Successful 1848 Revolutions Prevent World War 1?

[kernals12]

1848 saw massive numbers of uprisings in Central Europe. Let us imagine that liberal Hungary successfully breaks off from Austria, Sardinia unifies Italy under a liberal constitution, and this convinces Kaiser Wilhelm I to take the offer of the Frankfurt assembly to ascend to the throne of a unified liberal Germany. Would this butterfly away World War I?

 

[Thomas1195]

1848 saw massive numbers of uprising in Central Europe. Let us imagine that liberal Hungary successfully breaks off from Austria, Sardinia unifies Italy under a liberal constitution, and this convinces Kaiser Wilhelm I to take the offer of the Frankfurt assembly to ascend to the throne of a unified liberal Germany. Would this butterfly away World War I?

You need a much stronger and much more reactionary Russia to unite the West.

Most likely Germany and Hungary would become allies, since both face threats from Russia, especially the latter. Italy could also join in a Lesser Germany scenario (no South Tirol Question), and even Greater Germany if South Tirol can be resolved.

Also, if Napoleon III is not butterflied away, he would be likely to ally with Russia to rival the new liberal states. In this case, the Great Game with Russia might drive Britain towards Germany, Hungary and Italy. Finally, a Prussian-led Germany like that would be heavily influenced by Prussian militarism, although somewhat weaker than IOTL.

However, a surviving French Republic led by someone like Lamartine or even Cavaignac (prevent the June Day and butterflying away Napoleon III would help) would act differently. Likewise, a German Republic led by people like Carl Schurz would be very different (due to much stronger liberalism and weaker Prussian influence).

Besides, there are still problems with Savoie, South Tirol and Alsace-Lorraine. While the first and second ones could be resolved without war while maintaining a cordial relation, but the third one is hard. But being able to resolve all three cases via diplomatic solutions would butterfly away an European War.

 

[Mikestone8]

1848 saw massive numbers of uprising in Central Europe. Let us imagine that liberal Hungary successfully breaks off from Austria, Sardinia unifies Italy under a liberal constitution, and this convinces Kaiser Wilhelm I to take the offer of the Frankfurt assembly to ascend to the throne of a unified liberal Germany. Would this butterfly away World War I?

Not necessarily.

France would still be unwilling to let herself be overshadowed by a united Germany (no matter how liberal), and Russia wouldn't like a liberal Germany and Hungary on its doorstep. So in all likelihood Europe still splits into armed camps.

 

[Matteo]

There is no way Russia, itself a multinational empire, will back a Hungarian independance in 1848/49. It will back the Habsburg for self-preservation.

And it is almost as probable the king of Prussia will accept presiding a liberal Germany because he felt far more prussian than german. Prussia's goal was establishing its hegemony over Germany, not to dissolve prussian power into a unified Germany. It took 2 world wars to de-prussianize Germany.

 

[Salvador79]

It's king Friedrich w IV at the time.
Successful 1848 is certainly not implausible, there have been a few good timelines on it (e.g. The Smallest Possible Diference). It will butterfly away WW1 as we know it.
That doesn't mean, though, that a century of peace will ensue. All parties to the conflict across so
many countries had belligerent
positions: the conservative monarchists of OTL brought us WW1, and OTL's liberals who sought
improved colonial profits contributed
to it enough. Yet, if the radical Democrats had been at the Helm, that doesn't mean they'd be pacifists.
For one, they might intervene elsewhere to support popular revolutions. And by 1848, there were still many radical nationalists among them who e.g. supported war against Denmark and build-up against France even.

 

[Salvador79]

Sorry for the crappy editing. My Phone forced my hand...

 

[Kalan]

1848 saw massive numbers of uprising in Central Europe. Let us imagine that liberal Hungary successfully breaks off from Austria, Sardinia unifies Italy under a liberal constitution, and this convinces Kaiser Wilhelm I to take the offer of the Frankfurt assembly to ascend to the throne of a unified liberal Germany. Would this butterfly away World War I?

No it wouldn't.

