Protect and Survive: A Timeline

[Hörnla]

As weird as it may seem hitting France with around 300 nukes is not enough to completely destroy it.Its just enough to take out most targets of interest but from what I can see it would still leave something behind.In fact to completely destroy France beyond even a slim hope of survival you need around 450-500 nukes same for Britain.

I agree about France. France is (similar to Spain) a huge country when compared to the FRG. Ironically, having regions with nothing in there is an asset.
Your assumption that "the same goes for Britain", though, can only be based by the idea that large parts of Wales and Scotland have little reason to get nuked as long as you don't target sheep. I think that 100-200 nukes very much are in tune with the world Macragge describes and give some reason for hope in the long run. A lot more, though, and there is very little left. The UK is actually not so spacious.

West Germany,Holland,Denmark, Turkey ,Greece and Belgium are beyond recovery the surviving belgian government doesn't really matter since they have next to nothing left. Nothing beyond a few villages and small towns remains here

I agree mainly on Central Europe.

Nothing but a few villages and small towns exists in Denmark.

To plaster Denmark with more than 20 nukes, you really have to go.....counter-area and nuke it because it is there (given the idiocy of nuclear war, one cannot rule this possibility out). I cannot think of many actual targets there unless you have a nuclear naval battle waged there.

I am curious about Holland, too. Is there a possibility to nuke it in a way that it looks like that? Might prove very effective and save the Reds some bombs!

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/70/NederlandvolgensNAP.PNG

I am not sure about Turkey. That whatever might arise there afterwards will be a different kind of fish is sure, but on the other hand you have a huge country (more than 3x the size of the UK) whose rural population was still used to get along with very little.

Spain and Italy are touch and go maybe maybe not it depends on who do surviving troops swear allegiance to.

I think that Spain will have the advantage that it probably "cannot" commit a large part of its army to any frontlines in time. Or am I wrong here? If they disperse it, they will still have a large part of it intact to hold the remnants of the country together.

Just like Italy (which will be a lot harder hit due to a) more industrial areas b) a frontline in Northern Italy warranting a good deal of tac nukes and c) a higher population density ) they have, when being compared to the UK and France, the advantage of not having to be taken out as nuclear opponents (except for US bases, though).

The Swiss could recover but their economy won't be back to anything resembling normal for a long time,

I would have assumed that they received more than the two hits (Geneva, Bern) the timeline attributs them (unless I took misinformation too serious again but I tried to check). I actually expected Zürich and Basel to be gone, too (though the latter will get enough damage if Weil am Rhein or Lörrach are targeted).

However, if the Swiss planning for the event was only half-way matching their level of civil-defense regulations, they should come up with something to bring their economy into some way of working order again. The timeline told us about the start of their reconnaissance within Germany, but how much more effort will they put into establishing a route to the least destroyed ports on the Med-coast and to somehow make contact to trade partners in the Southern hemisphere?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I have to chip in and note that the 7,000 warhead figure is for the USSR's deployed nuclear weapons that are capable of reaching the United States*. Britain, and the rest of Europe, would not receive any of those. Instead, they would be attacked by theatre missiles (like the SS-20, which is only the most modern example) and nuclear bombs carried by strike aircraft. Germany (both of them) could possibly recieve more nuclear explosions then the United States, since both sides fielded the greatest proportion of their tactical nukes there.

*I should note that this is the first I have heard the 7,000 warhead number for the 1980's USSR 'ready' weapons. Usually I the number I get is approx 10,000.

 

[Dunois]

There seems to be a general assumption among some posters, especially on the American spin off thread, that almost everything has been targeted for the sake for just being targeted.

I am going to repeat myself, but the Soviet Union does not have an infinite number of nuclear warheads and even more importantly of vectors which with to put said targets on something worth targeting and destroying. It is frankly ludicrous to assume that the Soviet Union would try to carpet nuke Britain, France or Denmark just for the sake of it, with nice spaced out ground zeros at regular intervals to do a good job.

Taking out the ICBM silos in the United States alone will require a lot of weapons. To be honest there, I am almost tempted to think that the Soviet Union may actually not target the silos per se, but more likely the communication apparatus and the control rooms required to actually launch the weapons. Near simultaneous nuclear explosions in a small area, cancel a great deal of their destructive effects, especially as far as the blast wave is concerned (two waves of equal intensity moving towards each other, crash when they meet but cancel themselves out afterwards) don't forget that.

