Overestimated battles

[alexmilman]

I think it's the other way around; Borodino often gets framed as a quasi-victory for the Russians, or a deliberate defensive stand that did what it was expected to do, when the Russians planned on winning the battle and beginning the counteroffensive.

Well, this is indeed a popular spin but it is also a BS: Russian army was forced to retreat and suffered losses which made immediate 2nd battle impossible. Of course, this was a deliberate defensive battle but from the getgo it did not went as was planned by Kutuzov: Napoleon was not trying to bypass Russian right flank which made strong defenses there useless and Russians lost Shevardino redoubt on their left flank before the main battle started (thus losing the high ground position which made their left flank and center vulnerable to the French heavy caliber artillery). As a result, in a defensive battle in fortified position The defenders suffered greater losses than the attackers and run out of the reserves. Of course, due to the fact that Napoleon suffered huge losses and was not able to destroy enemy completely, this was a Pihhric victory but still a victory.

Needless to say that the French had been presenting it as unquestionable Napoleon’s victory.

Stories about the Russian victory started with Kutuzov’s report written when his army was in a retreat and then were picked by the Russian and then Soviet propaganda and Kutuzov ended up as a Russian military genius second only to Suvorov, blahblahblah. At least some of the post-Soviet military historians are openly rejecting the quasi-victory theory in a favor of more realistic assessment.

However, strategically, this battle was absolutely useless to Napoleon because he had too few troops too far inside Russia to be truly intimidating.

 

[Arcavia]

Kursk comes to mind; the Nazis had already entered the process of losing the war once Citadel rolled around.

 

[KaiserWilhelm]

The second Marne. By spring 1918, winning at the Marne wouldn’t have been enough for the Germans to win the war. They’d have to move a lot faster than they had been previously to get to Paris in time to win the war before the revamped American Army got there. Of course, if they do win at Second Marne, the US probably plays a much larger role than they did in OTL.

 

[KaiserWilhelm]

The second Marne. By spring 1918, winning at the Marne wouldn’t have been enough for the Germans to win the war. They’d have to move a lot faster than they had been previously to get to Paris in time to win the war before the revamped American Army got there. Of course, if they do win at Second Marne, the US probably plays a much larger role than they did in OTL.

Further, if they do get to Paris, there’s no guarantee the French govt surrenders, especially given how far overstretched the German supply lines would be and the massive aid the US would be providing

 

[Fabius Maximus]

New Orleans, given that peace had already been signed and the battle was only fought because news of this hadn't reached Louisiana yet.

 

[John7755 يوحنا]

New Orleans, given that peace had already been signed and the battle was only fought because news of this hadn't reached Louisiana yet.

From what I understand of the situation, was that it was estimated form the British that Louisiana was not fully part of the US at this point and was thus still open for war and its affiliation to France still in question, could be perceived as a remnant possession of France and being hidden within the US. Thus, if Britain did take it, it could be levied, that the British only made peace with the states, not with areas it had taken possession of through a deal with France. Britain cannot allow France to do what it did in 1765, where it gave Louisiana to Spain again, except this time to the US.

 

[Byzantine fanatic]

Kursk comes to mind; the Nazis had already entered the process of losing the war once Citadel rolled around.

It's an interesting one. Had the battle gone in reverse, Hitler's plan was to negotiate a ceasefire from position of strength. Whether the USSR would accept, I don't know. Stalin was angry at the West for not opening a second front, so who knows. The battle destroys Germany's last real ability to shape the war.

If assuming best case for Germany they win and USSR exits the war, D Day seems less feasible or at the very least a lot more costly and much slower. Worst case the invasion fails and the war ends with the Nazis still in power.

What a nightmare.

 

[TyranicusMaximus]

The true significance of the battle of New Orleans is of course not its effect on the War of 1812, but rather it cementing Andrew Jackson's prominence. In that regard it was rather pivotal.

 

[dandan_noodles]

Well, this is indeed a popular spin but it is also a BS: Russian army was forced to retreat and suffered losses which made immediate 2nd battle impossible. Of course, this was a deliberate defensive battle but from the getgo it did not went as was planned by Kutuzov: Napoleon was not trying to bypass Russian right flank which made strong defenses there useless and Russians lost Shevardino redoubt on their left flank before the main battle started (thus losing the high ground position which made their left flank and center vulnerable to the French heavy caliber artillery). As a result, in a defensive battle in fortified position The defenders suffered greater losses than the attackers and run out of the reserves. Of course, due to the fact that Napoleon suffered huge losses and was not able to destroy enemy completely, this was a Pihhric victory but still a victory.

