So your post here seems to revolve around the idea that the Ottoman Empire was generally worse off on the battlefield during the great turkish war relative to it's Hapsburg rivals. [/QUOTE]
Their rivals, even on the "Hapsburg front" were not just the Hapsburgs but a coalition of the imperial forces. This being said, they were generally worse off
on a battlefield against the PLC as well but not because their army, even after Sobiesky reforms was too advanced but because by that time the Poles developed tactics (and army composition) that was effective explicitly against the Ottomans (but already not necessarily so against the "western" armies with their greater reliance upon the firepower).
I think we agree here in principle, although I'd argue the degree to which you're suggesting this is true is in my opinion slightly exaggerated.
First of all, I did not give any precise estimate of the "degree of a backwardness" (and not sure that this is practically possible) so it is rather pointless to talk about the "slight" exaggerations.
But let's see, at Mohacs the Ottomans had been severely defeated by approximately half of their numbers: even if we assume that the initial forces were more or less equal, only the half (at best) of the imperial forces (left flank commanded by Elector of Bavaria) was directly engaged in the battle and ratio of the losses was 1:5. In 1739, at Stavuchani, with 60,000 Russians against 70 - 90,000 Ottomans the losses were approximately 100 (killed and wounded) vs. 1,000. In 1770 at Kagul 40K against 150 - 170K (75K Ottomans, the rest Tatar cavalry) the total losses - 1,000 - 1,500 vs. 20,000. I'm intentionally not bringing up Zenta because the Ottomans had been caught by surprise in their fortified camp or Belgrade where Eugene had approximately 3:1 advantage in the numbers.
You seem to suggest that the Ottomans had 'fallen behind' in some areas. I on the other hand am saying that generally speaking, modern historical research suggests that during this period, technologically and tactically both empires were on the same level.
I happen to disagree unless we have to assume that somehow by the 1730s the Ottomans, by whatever weird reason, lost their alleged tactical skills and forgot how to use the artillery.
It's just that during this specific period the Hapsburgs had more battlefield experience in comparison. They were more used to fighting larger scale battles in central europe.
Funny as it may sound (and no offense intended), this sounds exactly as an argument which Friedrich Engels used to predict Austrian victory in the coming Austrian-Prussian War.
Habsburg leadership probably knew how to conduct itself in battle better than that of the Ottomans, and this is part of the explanation for why the Ottomans lost most of the major field battles they fought during the war.
Of course, you need the generals adequate for the task but you also need the troops capable to accomplish the task. An assumption that the Ottomans were too dumb to learn from their mistakes seems much less plausible than an assumption that their troops were lagging behind in certain areas.
Furthermore, you're using Russian sources about how Janissaries fought in the Russo Turkish wars of 1768 and/or 1789. However the period we are discussing is the war of the holy league between 1683 and 1699. The reasons for the Ottoman defeat in the later two wars are completely different to the period we are discussing. Let alone the fact that the Ottoman military was in a completely different situation. We could go into more detail about the war of 1768 and try to explain why the Janissaries fought the way they did there, but it would go on a tangent and isn't really relevant to the topic.
I'm talking about the available
pattern, which allows to make certain conclusions. Even with the some allowances for a deterioration of the Janissary over the few decades following the Great Ottoman War, there are no traces of the western-style battlefield tactics starting from the Prut campaign (1710 - 11).
Wait, so volley formations are pathetic unless they are behind fortifications?
No, what I said is that firing by the volleys in itself is not indication of anything and was used even by the troops who were well below the "western" level on a battlefield and that these low quality troops tended to use fortified positions. In other words, that your argument is pretty much meaningless as indicator of being "advanced".
Not entirely, or at least not in the way you're thinking of it. The Ottomans did indeed rely on their Crimean clients for a significant source of their light cavalry, reconnaissance and harassment.
Yes, and they guaranteed the Ottoman victory at Vienna in 1683, at Stavuchani in 1739, at Kagul in 1770, etc.
Let's face it, by that time the Tatars were practically useless on a battlefield and as the allies were at least as a great danger to the population of Ottoman Empire as to the population of its enemies.
The fact that the their Crimean clients were pre-occupied with fighting the Russians during the campaigns of 1687 and 1689, as well as the later Azov campaigns diverted a significant amount of their attention and also deprived them of this usual source of light cavalry.
Wow! Even the Russian/Soviet historians of a "patriotic persuasion" managed to come with such a spin! If what you wrote is taken with any degree of a seriousness, then Vasili Golitsin has to be credited with the allied victory at Mohacs , the following disintegration of the Ottoman army. reconquest of Hungary in 1687 and the same goes for the victory at Nis (1689). Perhaps you can also attribute victory at Zenta to Peter's Azov campaign (something along the lines of 4,000 more thousand troops being available to the Sultan would make a critical difference)?
Really? I thought having to distribute one's forces across multiple fronts (Morea, Dalmatia, against the Commonwealth, Hapsburgs and Russians), meant that even if the ottomans did win some tactical victories, capitalising on these would be far more difficult due to an inability to sufficiently concentrate enough forces on one specific front, resulting in what is known as being 'defeated in detail.' Not to mention the lack of reconnaissance which is necessary for good manoeuvring as a result of the lack of Crimean cavalry.
Campaign of 1683 saw great concentration of the resources on a single front and ended up with a terrible fiasco. In general,
not concentrating forces in one place was much more typical for that period (and most of the XVIII century) than concentrating and it goes for everybody involved. Having the forces concentrated was creating serious logistical problems, especially for the Ottomans with their greater emphasis on a proper supply of their armies. Capitalizing on the victories (on both sides) also was a relatively rare event: Napoleonic times with a war being won by a major battle were more than a century away and really decisive battles were quite rare so paying attention to the small gains here and there was quite common.
As far as the Crimean cavalry is involved, you are way off. To start with, the Ottomans usually had enough of the irregulars to do reconnaissance and then, the Tatars had been a mixed blessing, as was demonstrated by the Vienna campaign: their services could not be taken for granted and their presence was not leading to the "good manoeuvring" (see the wars of the XVIII century).
However the main contributor in my opinion to the inferior battlefield performance is as stated, the greater level of experience and leadership in large scale battles of the Hapsburgs at this point in time.
The war lasted for 16 years, quite enough time to get battlefield experience if you are up to the task. During the GNW it took the Russians 9 years to bring themselves up to the needed level.
