Was the effort to bring democracy to Russia in the 1990s doomed to fail? Could it have possibly succeeded?
(POD no earlier than 1985/Gorbachev era).
(POD no earlier than 1985/Gorbachev era).
Russian Democracy in the 1990s: Doomed to fail?
- Thread starter sampleswift
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A cursory glance of the era reveals two big fault lines: oligarchs gobbling up the economy, and Yeltsin.
The economy was apocalyptically bad for Russia in the 1990s. I have several Russian friends who lived through it and some of their stories are incredibly bleak. How to fix it, however, I am not sure. The US extending credit and more sympathetic advisors under a more social democratic President could have helped, probably.
That leads us to Yeltsin. Getting rid of him would be crucial, as his apathy/corruption aided and abetted the worst excesses of the 1990s. Removing him in favor of, ironically, a Gorbachev type figure who would ease the transition to the world economy and promoted a culture of transparency and openness would do wonders
The economy was apocalyptically bad for Russia in the 1990s. I have several Russian friends who lived through it and some of their stories are incredibly bleak. How to fix it, however, I am not sure. The US extending credit and more sympathetic advisors under a more social democratic President could have helped, probably.
That leads us to Yeltsin. Getting rid of him would be crucial, as his apathy/corruption aided and abetted the worst excesses of the 1990s. Removing him in favor of, ironically, a Gorbachev type figure who would ease the transition to the world economy and promoted a culture of transparency and openness would do wonders
It'd need labour unions to be organised outside government control, to ensure a decent shake for workers, regulation of private business from the get-go to avoid the kind of scams, oligarchs and worst examples of vulture capitalism going that characterised Russia at the time, gradual liberalisation of the existing economy ('shock therapy' did not work)...
Do those, and it could be done.
Have Yeltsin not fire Primakov as PM in 1999, he'd then succeed Yeltsin as President in 2000. Primakov was a left wing populist, not an autocrat.
Hmm. That would help. Primakov would also have to beat Zyuganov in the Election of 2000 as well. That being said, Yeltsin did heavily damage Russian Democracy via his own blunders (especially 1993 Constitutional Crisis)
There is a reason that shock therapy in Russia was such a dismal failure compared to Poland and others. The assets were massively undervalued before transfer occurred, no effort was made to prevent a continuation of managerialism into the ownership phase, and the social crisis that Gorbachev had only started to fight far too late absolutely crushed productivity in the 90s. Alcoholism became a real scourge in the late 70s, but addressing it only came in the late 80s, and by the 90s, the industrial system was on the brink of collapse at the lower levels with accidents and supply chain problems overwhelming any attempts at changing outdated management structures.
Nobody was making the case, not even the Communist Party, that privatization and the introduction of markets, were things to avoid. There was however intense disagreement on how it should occur.
In Britain, Thatcher put escalating caps on the amount of stock in BT, for example, that could be bought, with higher purchase levels requiring payment at higher rates. The goal, essentially, was to create a broad base of shareholders, and this largely worked, as BT and other big privatizations in the 1980s in Britain did not usually end up going to the same people who ran them under state monopoly, but to a larger base of shareholders coming from different institutions entirely that did not always agree. The financial sector in Britain saw expansion, and suffered no capital flight, like in Russia. In fact, inflation in Britain went DOWN during the privatizations, and consumer spending saw year over year increases. It did help that Britain accompanied privatizations with more flexibility in its labor markets, which was not the case everywhere else that was deescalating the state control over consumer economies (for example, France and Kazakhstan both kept really restrictive labor laws afterwards).
In Russia, what would happen is the collective farm would be looked over, found to be a horribly run business (true enough), and have its physical inventory marked down in price (without transparency, for obviously corrupt ends), and then quickly sold, almost always, to the same person who administered it under Communism, who would quickly either pledge fealty to a big player or would start looting it into the ground even more openly than they had done in the late 80s. This was repeated, by the way, in most of the non-Baltic SSRs. Why do you think Lukashenko and Nazarbayev were able to take power? What differentiated Russia, however, was the total lack of room for fiscal and monetary tools to ease into markets, with a financial crisis, horrible decisions regarding foreign reserves, and bloated defense costs. As a result, the social effects were way worse than in the successor republics, some of which adapted quickly and quite well to markets like Estonia and Latvia, and some of which hewed closer to the old statist model to prevent similar collapses in wealth, like Belarus.
Nobody was making the case, not even the Communist Party, that privatization and the introduction of markets, were things to avoid. There was however intense disagreement on how it should occur.
In Britain, Thatcher put escalating caps on the amount of stock in BT, for example, that could be bought, with higher purchase levels requiring payment at higher rates. The goal, essentially, was to create a broad base of shareholders, and this largely worked, as BT and other big privatizations in the 1980s in Britain did not usually end up going to the same people who ran them under state monopoly, but to a larger base of shareholders coming from different institutions entirely that did not always agree. The financial sector in Britain saw expansion, and suffered no capital flight, like in Russia. In fact, inflation in Britain went DOWN during the privatizations, and consumer spending saw year over year increases. It did help that Britain accompanied privatizations with more flexibility in its labor markets, which was not the case everywhere else that was deescalating the state control over consumer economies (for example, France and Kazakhstan both kept really restrictive labor laws afterwards).