First of all while revolution was "liberal" in the sense that it demanded greater popular participation in government and was opposed to the absolute monarchies and nobility it was also very nationalistic, and not liberal in their treatment of minorities inside their nation states. A German empire encompassing Posen and Czechia might allow the Poles and Czechs to elect representatives to the imperial parliament but demographics alone would ensure that they stayed marginalised and they would likely be the subject of at least an unofficial germanisation. Furthermore the different nationstates had conflicting ideas of where their borders should be:
For example in the "Song of Germans", which would later become the national hymn of Germany, the writer proposes the borders of Meuse (which is quite a bit within France), Etsch (i.e. claiming South Tyrol). Of course it is only a song (and only one of many) but it shows that the proposed borders were quite expansive.
Italy also had some quite impressive claims and gave us the word "irredentism".
Hungary did not have any claims, but that was because it was at its biggest and included many other people (Slovaks, Croats, Romanians) and only about half of its inhabitants were Hungarians.
In France the idea to reexpand to the Rhine has Napoleon had done was often discussed - which had been the impetus for writing "the "song of Germans".

So even if all four nations are governed by liberal governments this would by no means guarantee that they become allies. I can easily see Germany and Hungary allying over the joint oppression of Slavic people (Poles and Czechs in Germany, Croats and Slovaks in Hungary) but that is only going to bring them into conflict with Russia which viewed itself as a protector of all Slavs. So a Great war between the European powers still looks likely.

But what if the liberal nations would be more accepting of minorities and the right of self-determination? While I view it as less likely it is by no means impossible. For example while the song of germans does claim South Tyrol, the reference to the Etsch makes it clear that Lombardy - which belonged to Austria - would not be included. Likewise the author omits to name any demarcation in southern part of the Western border, as there is no mention of e.g. the Vosges, mainly because there was no consensus where to put the border in this region.
So it is possible that the newly founded nations of Germany and Italy - which would after all have been allies in the fight against Austria - decide to settle their borders amicably with a vote amongst the inhabitants. This would be helped by the mountainous geography which had resulted in relatively clear linguistic borders. This would likely result in Trentino becoming part of Italy while South Tyrol becoming part of Germany.

Furthermore, if Germany and Hungary become allies this would mean that a significant minority of Germans would live in another friendly country which could bring about the recognition that not all Germans have to be integrated into Germany itself, but that it is sufficient to be on good terms with the local government.

If this happens then it is possible for all four "revolutionary" countries to become allies. However, this would by no means reduce the chance of a world war. On one hand a coalition of countries accepting the self-determination would be ideologically opposed to both Russia and the Ottoman empire. If Germany becomes more accepting of Polish nationalism and allows such parties in Posen, this would bring it into conflict with Russia which owns the core part of Poland - and after the breakup of Austria likely also Galicia.

Furthermore, France, Germany and Italy would also try to gain colonies brining them into conflict with Britain, which is anyway unlikely to be happy about an alliance encompassing all of central Europe.

So a successful revolution of 1848 is won't affect the chances of a world war occurring - although it would obviously be radically changed.

 

[Salvador79]

@Kalan while I agree with almost everything you say, I just wanted to clarify that "Von der Maas bis an die Memel", i.e. the mentioning of the Meuse as Germany`s Western border, did not envision annexing French territory. Prussia, which included EUpen and Malmedy since 1815, reached very close to the Meuse, and between the boundaries of the Kreis Eupen and the Meuse, you have villages which even today bear names like "Dalheim" and "Werkerath", which hints at German-speaking population even in the small strip of approximately 15 km West of Prussia`s border, which at that time (and today) was not French, but Belgian. I suppose it was a multilingual region. Subsuming it into Germany was indeed expansionistically nationalistic of Fallersleben, but not as much so as annexing quite a bit of France would seem.

 

[Thomas1195]

Furthermore, France, Germany and Italy would also try to gain colonies brining them into conflict with Britain, which is anyway unlikely to be happy about an alliance encompassing all of central Europ

Well, turning Britain into a Republic would allow a bunch of radical liberal "Little Englanders" to win power sooner or later. Britain being less aggressive in Africa would reduce tension and allow more lands for the new powers to grab.

If Germany becomes more accepting of Polish nationalism and allows such parties in Posen, this would bring it into conflict with Russia which owns the core part of Poland - and after the breakup of Austria likely also Galicia.

Not if Russia has to deal with a Liberal Triple (or even Quadruple) Coalition. Meanwhile, Russia was more of a threat to British India than either of these liberal states.

