Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)

[ChaosNDiscord]

Ok, where are the Germans getting all these paratroopers. Scraping together the Fallschrimjager units you might be able to get a single regiment ready for an immediate drop. 30,000 is as usual, you just talking out of your ass. Are the Germans dropping untrained infantry given a parachute and then thrown out of a plane? That's a damn good way to break a LOT of ankles.

Dont forget, he believes Paras are just infantry who are handed parachutes, given a slap on the back and told good luck. Besides these are teutonic paratroopers, they need no training in proper landing or disengaging the chute, or getting bearings after a scattered landing, or well, any of that. These aren't pansy American or British airborne troops who couldn't even do their job easily after months of training in '44. These are hastily assembled German infantry, much better for the job!

 

[Astrodragon]

The RN can certainly do pattern bombardments of targets using air spotting - so could the IJN in all those threads where posters hotly argue at how useless the IJN was at fire support. But in 1940, not so much of the precision fire tank plinking that posters were posting pictures of, and, AFAIK, coordination between the RN and British army on shore fire support teams was lacking. For example, can anyone cite a single instance of any army unit on Isle of Wight did a fire direction exercise with RN warships in the summer of 1940? Was the RN even tasked with such a mission as fire support in 1940?

Why on earth would the RN be doing fire direction exercises on the Isle of Wight????

The RN fire direction in 1940 didn't assume any Army help, because they had their own spotters, both on ship and on aircraft. You only need to have a pongo involved if you need to hit dead ground and you don't have the aircraft which were, oddly, there to do just that direction.

And why do they need to hit a tank when the Germans don't HAVE any tanks on the IoW...????

 

[Glenn239]

Ok, where are the Germans getting all these paratroopers. Scraping together the Fallschrimjager units you might be able to get a single regiment ready for an immediate drop. 30,000 is as usual, you just talking out of your ass. Are the Germans dropping untrained infantry given a parachute and then thrown out of a plane? That's a damn good way to break a LOT of ankles.

And one regiment of paratroops against IOW is not you talking out of your ass?

With 110 infantry divisions in France and a month to prepare, my guess was that FJ manpower requirements could be met.

The key bottleneck is transport aircraft. Something around 300 JU-52's were probably available mid-July 1940. That's sufficient to lift about 5,000 men in one wave. Now, add maybe 200 or 300 HE-111's pressed into transport service becaue 300 JU-52's isn't enough. Now the wave is about 8,000 or 10,000. Now, add in a seaborne element using fast transport. Now the first wave is over 15,000. Now, the second wave. Then the third, etc. That's how we get to 30,000 men. Versus maybe 4,000 defenders of poor quality spread out over the entire island.

 

[alfredtuomi]

would be interesting to watch all those seaworthy river barges towed across from france(nearest point is cherbourg at 70 miles away)at 3 knots then try to land(on what beach?) on the south shore of the isle of wight.Hint:check the currents in and around the solent.the parrallel the shoreline and move at up to three knots.

ooops.made a mistake.just checked google maps.cherbourg to the tip of isle of wight is 65 miles so how many minutes will your cap have over the isle of wight?How many millions of mines do you have to protect your convoy of floating targets?And do your tugs towing two barges each have enough fuel for a round trip?probably not .Logisitics really sucks eh.Expecting to cross under the cover of darkness....better get up to at least 12 knots and ya the faster you travel in a boaty thing the higher the fuel consumption goes per mile(and not in a linear way).

 

[Alanith]

And one regiment of paratroops against IOW is not you talking out of your ass?

With 110 infantry divisions in France and a month to prepare, my guess was that FJ manpower requirements could be met.

The key bottleneck is transport aircraft. Something around 300 JU-52's were probably available mid-July 1940. That's sufficient to lift about 5,000 men in one wave. Now, add maybe 200 or 300 HE-111's pressed into transport service becaue 300 JU-52's isn't enough. Now the wave is about 8,000 or 10,000. Now, add in a seaborne element using fast transport. Now the first wave is over 15,000. Now, the second wave. Then the third, etc. That's how we get to 30,000 men. Versus maybe 4,000 defenders of poor quality spread out over the entire island.

