The schema is that seems to be a Polish (judging by the language) version of the Russian alt-history dreams about victory at Tsushima. The main problem in both cases is that "it could not be because it could not be". In other words, while being laudably patriotic, they represent a wishful thinking completely divorced from a reality.
So, if we are talking about a pure fantasy, then the sky is a limit, the annoying facts or a common sense are applicable, argument does not make sense and you can write whatever you want.
However, if we are trying to operate with a realm of reality (with the reasonable amount of deviations) then the picture does not hold the water:
In 1807 Napoleon was almost as exhausted as his Russian-Prussian opponents. It is just that a clumsy Bennigsen's maneuver gave him a victory at Friedland (which compensated for less than a stellar Eylau) allowing to make a favorable peace. Even a potential earlier Russian defeat at Eylau would not change too much in the situation.
Under no realistic circumstances could he get much more than he got at Tilsit and "successful uprising in Lithuania" at that time is from a realm of the pipe dreams: unorganized (and mostly unarmed) civilians did not have a chance against the regular troops. Not that this could be anything but uprising of some part of szlcahta: the serfs would not care and at least part of szlcahta had been doing just fine under the Russian rule. Russian Empire had enough troops in reserve to deal with that problem (few regular and Cossack regiments would be enough to at least keep it under control).
The whole schema of forcing Russia to cede the territories annexed during the 3rd Partition and for whipping Prussia off the map would require a prolonged war in the region but Nappy had different priorities: French invasion to Portugal started in the late 1807 and a full-scale intervention in Spain in 1808. These wars had been a part of enforcing the Continental System and, hopefully I'll not offend anybody's patriotic feelings by saying that defeat of Britain was much higher on Nappy's set of priorities than independence of Poland. After all, invasion of Russia in 1812 had been more or less forced upon Napoleon by Russian unwillingness to comply with the Continental System.
As for 1812, practically any reasonably sane historian (from Clausewitz and Caulaincourt to Adam Zamoiski) described, one way or another, a futility of the whole enterprise. Napoleon's military system was NOT well-suited for this type of a war (neither did it work well in Spain) and on the top of this he did not have a clear idea how to achieve a strategic victory, which doomed the whole adventure even before it started. Then, there are some details like physical impossibility even for the Great Army to "completely devastate" the whole Central Russia (but I rather like a part about Alexander's insanity
): it simply was not big enough and its numbers had been shrinking way too fast. Neither Russia nor France had been (or could be) completely exhausted after 1812, on a contrary, during the following fight in Germany each of them kept raising troops in very impressive numbers.
Then the schema is seemingly ignoring an obvious fact that during the French-Russian confrontation Poland is not going to be an idle viewer. In OTL, the Duchy of Warsaw raised 120,000 (out of a total population of some 4.3 million people) and had a questionable pleasure to provide food and forage for the troops passing through it territory. A prolonged war would mean a much greater devastation, especially if and when fighting continued on its territory.
Realistically, the best scenario for everybody involved (including the Duchy) would be Alexander adopting Kutuzov's proposal to stop at the Russian border because in his opinion Russia is not going to benefit from a continued war.