 

[Reydan]

Short answer - Yes it would prevent WWI as we know it, but only as we know it, because of the changes wrought to Europe. It would not preclude alternate conflicts.

Long answer - The key thing you have to remember here is that, as others here and particularly @Kalan have observed, the 1848 Revolutions were Liberal but also Nationalist. The revolutionaries across Europe, and they really did encompass all sorts of ideologies, were fueled by a potent mixture of beliefs. There was already the potential for conflict therein.

For example, if we take a positive alt-history of the revolts in 1848:

France - 1848 happens as OTL, Second Republic declared.
Italy - The OTL chaos in some of major cities (Milan, Venice, Rome, etc) spills over. Napoleon III does not intervene to secure Rome for the Pope, the Bourbons are overthrown in mainland Italy and so cannot crush the revolt in Sicily, the Venetians manage to push the Austrians back from their walls as do the Milanese etc. Either Italy develops as a Republic or as a Confederation of Republics.
Germany - Either the Prussian Kaiser manages to swallow his ideological issues with liberal democracy (unlikely) or bungles events in Berlin (possibly after an ATL defeat in the Palatinate) and is swept away with other German Princelings as a Republic/Confederation of States is declared.
Hungary - Kossuth and Co. are successful in overthrowing Habsburg Rule and the Russians are dissuaded from intervening in events.
Denmark - Follows the peaceful path to reform as OTL.
Sweden - Instead of clamping down decides that sanity is the better part of valour and follows Denmark's example.

Already, there is the potential for war here for a number of reasons:

• Just because these regimes are "Liberal" doesn't mean they would be ruled by a Liberal Party. In fact revolutionaries represented a wide range of ideologies. Look at the French Second Republic OTL - conservatives remained a force to be reckoned with, as did those more to the left of the political spectrum. The 19th century is a period of sharp class antagonism. Its easy to pull together when you are manning the barricades - building a country though? Italy has its eyes on that Adriatic Coastline as OTL, but who owns that? Hungary? Austria? An independent Croatia etc? That's where divisions start to emerge. There is no guarantee these regimes would stay "Liberal" - just look at Napoleon III's rise to power.
• Just because these regimes are "Liberal" doesn't mean they would support each other. As @Kalan and others have pointed out, there is plenty of potential for conflict. A German Republic in the scenario I outlined above may well go to war with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein. A surviving Second Republic in France will still be very wary of a united Germany. Then there are the later flash points such as influence in the Balkans, trade and tariff friction, and colonialism.
• Even in its wildest possibilities a successful Springtime of the Peoples does not take into account all of Europe. It ignores the Balkans, which will continue to be a powderkeg of potential conflicts over influence, the Ottoman Empire, which continues to exert a potent influence in the Middle East and Mediterranean. People talk about Russia as if it would be the only reactionary power left, but don't discount countries like Spain. Spain was relatively unrocked by 1848, for a variety of complicated reasons, and will continue to be a counterweight in Europe for the forces of reaction. If you were an exiled Bourbon, from Italy for example, where would you feel that was sympathetically Catholic and Authoritarian?

Finally, remember those class antagonisms. They are vital in this period. An alt-Europe that emerges from 1848 will not escape the emergence of a modern capitalist system, rapid urbanisation, industrial change, etc etc that fueled social conflict in Europe in our own timelines. These states will be buffeted by the currents of history as others were in our own time and these will fuel new and, possibly, antagonistic politics on national and international scales.

 

[Thomas1195]

Just because these regimes are "Liberal" doesn't mean they would be ruled by a Liberal Party. In fact revolutionaries represented a wide range of ideologies. Look at the French Second Republic OTL - conservatives remained a force to be reckoned with, as did those more to the left of the political spectrum. The 19th century is a period of sharp class antagonism. Its easy to pull together when you are manning the barricades - building a country though? Italy has its eyes on that Adriatic Coastline as OTL, but who owns that? Hungary? Austria? An independent Croatia etc? That's where divisions start to emerge. There is no guarantee these regimes would stay "Liberal" - just look at Napoleon III's rise to power.

Well, agree, Napoleon and the conservatives are a problem. Certain conditions must be met to make a successful revolution. We can somehow wreck the monarchists and conservatives in the Second Republic, like the way they were tore apart after 1880 IOTL. Maybe better policies prior to the OTL June Day help butterfly it away and thus allow the Liberals to retain support.

