I don't have specifics on most of that but Armengaud's experience and what he wrote indicate he would have been good in the job.
Armengaud first started as a liaison officer with the USAAC in WW1 under Gen. Billy Mitchell when he received the Distinguished Service Cross. Good relations with the Americans would prove useful once he gets the Air Ministry ITTL. More interesting, he was the commander of the entire French air forces in Morocco during the Rif War, where he eventually cooperated with Pétain (in charge of ground forces) to defeat the rebels. Many lessons were learnt here. Armengaud's thoughts, which he considered could be useful in a european war were the following:
You know something? I had completely forgotten the 3rd Rif War. Close air support doctrine in that terrain would still have been applicable to France 1940. I will not discuss matters except technical and doctrinal issues to be lesson learned as I am not familiar enough with the Spanish side of the war with the Moroccans or how they initially got into that mess in the first place. The French participation has multiple lessons learned for air power application.
I will take these elements in order.
- the command of air forces should be centralized to coordinate the entire effort, with the ability to decentralize forces on a tactical level.
This was a problem of administering air force in an air campaign that was first seen in WWI and seems to have been misunderstood as a lesson learned as ground commanders of various national armies insisted on treating air power as demand call fires under their personal local control, instead of as a planned resource that must be applied across a front. The Russians and the Chinese will lesson learn this in WWII. It still remains to be a lesson learned by many states and armies today.
- STRONG coordination with ground troops is ESSENTIAL. During the Rif War, he first put aviators in ground units as forward observers. By the end of the conflict ground and air units were regularly exchanging men to create an effective communication chain between ground and air units. Command chain was simplified so that communication could be as fast and smooth as possible. Interarm fighting was heavily emphasized. ITTL by the late 30s this could also be an incentive to push for better radio comms between ground and air units.
Another WWI lesson learned, I might mention, is positive ground control. This does not just include pilots attached to company HQ sections with ground to air radios, but implies standardized training for platoon and section leaders in talk procedures or to show through visual means to pilots aloft, direction and distance from a reference aid to point them at geographic features and VECTOR them onto a specific target set to be bombed and strafed. Something as simple as colored cloth arrow shaped panels, color coded that point in the direction and give the distance from the panel by that color code to the target are means that can be employed in the absence of ground to air radios to guide the fliers onto their target sets. Obviously there is a downside in that these panels will draw fire, but remember the era and the state of equipment that probably will be available.
- per the above, CAS is deemed VERY IMPORTANT, in particular because it directly contributes to better morale of ground troops.
This is another WWI lesson learned, forgotten by many armies. Just the sight of your own planes forcing the enemy to keep their heads down and hide is contributive as a giant visual arrow that screams, "we are winning"; and it is safer for us to move than it is for them.
- interdiction and autonomous air attack missions are also important, but not as useful for troop morale.
The troops do not see the disruption of enemy transportation and infrastructure behind the front. Nevertheless, every train and every truck and every horse drawn vehicle that does not deliver supply or troops forward is just as important as bombing a hill that contains an artillery observer post or strafing and bombing attack that suppresses artillery. I include enemy air fields as part of the battlefield interdiction mission, because enemy planes destroyed and enemy airfields rendered even temporarily unusable means that enemy reconnaissance and air support for his ground forces are lacking. Another WWI lesson learned and forgotten is that the side who can see the battlefield top down and plan from it has 2 moves in advantage to the side which cannot.
This is the OODA Loop cycle. It took until the Korean War to be formalized as a doctrine of the military art, but it was understood as far back as the invention of the airplane before WWI that the side which can fly and can look down behind the front and see, while the side which could not was blind and lacked a full set of planning options. To coin a phrase...
Prendre les collines et les hauts lieux ou ils vous tuer dans les vallées et les endroits bas.
Roughly that means: "Take the high ground or they will murder you in the valley."
- during the war he also dispersed units on bases very close to the front (against the existing doctrine) to intervene as fast as possible. Some bombers were converted into transports or medical transports.
