Kursk comes to mind; the Nazis had already entered the process of losing the war once Citadel rolled around.
Clicked this thread to post "Kursk" and saw you beat me to it. Great minds think alike!
Kursk comes to mind; the Nazis had already entered the process of losing the war once Citadel rolled around.
Clicked this thread to post "Kursk" and saw you beat me to it. Great minds think alike!
Quebec (1775) is somewhat overplayed by Canadians. Even had Arnold taken Quebec he would shortly thereafter have been a prisoner of war when Burgoyne's forces showed up and besieged him, which probably would have had some disastrous long term consequences for the Patriots.
Which Alamein - the Axis attack or British counterattack?El Alamein (1942): Even if Rommel had won, he was still massively outnumbered, operating at the end of a very long and tenuous supply line, and operating against an enemy who was only getting stronger. Plus, soon enough, his western flank would have been compromised with the Torch landings.
Which Alamein - the Axis attack or British counterattack?
To take the latter, let's say the Eighth Army's attack does grind to a halt in the minefields, taking heavy casualties. Vichy French resistance to the Torch landings may well be stronger, since they know Montgomery poses no imminent threat to Tunisia (assuming he doesn't get sacked by a vexed PM),
The strategic factors had at least some influence on their commitment though. With hindsight we can say "Of course the Allies will win the war," but it's not so clear cut in 1942. In the aftermath of a serious Allied defeat at Alamein, French confidence in Allied victory isn't going to be so strong, and that has a knock-on effect on their attitude to an Allied invasion.I'm not sure strategic factors really mattered. A lot of troops were not committed to fighting the Aliies.
The Mississippi River was only psychologically important, not commercially.
I guess it didn't benefit the Union as much as it hurt the Csa.Really? Didn't the northern control of the Mississippi more or less cut the CSA in two parts?
For the North, the Mississippi no longer held the preeminent place in national commerce it once possessed. The Cincinnati Daily Commercial noted that four major railroads and the Erie Canal linked the Northwest with the Northeast and could supplant the Mississippi while forging an even tighter national unity between two sections that shared more in common than either shared with the South. However, a certain mystic character had developed about the Mississippi. People still believed it to be important. But even after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, there were still reports of transports that got badly shot up by Rebels all the way from Cairo, Illinois to New Orleans, Louisiana.Really? Didn't the northern control of the Mississippi more or less cut the CSA in two parts?
In terms of weapons, most weapons entering Texas from Mexico remained in Texas while Richmond was still able to send 30,000 arms to the Trans-Mississippi in early 1864 (for a comparison, Richmond sent 34,000 muskets to the Trans-Mississippi between September 1862-March 1863.
For the North, the Mississippi no longer held the preeminent place in national commerce it once possessed.
Albert Castel's article unfortunately does not elaborate as to how it was done.How did these weapons enter Texas in 1864?
Maybe. It is important to remember that there was a great attachment to the Mississippi for the people of the Northwest. However, the river as a route of commerce became less relevant due to railroads. It is plausible that a defeated Union sees the people of the Northwest become less attached to the river. The South had a lot of reasons to permit free trade between the Northwest and the South.So the argument that the North would want to reconquer the CSA after a southern victory in the Civil War because of New Orleans and the Mississippi is flawed?
I'd say Zama. Even if Hannibal won another Cannae, Carthage had no realistic chance of even forcing a white peace, let alone making a comeback.
I doubt it. Refusing to hand back New Orleans would have inevitably led to another war with the US, something Britain clearly didn't want. And if the UK was so set on stopping Louisiana going to the US, they'd have insisted on it at the peace negotiations and kept fighting till they got it.