Patton commander of UN forces in the Korean War

[ObssesedNuker]

What’s next? Will you also claim that the US should have won Vietnam because there were millions of tons of bombs dropped? Was the US not ‘aggressive’ enough in Indochina?

It's worth noting that another aspect of the AMBOMB's fixation on the 635,000 ton figure is how it displays his ignorance as to the nature of the war in Korea. The Chinese and North Koreans were not island garrison of a couple of divisions whom the USN had already isolated from all outside contact. It's a large-scale ground war involving whole armies and army groups. The requirements are on a completely different scale and just because you meet those requirements don't suddenly mean you win (as the Vietnam example shows) because the enemy gets a vote too.

OP probably would say no, given that USA and allies did not invade North Vietnam. /S

He actually dismissed it on the grounds that Vietnam was a "guerrilla war". Which further displays his ignorance about Cold War conflicts: guerrilla warfare was a essential aspect of the Vietcong and PVA's strategy, but it was conducted alongside a massed conventional campaign using regular armies... all of which managed to fight on for years in the face of American air power.

 

[AMBOMB]

As Rannult pointed out, the casualties were meaningless. What mattered really was the results. And frankly, the US would have fought the same way as the Chinese had they had the same equipment limitations, so saying the Chinese wasn't fighting "smarter" is just wrong.
​

In other words, nothing. Pointing to tonnage of bombs with zero context is meaningless. The Chinese weathered the bombing campaigns just fine and there is nothing about being more aggressive which would really change that. You've already displayed astonishing ignorance about the conflict as well as MacArthur and Ridgway's respective roles in in the conflict. Even after it being explained to you, in detail, why the raw bomb tonnage didn't mean much, why the US could not afford to be more aggressive, why it actually did more then just "sit on" it's positions on the 38th (include being evicted from those positions a number of times and having to take them back through some hard fighting), and all with copious evidence to back it up, you just revert to regurgitating the already debunked claim. So we compound ignorant assertions with an unwillingness to learn and inability to debate.

How many times do I have to repeat myself? 635,000 tons almost is as many as we dropped in the Pacific Theater of World War II fighting a much more powerful enemy and in less time. That should've been more than enough to defeat North Korea and China. The problem was we didn't take advantage of our air power by being aggressive. The Army parked itself on the 38th parallel and sat there for 2 years.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

How many times do I have to repeat myself? 635,000 tons almost is as many as we dropped in the Pacific Theater of World War II fighting a much more powerful enemy and in less time. That should've been more than enough to defeat North Korea and China. The problem was we didn't take advantage of our air power by being aggressive. The Army parked itself on the 38th parallel and sat there for 2 years.

You can repeat yourself all you want. Doesn't change the fact that citing the tonnage is meaningless for the reasons being cited. Being bombed is not the end of the world and how one reacts to it can matter quite a lot. Even leaving that issue aside, you have provided absolutely no evidence that the bomb tonnage dropped was "more then enough", given that the large-scale ground war in Korea ws a radically different enterprise then the largely naval-air conflict that the Pacific War was. Indeed, the prevailing evidence is that even at the end of the war, the Chinese were still just as tough as they had been in 1950 which suggests that 635,000 tons was far from enough. You've also failed to explain how, if US air power was adequate enough to allow it to be aggressive, it failed to prevent the devastating reverse in the winter of 1950, when the US was aggressive and the Chinese smashed them for it, inflicting one of the most devastating defeats upon the US Army in it's history and throwing it into it's longest ever retreat. Many people here have pointed it out to you and you haven't been able to muster even the slimmest reply, probably because you have no answer for it, don't actually know anything about the conflict in question, and are engaging in a lot of bluster to hide your ignorance.

 

[AMBOMB]

AMBOMB wrote:


Let’s first of all point out Patton if he had not died in 1945 would have been retired by 1946 at the latest. Truman disliked him almost as much as MacArthur and for similar reasons. He would not have been ‘brought back’ mostly due to his ego issues which put him at loggerheads with the majority of the at that time political and military hierarchy.

Second, at that time given that North Korea was directly supported by China who in turn was directly supported by the Soviet Union both of which could, (indeed did) fight a conventional war with the US and its allies should they choose to, (they did) and do so to a standstill somehow ‘assuming’ that the opposition during the Korean War was somehow ‘less powerful’ is pretty much a bald face revision of history.

Thirdly any commitment to a ‘more aggressive’ stance after regaining the 38th Parallel would have required more troops, more equipment and more logistics which would have also entailed gaining both a new UN resolution, (the US and allies had achieved the current one once they were back on the 38th parallel) AND larger home and abroad support for such an offensive. The question was asked but you’ve yet to answer is where does all this come from? The US? Hardly.

