Well done with this episode. Building the base..VII. False Start
‘De hele vaderlandse slagvloot naar de kelder gejaagd, zonder dat het ook maar een enkel schot gelost had. Tot zinken gebracht niet door den vijand, maar door den eigen volksvertegenwoordiging. Sinds Pichegru’s ruiters had den Marine geen schandelijkere nederlaag gesmaakt.’
‘The entire national battlefleet plunged to the bottom of the sea, without having fired even a single shot. Sunk not by the enemy, but by it’s own parliament. Not since Pichegrus hussars[1], had our Navy tasted a more bitter and shameful defeat.’ Captain C.E.L. Helfrich, January 1939.[1]
….there was nothing that could stop the Fleetlaw now. Nothing, but for an all-encompassing world war that is.
As Allied and Central armies marched to the fields of battle, the main priority of government and parliament were with keeping the country neutral and out of the war. As it became clear that the war would not be over by Christmas, the situation in the Netherlands normalised somewhat. In October 1914 the ministers of navy and colonial affairs did, however, notify parliament that the Fleetlaw-proposal would be put on hold. The first, and stated, reason was that the government wished to learn lessons from the war and adjust the proposal accordingly. The second, and unstated, reason was more important though: it was impossible to order the battleships in Germany or Great-Britain, as the latter had confiscated the Ottoman Empire’s Reşadiye (commissioning it as HMS Erin) and the former hit even closer at home by confiscating the Dutch Z-class[3] torpedoboats (commissioning them as V105 to V108) being build at AG Vulcan Stettin. Minister of the Navy Rambonnet nevertheless tried to keep the momentum of navalism going by requesting funds from parliament to build three cruisers. In the Tweede Kamer [4] he now finds heavy opposition to the cruisers, in favour of submarines. What had happened to the enthusiasm for the Fleetplan of 1914?
Influence of the First World War on the Fleetplan of 1914
As we have seen, Dutch navalism had faced an uphill battle from the start. In early 1914, that battle did seem to have been won. Naval warfare during the Great War quickly negated that victory however.
The war had only been going on for less than two months, when German submarine U-9 sank three British armoured cruisers in an action that took just over an hour. This event made even more of an impact in the Netherlands because it took place close to the Dutch coast and a large number of British seamen were rescued by Dutch shipping. These sinkings, as well as the successes against Allied merchant-shipping, made it clear that the submarine was a weapon which potency shouldn’t be underestimated. Meanwhile the battleships, that had been seen as great symbols of national strength and indispensable to every serious navy, made barely an act-de-presence. The Grand Fleet of the Royal Navy was driven off to Scapa Flow in the north by the German U-boats, while the Hochseeflotte was being unmasked as not much more than the Kaisers toy duck, with which he could only play in the bathtub that was the Helgoland Bight (under protection of those same U-boats no less!).
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Steamlaunch of HMS Cressy in the port of Scheveningen, after it was found drifting at sea by the Dutch authorities
It were these developments which opened up the debate between Artillerists and Torpedoists once again, by providing the latter with much needed ammunition. In this, they received support from the KNIL. The battlefleet-plan had, as mentioned before, entailed a drastic reduction of the Indian Army, which could now see an opening to reverse that defeat. In fact, plans were now being made for an expansion of its size and role, through the adoption of conscription in the East Indies. Initially this would concern the European subjects but why not for the natives as well? Didn’t the Ethical Policy[5] make colonial rule beneficial to them, and eager to defend that same colonial rule? This plan even received support from an unlikely place, as Indonesian Nationalists happened to be very much in favour of this idea. Their demands spooked the colonial establishment however, as the Nationalists demanded native participation in government to be included. In spite of colonial hesitancy, a Volksraad or Peoples Council was instated in 1918 as a first step, only for that development to be halted with the end of the First World War. Besides the native conscription, the KNIL had another ace in their sleeve. The position of Soeroebaja as the main naval base in the colony had been disputed ever since the discussion regarding the Fundamentals of 1892, and arguably even before that. The base was in East-Java, while West-Java (with the capital Batavia) was the centre of gravity for the KNIL-manned defence of the island, and her harbour was too shallow for large ships. Several proposals for a different base of operations were made, with the KNIL being especially interested in the construction of a new base in Soenda-Strait. Even the most ardent anti-KNIL naval officer had to agree that this idea had its merits. The location of the base would mean that a fleet based there, could only be blockaded if the enemy would divide its forces, and even in that case, the enemy fleets wouldn’t be able to jointly engage the Dutch one. More importantly for the KNIL however, was the fact that the base would allow unobstructed movement between the islands of Java and Sumatra. This would mean that the Army wasn’t bound to Java alone! This possible ascendance of the KNIL, and the fact that the construction of the new headquarters of the fleet would cost literal battleships of money, made the Navy’s opposition to this plan understandable, yet unfortunate[6].
Within the Koninklijke Marine the main venue of discussion was the Marineblad. In the wartime editions we can discern roughly four different variants for what the post-WWI navy should look like.