That goes to three critical elements in the efficient use of time.
a. --standing air patrols over own troops is a moral booster as the troops visually see their air force guarding them from enemy eyes aloft.
b.--from panels laid to strafers giving the enemy the works is crucial. There is a morale factor involved that translates into troops waiting for help to arrive. In the Rif War example, a French plane that shows up to strafe the Berbers 2-5 minutes after the call for help is sent is a lot more of a morale booster than waiting for an hour or for the help that never comes.
c.--short distance equals fast response time and more sorties per day. It means tired pilots and weary ground crews but if 1 plane flies four sorties and air missions per day at 30 minutes time aloft to the targets serviced, that is 4x as efficient as 1 pilot and plane who is 2 hours away. It means also, that the enemy can be swamped if your tempo of sorties is faster than his. In the numbers game, it means a smaller air force can work more to do more, saving money, fuel, lives of pilots, and TIME; which is the most precious commodity in war. This is a WWI lesson, which some air forces learned and remembered. The Germans did. The British did. The French? I do not understand why the AdA did not stand on the frontiers. I just do not understand it. This is especially the case, now that we have the French Rif War example.
I will take these items below in order.
After the war, he published some other books and had additional thoughts on airborne warfare:
- he published a book on air recon, showing his focus on this area
- contrary to other officers who thought that AAA was the main means of defense against aircraft, he was in favor of fighters.
- he wanted the aviation to be developped parallel to tanks, although the former should maybe have the priority because of its more general use.
- he wanted to strengthen the airforce in general. Based on current assessments of German capabilities in 1936, he published an anonymous letter advocating for an AdA that had at least 2/3 of German numbers, with 850 bombers, a minimum of 500 fighters and 400 recon aircrafts (note that in 1937, France only had about 200 of the latter). Due to the obsolescence of the existing aircrafts and the acceleration of aircraft development, he wanted to reduce the replacement rate to two years.
-- Reconnaissance is why air forces were born. Use of the air is fundamentally like use of the sea. There must be purpose and that purpose is the advantage of use. You cannot "hold" the air at all, but you can deny its use, but there must be a reason to deny it in the first place. The OODA cycle is the military reason and looking down is the usage. Again this is a WWI lesson.
--I think AAA is important, not because it is as efficient as air to air combat, but because the troops must have some chance and they need it for morale. Here there is a mistake to at least not give the illusion of defense. The soldiers should have the means to shoot back so as not to feel helpless. Besides, as WWI lessons learned taught, AAA IS dangerous and effective, even if it is not as effective as some might have hoped. I have a remark in a Pearl Harbor thread somewhere about the demoralizing effect American AAA had at Pearl Harbor on the IJN command (not the pilots) and how it was a factor in the Japanese leadership deciding not to go for a third strike since they knew 1/4 of their aircraft had been so damaged as to be rendered unusable. (26 of 29 shot down by AAA and 35 additional write offs pushed into the sea after return=26 % of the starting force.). AAA can be a force multiplier for the air force that uses it to its advantage. This is another WWI lesson that the French air corps of the era actually used. Postwar, it was set aside. I can see why AAA would not be a RIF War lesson learned because the enemy did not have it in any quantity to harass the French air force.
--Air to ground cooperation between tanks and planes is kind of German. Not even the British got that one right pre-war (EMF 1927.). it is a WWII lesson learned the hard way in Poland and France and I cannot justify it as anything but ASB to suggest that unless it is war-gamed in Krieg-spiel or worked as a Fleet Problem, that anyone can see it. One has to notice that tanks with radios and guys perched in them will be "observers" who can talk to planes above and steer the pilots aloft to a target holding up the tank column. Not even WWI is a lessons learned source. The Germans kind of suspected this aspect of CAS entirely by accident in Russia in the early 1930s. Even the Russians, right there with them in that secret training facility, missed it. They, the Germans, tried it out in Poland.
--The numbers game is a hard one to quantify. Contrary to popular opinion, there is as much aerial geography as there naval geography that determines the shape of what is in modern parlance known as "battle space". In its simplest fundamentals this is the area of bases and infrastructure behind a front that supports a land based air force.
The above is just an example of aerial battlespace geography at work during France 1944. The example is US 9th Air Force as it moves fighters forward to support 21st and 12th Army groups. The idea was to base forward to maximize sortie turnaround rates and minimize CAS response times in support of the allied armies. The "air front" was weighted to follow 1st US Army and aimed along an axis that was oriented north of Metz, much to Patton's displeasure. I think it was a mistake as Quesada's pilots did their best work with Patton's tank columns; but that is me with 2020 hindsight.
The next example is France 1940 with hypothetical French AdA possible operation dispositions and target boxes..
Notice that the way air geography is laid out is the radius of time aloft for an aircraft? In the above example
the airpower circle is measured as 170 minutes flyout aloft at a cruise speed of 320 km/h or 90 m/s. The string of air complexes is force de chasse (fighters) and close air support and battlefield interdiction coverage on a air "front" that encompasses the expected Franco German area of operations and it is sort of modeled on WWI aerial lessons learned and the existent French Army Dyle plans.