110 divisions yes. How many are jump qualified, and can be jump qualified in time for a hurried seat of the pant operation launched as soon as France Falls?

 

[Paradox-less]

per Wiki

Hull was the most severely damaged British city or town during the Second World War, with 95 percent of houses damaged.[1]It was under air raid alert for 1,000 hours.[2] Hull was the target of the first daylight raid of the war and the last piloted air raid on Britain.[1]

Of a population of approximately 320,000 at the beginning of the war, approximately 152,000 were made homeless as a result of bomb destruction or damage.[3] Overall almost 1,200 people were killed and 3,000 injured by air raids.[4]

Well, by total destruction, then yes. The chart I was seeing was of bomb tonnage dropped in major attacks. Southampton comes after Portsmouth and then Hull. So...that.

 

[Garrison]

For me Sealion is this conversation,

A: Barbarossa was stupid. They should have tried Sealion.
B: Sealion probably fails.
A: Still, worth the risk.
B: Maybe. Who knows.

For you, Sealion is this conversation,

A: Barbarossa was stupid. They should have tried Sealion.
B: HOW DARE YOU???!@?!?!
A: The risk wa....
B: ALERT!! EVERYONE! ALERT! THERE IS SOMEONE ON THE INTERNET THAT THINKS SEALION SHOULD HAVE BEEN TRIED! THIS MUST NOT BE! SEANAYERS, ASSEMBLE!

Look if that little fantasy makes you feel better about your every claim being refuted by those better versed in the history of WWII than yourself feel free, but I doubt one other person reading this thread, or any of your other dead sealion flogging exercises, will buy in to it. You have miserably failed to make a case for your claims about Sealion and Barbarossa and you seem to think, based on the above, that it is unfair that in a thread dedicated to questions about the feasibility of Sealion that other people point that fact out. I also note that rather than addressing any of the posts dealing with your lack of knowledge about the geography of the IOW you chose this one to reply to.

 

[Glenn239]

Dealing with your points in reverse order, any airfield that is built on the Isle of Wight will be discovered by the British, and it's location triangulated. That location will then be subject to at minimum naval artillery fire. When this airfield is undergoing repair, it will need to be supported from airfields in France. Generally, as of July 1940, the usable airfields in France are not near to England. The English airfields in England, on the other hand, are near to the Isle of Wight.

It's the tempo of airborne operations that is the problem. An airborne assault is a massive infusion in the timeframe of days. What you are talking about would require weeks to prepare, by which time there could be 60,000 German troops on IOW and there are so many airfields that the British army could expend its entire artillery shell reserve and still not effectively interdict.

RN warships can certainly provide very heavy artillery support in any attempt to recapture the island. A single I-class British destroyer has four 120mm guns, roughly equivalent to the artillery regiment of an infantry division. Note that, should we envision extended artillery duels with them, we will need to run the gauntlet across the Channel to resupply our forces on the Isle of Wight with artillery ammunition, while they will need to sail for resupply to one of a number of nearby British held ports on the mainland.

There are no examples in WW2 of naval gunfire dislodging this scale of shore position. RN gunfire would cause, (and take) attrition. It would not prove decisive.

A nearby British reserve of super-heavy 340mm artillery is floating in Portsmouth. If needed, it could be supplemented by a number of other old British battleships. RN use of an old battleship in a fjord in the Norwegian campaign seems to indicate they regard these vessels as fundamentally expendable. If the Luftwaffe is forced to make a major effort against these vessels while they are under the AA cover of a major naval base, then other important targets - such as RAF airfields and British aircraft factories - will remain un-attacked. In any case, the British will be able to move artillery by rail to Portsmouth, from where it can be emplaced in range of any force we place on the Isle of Wight, and withdraw the same artillery by rail. This will take perhaps two weeks, as - unlike during the last war - the British do not need to build new railway lines to support their artillery at the front.

Super heavy artillery was effective against fortified positions, but not dispersed ones. Artillery stripped from reserves to perform a bombardment mission are not available to defend against an invasion elsewhere.