Needless to say that the French had been presenting it as unquestionable Napoleon’s victory.

Stories about the Russian victory started with Kutuzov’s report written when his army was in a retreat and then were picked by the Russian and then Soviet propaganda and Kutuzov ended up as a Russian military genius second only to Suvorov, blahblahblah. At least some of the post-Soviet military historians are openly rejecting the quasi-victory theory in a favor of more realistic assessment.

However, strategically, this battle was absolutely useless to Napoleon because he had too few troops too far inside Russia to be truly intimidating.

Right, I agree that it's an overrated battle; I was just pointing to the way the Russian overrate it, whereas you at first focused on the French.

Both sides failed their objectives at Borodino. The French wanted to crush the Russian army, while the Russians wanted to repulse the French and chase them out of Russia. No one was happy with the result; the Russians had to abandon their capital and watch it burn to cinders, while the Russian army once more slipped through Napoleon's fingers.

 

[dandan_noodles]

The second Marne. By spring 1918, winning at the Marne wouldn’t have been enough for the Germans to win the war. They’d have to move a lot faster than they had been previously to get to Paris in time to win the war before the revamped American Army got there. Of course, if they do win at Second Marne, the US probably plays a much larger role than they did in OTL.

2nd Marne probably didn't keep Paris from falling, but the way it shook out was definitely crucial to the eventual shape of the war. Something like 20 German divisions get taken off the order of battle as a result of the French counterattack; with the aftershock at Amiens, the Germans had to quickly abandon all the ground they'd taken in the spring. If they had some time to consolidate their position, a more step by step withdrawal to the Hindenburg line could see their strongest bastions still intact when the time comes for winter quarters. This would put them in a much better position to negotiate the end of the war.

 

[alexmilman]

Right, I agree that it's an overrated battle; I was just pointing to the way the Russian overrate it, whereas you at first focused on the French.

Both sides failed their objectives at Borodino. The French wanted to crush the Russian army, while the Russians wanted to repulse the French and chase them out of Russia. No one was happy with the result; the Russians had to abandon their capital and watch it burn to cinders, while the Russian army once more slipped through Napoleon's fingers.

I have very serious doubts that anybody in the Russian upper command seriously expected that as an immediate result of Borodino Napoleon would be forced to retreat from Russia. It seems that the battle was a pure politics: everybody was grumbling about the fact that Napoleon was allowed to advance too far without a major battle (which would be most probably catastrophic) so here is a reasonably good position and finally a single commander appointed with an explicit purpose to stop a retreat. The whole arrangements were purely defensive leaving all initiative to Napoleon and nobody can tell for sure what Kutuzov was trying to achieve besides reporting that a battle had been fought and that it did not end up with a complete annihilation of the Russian army. Not that he seemingly had any comprehensive plan for after the battle: even after it was decided to abandon Moscow, its Arsenal was not evacuated and the wounded had been left in the city.

OTOH, speaking of the historic BS, a lot noice had been made about burned Moscow but the big fires had been a routine event in a predominantly wooden city (well, not to such a degree but still), the palaces and other brick/stone buildings survived and the wooden houses had been rebuilt very fast: there was a whole industry supplying prefabricated disassembled wooden houses allowing to have the new ones to be built within a couple days. As I understand, there was even enough accommodations in and around Moscow for the French to spend a winter there and plenty of surviving supplies which could be easily replenished (opinion of the Russian contemporaries) if the French were ready to pay in gold. But, with Alexander not being inclined to make a peace, staying in Moscow simply did not make any sense.

As for the happiness, Barclay could be happy: after the battle animosity was forgotten and the troops cheered him plus he got St. George 2nd class. Probably Ney also was happy: he became Prince of Moskva.

 

[Mort the Reaper]

Most, if not all the battles during the cursades.

Enrico Dandolo wants to know your location.

 

[KaiserWilhelm]

2nd Marne probably didn't keep Paris from falling, but the way it shook out was definitely crucial to the eventual shape of the war. Something like 20 German divisions get taken off the order of battle as a result of the French counterattack; with the aftershock at Amiens, the Germans had to quickly abandon all the ground they'd taken in the spring. If they had some time to consolidate their position, a more step by step withdrawal to the Hindenburg line could see their strongest bastions still intact when the time comes for winter quarters. This would put them in a much better position to negotiate the end of the war.