Using nuclear weapons in support of ground troops alongside the front will by itself consume a lot of warheads and a lot of SLBM and IRBM rockets. The failure rate at launch or afterwards is also something to consider, everyone seems to think that somehow all the missiles will launch successfully, but this won't be the case for several reasons. Don't forget for example that the Soviet Union used primarily liquid fuelled missiles, which have a lot more issues than solid fuel missiles especially as far as fuel logistics are concerned. I would not be surprised if some missiles don't launch for lack of fuel or fail in their siloes due to leaks and similar failures. Some will also be kept as a reserve as I mentionned before. As for the submarines, well sinking them will be the top priority of NATO in the begining of the war and the range of the missiles was low limiting their usability.

 

[LeX]

You know, I think we should make maps for all countries relevant. Then we can see for sure what's still left.

 

[ivfl]

Near the front lines once the general go order is given to use nukes anything that can be targeted will be.Since even small towns would have some troops near or inside them the temptation to use nukes to wipe out even a company of troops would be too great.There is this thing called escalation once it starts there is no way to keep it under control.Countries like Denmark,West Germany,also in this timeline eastern Austria,Northeastern Italy,Eastern Turkey,Northern Norway to name places in Europe would be carpet-nuked.There is the added reality that bomber and missile crews would be perfectly aware that their families are by then dead or soon will be.No one would be under the illusion that the other side is not nuking back.So there would be little to no restraint to literally nuke anything in sight.Even if orders would probably be a bit restrictive I doubt your typical bomber crew would care anymore he would be saying its not like there is a base to return to anymore even if there is its not like I still have a home to come back to so screw it we bomb anything we can find.Add to this the fact that in these places there is a high likelyhood that even a village would have enemy troops near it there is no reason to show restraint.Farther away there would probably be some restraint in targeting but the places near the front lines would be blanketed with nukes.So little Denmark despite not being so important would literally be showered with nukes relative to its size.Of course the same holds true for NATO East Germany,western Czechoslovakia,Northern Yugoslavia,Southern Bulgaria would also be showered with nukes.It might seem excessive but once the go order is given nukes would be used with abandon.As for estimates about the number of nukes used they are not that great compared to the size of the soviet arsenal.In Europe including tactical nukes I assume total use would be around 3500-4000(>1100 tactical nukes),about 1600 East Asia(tactical nukes here about 200),Middle East(150 most dumped on Israel but some on other countries),North America over 3300 most on obviously the US but Canada would get over 100 and other places maybe 50-70(?) ,other places in Africa,South Asia,Australia whatever 50,naval combat over 100.So all over 9000 nukes used by the soviets from a stockpile estimated at 37000.The rest where either destroyed,never used,missed their target badly or where kept as a long term reserve.

 

[Mario Rossi]

I think that we are underestimating again the vector problem, as stressed by Dunois: a Scaleboard team may disperse itself and fire all his missiles or at least the ones on firing position; but after that, the weapon launch is going to be detected and the same targeted unit could respond or direct a friendly force on them. In this, I think not so uncommon, case the aforementioned Soviet unit will be gone in minutes and gone will be not only the missiles launched but also the other held in reserve on trucks. If the vector is out of the game, or the base is out of the game it doesn't really matter how many (now unusable) warheads you may still have. Just think about it as the problem of having bombs but not having enough bombers (and fuel, and airbases...) to deliver them. A bomb that you can not deliver is a bomb that for any practical purpose is like non-existing.

 

[Chipperback]

"target the silos per se, but more likely the communication apparatus and the control rooms required to actually launch the weapons.

But that's the rub. The control and communications are near the silo itself...and those control center control a fleet of missiles.

The warplan of both sides, and this is from the people who made the plans, will not be as academic as first strike, reserve strike, etc. The plan, at least for the land based missiles is, "use 'em or lose 'em/smoke 'em if you got 'em"

As far as how both sides are going to hit the other, this is the beauty of staggered use of MIRVs. Each warhead hits at a calculated interval designed for maximum of the missile silos.

The weakness of much what has been discussed is that in our scenario is that we have a protracted period of tension and a period of conventional fighting to where both sides have time to get plans and forces in place to act. This is critical for the war plans and Civil Defence plans of both sides in this equation. By February 19, 1984, evacuations of possible targets are well underway. Evacuations of key personnel on both sides are either underway or the parts are in place to do so quickly to where only a massive miscalculation or general stupidity (i.e. the EVAC of NCA "Rawhide" from Washington).