An isolated FJ garrison on the Isle of Wight will not be able to meaningfully neutralise any of the British ports on the south or south-west coasts of England because they cannot meaningfully attack those ports - and indeed the economically critical ports are London and Liverpool, while the militarily critical ports are Scapa Flow and Rosyth. Drawing the RAF into an attritional battle can be done without this landing, merely by attacking their airfields and aircraft factories.

You just said the British army would strip its artillery reserves to attack IOW.

The proposed landing area is Southern Command, which already has the 1st Armoured and the 3rd Division, which is the best of the British Army after Dunkirk (*).

An armored division can't counterattack across the Solent.

In any case, it is likely that this operation will leave our FJ force stuck on the Isle of Wight. Rather than a Kanalkampf based around us choosing when and where to attack British convoys or surface ships, it will be a Kanalkampf based around the British choosing when and where to attack our supply and reinforcement convoys. It is also notable that the ports on the Isle of Wight are closer to Portsmouth than France, so it is likely they will be bombarded heavily by the RN and we will need to move supplies over beaches.

Wait, did you grant the premise that the Germans could take Isle of Wight?

 

[oldironside]

Wait, did you grant the premise that the Germans could take Isle of Wight?

Probably in the same way that the Light Brigade captured those Russian guns.

 

[hipper]

I think the crew of HMS Foylebank might disagree with you there. Plus a slight error on your part, the attacks on 18th August, the day of heaviest losses in Ju87s were against the airfields at Gosport, Thorney Island, Ford and the radar installation at Poling. Very few German aircraft were brought down by AA fire at this time and even fewer were Ju87s.

the Order by Goering to Avoid the RN, due to accurate AA fire is a matter of Historical Record, 0the losses to Stuka's on the 18th were caused by hurricanes, Portsmouth is at the maximum range of the 109 so german fighter cover was

the loss rate suffered by the Stuka's in the attack on HMS Foyle bank was 8%.

 

[Post]

And one regiment of paratroops against IOW is not you talking out of your ass?

With 110 infantry divisions in France and a month to prepare, my guess was that FJ manpower requirements could be met.

The key bottleneck is transport aircraft. Something around 300 JU-52's were probably available mid-July 1940. That's sufficient to lift about 5,000 men in one wave. Now, add maybe 200 or 300 HE-111's pressed into transport service becaue 300 JU-52's isn't enough. Now the wave is about 8,000 or 10,000. Now, add in a seaborne element using fast transport. Now the first wave is over 15,000. Now, the second wave. Then the third, etc. That's how we get to 30,000 men. Versus maybe 4,000 defenders of poor quality spread out over the entire island.

And the RAF just sits at their airports and do nothing?
Look up the losses of the paratroops in the Netherlands, and then think about the Dutch airforce (which was virtually non-existantm, but a bomber raid by 4 Fokker T-V's caused damage to parked Ju-52s. I'm sure the RAF can do better with their heavy bombers). There's no way the first wave will land without losses, so the there's no way the second wave will be as big as the first one. And the third will be even smaller.

Also note that (the much smaller) Dutch navy shelled the beaches where Ju/52s landed. There's no reason the RAF wouldn't do the same.

All in all the operation failed. Although the Germans initially took the airfields, they were retaken by the Dutch.

The 10th May passed. Although the fighting around The Hague would continue till the capitulation, the outcome of the battle had been decided. The most extensive and surprising airlanding operation, ever seen in the world, had resulted in a catastrophic failure. Up to 200 transport planes lay in the polders around The Hague, either extensively damaged or burnt out. After a short initial success, the enemy had had to relinquish the airfields they captured and were partly destroyed, captured, or confined in a number of places.

http://www.waroverholland.nl/index....the-first-great-airborne-operation-in-history

But of course the Dutch were very well prepared, trained and organized, and had a solid numority.