In Russia, what would happen is the collective farm would be looked over, found to be a horribly run business (true enough), and have its physical inventory marked down in price (without transparency, for obviously corrupt ends), and then quickly sold, almost always, to the same person who administered it under Communism, who would quickly either pledge fealty to a big player or would start looting it into the ground even more openly than they had done in the late 80s. This was repeated, by the way, in most of the non-Baltic SSRs. Why do you think Lukashenko and Nazarbayev were able to take power? What differentiated Russia, however, was the total lack of room for fiscal and monetary tools to ease into markets, with a financial crisis, horrible decisions regarding foreign reserves, and bloated defense costs. As a result, the social effects were way worse than in the successor republics, some of which adapted quickly and quite well to markets like Estonia and Latvia, and some of which hewed closer to the old statist model to prevent similar collapses in wealth, like Belarus.
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Russian Democracy was perhaps not doomed to fail, but the kinds of institutions needed to create liberal democracy just weren't there.
It might have been better for Zyuganov to have won the 1996 elections, and then take the heat for the Russian Financial Crisis of 1998 (which was a result of the shocks of the Asian crash in 1997), therefore discrediting illiberal remedies. The rise of the siloviki did not have to come from a big tent, slightly right party like Putin's United Russia. There were many indications that they were attaching themselves to the CPRF in the run-up to 1996 because Yeltsin had alienated them with the disaster in Grozny. Zyuganov had been making overtures to big siloviki related powerbrokers prior to the election, after all, and fully expected to win. This grouping therefore never suffered the kind of discrediting that liberal factions ended up with.
It might have been better for Zyuganov to have won the 1996 elections, and then take the heat for the Russian Financial Crisis of 1998 (which was a result of the shocks of the Asian crash in 1997), therefore discrediting illiberal remedies. The rise of the siloviki did not have to come from a big tent, slightly right party like Putin's United Russia. There were many indications that they were attaching themselves to the CPRF in the run-up to 1996 because Yeltsin had alienated them with the disaster in Grozny. Zyuganov had been making overtures to big siloviki related powerbrokers prior to the election, after all, and fully expected to win. This grouping therefore never suffered the kind of discrediting that liberal factions ended up with.
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Primakov was perhaps the most popular politician in Russia in 1998-1999, and even after being sacked by Yeltsin was still considered the frontrunner for the 2000 election until Putin became President and established himself as the national leader.
Yeltsin certainly undermined Russian democracy, but I've always thought his regime was more similar to that of Kuchma in Ukraine, a corrupt democracy rather than an explicitly authoritarian one. After all the 1996 presidential election was competitive, and the 2000 election saw Putin win by a plausible margin. It was in 2004 that Putin was re-elected with 71% of the vote with no serious opposition candidates outside the Communist Party. The 2003 and 2007 legislative elections saw the emergence of United Russia and Putin solidify his control over the legislative branch.
If Putin were not able to become president in 2000 its hard to see any alternative gaining that kind of supremacy. Even Alexander Lebed.
Russia had never had any tradition of democracy and the people didn't really beleive in it or really want it. They have always liked having a strong man at the helm. When their nascent democracy changed in an authoritarian regime, most were probably relieved.
I'm not sure if Zyuganov would have allowed anyone to challenge him at the next election.
I think much depends on how the budding oligarchs deal with him. There was reason to think they'd knuckle under and join the Communist Party again, but if he tries using nationalization in response to the 1998 crisis, there may be difficulties (not to mention a much worse crisis with illegal capital flight).
However, I also wonder to what degree union with Ukraine and Belarus might be pushed for.
More conflict with Chechnya is inevitable I think, and may have the same impact for him as it did for Putin in 2000, even with the financial crisis on his watch.
Absolutely doomed
Democracy is HARD
It takes time to evolve... that has been proved time after time
There has NEVER been a case where an "instant implant" worked
Russia's tradition is autocracy for thousands of years
There was no middle class
no tradition of public service, only various forms of corruption and self-interest
Probably apocryphal Russian Joke in the 90s
Western Taxi Passenger in Moscow: Well, Driver ... what do you think of your new democracy
Driver: Oh it's wonderful, but they have to find the right man at the top to make it work
Democracy is HARD
It takes time to evolve... that has been proved time after time
There has NEVER been a case where an "instant implant" worked
Russia's tradition is autocracy for thousands of years
There was no middle class
no tradition of public service, only various forms of corruption and self-interest
Probably apocryphal Russian Joke in the 90s
Western Taxi Passenger in Moscow: Well, Driver ... what do you think of your new democracy
Driver: Oh it's wonderful, but they have to find the right man at the top to make it work
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Not necessarily, and it theoretically could have. HOWEVER...