See you in Germany -- A life and death game of "Frogger"

 

[ObssesedNuker]

There seems to be a general assumption among some posters, especially on the American spin off thread, that almost everything has been targeted for the sake for just being targeted.

No, everything important has been targeted.

Taking out the ICBM silos in the United States alone will require a lot of weapons.

Lets start with the 7,000 strategic warheads that the USSR has ready in its silo's to be delivered on the United States... note that I recall this number being a lower estimate, with the number I see most often cited as 10,000, although now that I think about it, that latter number likely includes SLBM's and bombers. The US in the mid-80's had approx 500 missile silo's.

Assuming the assignment of 3 warheads per silo (not an unreasonable figure, given failure rates and CEP issues) that comes out to using 1,500 warheads. That leaves another 5,500 warheads to use on major C3 targets (like the Omaha headquarters), civilian C3 targets (like Washington DC), airfields, submarine ports, conventional military facilities, and finally counter-value targets.

Near simultaneous nuclear explosions in a small area, cancel a great deal of their destructive effects, especially as far as the blast wave is concerned (two waves of equal intensity moving towards each other, crash when they meet but cancel themselves out afterwards) don't forget that.

Uh... no, where the blast waves meet they will rebound and reinforce each other. From the Explosives Engineering Textbook of 1996, Page 216:

[FONT=Trebuchet MS, Arial, Helvetica]"In this example, two shock waves of unequal amplitude approach each other head-on. When they meet they produce a much higher pressure shock that is reflected back in each direction. You will see, as we solve this problem, that the final shock pressure produced is greater than the sum of the pressures of the initial two shocks."[/FONT]

That is one of the reasons using multiple smaller bombs in a semi-spread pattern is more efficient then using one big one. The real concern would be fratricide: ie the explosion of one warhead destroying another, nearby warhead as it approaches the target. One of the reasons of the SIOP is to avoid Navy and Air Force warheads (and pilots) from getting in each other ways and blowing each other out of the sky.

Using nuclear weapons in support of ground troops alongside the front will by itself consume a lot of warheads and a lot of SLBM and IRBM rockets.

The shorter-range SLBM's, yeah. So what? Only the IRBM's in the Soviet Far East can reach the United States, and even then it would only be Alaska... although that sucks for the Early-Warning Line.

The failure rate at launch or afterwards is also something to consider, everyone seems to think that somehow all the missiles will launch successfully, but this won't be the case for several reasons. Don't forget for example that the Soviet Union used primarily liquid fuelled missiles, which have a lot more issues than solid fuel missiles especially as far as fuel logistics are concerned. I would not be surprised if some missiles don't launch for lack of fuel or fail in their siloes due to leaks and similar failures.

The Soviets stuck with Liquid-fueled rockets alot longer then we did and became very good with them. In the 1980's the Soviets consistently maintained approx 80% success rates. In fact, one test of SLBM missiles conducted just after the fall of the Soviet Union involved the launch of an entire Delta-IV's missile complement at once (the only time that has ever happened, thankfull) and not a single missile (or their warheads) failed in the test.

Some will also be kept as a reserve as I mentionned before.

Yeah, the ones they don't manage to launch and the ones left in storage. As far the USSR is concerned, there is no point in maintaining a 'read reserve'. They came to realize what nuclear war actually meant by the 1980's and entertained no ideas of a 'limited' nuclear exchange

As for the submarines, well sinking them will be the top priority of NATO in the begining of the war and the range of the missiles was low limiting their usability.

For the earlier subs, yeah. But the Delta-IV's and Typhoon's would be able to hit US targets right from their ports. The shorter-range subs would likely fire on closer targets, like Europe and Asia in addition to making suicide runs in close on American targets. As for sinking them... the plan was they would be held in bastion area's in the USSR's home waters until they were needed for launch. If the United States Navy wants to run the gauntlet of submarines, aircraft, naval minefields, land-based anti-ship missiles, and both major and littoral surface combatants just to take out targets that could be interpreted as starting a nuclear war... well yeah, I think you get the idea

 

[Dunois]

But that's the rub. The control and communications are near the silo itself...and those control center control a fleet of missiles.