As the world war progressed, the obsolescence of the Fleetlaw-plan became more and more apparent, with most of its supporters joining those of the balanced fleet. Jan Maat[8] was not getting his battleships.
- Original Fleetlaw-plan of 1914.
- ‘Harmonic’[7] or balanced fleet.
- Four battlecruisers that would have to be faster or stronger than any Japanese ship.
- These would be able to use their speed to scout in a wide area and attack the enemy where it is the weakest.
- Would also be able to weaken the enemy anti-submarine units.
- Submarines to form lines in the small straits of the Indonesian archipelago.
- Tasked with taking out the enemy transport-fleet.
- Could weaken the enemy battlefleet.
- This plan would be more encompassing and more expensive than the 1914 Fleetlaw-plan.
- Submarine fleet.
- No heavy ships.
- Instead more (up to 78) submarines.
- Concentration of forces against the enemy transport-ships.
- There would be no (attempt at) hegemony of the sea, meaning the Japanese Kongo-battlecruisers would be able to penetrate the archipelago.
- Most supporters of this plan also advocate heavy cruiser-submarines for an offensive against the Japanese ports.
- Would be less dependent on (swift) support from possible allies.
- Barely less expensive than the previous two variants.
- Neutrality fleet.
- Cruisers, assisted by destroyers.
- Only purpose is neutrality enforcement, as in any other scenario the Netherlands can’t influence the outcome anyway.
Translated from: Teitler, G. (1988). Slagschepen voor Jan Maat! Het vlootplan van 1914. Marineblad, 100, 34-39
Java-class light cruisers
During the First World War the Royal Netherlands Navy had a problem. Its battleship-program could not be executed, as foreign shipyards started building for their own navies. This opened up the floor for new discussions on the composition of the fleet, within parliament and navy. Minister of the navy J.J. Rambonnet, tried to do his upmost best in these conditions to effectuate some form of fleet expansion. He tried to convince the members of parliament that light cruisers should be useful in any of the fleet compositions proposed. The former commodore envisioned tactical units of (light) cruisers, destroyers and submarines, where the surface-ships could lure the enemy to a line of submarines.
The proposed Java-class (named after the lead ship and most important island of the Dutch East Indies) had to be stronger than the strongest of Japanese cruisers, the Chikuma-class (see p.36). At first a Dresden-class (see p.58) look-a-like was proposed. When SMS Emden was sunk by HMS Sydney (which was very similair to the Chikamu) during the Battle of Cocos though, the design was expanded.
Rambonnet managed to get three Java-class cruisers accepted in parliament with the tiniest majority possible. The building of Java and Sumatra started in 1916, with work on Celebes starting in 1917. The building proces would be wrought with issues and delays, caused by inexperience of the shipyards (the Java-class being the largest naval ships ever constructed in the Netherlands), hindrance from the belligerent countries when obtaining equipement, and incidental bad luck such as a fire at the engine supplier and industrial actions from unions. All this would result in Hr. Ms. Java only coming in to service in 1925, Hr.Ms. Sumatra in 1926 and in 1923 Celebes being cancelled all together.
The two Java-class cruisers that did come into service would see extensive service in the Second World War however, starting in 1940 when….
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Hr.Ms. Sumatra in 1926, the year it was launched after a building-proces of 10 years.
Shaw, D. & Hendricks, T.Y. (2002). Warships Illustrated XVII. Annapolis, MA: Naval Warfare Publications
Socio-scientific explanation of the failure of the Battlefleet-plan
Why did the military-industrial complex failed to implement its aggressive Battlefleet-plan? For this we turn to the theory of the well known pacifist-theoretician, L.F. Richardson. According to him the succes any armament-expansion-proces is the result of (a) the level of armament of the opponent, (b) the level of the already carried armament-load and (c) the measure of enmity against the opponent. The higher (a) and (c) are, and the lower (b) is, the greater the expansion of armaments can be. Of course if (a) and (c) are low, while (b) is high, the effort to expand the military will most likely fail. How does that fit in the situation in the Netherlands before and after the start of the First World War? In the analysis below Japan will be the opponent, because that was the vision of the military-industrial complex in the Netherlands at that point in time.
Before the First World War: Japan had a high level of armament (a), the economy of the Netherlands had high numbers of wealth accumulation (b), while the level of emnity towards Japan was high (c). (a) and (c) were high, while (b) was low.
During the First World War: Japan still had a high level of armament (a), the economy of the Netherlands tanked (b), while the lack of a Japanese attack (as ordered by the United Kingdom) on the colony of Indonesia, coupled with a change of government[9] meant that the emnity towards Japan was low (c). This explains the failure of the Battlefleet-plan. One
This explains why the Battlefleet-plan was gaining traction with the bourgeoisie before the start of the First World War, while also explaining its loss of momentum after the beginning of overt hostilities. I do want to add that it is very well possible that if the Netherlands had a domestic industrial base that could provide the battleships, the Battlefleet-plan could very well have kept up the momentum and come to fruition, with all consequences that would entail. Indeed, we will see in the next chapter that it would not take long for the military-industrial complex to make another push for a expansion of the fleet.