From late 1945 until the day North Korea invaded the US had been drastically drawing DOWN it’s military. Truman’s policy pre-1948 had been to “pay” all domestic programs and efforts first and then divvy whatever remained to the military with priority to the Atom Bomb and the Air Force since they were at the time the only means of delivering those weapons. (And THAT btw was highly questionable SAC by 1950 had barely managed to climb out of its worst post-war slump where during exercises fully 90% of the bombers could not find their target and the 10% that did “missed” by over 5 miles, note of the bombers deployed to Guam on average only three {3} were actually “missions capable” at any time and it was not very likely they could penetrate even modestly contested airspace without massive escort and pre-mission attacks which would of course clearly point to an attack being planned…) Truman then took his ‘miracle’ win of 1948 as a mandate from the American people and proceeded to ‘double-down’ on the military cuts, (which the new Secretary of Defense Johnson made clear meant the Navy and Army were likely going to be disbanded as ‘obsolete’ due to the Air Force and Atom Bomb) which is why when North Korea invaded and Truman declared a “blockade” he was aghast to find out he actually had no ships available to enforce such a blockade.

Further MacArthur hadn’t been following orders in that instead of stockpiling supplies and equipment along with personnel in South Korea he’d actually been withdrawing them to Japan and in fact had ‘withdrawn’ significant supplies and equipment that had been promised to the South Koreans for building their own forces. Arguably he had even had a semi-good reason for doing so but mostly he “trusted” his “experts” who told him the Koreans were poor soldiers and any attempt to ‘hold-the-line’ in Korea, (which was actually the Truman Doctrine which had US forces, anchored by allied/local forces facing off directly against Communist forces) using them endangered isolation and destruction of any US forces stationed in Korea. These “experts” argued that it would be more effective to build up ‘reserves’ in Japan and plan on amphibious transported/inserted troops to push back any Communist assault.

(This ‘might’ sound familiar but keep in mind MacArthur didn’t in fact come up with Inchon he only took it and ran with it once it became clear breaking out of Pusan wasn’t viable) Who were these ‘experts’ btw? The Japanese mostly who MacArthur and his staff believed had ‘intimate knowledge’ on both Korea and China. Same people who convinced him that North Korea was less of a threat than South Korea btw due to Rhee’s rhetoric of “uniting Korea by force” (which remember I noted Mac had a “semi-good” reason for withholding supplies and equipment, well Rhee and company had made it QUITE clear that given material support they WERE in fact planning on going North given the slightest opportunity and would drag the US into the war with them if they could, Mac and Truman both were less than thrilled by this prospect) and that China would not intervene on North Korea’s behalf unless the North was attacked by the South. (Which again see Rhee’s rhetoric which scared them more than Kim’s)

Again some semi-good reasoning but neglecting a few VERY well known facts available to Mac and Truman but due to the purge of the old “China hands” not understood or taken in context at the time. In fact Mao “owed” Kim for direct support during the civil war and Kim was always going to call on this marker once hostilities began. Further it was well understood by those who knew China that they would not tolerate US (or Allied) forces on their border. It was questionable if they would tolerate South Korean forces but frankly since they HAD to support North Korea it was very likely that ANY presence close to the Yalu would bring intervention.

We know today that Kim straight up lied to both Stalin and Mao about ‘support’ for an invasion but once it began neither leader could or would back out, and frankly at the time Kim looked to be right as he rolled over South Koreans and steadily pushed them back it looked very much like it would be a ‘simple’ and ‘quick’ operation.

The ‘wildcard’ was the US response of course and both China and Russia expected the US to respond but having to move from Japan to Korea was seen as a limiting factor, (which it was) but having to ‘protect’ Japan (which was a US imperative) made such a response inevitable. Main problem was the US had little to ‘respond’ with due to the aforementioned military cuts. Here I’ll point out a bit of fact the initial post missed; A significant amount of that “635,000 tons” was not dropped on North Korea but on SOUTH Korea to allow US and South Korean forces the ability to establish and support the “Pusan Perimeter” and halt the North Korean advance. This was then back-tracked into North Korea to destroy logistics and transportation nexus’ and starve out the forces being used to attack the perimeter which allowed a Allied build up but didn’t allow a feasibly ‘break-out’ even against the weakened KPA forces.