A couple of things:
--The air op plan layout practically drives desired plane characteristics. You want aircraft that can operate at a minimum at cruise about 150 minutes in the air with a pad of 15 minutes to climb from and 15 minutes to descend to their bases and have 20 minutes combat time over target. That means French aircraft need a minimum of that characteristics in the battlespace in which they operate, so they have to be CLOSE to the front to effectively operate with the army.
--Needless to say, the air complexes are numerous and the distribution is three lines in case the AdA has to fall back with the army. The coverage is favored to WW I lessons learned. Notice the suggested French AdA presence in the UK? This is a concept called "Threat Axis". Air forces can be flanked. Did not know this? It is a WWI lesson learned that if you can raid from different directions, you can swamp an enemy air defense that is linear thinking and minded. The LW for all its supposed tactical prowess did not understand this concept at all.
--Finally the ground establishment needs not only aircraft maintainers, but engineers (sappers or pioneers) who can turn a farm field into an improvised air strip. This is seen in the first example of the USAAF 9th Air Force which created almost 100 impromptu air strips to follow the allied armies. The AdA may have to dodge and weave just as much in the same battlespace.
Notice that this will contradict one of Armengaud's tenets about reducing fuel bowsers and trucks for the French air force? If the improvised air fields are critical to a successful aerial battlespace management (WWI lesson learned); then crews, maintainers, road building equipment, fuel, bombs and ammunition, fuel, mechanics' work areas and tool sets aviation supplies and parts, almost everything an air base needs including AAA and air traffic control has to be put on wheels and lorried to where they are needed.
--Murphy's gift to an air force is DIRT. Berm everything; hardstands, bomb dumps, fuel parks, barracks, PLANES, the traffic control post and admin sections, the hospital, the AAA gun positions, the raid shelters, even the tennis courts if the improvised base has one. This one WWI lesson alone could have saved so many air forces caught on the ground and surprised. Bombs miss and strafing is less effective against targets protected by walls of earth.
- Armengaud's focus on recon could lead him to accelerate the existing recon aircraft programs, in particular those made for cooperation with the Army.
- knowing the flaws of the MS 406 fighter, well-known by 1937 already, he could start what amounts to the MS 410 modernization program much sooner. In particular, getting propelling exhausts and a proper fixed radiator which would increase top speed by about 30kph, and new wings with 4 MGs.
- Alternatively, he would be in a good position to order LN 161 fighters, which are WAY superior to the MS 406 in climb rate and speed, and are much easier to mass produce, and much faster to refuel (the MS 406 had a stupid small fuel tank on top of a larger one which had to be refueled first, so refueling was very slow).
- OTL, Armengaud's predecessor was about to sign an order for the Amiot 340 which is a single tail fast bomber like the Leo 451, but WAY safer and easier to produce ( 24,000 man hours vs 45,000). The 340 could get in service in 1938, be made even easier to produce like the Amiot 351, and be replaced by the latter if necessary (it just added an extra gunner). OTL the 340 was not ordered and had to be redesigned for that 4-man crew and twin-tail, which wasted at least a year.
--This is one area where obsolete French fighters can be turned into camera planes and used as over-fliers to map the front. Intruders can be dedicated for deep flights to see where enemy concentrations are and what infrastructure and transport back there has to be bombed and strafed in what order. This is why the air staff and not the army generals have to control the air battle behind the front. Generals locally on the ground think about what is in front of them, not what threat develops away from them 100 km distant. One of the things air generals do think about is where the enemy air force operates the most. That usually means something BAD on the ground underneath is developing and must be addressed by reconnaissance and battlefield interdiction missions immediately.
-- The M.S. 406 is solvable several ways. Finnish war lessons learned but in pre-war operations the AdA can do the same.
a. redesign the fuel tankage and back-fit.
b. aspirate the existent engine better. This means a better intake circuit and would have to be back-fit. Difficult.
c.
change the wing cord. This is major and might not be possible to solve the lift problem.
d. GIVE IT A BETTER PROPELLER. This one is easy.
e, Otherwise it is the M.S. 410 program.
--The LN 161 seems to have had tail control issues. If those were solved it could be a good aircraft though its 13 m/s climb rate to best cruise at mid-band altitude (~4000 meters) still worries me a lot. The BF 109 has a 2 m/s climb advantage and its bounce from altitude was at least 2,000 meters higher. So that is a vertical and corner turn advantage for the German.