The warplan of both sides, and this is from the people who made the plans, will not be as academic as first strike, reserve strike, etc. The plan, at least for the land based missiles is, "use 'em or lose 'em/smoke 'em if you got 'em"

A control centre usually control several silos, to use the example of the French nuclear silos, each control centre controlled nine silos each containing one missile. Take the control centres down and you can't control the missiles anymore.

Targetting the silos themselves offers redundancy and that's pretty much it.

The weakness of much what has been discussed is that in our scenario is that we have a protracted period of tension and a period of conventional fighting to where both sides have time to get plans and forces in place to act. This is critical for the war plans and Civil Defence plans of both sides in this equation. By February 19, 1984, evacuations of possible targets are well underway. Evacuations of key personnel on both sides are either underway or the parts are in place to do so quickly to where only a massive miscalculation or general stupidity (i.e. the EVAC of NCA "Rawhide" from Washington).

See you in Germany -- A life and death game of "Frogger"

This period of prolonged tension will also greatly enhance the civil defence preparation in the United States and elsewhere compared to what was the case before the crisis. This alone and the decisions taken during that period, including the evacuation of personel and the dispersion of assets. Considerably reduce the likelyhood that the "United States falls apart" scenario used in the two American spin off will happens. As I have said on one other thread, reestablishing a semblance of cross national communications in some form will be easy if important assets are evacuated and dispersed.

No, everything important has been targeted.

Lets start with the 7,000 strategic warheads that the USSR has ready in its silo's to be delivered on the United States... note that I recall this number being a lower estimate, with the number I see most often cited as 10,000, although now that I think about it, that latter number likely includes SLBM's and bombers. The US in the mid-80's had approx 500 missile silo's.

I think that we can use the number provided by the NRDC as being quite reliable and here they are for 1984:
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab2.asp
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab4.asp

Assuming the assignment of 3 warheads per silo (not an unreasonable figure, given failure rates and CEP issues) that comes out to using 1,500 warheads. That leaves another 5,500 warheads to use on major C3 targets (like the Omaha headquarters), civilian C3 targets (like Washington DC), airfields, submarine ports, conventional military facilities, and finally counter-value targets.

You are not taking into account the fact that there are plenty of targets outside the United States as well, such as China, Japan, Europe and the neutrals. I mention China and Europe in the list because of the IRBMs and shirt range missile were tactical weapons and not strategic weapons in nature. In order to destroy targets such as Paris, London or Brussels, using megaton sized warheads from ICBMs would have sense, leaving aside lower yields warheads for other targets.

We have to be very careful in my opinion with regards to counter value targets as there seems to be a general assumption that almost everything important for one reason or another will be targeted. Since we don't know what the Soviet SIOP was, we can't be sure of anything for sure. But if you look at the issue more carefully, wasting a missile on an isolated power plant or small refinery makes no sense whatsoever. It does not serve any strategic purpose, since the war will be won by destroying the forces of the other. And "population targeting" achieve a much greater effect with regards to breaking the enemy will to fight and in reducing the enemy capacity to wage war.
We already know that individual power plants have not been attacked from the target list provided by Macragge1 in Britain. I therefore doubt that power plants would be attacked in the United States, for consistency reasons.

Uh... no, where the blast waves meet they will rebound and reinforce each other. From the Explosives Engineering Textbook of 1996, Page 216:

I give you that one . My own source was obviously wrong on this.

That is one of the reasons using multiple smaller bombs in a semi-spread pattern is more efficient then using one big one. The real concern would be fratricide: ie the explosion of one warhead destroying another, nearby warhead as it approaches the target. One of the reasons of the SIOP is to avoid Navy and Air Force warheads (and pilots) from getting in each other ways and blowing each other out of the sky.

The Soviets stuck with Liquid-fueled rockets alot longer then we did and became very good with them. In the 1980's the Soviets consistently maintained approx 80% success rates. In fact, one test of SLBM missiles conducted just after the fall of the Soviet Union involved the launch of an entire Delta-IV's missile complement at once (the only time that has ever happened, thankfull) and not a single missile (or their warheads) failed in the test.

A twnety percent failure rate is still something to bear in mind when planning these kind of things.

Yeah, the ones they don't manage to launch and the ones left in storage. As far the USSR is concerned, there is no point in maintaining a 'read reserve'. They came to realize what nuclear war actually meant by the 1980's and entertained no ideas of a 'limited' nuclear exchange

Since we don't have access to reliable informations from that time we can't say anything for sure. But bearing in mind that Soviet leadership took a turn to the "hardliners" during the crisis, I would not be too sure that logical arguments would be listened to.