Translated from: Van der Spek, A.G. (1973). Het Pacifisme in Nederland. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Antimilitaristische Uitgeverij.[10]
[1]On the 23th of January, a force of French cavalry commanded by general Pichegru captured the Dutch fleet at Den Helder. The fleet was iced in and had no way to escape. This is seen by many as the only time a unit of cavalry defeated a naval squadron, though when the French arrived at Den Helder, the decision to surrender had already been made.
[2]Very much ATL. Actually this is the first actual butterfly in this TL, as Helfrich was OTL a schout-bij-nacht or commodore at this point in time.
[3]Z standing voor ‘Zeer grote’ or ‘Very large’
[4]The Lower House of Dutch parliament
[5]Collection of policies that aimed to improve life of the colonial citizens of the Dutch Indies. Because it did nothing to stop the racial divide in society, and was wrought with paternalization, it did in fact not endear the population to their colonial overlords.
[6]If I would be doing a Dutch-wank this would be my starting point. The Sunda-strait base would have been fantastic for the allied defense of the Malay Barrier, allowing for a more substantial force to be stationed near Palembang, as its lines of retreat to Java would be secure. Pity.
[7]AFAICS the term isn’t used in English.
[8]Nickname for the navy.
[9]During WWI the Netherlands was ruled by a liberal minority cabinet. As we will see the Liberals were pretty much in favour a defense of ethics, instead of arms.
[10]Fred Van der Spek was a Dutch politician and one of the founders of the PSP, the Pacifistic Socialist Party.
Onderzeeboot Nekt Navalisme - Or: The Dutch Submarine Service during World War 2
- Thread starter HJ Tulp
- Start date
Hmm, the cancelation of the Celebes cruiser by Cabinet Ruys de Berenbroeck means politicly nothing changed in the period 1918 to 1920 something. I hope it is a learning curve for the new Prime Minister, how to keep his party members on a short line....to prevent a too large groups of dissidents.
I am also curious to know what Captain Helfrich did wrong to have him only Captain in 1939, probably not the rigth connections or naval- school views?
I am also curious to know what Captain Helfrich did wrong to have him only Captain in 1939, probably not the rigth connections or naval- school views?
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I'm sad to say that it's not a cliffhanger! Not for the next update anyway. We still have a few more steps to go until the Second World War starts I'm afraid, if only to fully grasp the development of Dutch submarine tactics and doctrine. There will be a whole bunch of changes when the shooting starts though, and I couldn't give away the whole alternative history of the Java-class just yet!
Indeed, politically - or militarily for that matter - not much will change in the first half of the interbellum, because (a) Furstner wasn't influential enough at that point and (b) the POD was pretty minor. As the period progresses there are bound to be more and more changes of course, though I'm still figuring out what those will be exactly. In 1933 we have two big events I'm mulling about: the mutiny on Hr.Ms. Zeven Provinciën (will it be bombed as OTL?) and the founding of the Union for National Recovery (Verbond voor Nationaal Herstel) of which Furstner was an early member (does he become a member in this TL as well or is he not navalist enough for them? Does that change his career or the trajectory of the Union?).
Even with a changed Furstner, there will be a battle between the artillerists and torpedoists in the 1930s, and Helfrich will be one of the casualties of that indeed! I might be doing him a bit wrong (seniority seems to be pretty important in the Navy) but Furstner was a bastard of a man so I wouldn't put it past him to sabotage Helfrichs career, if only a bit.
Well a aricraft bomb can easily miss a ship....as was intended according to the records.
it is a very elite club, probably the liking of Furstner, but on the otherhand a smart man could see that this was nothing more than but a club of men who where , want to return to the 19th century, fighting a rear battle, and could not cope wiht the changing world. I mena there were other means to fight communism, and pursue the goals of this VNH movement. The VNH movement fits in an Europena wide tendensy of , mos upper middel calss people who where very distrussed of the new parlementairian democracies and its inherent slow, chaotic desiscion process and, the looming communism.
Haha you mean Furstner? Yeah, it's pretty weird that I dislike the personality of my protagonist isn't it?
I might actually like Helfrich less actually! Helfrich's character is more likeable in my opinion, but the stuff he pulled as commander of the navy in the Indies -along the lines of the 'anarchy at sea' - rub me the wrong way. I might not be totally objective with regards to Helfrich though. This may have one or two things to do with the fact that he didn't make preparations for an evacuation meaning all the KNIL and RNLN records were destroyed (farewell wealth of sources!), and the fact that he became known as ship-a-day Helfrich because of the exploits of the submarine service while being one of their greatest enemy's. Really! There were like four airplanes tasked with the mission, only two manage to take off, with one of those having to return to base because of mechanical failure, and the pilot of the last plane is the only pilot who missed the briefing? And he decides that the mission is probably to make a direct hit? And he hits? I'm struggling to find a reason for this not be butterflied away I must admit!
Hmm, that is a very odd history and agree this make it more likely that the ship will be hit. An other way is that the mutuny never happens. As I understand the reason for the mutiny was the drastic cutback on the salary of the sailors.
Leave it in there, and then watch the complaints that it'd never happen like that.