This result is in fact very remarkable. Especially as the first countermeasures were carried out in an atmosphere of great confusion, with complete German air superiority and in a situation in which countless false rumours greatly hampered the operations. Remarkable too, because the troops, that actually carried out the counterattacks were numerically even or hardly stronger than their opponents who mainly consisted of regulars and volunteers. Among the Dutch, there were many recruits who were firing a rifle for the very first time.

Oh, wait they hadn't.

But after initial succes, it went less well for the Dutch.

The conspicuous [Dutch] successes of the 10th May, did not recur in the same measure in the following days. For this there are different reasons. In the first place the enemy now had had time to consolidate the positions that were left to them and to reorganise the units that were initially mixed up. Furthermore, the areas where the remaining Germans were entrenched were difficult to approach as these were usually areas surrounded by flat open country that afforded them open and free fields of fire. Even for the best troops, an attack without support of armour over such terrain is a hazardous matter and especially against a well-trained and armed enemy, who also had excellent camouflaged uniforms. The Dutch troops did not have these and were thus visible from a long distance. Finally, the soldiers had never been able to train for attacks on a large scale. The army had always lacked the time, space and training.

Luckily, the germans were well supplied by the LW.

Most air-dropped containers of ammunition and supplies fell into Dutch hands. Some small groups of hungry paratroopers, low on ammunition, quickly surrendered.

Oops.

At the end the losses were quite severe. And they failed to get their objectives.

German losses prove tougher to pin down, but for the battle of The Hague Brongers estimates total killed, wounded, missing, and POWs transported to England - paratroopers, airlanding troops, and aircrew - at about 2735. That number includes about 400 killed and around 1745 POWs in England. Aircraft losses were also heavy, with around 180-220 transports written off.

Note the heavy aircraft losses.

You're probably gonna argue that the Germans did a lot better at Crete, which they did. But the situation at Wight would be more comparable to the Hague than to Crete, since the British were on their own turf and had plenty of air- and navalsupport at hand. Which was a lot more problematic at Crete.

 

[Lucarionape]

I don't think the British had a snowball's chance in Hell of holding IOW if this was airborne-seaborne assaulted in July 1940. I doubt you do either.

Okay, I was going to hold my quiet but now you’ve assumed I’ll explain how it makes an ass out of both you and me.
Unlike others on this thread, I don’t/haven’t live/lived next to your proposed invasion points. I have however seen the size of roughly what the barges you’d be using and what they do in their natural environment. I have also seen how hilly something that looks flat is. The barges you are proposing to use (and this is based of the modern/relatively old but not WW2 era old barges I’ve seen) are first of all, they’re to small to carry much more than a company with light supplies, now, this wouldn’t be an issue in a river crossing of a short duration but this is a crossing of the channel under hostile control, because no matter how much you argue against it I know that the Nazis didn’t control enough of the channel to do what you are proposing (these minefields, as already pointed out, would have to stretch all the way to the English coast and would be under constant interdiction and clean up efforts by the Royal Navy/Coastal Command, and I doubt the Nazis has enough mines to keep these fields replenished). This means a barge that I’ve seen covered in tarpaulins in heavy rain would need to cross the channel whilst under enemy fire, continuous or not does not matter, it will come under fire and will have to worry about bailing the water out. This would have to be done by the soldiers, as there wouldn’t be enough sailors to bail the water out. Now imagine that 100% of your ships made it across and to the designated landing zones (and they won’t, as explained many times before). You now have tired men that will need to attack up sand/shingle at the first line of defences in many places (a.k.a. a contested landing) these tired men would be expected to get through what was in many cases bunkers or barricades, after getting across mines beaches whilst under gas attack. And then they would head to advance (at this point supposing they have ammunition, read all of the other issues with logistics such as a requirement for someone else to bring the supplies over from where the KM dumped them). At this point you would have Churchill giving a direct order to commanders to move forwards, if necessary bypassing higher commanders to expedite the commands. I wouldn’t want to be a Nazi in this situation (actually, does anyone know if the invasion force would have gas masks ?).