Despite how ‘good’ things were going China in fact had made an agreement with the Soviet Union to support them and began moving troops towards the border with Korea. Mac was ‘aware’ of this but still did not believe the Chinese would intervene since North Korea had been the aggressor and was under the assumption that the Soviet Union was not going to support North Korea militarily either. (Despite the rather obvious fact that North Korea was using Soviet equipment that as obviously had to come through China) So when Inchon happened really the only people actually ‘surprised’ was the US and North Korea. And North Korea shouldn't have been considering both the Soviets and Chinese had pointed out it was the 'logical' think for MacArthur to do, but Kim had focused on reducing the Pusan pocket and with Allied air supremacy could not redeploy troops to significantly oppose the Inchon landing. (And oddly enough despite Allied and US thinking that the “Communists” were a solid block which they were not Kim and Soviet advisers began movement and planning without consulting the Chinese, and in fact the Chinese were surprised when the KPA effectively collapsed around the end of September 1950)

When China announced on 20 August 1950 that they would ‘intervene’ it should be noted that no one really took them seriously. Neither Truman nor MacArthur actually believed they would or even could intervene before UN troops were on the Yalu river banks. (And despite his 'reminder' from Truman his CO at the Pentagon basically told him he had free reign to go beyond the 38th parallel so conflicting orders/suggestions...) Now again with those same ‘troops’ badly over-extended and out of contact with each other AND the intervening terrain accessible to and usable by light infantry which was known to be the Chinese ‘spear-head’ you’d think someone would recall that during the Chinese Civil War the Communists were in fact pretty damn good about hiding from aerial reconnaissance and moving through difficult terrain with very good march and bivouac discipline…

But, no apparently not…

Worse after the initial attack the Chinese forces seemed to withdraw and the UN forces then went on the offensive again. Which allowed the Chinese to flank the offensive and send the UN into retreat. (Note here that MacArthur had noted that “if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter” BUT most people forget he said and meant “without air force protection” which they actually had and which they used to harass and suppress UN forces, so he wasn't wrong...)

Now the final issue with the OP is the idea that we didn’t “pursue an aggressive enough strategy” which is unsupported by the facts or history. Nor did we “park on the 38th parallel and shell and bomb” for two years. In fact offensives were undertaken by both sides right up to the armistice with little effect. The UN could not commit more troops to a decisive attack because that would mean taking away troops from the ‘important’ areas such as Europe. The Chinese on the other hand had little artillery, armor or air power to commit to any attack they made. Meanwhile UN attacks opened them up to the Chinese forte of ambush and hit-and-run attacks with significant danger to supply lines and possible counter-attack on the weakened defensive lines. (Your attack troops have to come from somewhere after all)

In general Patton couldn’t have done much better than Ridgeway simply because while he might LIKE to attack aggressively the opportunity at the point given, (replacing MacArthur AFTER China intervenes) doesn’t present itself for any ‘war-winning’ offensive. The means and ability simply isn’t there at that time. He may have knocked off a few more kilometers by increasing casualties but there was no clear path to a win from that point. By the POD given it was already too late to ‘win’ the war short of a full commitment of US forces to Korea which to be CLEAR was NEVER anything more than a ‘side-show’ conflict to anyone on either side! The only forces ‘fully’ committed were North and South Korea and China and even China was holding back. The major players, (US/Allies and the USSR) all were focused on Europe not Asia and it would remain that way till the end of the Cold War.

AMBOMB wrote:


Would love to see something to back this up because;
1) The UN DID in fact overrun North Korea
2) Then got kicked back below the 38th parallel by the Chinese
3) Then fought their way BACK to the 38th parallel but had neither the strategic nor tactical opportunity to advance much farther due to materials and personnel limitations.

A “more aggressive” commander or attitude would not have significantly changed any of this situation so ya, I’d like to see you support this assertion please.

Randy

First of all, Russia wasn't a combatant in the war. There were Russian pilots flying North Korean planes. But, that didn't make it a combatant. China was a backward, impoverished country during the Korean War. Japan was a major combatant in World War II. It was a great power. China had a lot of people. That was it. We may have launched limited offensives. But, we didn't launch any all out offensives. That's what we should've done. If we'd launched an all out offensive, with our air power, we would've overrun North Korea and driven the Chinese back to China. Then, we could've set up a defensive position on the North Korean-Chinese border and bombed and shelled any Chinese forces that came near it until China gave up and sued for peace.

 

[RanulfC]

First of all, there's no way we were going to lose. We had too much air power. Second of all, look what Patton accomplished as commander of the 7th and 3rd armies. Thirdly, the North Koreans and Chinese wouldn't have been able to use his aggression against him because of our air power.

