykes & flooded every meter possible.

You're right that Antwerp is not a panacea, but it is a major factor in the battle to keep the Allied armies supplied.

If the German 15th Army can be cut off in the first week in September, when they're still in the process of evacuating from south of the Scheldt, it should be simpler to dig them out than it was in OTL. Even if it isn't, it took about three weeks between the fall of Walcheren and the first unload. If the effort to clear the Scheldt is made instead of the dash to the Rhine, then that pushes everything forward a month. ....

Its in part hindsight, but I'd use at least part of the Allied airborne forces to secure Walchern, Beveland, and perhaps the northern approaches to Antwerp on or previous to 4 September.

 

[Geordie]

part hindsight, but I'd use at least part of the Allied airborne forces to secure Walchern, Beveland, and perhaps the northern approaches to Antwerp on or previous to 4 September.

It's a good idea, but would probably need Monty or even Ike demanding it. See how precious the air forces were about landing zones and drop zones in the planning for Market Garden.

 

[Aber]

Its in part hindsight, but I'd use at least part of the Allied airborne forces to secure Walchern, Beveland, and perhaps the northern approaches to Antwerp on or previous to 4 September.

The airborne forces were asked about Walcheren prior to Market Garden; they said no. Referenced to Brereton Diaries p340-1

Preventing them from coalescing in and west of the Siegfried Line requires rather more effort that the Allies could muster in early Sept.

Not convinced of that. The Aachen corridor had been identified pre D-Day as the main axis of advance into Germany. If Bradley had focussed here, then a breakthrough was possible.

Are there enough supplies for VIII Corps and XII Corps to launch simultaneous attacks?

As I showed with the example of 3rd Division, the units and supplies are in the wrong places. There is a question whether it would have been better to delay Market Garden a few days for this, or longer to allow a night airborne operation.

but First Canadian's task is one Monty, or somebody, should've realized was going to be a lot harder than (it seems) they expected; it's as if nobody anticipated the Germans would fortify ports, or blow up harbor facilities...

First Canadian did extremely well in capturing Le Havre (10-12 September), Dieppe (1 September & undamaged), Calais (25-28 September), Boulogne(17-22 September); they only really bogged down in the Antwerp approaches. By comparison the Battle of Brest was 9 August - 19 September.

 

[Draconis]

You're right, but my thinking is, given a choice of operating *Red Ball/White Ball out of Normandy or Antwerp, I'll take Antwerp every time. (I'd also take more ten-tonner tractor-trailers & fewer deuce-and-a-halfs...) And that is the bottom line, whatever other problems may arise.

Do you have anymore information about the 10 ton tractor-trailer or semi trucks you mention that should have been used more by the Western Allies in Northern Europe? Who made them? What was their designation?