In response to the Isle of White, you propose that a bombing raid be carried out on Portsmouth before hand, this would be detected in advance and the fleet would be moving to react, the first wave would probably drop on the fleet at anchor, causing damage to some ships yes, but not enough to put any on the bottom for long (they could refloat most ships that would have sunk in port AFAIK), as such most elements would try leave port to escape any follow up attack, and be readily moved towards your Falschrim Jäger air convoy after people realised, heck, those aren’t bombers, even if they react to late to interdict said air convoy they are no close enough to provide accurate naval bombardment, if necessary they would be doing so aimes by spotter planes/naval attaches landed/a radio man from the local garrison’s artillery unit. It would be ad hoc as heck but still be done.

In short, your barges would need bailing, your men a rest and gas masks and your army a new paratrooper arm.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The airbase network in northern France was probably not suitable in the period June 15-July 15 for the type of softening up required to remove the RN from Portsmouth prior to an assault on IOW. Nor could all bombing missions be made against one port target. But, from bases in Belgium and Germany, using radio navigational aids and attacking at night, it would require thousands of bombing sorties concentrated on the naval dockyards and piers for a matter of weeks. To assault IOW by airborne, Portsmouth had to be largely neutralised by LW attacks first. Since the Battle of France was over, the entire OOB of the Luftwaffe twin engine level bombing forces were available for such a mission, less the HE-111's that had to be used for airborne transport.

Exactly - as you say it cannot be done.

 

[Darrenb209]

My guess would be that about the first time an "R" Class battleship drops 400 x 15" HE rounds on Ventor and killed 300 British civilians, that the rest of the British civilians on IOW are leaving for Portsmouth on anything that will float, and the Germans will not stop them. When they got to Portsmouth, they would ask why Churchill ordered such a bombardment? Cabinet crisis?

In terms of civilians burning their own equipment and supplies, that generally wasn't a thing civilians did - you're just inventing arguments to cover for the fact that you didn't think to realise that a rich and well stocked island of 100,000 people was not quite the Kakoda Trail.

Do you really think that the Royal Navy is so incompetent that they'd be bombarding their own towns, when it makes far more sense to bombard the forces and areas outside the towns? Gather them in one place in the towns and you can utilize that to encircle them with ground troops. They know the terrain, they'll have people able to play spotter for them. They shouldn't be firing on the town if there are still civilians in the area in the first place, that's what civilian resistance is for.

Only circumstances that Naval bombardment should be hitting the towns is if the towns only have Germans.

As to the second, maybe you should actually consider the sheer amount of Anti-German propaganda that was floating around for the better part of the last 40 years and the mentality of if we can't have it we won't let the occupiers have it

If they're leaving they won't need it and burning things they can't take and don't need to harm the enemy is a long tradition and not something that there'd be any real hesitation to do.

If they're staying, do you really think that the population will just sit there passively, let the Germans take the supplies and then not do anything about it?

Resistance to occupiers is very much a thing.

You're just completely ignoring the fact that they have no reason to leave the supplies if they aren't going to be there, and if the Germans are seizing the supplies they have no reason not to destroy and/or seize them back.

Seriously, what world do you live in that you think 1930's/40's British people are just going to turn around and be nice to their occupiers?

 

[Kamzil118]

For me Sealion is this conversation,

A: Barbarossa was stupid. They should have tried Sealion.
B: Sealion probably fails.
A: Still, worth the risk.
B: Maybe. Who knows.

For you, Sealion is this conversation,

A: Barbarossa was stupid. They should have tried Sealion.
B: HOW DARE YOU???!@?!?!
A: The risk wa....
B: ALERT!! EVERYONE! ALERT! THERE IS SOMEONE ON THE INTERNET THAT THINKS SEALION SHOULD HAVE BEEN TRIED! THIS MUST NOT BE! SEANAYERS, ASSEMBLE!

It's not our fault that you deny the fact that the possibility of Operation Sealion occurring was not in the realm of possibility. The Germans considered this operation but realized how much their navy was outmatched by the Royal Navy, their air force was not capable of handling an attritional war in the skies, alongside the sheer amount of logistics involved - which the Germans were complete shit at understanding when compared to some of the other major powers they were up against.