Actually, and keep in mind this isn't MY opinion but the actual positions of those who actually fought this war, air-power while effective would NOT have stopped a breakthrough or route. It didn't the FIRST time around and quite logically it was felt that the enemy would and could 'surge' to suppress UN air-power given we couldn't effectively suppress HIS air power in China. As has been pointed out our direct air-power on the peninsula was VERY vulnerable, along with our logistics tail, and we were well aware of that fact. Naval air-power was limited and anything outside the peninsula would be 'late' if it arrived in time at all

As it was our air-power was constantly having issues suppressing Chinese aggression normally which was a big part of the reason we couldn't get 'more' aggressive.

Yes I'm well aware of Patton's performance and he had several advantages there he would not have in Korea. Which is a point you keep missing, I suspect on purpose. Note that WHEN he was denied logistics or superior support he did NOT in fact do as well as when he had such and keep in mind Korea IS a "side-show" and not the main theater and was treated as such. It would be NO different with Patton in charge. It can't be.

Lastly why would you assume our air-power would prevent the Chinese, (at this point they were in full control of all combat forces in Korea and the North Koreans were regulated to duty IN North Korea because they Chinese didn't trust their abilities) from exploiting Patton's well known aggressive tendencies? The Germans did it several times including delaying his relief of Bastogne by 'dangling' opportunities in front of him he took despite allied air supremacy. He got his (his units actually) nose smashed several times but in the end they couldn't stop him. In the case of Korea he's got nowhere to go and nothing to do it with so he's in effect going to keep smashing his (his units) nose into the wall.

I already have. We dropped 635,000 tons of bombs during the Korean War, almost as many as we dropped in the Pacific Theater of World War II fighting a much more powerful enemy and in less time. That should've been more than enough to defeat North Korea and China. The problem was we didn't take advantage of our air power by being aggressive. The Army parked itself on the 38th parallel and sat there for 2 years.

Eh not you simply dropped a opinion with no supporting evidence, (and most of it's been refuted as to your interpretation) and made the assumption that dropping high explosives somehow means the UN should have 'won' because of that and a suggested commander who in fact would have had the same handicaps and drawbacks to deal with and far less suitability either as an overall commander or battlefield commander. (Korea is not Europe and Patton specifically trained himself and his units to fight in the latter not the former) As has been pointed out the Army did NOT in fact 'park' itself on the 38th parallel and was in fact actively trying to move forward. Our 'air-power' was sufficiently stretched simply suppressing the enemy ground forces and logistics and did not have enough left to support 'more aggressive' operations. Your constant assumption that it did is not supported by the facts or history.

Try and understand this point: The air-power we had was barely sufficient to suppress the enemy. To support an 'more aggressive' campaign would have required almost double those forces committed by ALL UN combatants and those forces would have to be drawn from Europe which would have significantly weakened Allied defenses there. And that is JUST air-power, to force and effective 'aggressive campaign' would have required additional armor and infantry again having to be drawn from Europe with the effect of (again) significantly weakening Allied defenses there. Who was 'in charge' of Korea didn't and wouldn't matter at that point.

Air power couldn't and can't take land away from the enemy, only boots on the ground can do that and only if they are properly supported. No matter what Korea was NOT the primary area of importance and therefore it was a secondary front and given that priory and support. Comparing Korea to the Pacific War is a false comparison as there was no way to isolate and cut off support and supply like we did with Japan. Further China WAS 'as powerful' as Japan in combat power BECAUSE it was fighting the kind of war it had been fighting since the 1930s on its front doorstep against a foe who was not going to commit the same combat power it had against Japan because Korea, (and this is a major point that can't be stressed enough) was NOT the main theater and China not the main enemy.

There is a point where dropping more bombs simply rearranges the rubble and if the enemy hasn't given up yet he's not going to and more bombing won't help. Neither will a 'more aggressive campaign' if the front is already stalemated which it was by the beginning of 1951.

I think the disconnect here is that you are assuming that the US put as much 'effort' into Korea as we did Japan which is far from the truth and that somehow more 'aggressive' action would have somehow made up for that lack of commitment. It wouldn't and it didn't because Korea wasn't the main focus of our efforts.

Yes if for some reason the US HAD committed to total war over Korea we could have and would have pushed the Chinese back and likely 'freed' Korea. Meanwhile Stalin who would have to come to support China would have taken parts of Europe and caused the US to back off just as the Allies feared would happen if they took their eyes on the 'real' prize of Europe. The Commies still 'win' in the end and no one in Europe 'trusts' the US to protect them from Communism. No it wasn't going to happen. Ever.