For the earlier subs, yeah. But the Delta-IV's and Typhoon's would be able to hit US targets right from their ports. The shorter-range subs would likely fire on closer targets, like Europe and Asia in addition to making suicide runs in close on American targets. As for sinking them... the plan was they would be held in bastion area's in the USSR's home waters until they were needed for launch. If the United States Navy wants to run the gauntlet of submarines, aircraft, naval minefields, land-based anti-ship missiles, and both major and littoral surface combatants just to take out targets that could be interpreted as starting a nuclear war... well yeah, I think you get the idea

Delta IV subs were not even in service in 1984, as for Typhoons there will be only two subs in service which is frankly not much. Naval Battles will take place in the Murmansk area involving both NATO and Soviet forces, it will be a bloodbath and considering the poor acoustic performance of Soviet submarines at least a few will end up at the bottom of the sea if not more.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I think that we can use the number provided by the NRDC as being quite reliable and here they are for 1984:
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab2.asp
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab4.asp

Land-based ICBM's are just shy of 7,000 warheads. Take into account the number of SLBM's able to reach the US from the bastion area's, and the number runs over 7,000.

You are not taking into account the fact that there are plenty of targets outside the United States as well, such as China, Japan, Europe and the neutrals. I mention China and Europe in the list because of the IRBMs and shirt range missile were tactical weapons and not strategic weapons in nature. In order to destroy targets such as Paris, London or Brussels, using megaton sized warheads from ICBMs would have sense, leaving aside lower yields warheads for other targets.

:/

The distinction between a tactical weapon and a strategic weapon is an academic one. A unitary warhead SS-20 carries a 500 kiloton warhead (slightly larger then one of the warheads on the Minuteman-3) and can hit Brussels from behind the Urals. From Belarus or the Ukrainian SSR, they could hit the entire European Continent The Soviets would not use ICBM's on European or Asian targets that can be hit by such weapons.

We have to be very careful in my opinion with regards to counter value targets as there seems to be a general assumption that almost everything important for one reason or another will be targeted. Since we don't know what the Soviet SIOP was, we can't be sure of anything for sure.

We can guess pretty well.

We already know that individual power plants have not been attacked from the target list provided by Macragge1 in Britain. I therefore doubt that power plants would be attacked in the United States, for consistency reasons.

That depends on the power plant. A nuclear plant would likely rate higher then a coal or oil plant. That does not garuntee the plant would be targetted. But sometimes that is unnecessary... there are sme cases where multiple targets can be destroyed by a single warhead.

A twnety percent failure rate is still something to bear in mind when planning these kind of things.

Hence, three warheads per silo, probably from different missiles. Greater degrees of overkill would be assigned for even toughter/more important targets (36 twenty-megaton weapons for Cheyenne mountain, for instance). 'Soft targets' would be assigned one or two warheads, depending on the importance of the target in question.

Since we don't have access to reliable informations from that time we can't say anything for sure. But bearing in mind that Soviet leadership took a turn to the "hardliners" during the crisis, I would not be too sure that logical arguments would be listened to.

The Soviet leader in this case is from the Red Army (Ogarkov in OTL was actually famous in the Red Army for developing some operational concepts) and the Red Army, once they came around in the 70's, actually wound-up rejecting the concept of limited nuclear war far more thoroughly then even the Soviet politicians. They had to be pretty much be directly ordered before they drafted a nuclear war plan that did not constitute a civilization-shattering, full exchange in the 1980's. And even then they never took those plans with any seriousness.

Delta IV subs were not even in service in 1984,

You are correct, but the entire Delta-class actually uses the same missiles.

Naval Battles will take place in the Murmansk area involving both NATO and Soviet forces, it will be a bloodbath and considering the poor acoustic performance of Soviet submarines at least a few will end up at the bottom of the sea if not more.

If you want to go into ASB land, sure. But the bastion area will be in the White Sea near Arkhangelesk, not Murmansk. The US attack subs will have to penetrate hundreds, even thousands of kilometers, of heavily patrolled Soviet waters to get to them. There would be a similar story with the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

 

[Chipperback]

"Considerably reduce the likelyhood that the "United States falls apart" scenario used in the two American spin off will happens.