The possibility of Operation Barbarossa having success seemed like it was in the realm of reality thanks to the Soviet Union's poor military performance against the Polish and the Finnish troops. To add more, the Soviet Red Army was overhauling its entire military, so that window of opportunity to take out the Soviet Union was ever-present. The chance of success was low, but not as low as the 0% possibility that is Operation Sea Lion. Then there's the fact that the Third Reich can actually solve that inherent strategic problem that plagued them throughout the entire conflict - the lack of oil - which placed limitations on their Panzerwaffe and forced most of the German armed forces to rely on horses for logistics while the Americans had enough trucks for themselves and enough to send to the Soviet Union. Lastly, the Third Reich is using their most experienced forces in the invasion - their ground forces and the Luftwaffe.

Operation Sea Lion doesn't have that same chance of success because the Luftwaffe is going to be doing most of the heavy lifting with the Kriegsmarine trying to survive against the sheer numbers of surface fleets coming to end their careers in the English Channel. The fact that you're suggesting that the German army tries to make gun platforms out of river barges is laughable, as mentioned earlier, naval gunnery is a far different beast because the German army doesn't have the gunnery skill to fire accurate and precise shots when the channel's unruly nature screws up their shots. At the same time, the British had people trained for this with the naval tradition of doing everything they can to stop an invasion force from getting a foothold on Britain. Even if the Germans land, it's not sun, roses, and daisies, because the initial wave doesn't have the luxury of Panzer divisions to help them out and their supply situation is in a critical state because it might be sunk by the navy or shelled by the British ground forces waiting for this day.

Operation Barbarossa had the Germans have complete surprise over their enemies and inflict an atrocious amount of casualties on the Soviet Union with the type of forces that they had the luxury of using.

Operation Sea Lion had the Germans up against an enemy that was doing everything they can to reduce the success of the invasion by any means necessary with the Kriegsmarine up against unfavorable odds, the Luftwaffe carrying so many weights that sink them into the ocean, and the German ground forces are going to be at the mercy of the Royal Navy with little means to retaliate.

In the lens from Hitler and the political spectrum, he wouldn't want to give the Royal Navy a reason to write more thing they did in their achievement book.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

With 110 infantry divisions in France and a month to prepare, my guess was that FJ manpower requirements could be met.

So there’s a month where the British do and realised nothing? Ok. Infantry aren’t paratroops just in case you haven’t grasped this salient fact, they require training. The German parachute was notoriously tricky to steer and detach from, all of which aren’t good for lightly trained troops.

The key bottleneck is transport aircraft. Something around 300 JU-52's were probably available mid-July 1940. That's sufficient to lift about 5,000 men in one wave. Now, add maybe 200 or 300 HE-111's pressed into transport service becaue 300 JU-52's isn't enough. Now the wave is about 8,000 or 10,000. Now, add in a seaborne element using fast transport. Now the first wave is over 15,000. Now, the second wave. Then the third, etc. That's how we get to 30,000 men. Versus maybe 4,000 defenders of poor quality spread out over the entire island.

No, the key bottleneck in this insane plan is the lack of paratroops. That maths is absolute garbage as well by the way, pure guesswork and bearing no relation to reality. That won’t be 30,000 all at once either (it won’t be 30k at all, but that’s not the issue) your ‘timetable’ has several delays in it - and by introducing naval elements, even less chance of delivering the ‘numbers’ you mention.

It's the tempo of airborne operations that is the problem. An airborne assault is a massive infusion in the timeframe of days.

Exactly, timeframe of days for the British to react defend and bring in reinforcements (if required) by the safe “northern route” from Portsmouth.

What you are talking about would require weeks to prepare, by which time there could be 60,000 German troops on IOW and there are so many airfields that the British army could expend its entire artillery shell reserve and still not effectively interdict.

Weeks if you’re lucky and none of the assembly areas are bombed, none of the transports requisitioned for other uses, none of the troops fail training and of course if the German war industry can provide their equipment. Also, how the hell is it 60,000 troops now? Where have the extra 30,000 come from? Are you dropping in hausfraus as well and the paras multiplying on the IoW?