Randy

 

[sloreck]

Before I hurt myself with more involvement here, IMHO the bottom line is that the Chinese were willing to pay whatever price it took to achieve at least a stalemate more or less along the prewar demarcation line. For them it was primarily dead and wounded soldiers and support personnel (the coolies who carried the supplies), although they lost a fair amount of materiel as well. Because of the nature of the terrain, while the US/UN could have used airpower, artillery, and armor to limited effect and it would have helped BUT deriving the Chinese across the Yalu would have cost a LOT more casualties. It also would have required the US to go at least a long way down the road to a wartime mobilization to get the warm bodies and materiel to do this. If a triumverate of Napoleon, Caesar, and Hannibal was in charge in Korea they simply could not have been significantly successful over and above what happened unless they were given these resources.

Potentially the USA could have provided these resources, their major UN allies most likely could have only stretched a little more as they were far from recovered from WWII. Politically the USA was simply unwilling to do this. Had Truman been a dictator with the powers of Stalin, things might have been different but in a democracy asking the society to make these sacrifices when they don't have a good reason to is simply not happening.

 

[wcv215]

Guys...he literally provided a movie quote as a citation. Isn't continuing to argue kinda like shouting at a brick wall at this point?

 

[RanulfC]

First of all, Russia wasn't a combatant in the war. There were Russian pilots flying North Korean planes. But, that didn't make Russia a combatant. China was a backward, impoverished country during the Korean War. Japan was a major combatant in World War II. It was a great power. China had a lot of people. That was it. We may have launched limited offensives. But, we didn't launch any all out offensives. That's what we should've done. If we'd launched an all out offensive, with our air power, we would've overrun North Korea and driven the Chinese back to China. Then, we could've set up a defensive position on the North Korean-Chinese border and bombed and shelled any Chinese forces that came near it until China gave up and sued for peace.

They were not a direct combatant true but they did directly support the Chinese with supplies and materials. China wasn't 'backward' or really impoverished where it counted during the Korean war. Unlike you the US was quite aware that they came out of the Civil War in much better shape than the Nationalists and were in direct collusion with the USSR at the time. Japan as you will note on any thread that discusses it here was in fact 'trading' on it's supposed "Great Power" status but unable to actually back that up. They couldn't hold what they'd taken and were well aware of it and were losing from 1942 on. China on the other hand DID have a lot of people and could put an overwhelming army into the field that the UN could NOT effectively suppress which was all it needed.

Again we could NOT launch any 'all out offensive' because our resources were not up to doing so. No we could NOT have 'over-run' North Korea and China neither out air-power or ground forces were capable of doing so. Our 'air-power' was in fact only capable of suppressing the Chinese forces not overwhelming them. You seem to be missing the point that the Chinese were in fact very, very good at NOT being spotted and attacked from the air and even concentrated bombardment with artillery and air support often did not marginally effect an enemy position when which was still capable of resistance once the ground forces arrived. (And as often as not despite our 'air superiority' said enemy would often have moved into a position to attack our forces from ambush or even attack the position our forces had left causing our forces to back-track to keep from being cut off)

The Chinese actually had the army they NEEDED in Korea and it fought the UN to a standstill with it. They had honed and practiced exactly the right kind of tactics and organization they needed to fight in that war and they knew it. HAD we not been willing to "settle" (and frankly that's a political and social question not a military one) and continue the war our air-power and technological edge would have eventually begun to tell. (The Chinese were having significant issues by the end of the war but there was no real sign of this on the UN side. But that's not what your suggesting and frankly, again, more aggressive operations required more support than was available and by the end no one was really willing to carry things on. (Ike promised to end Korea and he did)

Randy

 

[AMBOMB]

Actually, and keep in mind this isn't MY opinion but the actual positions of those who actually fought this war, air-power while effective would NOT have stopped a breakthrough or route. It didn't the FIRST time around and quite logically it was felt that the enemy would and could 'surge' to suppress UN air-power given we couldn't effectively suppress HIS air power in China. As has been pointed out our direct air-power on the peninsula was VERY vulnerable, along with our logistics tail, and we were well aware of that fact. Naval air-power was limited and anything outside the peninsula would be 'late' if it arrived in time at all

As it was our air-power was constantly having issues suppressing Chinese aggression normally which was a big part of the reason we couldn't get 'more' aggressive.

Yes I'm well aware of Patton's performance and he had several advantages there he would not have in Korea. Which is a point you keep missing, I suspect on purpose. Note that WHEN he was denied logistics or superior support he did NOT in fact do as well as when he had such and keep in mind Korea IS a "side-show" and not the main theater and was treated as such. It would be NO different with Patton in charge. It can't be.