I think you are reading something in both my and Patton's scenarios that isn't quite there.

In the first few weeks and months after the attacks, everything going to be disjointed, no matter how much coordination or pre-planning you do, communications with the next town are down, let alone the entire country.

It's is going to be very difficult for a continental nation of the size of the United States to just pick up where they left off with two dollars and a biscuit.

My scenario is built around the idea, that if there is a federal government getting back in shape, our state will be ready to plug back in. Until that happens we need to get our stuff together as best we can.

Like the Governor's buddy Glenn said,

"there is continuity of federal government. FEMA will carry the ball on that, problem is they want to consolidate it their way and they think the can do it quick and it'll be damn near impossible to do that in a short term scenario. It may impossible, period. The only hope they have?Strong continuous governments within the states."

 

[Gen_Patton]

My goal is to have a "Continental Congress" to re-establish the United States in 1986ish, it sounds reasonable.

 

[John Farson]

I think you are reading something in both my and Patton's scenarios that isn't quite there.

In the first few weeks and months after the attacks, everything going to be disjointed, no matter how much coordination or pre-planning you do, communications with the next town are down, let alone the entire country.

It's is going to be very difficult for a continental nation of the size of the United States to just pick up where they left off with two dollars and a biscuit.

My scenario is built around the idea, that if there is a federal government getting back in shape, our state will be ready to plug back in. Until that happens we need to get our stuff together as best we can.

Like the Governor's buddy Glenn said,

[/I]

Pretty much what I think. It's not that the states want to secede from the Union and become independent; they want to take orders from the Federal government. Problem is that the Federal government as we know it no longer really exists. Few people will even know that Reagan is alive (before he's blown up by one crazy SAS person). For better or worse, the individual state governments (those that are left) will have to take care of themselves.

 

[Weaver]

Where does the figure of 500 silos in the CONUS come from?

Surely the US had 1,054 ICBMs in silos at that time?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Where does the figure of 500 silos in the CONUS come from?

Surely the US had 1,054 ICBMs in silos at that time?

I was given to understand that that was the US's numbers at its peak, which was in the late-60s... let me double check the number at this new website.

EDIT: Ah, yes. You are correct. So 3,000 warheads... that still leaves another 4,000 for the other targets.

 

[JasonQ]

Taking out the ICBM silos in the United States alone will require a lot of weapons. To be honest there, I am almost tempted to think that the Soviet Union may actually not target the silos per se, but more likely the communication apparatus and the control rooms required to actually launch the weapons.

This idea had occurred to US planners, which is why systems like LOOKING GLASS, Airborne Launch Control System, and the Emergency Rocket Communications System existed...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/DRC-8_Emergency_Rocket_Communications_System

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airborne_Launch_Control_System

...basically forcing the Soviets to target the silos individually.

 

[Hörnla]

My goal is to have a "Continental Congress" to re-establish the United States in 1986ish, it sounds reasonable.

Along with what Chipperback just said and which goes into a similar direction, I find this timeframe quite reasonable. And as long as there is no "key dividing issue" arising in the meantime, this congress will with a high probability re-establish (most of) the USA.

It will, however, be a largely de-populated, especially de-urbanized, to a large degree de-industrialized, impoverished third-world-USA (albeit on a globe which has little first and second world left, after all) with a drastically lowered life-expectancy and a lot of territories where you simply shouldn't go...

I am sure you will make a fantastic read out of it.

 

[Dunois]

The distinction between a tactical weapon and a strategic weapon is an academic one. A unitary warhead SS-20 carries a 500 kiloton warhead (slightly larger then one of the warheads on the Minuteman-3) and can hit Brussels from behind the Urals. From Belarus or the Ukrainian SSR, they could hit the entire European Continent The Soviets would not use ICBM's on European or Asian targets that can be hit by such weapons.

I am still not fully convinced to be honest, chiefly because of the "softer" nature of SS-20 on mobile launchers and such. I do nevertheless fully accept the fact that ICBMs will be primarily used against American targets.

That depends on the power plant. A nuclear plant would likely rate higher then a coal or oil plant. That does not garuntee the plant would be targetted. But sometimes that is unnecessary... there are some cases where multiple targets can be destroyed by a single warhead.