A more involved US with more casualties under Woodrow Wilson is not going to accept anything short of basically unconditional surrender. The war might last another 4-6 months, but that’s really it

 

[Somebody-Someone]

The Battle of Talas going differently would not cause massive Sinowank or massive Islamwank.

 

[Flavius Iulius Nepos]

The battle of Mantzikert: usually people consider this battle the event that marked the decline of the empire and the loss of Asia. But back in Constantinople the Doukas were already plotting againt the emperor and only the deposition of Romanus IV allowed the Turks to take advantage of the weakened empire. 10 years of civil wars and usurpers, who heavily relied on mercenaries (including Turks) brought the empire to the brink of collapse while gifting the East to mercenaries as payment (mainly Turks but also Normans and to a lesser degree Armenians).

People usually link these events to Mantzikert, when the same events (albeit with some chronological differences) could have taken place even after a Roman victory against the invaders. Of course I’m not saying that this course of events would be certain, as Romanus IV was a rather capable emperor, but all the elements necessary for the collapse of the empire were already there.

 

[Legofan4]

The Battle of Midway. The real decisive battle was the Attack on Pearl Harbor. Once America was at war with Japan there was no way that Japan was going to be able to win. All Midway changed was the timeline.

 

[GauchoBadger]

The battle of Mantzikert: usually people consider this battle the event that marked the decline of the empire and the loss of Asia. But back in Constantinople the Doukas were already plotting againt the emperor and only the deposition of Romanus IV allowed the Turks to take advantage of the weakened empire. 10 years of civil wars and usurpers, who heavily relied on mercenaries (including Turks) brought the empire to the brink of collapse while gifting the East to mercenaries as payment (mainly Turks but also Normans and to a lesser degree Armenians).

People usually link these events to Mantzikert, when the same events (albeit with some chronological differences) could have taken place even after a Roman victory against the invaders. Of course I’m not saying that this course of events would be certain, as Romanus IV was a rather capable emperor, but all the elements necessary for the collapse of the empire were already there.

Neither was the empire doomed after Manzikert: it rebounded after the Komnenian Restoration, and even occasionally went on the offensive in northern Syria during the Crusades. It was the Fourth Crusade that quelled the empire's offensive capabilities for the remainder of its history.

 

[Arcavia]

It's an interesting one. Had the battle gone in reverse, Hitler's plan was to negotiate a ceasefire from position of strength. Whether the USSR would accept, I don't know. Stalin was angry at the West for not opening a second front, so who knows. The battle destroys Germany's last real ability to shape the war.

If assuming best case for Germany they win and USSR exits the war, D Day seems less feasible or at the very least a lot more costly and much slower. Worst case the invasion fails and the war ends with the Nazis still in power.

What a nightmare.

The formulation I have usually seen (I forget where though) is that Moscow determined the Nazis would not win the war, Stalingrad that they would lose it, and Kursk how quickly they would lose it.

 

[Fabius Maximus]

From what I understand of the situation, was that it was estimated form the British that Louisiana was not fully part of the US at this point and was thus still open for war and its affiliation to France still in question, could be perceived as a remnant possession of France and being hidden within the US. Thus, if Britain did take it, it could be levied, that the British only made peace with the states, not with areas it had taken possession of through a deal with France. Britain cannot allow France to do what it did in 1765, where it gave Louisiana to Spain again, except this time to the US.

I doubt it. Refusing to hand back New Orleans would have inevitably led to another war with the US, something Britain clearly didn't want. And if the UK was so set on stopping Louisiana going to the US, they'd have insisted on it at the peace negotiations and kept fighting till they got it.

 

[RyuDrago]

Talas, 751 AD. Tang China could not project power in Central Asia any further, as they had to rely on nomadic proxies. I'd say that the Abbasid drive for expansion into the area, alongside the Tang dynasty's sudden almost-collapse when faced with the jiedushi rebellion of An Lushan, were much more decisive factors for explaining the slowdown of Chinese territorial expansion.

Well, on the other side, it didn't grant the Muslim juggernaut access into China.

Anyway, I would suggest the battle of Catalaunian Fields. Just a last hurray for a dying empire and besides didn't advantage any fighting side - if else opening the path for the Franks some years later.