I vote that Chennault arrange fora tragic avation accident for MacArthur. Perhaps too close to a spinning prop?
Remember the Texas! The United States in World War II (an alternate history)
- Thread starter galveston bay
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Exactly, cisterns 20 foot deep and 2 foot thick, but designed to drop one of the above mentioned turrets right in.
marathag
Banned
Nothing so crude.
He had enough contact with the Chinese to make it look like a real accident.
or deliberate hit, to pin it on the Communists.
The point of departure is the sinking of USS Texas. Too many 'convenient demises' only tenuously connected to that and it starts to look as if a magic Alien Space Bat Allied assassin fairy (cousin of the magic Alien Space Bat Nazi armaments fairy) might be loose in the timeline.
The good guys do have to have their learning curve after all.. and in 1941 all of the Allies, British included, are still learningThe point of departure is the sinking of USS Texas. Too many 'convenient demises' only tenuously connected to that and it starts to look as if a magic Alien Space Bat Allied assassin fairy (cousin of the magic Alien Space Bat Nazi armaments fairy) might be loose in the timeline.
yes indeed, and Congress being supportive on things (like for example the seacoast forts in the late 18th and early 19th Century) is but the first example of that
Thanks. I twitched when Harris crashed, but as McPherson pointed out, Bomber Command is still filled with lunatics anyway.
McPherson
Banned
The problem with MacArthur was... he was a rich mama's boy burdened with a "superhero dad" and he went into the wrong profession. Even, so, as long as he had good subordinates, who others picked for him (Marshall), he actually was a "decent" op artist. His problem was that he still had the right and power to surround himself with immoral people (personal staff) who allowed him to indulge himself as he allowed them. Park some tough hombres around him and one gets CARTWHEEL and CHROMITE.The point of departure is the sinking of USS Texas. Too many 'convenient demises' only tenuously connected to that and it starts to look as if a magic Alien Space Bat Allied assassin fairy (cousin of the magic Alien Space Bat Nazi armaments fairy) might be loose in the timeline.
True enough, but gagh, they were so slow. Also, the Americans had done due diligence in their 1940 and 1941 simulations of German maneuver warfare, but they had not had not been honest in their own testing results. Seriously, their wargames yielded valuable lessons learned that down to the present have been rejected and not applied.
Congress accepted coast defense and Mahan argued for it to free the fleet for offense. Alexandria (1888?) was the proof case that for once that Mahan was wrong. Coastal forts were not effective in defense. A navy was the only security against overseas attack.
Let us not be too complacent in Americansisms, for every British person, I named who I wish replaced, I could name an American and I think I did?
Yeah Banzai charges were used and used effectively in the earlier battles that the IJA was involved in, mainly against the relatively poorly trained and equipped Chinese forces.
The concept is that while more men might be killed in the initial charge, the 'shock effect' of the assault on the enemy results in a cheaper overall victory than might otherwise have been the case had other tactics been used.
However in the face of better quality opponents with more automatic weapons, tanks and most importantly sufficient artillery that can respond very quickly resulted in a 'tipping point' where not only does this tactic fail but results in horrendous losses for no gain and there was no initial plan B when it was used and failed.
Except where there was.
Better Japanese units understood the danger of the heavy firepower of western forces and in Malaya, and later on in Burma it should be noted that the assaulting IJA forces used infiltration tactics and bypassed strong enemy formations and frequently used light forces to create road blocks behind the enemy formations knowing that they were reliant on road transport.
Again this worked until it didn't - the allies understanding that the 'blocking units' were often poorly supplied and lightly equipped and just as cut off as the unit they had sought to cut off.
Once the allies had made that understanding and had sufficient armour dealing with such tactics was a combination of holding their nerve, not panicking and treating the 'roadblocking' elements as a conventional fight and dealt with accordingly.
The problem for the IJA was that as those experienced units were ground down and their leaders lost the tried and tested tactics of Banzai was easier to implement by the less experienced troops who would later end up fighting the Allies.
Driftless
Donor
Recently, I've been reading some WW1 histories and there are some parallels in the massed wave charges across no man's land, even after it was long apparent that tactic was near suicidal and any gains made were temporary. The various iterations of infiltration and other tactics (creeping barrages, tanks, etc) learned by all sides were the lessons learned.......sometimes..