- Yeltsin was significantly worse than Gorbachev, and little better than Putin. He was a drunk puppet of massively corrupt corporate and criminal interests, effectively launched an autocoup, and blatantly rigged the 1996 election, thus setting the stage for Little Volodya.
- Gorbachev himself seriously bungled many aspects of the reform, leaving himself wide-open to the conservative coup that led to the dissolution of the USSR. With a better-advised Gorbachev or a more moderate reformer (Ligachyov?) in control, it's theoretically possible for the USSR to survive in some form (probably would retain Belarus, the 'stans; otoh Baltics are bugging out ASAP, Ukraine maybe/maybe not, Caucasus I don't know enough about to say), with a gradual transition to partial or functional democracy.
- Putin dying at some point prior to 2000 or very early in the 2000s--i.e. before or during his rise to power--would allow the OPPORTUNITY for democratic and anticorruption reforms in a post-Yeltsin environment.
From reading the book "Winter Is Coming" by Garry Kasparov, I get the feeling that Zyuganov was a bit revanchist in terms of foreign policy. He would try to get Ukraine or Belarus. The former would say "HECK NO" but the latter might be absorbed or greatly influenced by him. The oligarchs might also fight tooth and nail against him (which may lead to a more successful multi-party system than OTL Russia). I'd say that media suppression was a big problem, and a bunch depends on whether or not Zyuganov decides to control the media or not. Chechnya conflicts are inevitable due to Russia having a relatively solid claim on it.
Now for the financial crisis: If Zyuganov is able to reverse some of the damaging effects of "shock therapy" combined with the Chechnya crisis, he should win in 2000.
Poland and Hungary are functioning democracies. They are not comparable to Russia in the slightest. Both however significantly failed in lustration efforts in the 90s and have played catch up in recent years in reaction. To some more ideologically inclined foreign observers, they perceive this as backsliding. I would caution against such claims.
Ukraine is a democracy as well, albeit a dysfunctional one. The Baltic nations have some ethnic tensions but otherwise are functional liberal democracies.
Really, it Belarus and Turkmenistan that are the countries with less democracy than Russia. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are about the same. Georgia and Armenia are similar to Ukraine.
It was doomed when Bush 41 decided to not listen to Nixon at the start of the 90s that its a situation much like he recalled Germany was in during the 20s where the world ignored the plight of the new democracy there.
Nixon felt the late Cold War generation simply did not understand what a highly effective Russian leader could do. He had memories of the Stalin era and the nightmare he wrought for US policy and the young ones saw the Soviets as a ‘gas station’ with weak and ineffectual drunks at the helm didn’t understand how quickly that can change with an ambitious leader who understood power politics.
Nixon felt the late Cold War generation simply did not understand what a highly effective Russian leader could do. He had memories of the Stalin era and the nightmare he wrought for US policy and the young ones saw the Soviets as a ‘gas station’ with weak and ineffectual drunks at the helm didn’t understand how quickly that can change with an ambitious leader who understood power politics.
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The odds were against it, and none of the rancid bastards around Yeltsin would have made things better. Primakov was ur-Putin, but probably would have had some veneer of respectability and not been so brazen about things. He was a populist in the same way Putin is allegedly a populist, in that he had certain beliefs that were not aligned to a given political ideology and would have benefited people, but it would have come at a cost. The nice liberal types that were respectable and seemed to have a clue as to how help the nation were all locked out of power by Yeltsin, who pitted them against each other for shits and giggles as he held on to power for the sake of his family and because power is intoxicating and toxic. Democracy is hard when the people keep voting for the "wrong kind of candidates," ain't it? And so Yeltsin resolved his democratic troubles by opening fire on the Russian Parliament, sending in the tanks and then having state owned TV stations pretend he was great and no other candidate existed.
Also, to my good AH brothers and sisters, you don't need to kill Putin prior to 2000 or hit him over the head with a snow-shovel to remove him from the scene and prevent him from becoming what he is today. Putin was an utter nobody - an after-belch who squirmed into power because Yeltsin wanted to stick it to the Moscow power brokers and other stolid candidates by bringing in an outsider from St. Petersburg. Putin was not an inevitability. He was an accident.
Also, to my good AH brothers and sisters, you don't need to kill Putin prior to 2000 or hit him over the head with a snow-shovel to remove him from the scene and prevent him from becoming what he is today. Putin was an utter nobody - an after-belch who squirmed into power because Yeltsin wanted to stick it to the Moscow power brokers and other stolid candidates by bringing in an outsider from St. Petersburg. Putin was not an inevitability. He was an accident.
Russian people were ready for democracy when they, in 1991, went out in force to stop the August Putsch. This ideal that some people are 'not ready for freedom' is silly at best, discriminatory at worst.