Or maybe more extreme version, a Republican version of "Night of the Long Knives" which results in the death of almost all if not all the leading and influential conservatives and monarchists (Parti d'Order). This, although sounds Communist, would leave the Old Right being powerless and void of leadership while ensuring no backlash (because all of those who could lead such a backlash were already murdered).

Just because these regimes are "Liberal" doesn't mean they would support each other. As @Kalan and others have pointed out, there is plenty of potential for conflict. A German Republic in the scenario I outlined above may well go to war with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein. A surviving Second Republic in France will still be very wary of a united Germany. Then there are the later flash points such as influence in the Balkans, trade and tariff friction, and colonialism.

Liberals were generally pro free trade, or at least pro tariff reduction. A war with Denmark after all would be just a minor war, as long as Germany can keep Britain from intervening. Also, if the likes of Carl Schurz can win the elections, Germany would be far less militaristic.

Spain was relatively unrocked by 1848, for a variety of complicated reasons, and will continue to be a counterweight in Europe for the forces of reaction. If you were an exiled Bourbon, from Italy for example, where would you feel that was sympathetically Catholic and Authoritarian?

Spain was just a joke by that time and could be easily squashed by the French alone by the mid-19th century. Only Russia would be a true threat, but a German-Hungarian-Italian alliance would be too much for Russia.

Ottoman Empire, which continues to exert a potent influence in the Middle East and Mediterranean

There would be more William Ewart Gladstone ITTL, who would prefer the Empire to crumble even if Russia might gain Constantinople. This means European liberals would turn Ottoman Empire into an even worse mess riddled by supporting various nationalist movements, specifically Greek and Bulgarian nationalism.

Finally, remember those class antagonisms. They are vital in this period. An alt-Europe that emerges from 1848 will not escape the emergence of a modern capitalist system, rapid urbanisation, industrial change, etc etc that fueled social conflict in Europe in our own timelines.

Liberalism ITTL would be less elitist, less intellectual, and closer to the mass, since it would be rooted from a popular revolution. Which means the Liberal answer (OTL British New Liberalism/American New Deal Liberalism/social liberalism) to poverty, hardship and class struggle would come into existence much earlier. Even IOTL Britain, social liberalism was already on track to displace classical liberalism up to 1914 without any kind of revolution, but was cut short by the death of the Liberal Party (a liberal revolution would accelerate such transition)

 

[Alex Zetsu]

There is no way Russia, itself a multinational empire, will back a Hungarian independance in 1848/49. It will back the Habsburg for self-preservation.

I don't know, I've seen a few times Russia (or some nations) let someone get mauled when they really need to save them.

 

[Kalan]

Well, agree, Napoleon and the conservatives are a problem. Certain conditions must be met to make a successful revolution. We can somehow wreck the monarchists and conservatives in the Second Republic, like the way they were tore apart after 1880 IOTL. Maybe better policies prior to the OTL June Day help butterfly it away and thus allow the Liberals to retain support.

Or maybe more extreme version, a Republican version of "Night of the Long Knives" which results in the death of almost all if not all the leading and influential conservatives and monarchists (Parti d'Order). This, although sounds Communist, would leave the Old Right being powerless and void of leadership while ensuring no backlash (because all of those who could lead such a backlash were already murdered).

So a second reign of terror? That is definitely a possible outcome of 1848 revolution, but judging from the first one it won't lead to a stable Republic, but rather embolden the reactionary elements, and counter-revolutions in the countryside. It would also increase the chances of refugees successfully agitating for an intervention, and make the nobility in other countries more willing to use violence against their own revolutions.

Liberals were generally pro free trade, or at least pro tariff reduction. A war with Denmark after all would be just a minor war, as long as Germany can keep Britain from intervening. Also, if the likes of Carl Schurz can win the elections, Germany would be far less militaristic.

Interestingly enough, the Danish-German war IOTL was supported and caused by liberals on both sides, while the conservatives tried to prevent/delay it:
- On the Danish side the liberal majority in the parliament passed a new constitutions that included Schleswig into the kingdom of Denmark. The king was aware that this would likely lead to an uprising in Schleswig and and unwinnable war with the German confederation but couldn't convince the liberal nationalists of that.
- On the German side the liberal small states advocated war from the beginning of the crisis while the conservative states of Prussia and Austria tried to delay it and keep everything in accordance with the London Protocol - mainly to prevent any outside intervention.