The Soviet leader in this case is from the Red Army (Ogarkov in OTL was actually famous in the Red Army for developing some operational concepts) and the Red Army, once they came around in the 70's, actually wound-up rejecting the concept of limited nuclear war far more thoroughly then even the Soviet politicians. They had to be pretty much be directly ordered before they drafted a nuclear war plan that did not constitute a civilization-shattering, full exchange in the 1980's. And even then they never took those plans with any seriousness.

I have heard conflicting stories on this to be fair, witness what some Soviet war plans had in mind for example:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1563692/Soviet-plan-for-WW3-nuclear-attack-unearthed.html

Don't forget also that the Soviet Union civil defense arragements were far more advanced than the American plans. It would not surprise me the slightest if they had a huge bunker somewhere in the Urals for the leadership in case of strike. Of course it may have been targeted by NATO strikes.

Still, I think that the Soviets would keep some capability in reserve post trike. It is just common sense and basic strategy to keep part of your forces in reserve.

If you want to go into ASB land, sure. But the bastion area will be in the White Sea near Arkhangelesk, not Murmansk. The US attack subs will have to penetrate hundreds, even thousands of kilometers, of heavily patrolled Soviet waters to get to them. There would be a similar story with the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

American war plans included strikes on the Murmansk area using carriers and cruise missiles. In any case, naval support of NATO forces operating in Norway is a given. You presume a defensive posture from the Soviet Navy, which does not make sense as controlling the GIUK gap is of paramount strategic importance to them in order to deny NATO reinforcements.

I would also like to say that considering the time of the year, an easy way for NATO to possibly surprise the Soviets would be to attack them from the north by going under the icecaps.

I think you are reading something in both my and Patton's scenarios that isn't quite there.

In the first few weeks and months after the attacks, everything going to be disjointed, no matter how much coordination or pre-planning you do, communications with the next town are down, let alone the entire country.

It's is going to be very difficult for a continental nation of the size of the United States to just pick up where they left off with two dollars and a biscuit.

My scenario is built around the idea, that if there is a federal government getting back in shape, our state will be ready to plug back in. Until that happens we need to get our stuff together as best we can.

Like the Governor's buddy Glenn said,
[/I]

My goal is to have a "Continental Congress" to re-establish the United States in 1986ish, it sounds reasonable.

I thank you both for your clarification there, as things were far from clear in that respect especially in Gen_Patton timeline with the Republic of the Brazos thingy.

I do not challenge the idea that states and local communities will have to work on their own for themselves for sometimes. I actually think that the great deal of localism inherent to American society will make things a lot easier down the line.

Along with what Chipperback just said and which goes into a similar direction, I find this timeframe quite reasonable. And as long as there is no "key dividing issue" arising in the meantime, this congress will with a high probability re-establish (most of) the USA.

It will, however, be a largely de-populated, especially de-urbanized, to a large degree de-industrialized, impoverished third-world-USA (albeit on a globe which has little first and second world left, after all) with a drastically lowered life-expectancy and a lot of territories where you simply shouldn't go...

I am sure you will make a fantastic read out of it.

If America gets its act together, it will be an industrial nation once again by TTL 2011. Standards of living will be lower than they were pre strike, but there is a limit as to how low you can fall. The main issue one and two years after the strikes will however be the reestablishment of moneyed exchange and of the dollar as a viable currency. It is actually what the official study from 1979 I linked too in a previous post said quite clearly.



The other thing we really need to agree on is fallout and radioactivity. The more research I make on the subject, the more my view that radiation levels would fall back to a low point is strenghtened. So I advise anyone working on the P&S project to do a lot of reading on radiation physics and science in order to get a better idea of things.

 

[Hörnla]

If America gets its act together, it will be an industrial nation once again by TTL 2011. Standards of living will be lower than they were pre strike, but there is a limit as to how low you can fall. The main issue one and two years after the strikes will however be the reestablishment of moneyed exchange and of the dollar as a viable currency. It is actually what the official study from 1979 I linked too in a previous post said quite clearly.

That is 27 years down the line, though. Of course, I expect there to be industry within the US. But it won't be able to develop further than the demand on shrunken markets, interior as well as exterior, allow for. Also, how much of the pre-war market-position will be taken away by less affected competitors in the Southern hemisphere?

So I expect the industrial capacity to be such far lower that the degree of industrialization will be noticeable lower than OTL 2011. This also has to do with the mainly rural outlook of the more survivable regions.

I am not so worried about the return of the $. If you have a recognized government, you can have a currency. It will be like West-Germany 1948. Everyone gets a fresh start with 40 bucks and then you go! (Yes, that was simplified).