Laughable garbage, even by your ‘standards’.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

And one regiment of paratroops against IOW is not you talking out of your ass?

With 110 infantry divisions in France and a month to prepare, my guess was that FJ manpower requirements could be met.

The key bottleneck is transport aircraft. Something around 300 JU-52's were probably available mid-July 1940. That's sufficient to lift about 5,000 men in one wave. Now, add maybe 200 or 300 HE-111's pressed into transport service becaue 300 JU-52's isn't enough. Now the wave is about 8,000 or 10,000. Now, add in a seaborne element using fast transport. Now the first wave is over 15,000. Now, the second wave. Then the third, etc. That's how we get to 30,000 men. Versus maybe 4,000 defenders of poor quality spread out over the entire island.

Capacity of a single Isle of white ferry of the period is 500 plus in addition to '17 cars' so basically it can deliver a battalion of Infantry to the isle of white every hour or so (took 22 minutes in 1938) including its heavy equipment

There were a number of such ferries from several ports in the region - so just using those craft

Oh and of course there is hundreds of other vessels that can make the trip.

The idea that the Germans can deliver more troops to the Isle of white in a given time period than the British using purely an airhead is utterly ridiculous

Also all those planes are not landing all at the same time are they? For an airlanding op using a couple of suitable landing sites are going to be able to land what an airplane every minute or so? So 5 hours to land that many planes - and of course they wont all fit so you then need them to take off again - so 10 hours assuming everything goes totally like clockwork with no human error accidents malfunctions etc and of course no interference from the British.

Meanwhile all of 3rd Division has arrived via boat - with some tanks over a fraction of the time

So it would take I reckon 3 or 4 days to get all of the airlanding units onto the island

Which granted is a lot quicker than the British can get the surviving paratroopers to Canada so start their new career as farmers.

 

[alfredtuomi]

apparently the RAF reconnaissance was run by Lord Percy Percy who failed to notice the movement of large numbers of empty barges along the shoreline of France ending in Cherbourg.

 

[CV12Hornet]

And one regiment of paratroops against IOW is not you talking out of your ass?

With 110 infantry divisions in France and a month to prepare, my guess was that FJ manpower requirements could be met.

The key bottleneck is transport aircraft. Something around 300 JU-52's were probably available mid-July 1940. That's sufficient to lift about 5,000 men in one wave. Now, add maybe 200 or 300 HE-111's pressed into transport service becaue 300 JU-52's isn't enough. Now the wave is about 8,000 or 10,000. Now, add in a seaborne element using fast transport. Now the first wave is over 15,000. Now, the second wave. Then the third, etc. That's how we get to 30,000 men. Versus maybe 4,000 defenders of poor quality spread out over the entire island.

Even if I took you at your word here, and the Isle actually falls... then what?

 

[alfredtuomi]

Capacity of a single Isle of white ferry of the period is 500 plus in addition to '17 cars' so basically it can deliver a battalion of Infantry to the isle of white every hour or so (took 22 minutes in 1938) including its heavy equipment

There were a number of such ferries from several ports in the region - so just using those craft

Oh and of course there is hundreds of other vessels that can make the trip.

The idea that the Germans can deliver more troops to the Isle of white in a given time period than the British using purely an airhead is utterly ridiculous

Also all those planes are not landing all at the same time are they? For an airlanding op using a couple of suitable landing sites are going to be able to land what an airplane every minute or so? So 5 hours to land that many planes - and of course they wont all fit so you then need them to take off again - so 10 hours assuming everything goes totally like clockwork with no human error accidents malfunctions etc and of course no interference from the British.

Meanwhile all of 3rd Division has arrived via boat - with some tanks over a fraction of the time

So it would take I reckon 3 or 4 days to get all of the airlanding units onto the island

Which granted is a lot quicker than the British can get the surviving paratroopers to Canada so start their new career as farmers.

OK for the last time they didn't work on farms .they chopped trees down in mosquito infested swamps.Well not always swamps but fences weren t needed.the nearest town is 400 miles away.enjoy the forest