This shows clearly that a) liberals in different countries were by no means friends, b) liberals were not opposed to militarism, c) liberals were less likely to feel bound by international treaties increasing the chance of an British intervention.

But lets assume for the moment that the war remains localised and ends in clear defeat of Denmark. Well then Germany has just proven that it is willing to use force to extend its borders to include more Germans, which will make France very suspicious of this revolutionary Germany, regardless of its government. Such a short and successful war is also likely to increase the appetite for more such short and successful wars among Germany nationalists leading to more not less militarism.
France would seek allies against this threat, which would lead to exactly the same configuration as IOTL.

There would be more William Ewart Gladstone ITTL, who would prefer the Empire to crumble even if Russia might gain Constantinople. This means European liberals would turn Ottoman Empire into an even worse mess riddled by supporting various nationalist movements, specifically Greek and Bulgarian nationalism.

First of all such a war against the Ottoman empire could easily become the first world war as different nations start to support different breakaway states, and try to win influence in the Balkans (which is after all what caused WWI). Secondly it is by no means given that all revolutionary states would support such a breakup. Hungary for example will have sizeable Serbian and Romanian minorities in its southern regions (Vovoidina and Transylvania). This will make its government hesitant to support the creation of theses states from the Ottoman empire out of fear that they would lay claim to these regions.

Liberalism ITTL would be less elitist, less intellectual, and closer to the mass, since it would be rooted from a popular revolution. Which means the Liberal answer (OTL British New Liberalism/American New Deal Liberalism/social liberalism) to poverty, hardship and class struggle would come into existence much earlier. Even IOTL Britain, social liberalism was already on track to displace classical liberalism up to 1914 without any kind of revolution, but was cut short by the death of the Liberal Party (a liberal revolution would accelerate such transition)

That is by no means given. In Switzerland - the only nation where the 1848 revolutions were successful - the liberal movement was by no means inclined to include the lower classes and instead gave rise to a small group of tycoons (e.g. Alfred Escher) controlling most of the industry and politics for about 20 years. It took a new movement to break their power, and even then Switzerland remained hostile to socialist movements for a long time. So the idea that the liberal movement would automatically welcome the working class and peasants after a successful revolution is dubious at best.
Particularly if a second reign of terror happens as you suggested. A movement that is willing to murder all of its opponents will not allow the underclass to express its grievances, no matter what its ideology claims (see Russia and China).

 

[Thomas1195]

First of all such a war against the Ottoman empire could easily become the first world war as different nations start to support different breakaway states, and try to win influence in the Balkans (which is after all what caused WWI). Secondly it is by no means given that all revolutionary states would support such a breakup. Hungary for example will have sizeable Serbian and Romanian minorities in its southern regions (Vovoidina and Transylvania). This will make its government hesitant to support the creation of theses states from the Ottoman empire out of fear that they would lay claim to these regions.

That's why I said "specifically Bulgarian and Greek nationalism, or maybe only Greek nationalism. I am aware of this problem. But if Kossuth got his way, then things could be better.

That is by no means given. In Switzerland - the only nation where the 1848 revolutions were successful - the liberal movement was by no means inclined to include the lower classes and instead gave rise to a small group of tycoons (e.g. Alfred Escher) controlling most of the industry and politics for about 20 years. It took a new movement to break their power, and even then Switzerland remained hostile to socialist movements for a long time. So the idea that the liberal movement would automatically welcome the working class and peasants after a successful revolution is dubious at best.

But in many other countries, liberal movements also included a sizable chunk of radicals (e.g. in OTL Germany: National Liberals vs Free-minded Progressives, or currently D66 vs VVD in Netherlands), but there weren't any clear socialist movements in 1848 (I mean socialist movements like Labour party or SFIO, not just proto-socialist or borderline socialist).

I mean, classical liberals would occupy the right, and Radical Liberals would occupy the left. So social liberalism could come into existence earlier, and if early enough, could butterfly away socialism as a main political force (not as an ideology but as a prominent political force). The political landscape of OTL Third French Republic between 1890s-1910s was a prime example: the right and the left being dominated by right-liberals and left-liberals.

