Successful Market Garden

Also reduces the criticism of Eisenhower for not following a specific detailed strategic plan. How does one do that when your core assumptions are overturned in a couple weeks.
It does. I suspect the situation was changing so fast, the only thing really in play was the grand concept; recall the expected dates for arrival at given lines were being thrown out daily as the invasion force overtook their schedule...
 
Also reduces the criticism of Eisenhower for not following a specific detailed strategic plan.

But increases the criticism of him for not actually having a plan. :)

It has never been clear to me how Eisenhower intended to control operations after his move to France. Initially it seems to me that his concept was to delegate to the commanders of the Army Groups of the North, Centre and South, giving them authority within their own areas. But this never seemed to happen as the situation in early September was so chaotic.
 
Well, there was that outline made back in England months earlier. It served as a sort of commanders intent. & There was that incredibly complex pile of logistic documents. How many truck loads was that? & Like any good plan it was clear which subordinate went on the left/centre/right & the allocation of fire support was clear enough.

I suppose Ike could have written up something akin to to a division or corps operational order, but I'm unsure what that would have really achieved. Ditto for a map with big blue arrows. There may have been one of those around SHAEF.
 
Very difficult. Same sort of issues as the Breskens pocket etc. The Germans control the infrastructure and so can flood areas at will. Usual process was to raise the ground water level to the surface so that roads are useable by the defenders, but off road movement is almost impossible for the attackers. It's arguably easier to head to Berlin and get a German surrender than to fight through Holland in winter.
Bugger, that's what I was afraid of. Only counter that I can think of would be wider use of LVTs and Terrapins/DUKWs combined with close air support and that would require even more changes.
 
Bugger, that's what I was afraid of. Only counter that I can think of would be wider use of LVTs and Terrapins/DUKWs combined with close air support and that would require even more changes.

The real issue is how quickly you can do things. Market Garden was exceptional as the surprise use of airborne meant that once the hard crust of the frontline was broken, the advance was rapid. It's going to be much more difficult to do that again.
 
Market Garden was just one of dozens of airborne operations planned after D-Day. The problem was ground troops advancing too quickly, over-running objectives before paratroopers finished planning their mission, airlift, logistics, etc.

Airborne forces were ordered to plan a parachute and glider assault on Walcheren Island, but staff officers predicted too many casualties, so the operation was cancelled. Staff officers feared that light infantry landing on open fields would be slaughtered by German defenders dug into dykes.

German soldiers - still occupying the western provinces of the Netherlands - were allowed to "wither on the vine" because the Canadian Army knew that crossing all those water obstacles - during winter - would cause horrendous casualties.
Unfortunately, a bitter winter combined with a railway strike to starve thousands of Dutch citizens living west of Operation Market Garden.
The Canadian Army was exhausted by September 1944 (near Antwerp) and could not resume thier advance until February 1945.
Last last German soldiers - occupying the Dutch coast - did not surrender until April or May 1945.
 
Market Garden was just one of dozens of airborne operations planned after D-Day. The problem was ground troops advancing too quickly, over-running objectives before paratroopers finished planning their mission, airlift, logistics, etc.
This is a good point well made. There had been something silly like twelve or thirteen different plans (some less advanced, some more extensively planned) for what to do with elements of the First Allied Airborne Army. The vast majority were cancelled because the ground troops they were supposed to be supporting had already reached the drop sites they were supposed to secure.
 
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