Harris was, however, almost uniquely fixated on dehousing. Even when given direct orders to divert from his city burning campaign to the Combined Chief of Staffs transportation/oil strategy he more or less refused (what is even more amazing is that he got away with it) despite the fact that, when presented with the opportunity Bomber Command crews had demonstrated the ability to very successfully attack targets like refineries.
None of the major bombing advocates liked it when they were told to alter their targets, or divert part of their force to other missions, but they followed orders. Possibly the best example of this is LeMay. LeMay destroyed more urban area of Japan in a year than Harris managed in his entire campaign*, and he was utterly convinced that he was destroying Japan's ability to fight on (and there is some evidence that he was actually succeeding), although not anywhere near as much as he and Arnold thought). Despite that, when he was directed to divert a fraction of his B-29 force to the exact opposite of the very spectacular, and frankly, terrorizing firebombing campaign to deploying sea mines, he not only complied did diverted about 40% of his entire available force, 160 bombers, an entire bomb group, to the mission. He was briefed, told it would shorten the war, and save lives, both American and, in the long run, Japanese and he followed his orders, expanding and adapting them beyond the orginal scope of his brief (i.e. what every officer and NCO should do). LeMay was anything but a good guy, cold blooded doesn't begin to cover it, but that may have been his biggest difference from Harris. Harris was invested in the idea of proving air power could win the war all on its own and intended to prove it, even when it became clear it couldn't. LeMay wanted to end the war. Full Stop. Didn't care how.
*During the entire CBO, both Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force destroyed roughly 79 sq. mi/200 sq km of Germany from 1939-1945. XXI Bomber Command topped that only counting its raids on three cities (Nagoya, Osaka, and Tokyo where 100 sq mi/260 sq km were burned to ash).
Not only were coastal defenses at least somewhat practical in the era, they also had the unquestioned advantage of making all those voters feel protected thanks to Congressman Ican B. Aught's efforts.
Win/Win/WIN!
Not Chennault's style.
Madame Chiang? Ya, about her...
Not at all sure what the Flying Squadron or its inconclusive gun duel really shows. The Forts did not inflict damage on the U.S. ships, but the ships did not damage the Forts to any degree. The forts did, it appears, prevent the U.S. forces from closing range to engage the Spanish shipping in the harbor.
As a counterpoint, the Japanese lost a modern destroyer, the Hayate to shore battery fire at Wake. The failure of the Entente Fleet to carry the Straits in WW I is another example (yes, well aware that the Entente effort failed thanks to a loss of resolve by the on-scene commanders, but that is rather the point of forts, make it too expensive to continue). In the same vein, Fort Drum effectively prevented the IJN's entry into Manila Bay until it was ordered to surrender as part of the general surrender of of American/Philippine force in May of 1942.
Given time, warships will eventually wear down defending fortifications. However, prior to the arrival of effective air bombardment, which greatly reduced the natural terrain advantages of many emplacement, well sited forts were more than enough to give an enemy fleet commander reason for concern.
McPherson
Banned
The Flying Squadron was created to act as a mobile force to chase Cervera's cruisers to keep them from conducting terror bombardments as the Spanish Armada had against various South American republics. (First War of the Pacific).
Bombardment of Valparaiso is an example.
I would also add the defense of Malta in 1941 when shore batteries decimated an Italian seaborn raid on the Grand Harbor.
As the old saying goes, "only a fool attacks a fort with a ship".
McPherson
Banned
Uhmmm. Doing it wrong.
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Still doing it wrong. What happened to the fortified island?
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System of systems... That is a series of ships about to attack a fortified objective.
And yet, they still did it wrong.
The lesson learned is that Forts don't work.
if the enemy controls the air and sea.
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The Bombardment happened specifically because the Valparaiso forts had been dismantled.
When the Spanish tried it with another port, that had defenses, they were handled very roughly, including have the serious officer seriously wounded.
Again, the history indicates that defenses were a deterrent, not a waste of time.
marathag
Banned
1st time around, ordered to surrender, since the Japanese could not take it
2nd time?
US was able to kill every last soul there, and did
McPherson
Banned
1. The place surrendered.
2. The place fell again.
Reason? The enemy controlled the air and sea.