Oh wait, IOTL, since Switzerland actually underwent a successful 1848, its liberal party remained the main party of government for much much longer than the rest of Europe. Liberal parties in France also remained significant for much longer than those in Britain, Germany.... IOTL, until the fall of France.

In the unlikely case of a successful British Revolution, the Whigs and Liberal/Peelite Tories would occupy the Right and merge into a Liberal Party, and the Radicals/Little Englanders would occupy the left. The huge urban working class in Britain would allow the Radicals to become a main political force, and eventually, social liberalism would emerge from the Radicals with someone like Joe Chamberlain, Charles Dilkes, or Lloyd George.

So a second reign of terror? That is definitely a possible outcome of 1848 revolution, but judging from the first one it won't lead to a stable Republic, but rather embolden the reactionary elements, and counter-revolutions in the countryside. It would also increase the chances of refugees successfully agitating for an intervention, and make the nobility in other countries more willing to use violence against their own revolutions.

Well, unlike the prior Reign of Terror, a "Night of the Long Knives" would swiftly wipe out the organization and leadership of the conservatives/monarchists after a night, even Thiers could be killed. You can look at the way the Conservative Right essentially disappeared in the Third Republic until the 1930s. This purge could look like a successful Gunpowder Plot, lets say: Conservatives and Monarchists hold an all-party meeting at a big building. Suddenly, the building blows up (original Gunpowder Plot)/Suddenly, Republican guards locks the doors of the building and burn it down. Both are very quick and swift.
There would be no intervention because other countries were also undergoing revolutions at that time.

Of course, I would prefer sensible economic policies that prevent June Day and preserve the popularity of the Liberal Republicans.

 

[Reydan]

Well, agree, Napoleon and the conservatives are a problem. Certain conditions must be met to make a successful revolution. We can somehow wreck the monarchists and conservatives in the Second Republic, like the way they were tore apart after 1880 IOTL. Maybe better policies prior to the OTL June Day help butterfly it away and thus allow the Liberals to retain support.

Or maybe more extreme version, a Republican version of "Night of the Long Knives" which results in the death of almost all if not all the leading and influential conservatives and monarchists (Parti d'Order). This, although sounds Communist, would leave the Old Right being powerless and void of leadership while ensuring no backlash (because all of those who could lead such a backlash were already murdered).

Well, unlike the prior Reign of Terror, a "Night of the Long Knives" would swiftly wipe out the organization and leadership of the conservatives/monarchists after a night, even Thiers could be killed. You can look at the way the Conservative Right essentially disappeared in the Third Republic until the 1930s. This purge could look like a successful Gunpowder Plot, lets say: Conservatives and Monarchists hold an all-party meeting at a big building. Suddenly, the building blows up (original Gunpowder Plot)/Suddenly, Republican guards locks the doors of the building and burn it down. Both are very quick and swift.
There would be no intervention because other countries were also undergoing revolutions at that time.

Of course, I would prefer sensible economic policies that prevent June Day and preserve the popularity of the Liberal Republicans.

But this is to completely misunderstand what was happening in 1848 as well as misrepresent politics in the nineteenth century. Firstly, it would be very hard to avoid the June Days and keep working-class support for the Liberal revolutionaries. The National Factories, the closing of which led to the June Days, were an economic disaster BUT were exactly what the working-class had asked for.

Really, though, you just can't achieve something like a 'Night of the Long Knives'. Firstly that comparison doesn't work - the situation in Nazi Germany in the 1930s was very different and Hitler was able to lash out at the SA because he was able to mobilize other armed groups within a situation where, despite the complete illegality of the action, he had total control. On a practical level your suggestion doesn't work - who are these 'Republican Guards' for example? But on a more general level it doesn't reflect politics at the time. You can't simply purge a political opinion from a country, even in a full dictatorship which c19th France was by no means. Even if you somehow managed to kill the entire British Labour Party today, in terms of shooting every MP, Peer, and Party functionary, for instance, do you really think that would be the end of left-of-centre politics in Britain? That Labour voters, for example, or local councilors, would simply shrug their shoulders and submit to Tory domination?

As for the suggestion that the Conservative Right somehow vanished in Third Republic France, Raymond Poincare, Georges Boulanger, the Conservative Union, the Ralliement, the Catholic Church, the Progressive Party, the Monarchist Factions, and the civil and judicial apparatus that destroyed Alfred Dreyfus would like to speak to you...