Lastly why would you assume our air-power would prevent the Chinese, (at this point they were in full control of all combat forces in Korea and the North Koreans were regulated to duty IN North Korea because they Chinese didn't trust their abilities) from exploiting Patton's well known aggressive tendencies? The Germans did it several times including delaying his relief of Bastogne by 'dangling' opportunities in front of him he took despite allied air supremacy. He got his (his units actually) nose smashed several times but in the end they couldn't stop him. In the case of Korea he's got nowhere to go and nothing to do it with so he's in effect going to keep smashing his (his units) nose into the wall.



Eh not you simply dropped a opinion with no supporting evidence, (and most of it's been refuted as to your interpretation) and made the assumption that dropping high explosives somehow means the UN should have 'won' because of that and a suggested commander who in fact would have had the same handicaps and drawbacks to deal with and far less suitability either as an overall commander or battlefield commander. (Korea is not Europe and Patton specifically trained himself and his units to fight in the latter not the former) As has been pointed out the Army did NOT in fact 'park' itself on the 38th parallel and was in fact actively trying to move forward. Our 'air-power' was sufficiently stretched simply suppressing the enemy ground forces and logistics and did not have enough left to support 'more aggressive' operations. Your constant assumption that it did is not supported by the facts or history.

Try and understand this point: The air-power we had was barely sufficient to suppress the enemy. To support an 'more aggressive' campaign would have required almost double those forces committed by ALL UN combatants and those forces would have to be drawn from Europe which would have significantly weakened Allied defenses there. And that is JUST air-power, to force and effective 'aggressive campaign' would have required additional armor and infantry again having to be drawn from Europe with the effect of (again) significantly weakening Allied defenses there. Who was 'in charge' of Korea didn't and wouldn't matter at that point.

Air power couldn't and can't take land away from the enemy, only boots on the ground can do that and only if they are properly supported. No matter what Korea was NOT the primary area of importance and therefore it was a secondary front and given that priory and support. Comparing Korea to the Pacific War is a false comparison as there was no way to isolate and cut off support and supply like we did with Japan. Further China WAS 'as powerful' as Japan in combat power BECAUSE it was fighting the kind of war it had been fighting since the 1930s on its front doorstep against a foe who was not going to commit the same combat power it had against Japan because Korea, (and this is a major point that can't be stressed enough) was NOT the main theater and China not the main enemy.

There is a point where dropping more bombs simply rearranges the rubble and if the enemy hasn't given up yet he's not going to and more bombing won't help. Neither will a 'more aggressive campaign' if the front is already stalemated which it was by the beginning of 1951.

I think the disconnect here is that you are assuming that the US put as much 'effort' into Korea as we did Japan which is far from the truth and that somehow more 'aggressive' action would have somehow made up for that lack of commitment. It wouldn't and it didn't because Korea wasn't the main focus of our efforts.

Yes if for some reason the US HAD committed to total war over Korea we could have and would have pushed the Chinese back and likely 'freed' Korea. Meanwhile Stalin who would have to come to support China would have taken parts of Europe and caused the US to back off just as the Allies feared would happen if they took their eyes on the 'real' prize of Europe. The Commies still 'win' in the end and no one in Europe 'trusts' the US to protect them from Communism. No it wasn't going to happen. Ever.

Randy

You're right. Air power can't take land away from the enemy. That's why you need an aggressive ground strategy to go with it. We didn't have one. If we did, we would've won. Our air power wasn't barely sufficient to suppress the enemy. It was more than sufficient to defeat the enemy if we'd have an aggressive ground strategy. The problem was we didn't. I don't know what reality you're from. But, in this one, China was a backward, impoverished country during the Korean War. Japan was a major combatant of World War II, a great power. And we were only fighting one war during the Korean War, the Korean War. I never said we were putting as much effort into fighting the Korean War as we did into fighting Japan. But, air power is the name of the game in modern war. And, given that it was only slightly less than the the bomb tonnage we dropped in the Pacific Theater of World War II, the bomb tonnage we dropped in the Korean War should've been more than enough to secure victory if we had had an aggressive ground strategy to go with it. And under no circumstances would Russia have entered the war. Russia had very few nukes and no intercontinental range bombers at that time. No way would it have taken us on.

 

[AMBOMB]

You can repeat yourself all you want. Doesn't change the fact that citing the tonnage is meaningless for the reasons being cited. Being bombed is not the end of the world and how one reacts to it can matter quite a lot. Even leaving that issue aside, you have provided absolutely no evidence that the bomb tonnage dropped was "more then enough", given that the large-scale ground war in Korea ws a radically different enterprise then the largely naval-air conflict that the Pacific War was. Indeed, the prevailing evidence is that even at the end of the war, the Chinese were still just as tough as they had been in 1950 which suggests that 635,000 tons was far from enough. You've also failed to explain how, if US air power was adequate enough to allow it to be aggressive, it failed to prevent the devastating reverse in the winter of 1950, when the US was aggressive and the Chinese smashed them for it, inflicting one of the most devastating defeats upon the US Army in it's history and throwing it into it's longest ever retreat. Many people here have pointed it out to you and you haven't been able to muster even the slimmest reply, probably because you have no answer for it, don't actually know anything about the conflict in question, and are engaging in a lot of bluster to hide your ignorance.