--Now that I think about it, the De 520 is even more critical. One of the WWI lessons learned is that bombers may make history, but FIGHTERS determine whose bombers make that history.
--The Amiot 340 is a doctrine issue. Do you want that tail gunner? I will suggest that it is not just the AdA that struggled with the morale booster question in this regard. Personally, I look to USN lessons learned. The GIB *(guy in back) if he is the radio-man bombardier, has a dedicated mission. Give him a gun to cover the tail as it will give the attack plane at least a chance if it is chased. If he has no other air mission purpose anjd is just a gunner, then he is excess weight that can be omitted or used for other reasons. Speed and maneuver is a BETTER defense. The quandary is deciding if the tail-gun is worth it as added weight.
In the TL about him becoming Air Minister in late 1937, the following measures are taken:
- a symbolic additional billion francs for the aviation, including 300 million francs for industrial modernization, knowing that the industry needs to be modernized before higher aircraft production can be contemplated.
- three projects involving the US industry were being discussed at the time. ITTL, Armengaud accelerates those:
- France gets a license in October 1937 for the PW R1830 Twin Wasp
- contact is made to get the Guérin-Douglas process
- Eugène Houdry is called back to France a year sooner than OTL to get a license for catalytic cracking units to increase production of high octane fuel. 2 units are ready by July and August 1939, 2 additionnal ones in 1940.
- the pipe-line from Donges to Amilly (which was an OTL project) is built, with additionnal fuel tanks along the way. Finished for May 1940, this frees fuel trucks and cars that can be used to supply military units.
- pressure is made on MAC sooner to develop the belt-fed MAC 34 (and by proxy the belt-fed HS 404)
- the FN 13.2 Browning is licensed sooner to equip Bloch fighters and eventually replace HS 404s as bomber defense weapons. This frees HS 404s that can be used on inline engine fighters.
- thanks to the license for the PW R1830, the Bloch MB 153 fighterwith this engine is prioritized. In the context of purchasing US P-36 fighters, France gets a license for the P-36's entire powertrain (engine, radiators, cowling, propeller) as well as electric gun controls (which can be useful on other fighters). This allows the engineers to immediately have reliable cooling, so that they can concentrate on other aspects of the MB 153, such as better dive performance. Said MB 153 eventually settles with 4 13.2 HMGs.
- cooperation with the US industry opens the possibility of getting help from US engineers to redesign the structure of French aircraft projects, making them more suitable to mass prodution.
- Armengaud trusts Dewoitine with the D520 and orders the prototypes 6 months earlier, allowing production to start in Summer 1939 instead of late 1939. A much greater number of D520s can thus be built, and they are more mature by 1940.
Take those in order. (^^^)
--Agreed. No politics, but sorting aircraft manufacturer "personality issues" will help as much as the money.
--The 3 Franco-American projects...
a. You cannot go wrong with Pratt.
b. I suppose this is rubber pad formatted aluminum sheet metal shape stamping? It is not an easy tech to master. Douglas had a lot of trouble perfecting it. Don't forget the rivet presses that have to go with it for the panel joinings.
c. Av-gas fractionation is like b. It is possible to boost octane ratings, but the process is corrosive in the stills. Needs care.
d. Pipelines are important. Fuel bowsers and
transfer pumps from bowsers to planes are just as important.
e. Good enough is better than perfect never. HS 404s in quantity sufficient for everybody who can use them is better than belt feed delays. (AAA remember?) I think the Belgians should be "encouraged" to supply "Brownings" as well just for good relations.
f. Ugh. I would like to sit Marcel Bloch down and educate him about pilot visibility (WWI lesson learned.) but aside from that little problem, I agree.
g. What I suggested for Mssr. Bloch as friendly advice especially applies to Don Berlin as off the wall bounce counseling for the P-36 on a host of issues. 2x4 to the head for him. Not only is pilot visibility lousy and cockpit (head down to manage instruments) workload unacceptable, but the plane is draggy. That air frame needs a lot of clean up work. But that is Curtiss for you.
h. Kahn factory will carry you far. Look to PACKARD.
I. Never enough De 520s. Missed opportunity.
If you can read French or don't mind google translating, here is the blog:
sam40.fr
And something on Armengaud and the Rif War:
https://journals.openedition.org/rha/7510
Thank you. I will read for what I missed here. (^^^)