Spain was just a joke by that time and could be easily squashed by the French alone by the mid-19th century. Only Russia would be a true threat, but a German-Hungarian-Italian alliance would be too much for Russia.


There would be more William Ewart Gladstone ITTL, who would prefer the Empire to crumble even if Russia might gain Constantinople. This means European liberals would turn Ottoman Empire into an even worse mess riddled by supporting various nationalist movements, specifically Greek and Bulgarian nationalism.


Liberalism ITTL would be less elitist, less intellectual, and closer to the mass, since it would be rooted from a popular revolution. Which means the Liberal answer (OTL British New Liberalism/American New Deal Liberalism/social liberalism) to poverty, hardship and class struggle would come into existence much earlier. Even IOTL Britain, social liberalism was already on track to displace classical liberalism up to 1914 without any kind of revolution, but was cut short by the death of the Liberal Party (a liberal revolution would accelerate such transition)

Spain - don't confuse general military/industrial power for the potential for political intrigue. I'd argue Spain was a major power player, albeit beset by internal issues that hemmed it in in this period, but it doesn't have to invade France or Italy to provide a home for anti-Liberal clerics, politicians, Royals in exile, etc etc for conservative forces in those countries to rally around. Spain as a conservative bastion in this period, for example, is very much an issue.

UK - You and I repeatedly disagree on this period of British history, so I won't flog a dead horse and wheel out my usual objections. But nothing in this POD makes Liberalism less elitist or intellectual. Nothing really stymies the emergence in this period, for factors that are much more long-term and important than the 1848 revolutions, of an industrial working class more and more conscious of its need for political representation and that its needs can, potentially, conflict with the core beliefs of liberalism [the group vs the individual, free trade vs trade protection, social intervention vs laissez faire etc etc].

 

[Clandango]

There were a variety or revolutions and revolts. Likely a couple that had slightly different goals within the same nation and/or state. Don't think many were successful, though the Danes managed it in a way. Members of their legislature went up to the king in private, and asked about getting more powers for themselves. He agreed and later said that he was the only monarch in Europe who could sleep soundly at night. Hell, WWI also led to changes in way the Danish government was run, as the king lost some abilities to go against the wishes of the legislature after he was too intend upon regaining land from Germany, when the legislature only wanted land with Danes in it. That being said, I believe Schleswig is going to end up a sore point in this world. And I really do hate the word Schleswig. MY spellcheck doesn't even recognize it as a word, suggesting a type of gun or something instead.

 

[Mikestone8]

And I really do hate the word Schleswig. MY spellcheck doesn't even recognize it as a word, suggesting a type of gun or something instead.

In his Struggle For Mastery, AJP Taylor preferred to call it "Sleswick" as more neutral between Germans and Danes. But I've never seen that name used anywhere else so evidently it didn't catch on.

 

[HIM Dogson]

At most the states would be ideologically friendly for maybe a decade before political reality would set in. Germany, and even moreso a Germany that includes Cisleithenian Austria, is still incompatible with the balance of power doctrine; Britain and France would either have to abandon that or oppose Germany at some point. You also still have Russian Panslavism, which I can't see successful 1848 butterfly ing away. WWI was not due to ideology, it was due to competing geopolitical interests, and no amount of liberalism would change those geopolitical interests.

 

[Thomas1195]

But this is to completely misunderstand what was happening in 1848 as well as misrepresent politics in the nineteenth century. Firstly, it would be very hard to avoid the June Days and keep working-class support for the Liberal revolutionaries. The National Factories, the closing of which led to the June Days, were an economic disaster BUT were exactly what the working-class had asked for.

US-style internal improvement is a fine alternative, as it could be applied nationwide

 

[Thomas1195]

Nothing really stymies the emergence in this period, for factors that are much more long-term and important than the 1848 revolutions, of an industrial working class more and more conscious of its need for political representation and that its needs can, potentially, conflict with the core beliefs of liberalism [the group vs the individual, free trade vs trade protection, social intervention vs laissez faire etc etc].

There is no question that classical liberals would go into conflict with industrial workers over the issues you mentioned, but social/interventionist liberalism could emerge earlier to challenge classical liberalism and could reconcile these conflicts significantly, although not totally.