OK, let's forget about the Pacific Theater and look at the European Theater. I should've mentioned this in the first place. But, I didn't think about it thoroughly. The Western Allies dropped less than 850,000 tons of bombs tactically (not counting strategic bombing) in the European Theater. B-29's dropped 160,000 tons of bombs in the Korean War out of a total of 635,000. So, that presumably means we dropped 475,000 tons of bombs tactically in the Korean War. So, we dropped more than half as many tons of bombs tactically in the Korean War as the Western Allies dropped in the European Theater of World War II. The Chinese caught us by surprise in the winter of 1950. We weren't prepared for their offensive. They pushed us back for a while. Then we pushed them back. But, instead of continuing to push all the way across North Korea, we stopped.

 

[AMBOMB]

They were not a direct combatant true but they did directly support the Chinese with supplies and materials. China wasn't 'backward' or really impoverished where it counted during the Korean war. Unlike you the US was quite aware that they came out of the Civil War in much better shape than the Nationalists and were in direct collusion with the USSR at the time. Japan as you will note on any thread that discusses it here was in fact 'trading' on it's supposed "Great Power" status but unable to actually back that up. They couldn't hold what they'd taken and were well aware of it and were losing from 1942 on. China on the other hand DID have a lot of people and could put an overwhelming army into the field that the UN could NOT effectively suppress which was all it needed.

Again we could NOT launch any 'all out offensive' because our resources were not up to doing so. No we could NOT have 'over-run' North Korea and China neither out air-power or ground forces were capable of doing so. Our 'air-power' was in fact only capable of suppressing the Chinese forces not overwhelming them. You seem to be missing the point that the Chinese were in fact very, very good at NOT being spotted and attacked from the air and even concentrated bombardment with artillery and air support often did not marginally effect an enemy position when which was still capable of resistance once the ground forces arrived. (And as often as not despite our 'air superiority' said enemy would often have moved into a position to attack our forces from ambush or even attack the position our forces had left causing our forces to back-track to keep from being cut off)

The Chinese actually had the army they NEEDED in Korea and it fought the UN to a standstill with it. They had honed and practiced exactly the right kind of tactics and organization they needed to fight in that war and they knew it. HAD we not been willing to "settle" (and frankly that's a political and social question not a military one) and continue the war our air-power and technological edge would have eventually begun to tell. (The Chinese were having significant issues by the end of the war but there was no real sign of this on the UN side. But that's not what your suggesting and frankly, again, more aggressive operations required more support than was available and by the end no one was really willing to carry things on. (Ike promised to end Korea and he did)

Randy

Japan had 2,520 front line combat aircraft in January, 1942. Germany had 2,561 in December, 1941. In December, 1941, Japan had 10 carriers (2 more than we did), 10 battleships, 36 cruisers (as many as we did), 113 destroyers and 63 submarines. It had 7,200,000 people in its armed forces at the end of the war, more than Britain (4,683,000).
If the Chinese were so good at avoiding being spotted and attacked from the air, how did they take 600,000 casualties? Besides, air power doesn't have to inflict casualties to be effective. It restricts the movement of enemy forces and forces the enemy to hunker down while your forces advance. Bombing can also have a psychological impact on enemy soldiers.

 

[CalBear]

One of the other lesser known reasons why he was fired : MacArthur implicitly rejected White American contemporary notions of racial superiority - he always treated Filipino and Japanese leaders with respect as equals. He also knew the capabilities of his Southern Korean soldiers.

You mean he was fired for being open to having non-white troops under his command by the President who, despite opposition from all sides ORDERED the desegregation of the U.S. military?

Okay.

 

[cpip]

How many times do I have to repeat myself? 635,000 tons almost is as many as we dropped in the Pacific Theater of World War II fighting a much more powerful enemy and in less time. That should've been more than enough to defeat North Korea and China. The problem was we didn't take advantage of our air power by being aggressive. The Army parked itself on the 38th parallel and sat there for 2 years.

How much of that 635,000 tons targeted POL for mechanized forces or fuel depots for aircraft?
How much of it struck the factories manufacturing arms, equipment, and clothing?
How much of it disrupted railways moving supplies?
How much of it landed on the farms which fed combatant personnel?
How much of it was used in close air support?
How much of what was dropped failed to strike the targets, and how does it compare to the CEPs and BDAs in the Pacific Theater?