What you had on accounts, you will be hard pressed to find evidence (although, back in the 80s, a lot more of these information will have been on paper still and not just electronical data).

But the Americans won't boycott the new $. Because life is easier with money.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I am still not fully convinced to be honest, chiefly because of the "softer" nature of SS-20 on mobile launchers and such.

Depending on how lax you want to be with the definition, mobile launchers are actually the hardest land-target there is. The key behind this is, in fact, their mobility. The Iraqis demonstrated this perfectly in Gulf War 1 with their Scuds... we never managed to take a Scud launcher out before it fired its missiles. Even the ones we did manage to destroy after they fired usually came down to being lucky enough to having a loaded fighter craft already nearby when the missile left its launch platform.

Take into account the USSR's much greater size, much better terrain for hiding in, and greater technical skill across the entire board, and you'll come out with a nuclear launch system that will only be surpassed by US boomers in its survivability.

I would expect for the SS-20's and other IRBM's to be used pretty much against everything west of the Rhine, alongside nuclear-armed Soviet strike fighters[1] and naval launched missiles[2]. Targets between the Rhine and the Soviet front will largely be attacked by short-range ballistic missiles and nuclear shells fired by artillery. In the former category, we're looking at yields between the hundreds of kilotons into the single-digit megatons. The latter category will see yields ranging from the hectaton to a few hundred kilotons.

I have heard conflicting stories on this to be fair, witness what some Soviet war plans had in mind for example:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1563692/Soviet-plan-for-WW3-nuclear-attack-unearthed.html

Literally in the first line of the second paragraph of that story:

According to scenarios drafted in 1964

This is when the Red Army did believe in a survivable nuclear war. They changed their views in the 70's, which helped lead to the USSR's adoption of a no-first use doctrine.

There was actually a study conducted in 1996 that chronicled the evolution of Soviet nuclear doctrine and thinking in both the military and the political leadership. I don't have time to look for it after I post this.

It would not surprise me the slightest if they had a huge bunker somewhere in the Urals for the leadership in case of strike. Of course it may have been targeted by NATO strikes.

I recommend you look up Mount Yamantau.

Still, I think that the Soviets would keep some capability in reserve post trike. It is just common sense and basic strategy to keep part of your forces in reserve.

I don't know if there was anything definitive, but such an idea runs counter to the logic the Soviets were using. In any case, a large proportion of mobile missile launchers would likely survive the exchange, along with some of the stockpiled missiles, so maybe that would be the reserve they were thinking of.

American war plans included strikes on the Murmansk area using carriers and cruise missiles. In any case, naval support of NATO forces operating in Norway is a given. You presume a defensive posture from the Soviet Navy, which does not make sense as controlling the GIUK gap is of paramount strategic importance to them in order to deny NATO reinforcements.

It takes a week for a ship to cross the Atlantic, then you have to off-load the equipment at the ports in France and the Low Countries and move it too the front. From this schedule we can note three points that argue for a defensive stance by the Soviet Atlantic Fleet.

1. Reinforcements can be attacked by the full-extent of Soviet air power as they offload and move up to the front. Attacking the ports themselves would also inhibit their use by the enemy.
2. Because of the pro-longed build-up to war, in all likelyhood NATO has either fully or largely completed REFORGER which means that most of the reinforcements the US planned to send to Europe have been sent. Any further deployments would be by units that were not planned to be moved there prior to the war.
3. The length of time required to ferry troops from the US to the FEBA is much longer then the rapidity of the ground war. In the time it takes the US to send one division to Europe, the Soviets could smash several NATO divisions and, since its only a single nights trip from the Ural to the Inter-German border, the Soviets can reinforce much more rapidly.

As for you idea of the Americans attacking Murmansk: they would suffer terrible, terrible losses even if Soviet nuclear subs and major surface ships don't attack them. Mobs of missile-armed littoral combat vessels, diesel submarines, land-based air power, and ground-based missile launchers.

I would also like to say that considering the time of the year, an easy way for NATO to possibly surprise the Soviets would be to attack them from the north by going under the icecaps.

Still icefree enough for the Soviet navy to inhibit them.

[1]Remember, by this point NATO F-16s and Soviet MiG-27s can lug around bombs with yields up to a megaton yield...
[2]Both cruise and shorter-ranged SLBMs.