I fail to see what you're attempting to prove with this bit.
Oh, just noting that I can rely on putting most of these tables through google translate. Not all of them, but when google translate fails to translate singular words it is very obvious in doing so. Just... never rely on it for sentences.
Declined production in 1945 can easily be explained: the loss of America Tetrathyl lead.
Maybe, maybe not. I won't say it's wrong, but unless more concrete evidence can be provided then it's no more likely then the possibility that, for example, the Soviets deliberately scaled back production in response to capturing new, non-domestic production centers much closer to their air forces operational bases (that is, the East German refineries obviously).
Not by Mid-Summer of 1944.
Uh. Yes, by mid-summer of 1944? I mean, that is the time period I was talking about and the numbers speak for themselves: 18 panzer divisions in the east vs 9 in the west. ~5,000 AFVs vs ~2,500.
There's in the vicinity of at least 2.5 Million Allies soldiers in the way versus about an equal number of Soviets who, at best advance,
Wait, why did WAllied soldier strength suddenly jump by half-a-million and Soviet strength decline by anywhere from one-half to one-third? We already established earlier in the thread that it'd probably be about 2 million WAllied soldiers vs 4.5 million Soviet soldiers at best and close to 7 million at worst...
will still take probably close to two weeks if not longer to reach the facilities. Given the Allies managed to conduct such operations repeatedly over the course of WWII despite much worse conditions is salient in this point.
Examples such as what? Genuinely curious here: The only instance of the WAllies having to blow up fuel production facilities under their own control I can recall was the Dutch East Indies in early 1942. Not only were the conditions there at best the same as they are IATL and at worst considerably better (months instead of weeks), but the attempt was a massive failure with the Japanese seizing the oil facilities mostly intact and quickly re-establishing production.
I also completely fail to understand the logic of explaining how the Anti-POL strategy came about in this context; it's not like the Anglo-Americans unlearn such lessons because their enemy speaks Russian instead of German now.
It's less about having to relearn any lessons and more about recognizing the need to implement such a strategy in the midst of the panic and shock of a Soviet surprise attack.
I've already provided the screenshots sufficiently enough times to disprove this notion, yet you insist upon it.
Here's all the chapters available on JSTOR, please direct me to where it states what you claim.
There's no page number attached, but the screenshot you posted earlier states "During all of 1942, 1943, and the
first-half of 1944, food consumption among the civilian home front population was pushed down right down to the lowest possible limit" so once again, we have a case where you are ignoring what the sources you have already posted actually are saying.
And American Lend Lease continued into the fall of 1945. The 1946-1947 famine began just months after the cessation of such.
Actually, the 1946 famine began almost a year after the cessation of lend-lease, with the famine not hitting it's peak until early-1947. This also ignores that the quantity of food shipped under the Milepost Agreement was almost 1/5th that shipped under the 4th Protocol, at 258,201 vs 1,157,373 tons respectively. Taking into account the time differences and food shipments on a per-day basis declined by almost 40% and a nearly 50% decline from that of the Third Protocol Agreement (the 1943-1944 shipments). The correlation of the 1946 famines with the end of lend-lease is hence weak and the causative link has not been established.
Because such numbers don't fit with the land area the Germans controlled at that time nor does it match with the amount of partisans the Germans killed at this time. In 1942, the Germans controlled all of Belarus, Ukraine and the Kuban; over the course of 1943 they lost significant ground in these sectors.
Again, I'm not sure how? Seeing as the 500,000 number for partisans is in mid-'43, when the Germans still controlled all the territory you listed. Even in 1944 while the Germans lost Kuban and much of Ukraine, they still retained major footholds in the latter and lost no ground in Belarus or the Baltics (speaking of which, you seem keen on ignoring the Baltics... how many partisans were operating there in 1944?). While many partisans in a freshly liberated region would (re)join the Red Army's main units, others would (under orders) simply follow the retreating Germans in order to provide intelligence to the Soviet military and assist their comrade partisans further west. Additionally, as the obvious imminence of German defeat rose, regions that had previously been reluctant to support the partisans decided to throw their weight behind them in the hopes of avoiding Stalin's retribution. So while I can see the total number of partisans operating in German rear areas may have declined during the course of 1943 and early-'44, I sincerely doubt it fell to a mere 150,000 nor that the 150,000 partisans in Belarus represent the sum total of all Soviet partisans in operation in June of 1944.