 

[Fenrir_Angerboda]

How many times do I have to repeat myself? 635,000 tons almost is as many as we dropped in the Pacific Theater of World War II fighting a much more powerful enemy and in less time. That should've been more than enough to defeat North Korea and China. The problem was we didn't take advantage of our air power by being aggressive. The Army parked itself on the 38th parallel and sat there for 2 years.

Repeating the same point over and over after it’s been debunked and countered isn’t going to convince anyone that it’s true.

 

[longsword14]

@AMBOMB
You have the belief that everything in American history was WWII. The Korean intervention was not WWII Pacific, nor did the US public think of it that way.

 

[AMBOMB]

It's worth noting that another aspect of the AMBOMB's fixation on the 635,000 ton figure is how it displays his ignorance as to the nature of the war in Korea. The Chinese and North Koreans were not island garrison of a couple of divisions whom the USN had already isolated from all outside contact. It's a large-scale ground war involving whole armies and army groups. The requirements are on a completely different scale and just because you meet those requirements don't suddenly mean you win (as the Vietnam example shows) because the enemy gets a vote too.



He actually dismissed it on the grounds that Vietnam was a "guerrilla war". Which further displays his ignorance about Cold War conflicts: guerrilla warfare was a essential aspect of the Vietcong and PVA's strategy, but it was conducted alongside a massed conventional campaign using regular armies... all of which managed to fight on for years in the face of American air power.

OK, let's forget about the Pacific Theater and look at the European Theater. I should've mentioned this in the first place. But, I didn't think about it thoroughly. The Western Allies dropped less than 850,000 tons of bombs tactically (not counting strategic bombing) in the European Theater. B-29's dropped 160,000 tons of bombs in the Korean War out of a total of 635,000. So, that presumably means we dropped 475,000 tons of bombs tactically in the Korean War. So, we dropped more than half as many tons of bombs tactically in the Korean War as the Western Allies dropped in the European Theater of World War II.

 

[CalBear]

Back in '35 one of the big Hawaiian volcanoes erupted, and was threatening a nearby city. A geologist proposed dropping bombs on the volcano to open up more channels for the lava to go through. This...failed. Miserably. For reasons that should be obvious (most of the bombs missed, the volcanoes was too thick for the bombs to penetrate, at least one bomb failed to explode, and they were all too weak.)

The army was going to dynamite the place instead, but the lava stopped on its own.

Pele laughed at the weak outsiders.

 

[CalBear]

No, it wasn't. The Allies took Sicily. Besides, they didn't follow Patton's plan. Don't you remember the movie? "If they'd followed my plan I'd be there by now! (Messina) I'd cut off the retreat of every goddamn German and Italian on this island!"

You are, I'm sure, aware that the movie Patton, as entertaining as it is (and it was damned entertaining) was about as historically accurate as Michael Bay's Pearl Harbor.

 

[Icarus II]

Back in '35 one of the big Hawaiian volcanoes erupted, and was threatening a nearby city. A geologist proposed dropping bombs on the volcano to open up more channels for the lava to go through. This...failed. Miserably. For reasons that should be obvious (most of the bombs missed, the volcanoes was too thick for the bombs to penetrate, at least one bomb failed to explode, and they were all too weak.)

The army was going to dynamite the place instead, but the lava stopped on its own.

They should've tried dropping MacArthur in the volcano

 

[ObssesedNuker]

OK, let's forget about the Pacific Theater and look at the European Theater. I should've mentioned this in the first place. But, I didn't think about it thoroughly. The Western Allies dropped less than 850,000 tons of bombs tactically (not counting strategic bombing) in the European Theater. B-29's dropped 160,000 tons of bombs in the Korean War out of a total of 635,000. So, that presumably means we dropped 475,000 tons of bombs tactically in the Korean War. So, we dropped more than half as many tons of bombs tactically in the Korean War as the Western Allies dropped in the European Theater of World War II.

And in the end it still was the ground forces who had to do the job of breaking the German army and defeating the Germans, taking years of vicious fighting and around a million WAllied dead (to say nothing of the 8.7 million Soviet KIA who did the overwhelming bulk of the fighting, dying, and killing) to win.

If the Chinese were so good at avoiding being spotted and attacked from the air, how did they take 600,000 casualties?

Probably by launching close-in infantry assaults against a enemy ground force with copious quantities of artillery and automatic weapons, which is always going to be a bloody and vicious affair. Anglo-American airpower was a pinprick by comparison.​