Oct 44 – Jan 45: The last chance at peace
In October, Stalin opted to attack the “soft” parts of the eastern front, particularly Estonia, with the hope of breaking through into Latvia, and then Lithuania; as well as a massive attack into Ukraine. Successful campaigns would create a salient which would allow the Soviets to either surround AGC or force a withdrawal to 1941 borders.
All said and told, 500,000 Soviets were earmarked to attack Estonia, with an addition 250,000 soldiers held in reserve for follow up operations in the other Baltic states. Approximately 1.75 million men were slotted for the attack on Western Ukraine.
In both theaters, the Soviets completely overwhelmed their enemies. Estonia’s small army of 125,000 poorly trained auxiliaries evaporated under the Soviet onslaught, even though it was buttressed by a strong Waffen SS division as well as four quality German divisions on good defensive grounds. They could not hold out against the onslaught. The Waffen SS and German divisions retreated into Latvia (along with Estonian anti-communists), which had about 200,000 auxiliaries as well as a Waffen SS division. They likewise folded to the pressure, though a significant pocket of Latvians and Germans continued to hold out in the Courland Pocket.
Soviet reserves were thrown into the invasion of Lithuania, which due to the German destruction of the rail infrastructure, was on a logistical shoestring. The Lithuanians likewise had approximately 200,000 auxiliaries and were buttressed by 200,000 German soldiers, which moved into the battle from East Prussia, with Latvian and German forces who had previously retreated as well. At this point, the Germans had a significant degree of parity and were able to break through to the Courland Pocket and stabilize the front.
Soviet losses were relatively severe, with the loss of 300,000 men. Axis losses were higher on paper, about 325,000—but most of these were poorly trained Estonians and Latvians , many of which (though “missing”) were in the forests acting as partisans.
In Ukraine, even though there was a rough parity (about 1.3 million Axis soldiers versus 1.75 million Soviets), the Soviets had the edge in equipment and quality. Losses were roughly equal on both sides and the Ukrainians withdrew. The Crimea was entirely bypassed, as was the fortress city of Odessa, saving the Romanians a significant blow similar to the one they experienced in 1942 outside of Stalingrad.
The Soviets reached the northern Carpathians by December, but at this point the Axis fell back to a Romanian defensive line manned by 400,000 Romanian soldiers, 400,000 western Ukrainians (in the western parts of Ukraine west of Moldova), and 300,000 Germans (those of which that did not withdraw into the Crimea itself). Having experienced 500,000 casualties, the Soviets had rough parity and mobility was not a factor that would suit them at this juncture. Though they occupied the majority of Ukraine, particularly its breadbasket, what they had left to themselves was a partisan Hell that would take years until after WW2 to subdue.
All things said and told, the Soviets were in a good position to regain 1941 borders by 1945. They recaptured important population centers, but a loss of 1944’s harvest in Ukraine meant that the Soviet military could not make due on their losses. Having begun the campaigns with roughly 5.2 million men in the eastern front, their losses were approximately 1,000,000 casualties. Worse yet, the Axis were sitting on good defensive ground on the Carpathians and Crimea which would require at least two million men to break through—stripping the other fronts bare as both sides roughly had parity (3.4 million Axis to 4.2 million Soviets). Stalin looked for major events to unfold in the West as he had no choice but to bide his time.
With their supply lines stretched, the Wallies were stopped in their tracks by the Germans in the Netherlands and the German border. By December, total German and allied forces in the West totaled three million men. Though many quality divisions were shipped in from the east, many were not mobile (especially compared to Allied divisions) and subpar fortress divisions of Crimean Tartars and ex-Soviet POWs as well as Volkstrum padded the numbers. Nevertheless, by this point of the war, they actually slightly outnumbered the Wallies, at least temporarily.
Goering’s military planners opted for a “small solution.” Italian forces with German help were to recapture the port-town of Nice, which was being held by the dregs of the US and French armies. This was intended to be an uncreative, full-frontal assault where surprise would help achieve the objective.
In the Ardennes region, Rommel planned an ambitious attack, a two pronged offensive aimed at surrounding United States forces east of the Meuse. If fuel depots were captured according to the plan, a drive towards Antwerp would be attempted. The attacks would be timed for a period of time when weather would ground the Wallies’ air force.
The cream of Germany’s military was slotted for the attack and despite the obvious overtures in the east which indicated a greatly diminished German presence, Western military planners did not seriously anticipate a German attack, especially considering they ruled the skies and intelligence had not picked up on it.
On December 16th, Rommel attacked and achieved a massive breakthrough. Lessons in 1940, where miles of backed up vehicles tied up German logistics, were learned well and avoided at this juncture. By Christmas Eve, the Germans had surrounded 200,000 American soldiers. Fuel depots were captured and Rommel broke with his commander, Gerd von Rudstedt, and thrust significant mobile elements forward towards Antwerp. General Patton’s breakthrough attempt was repulsed, but was so sudden, along with the break in the weather, that Rommel lost his nerve and reversed course. Nevertheless, German forces secured the surrender of the pocket by the end of the year, suffering token losses. It was a “massive” victory, but Pyrrhic as it did little to change the strategic situation—not that this was fully appreciated at the time.
Through Swedish intermediaries, peace investigations began in earnest. Stalin demanded a return to 1941 borders, including eastern Poland, the Baltic states, Crimea, and Moldova. The British demanded that Greek (and Norwegian, Yugoslavian, and Danish) independence be restored, the Alsace-Lorraine be returned to France, that the Rhineland be demilitarized, and Belgium and the Netherlands have restored independence. The Americans demanded that Austria be partitioned from Germany and Czechoslovakia restored. All agreed that Germany must pay reparations. In other words, a Treaty of Versailles 2.0.
Goering felt that fundamentally, this was a good deal. He perceived that Germany faced disaster, and retaining gains in Lithuania and western Poland, as well as hegemony in central Europe, would suffice if the Germans could retain Alsace-Lorraine and avoid demilitarization and reparations. Hence, his goal was a return to German borders in 1914.
Mussolini was willing to part with his French acquisitions, but not his acquisitions in Yugoslavia and the Dodecanese. He also demanded a restoration of Sicily and Sardinia to Italy. He was also unwilling to pay reparations.
The more junior Axis members really did not a say, but demanded retention of their acquisitions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Moldova, and etcetera. In reality, Goering was willing to have a separate peace that left the junior Axis members to fend for themselves.
The German military loathed this “deal.” Why, if they attained victory in the west and a stalemate in the east should they just give away the Crimea or Lithuania? Why have the Soviets right at their border? Goering was “gently” encouraged to step down, which he did, and another senior Nazi member take his place, pliable Franz von Papen. After this point, the nation was entirely led by the military.