Do they? Their performance in Manchuria says otherwise.
I'm not sure how? The Soviets experienced difficulties in maintaining their formations operational towards the end of the operation but these were typical operational problems that stemmed from a rapid advance leaving behind supplies of spare parts and maintenance workshops and nonindicative of a strategic inability to maintain truck stocks and replace losses. Such issues were no different then those experienced during the massive of advances by the Soviets in 1943-45 or the WAllies in 1944-45 and in those cases too they were transient until the supply and maintenance units caught up and fixed those vehicles right up.
Irrecoverable truck losses were no better or worse then prior operations in 1945. If anything, the Manchurian operation suggests that logistically the Soviets would see little problem in the first stage of the war, seeing as it was conducted over a region comparable to the size of Western Europe but far poorer in infrastructure and much further from the Soviet core, with the Soviets still only taking a month to overrun it all.
Yes, I got my information from the GAVTU as well. That's why the loss figures line up rather directly with mine. The figures in the table don't include Soviet production (only the quantity of vehicles received by the Red Army from Soviet production), but the already linked-too production archives section for industrial machinery output gives the aforementioned 76,000 production. Even there, however, the figures are for production in 1945 rather then the more relevant figures for 1946 when Soviet automotive industry was in a advanced enough state of recovery that they even began the mass production new, modern models of trucks.
The claim was never that all units were being maintained, but that the units to be shipped to the Pacific were; I have absolutely no idea where you get the idea that combat vets were few in number for the ETO in May of 1945, however. As for redeployments to the Pacific,
none were to occur in 1945.
Your post gave off the tone that the all units would be maintained. I said the number of combat vets in the ETO was
relatively small... which it was. Even leaving aside that a vaster proportion of WAllied military manpower in Europe was devoted to deep rear service tasks then that of the Red Army or Wehrmacht (in part, because those tasks were being undertaken by German/Soviet civilian or paramilitary functions) and hence would have little opportunity to see combat, by the time they confronted major German formations they had such overwhelming advantage and advanced in such a methodical and broad manner that the "shallow" rear service personnel never had much opportunity to gain significant combat experience as was the case with the Soviets or Germans. WAllied veteran combat experience was hence heavily concentrated in the combat elements of their forces.
As to transfer to the Pacific, your link does not really support your claim: it discusses operations to be undertaken once they have redeployed to the Pacific by the start of 1946 but for that to be the case, those formations would have to begin redeploying in 1945. The logistics of shipping out hundreds of thousands, even millions, of men and their equipment without rendering them completely disorganized and combat incapable is a lengthy process and by the time the Soviets would attack, they would have to had all left Europe and be halfway to the Pacific in order to meet such a early-1946 deadline.
Total, yes. Actually functioning? Just 44 in AGC's sector as I said.
How many in AGC's sector? As with the above, you're committing the error of willful omission.
I'm not the one committing wifull omission. That's you, trying to pretend that Bagration represents the sum total of Soviet offensives in mid-1944. I'm looking at the whole of the Eastern Front, not just this one limited sector.
Really? Because as I recall Bagration lasted two months, while Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive lasted for one month as well.
Yes, really. The length the entire operation lasted is not the same thing as when the offensive overran their oppositions defenses. Breakthrough is only the first stage in a military operation, after all, to be followed by exploitation and the fact act you tried to conflate the two speaks to either ignorance of basic military affairs or willful misrepresentation. L'vov-Sandomierz began on July 13th. The right wing of the assault had smashed through German defenses by July 15th. The left-wing saw harder going, but also had completely cleared the German defensive belts by July 18th. For it's part, Bagration had the Red Army pour through the entire depth of German defensive lines on almost every sector of the Soviet attack by the end of the first day.
