Could an older Napoleon vent his aggression in colonial adventures instead?
The British are also tired of war. They don't want to fight a huge campaign in America. IOTL they made peace not long after Napoléon's abdication. Considering that TTL peace treaty is probably also signed in early 1814, the timeline of the war in America probably is not too different from OTL.
This is very true and, taking into an account that the coalition wars started well before Napoleon came to power, it is probably fair enough to talk about a general anymosity on all sides which could at some points disappear and then reappear due to the various sets of the objective and subjective factors.Yes, but the issue of who actually sends the declaration of war is far from the most important factor in determining war guilt.
WW2 was technically started by Chamberlain, but we still -- rightly -- consider the Nazis the aggressors in that conflict.
Who's going to sign the treaty, and do the Americans even want to sign this early? There haven't been any preparations for it, even the British offer of peace in late 1812 was rebuffed. It's going to take at least six months for anything to happen, and most likely a full year... at which point both sides will be waiting to see how the 1814 campaigns go.
They will sign it on about the same schedule as OTL.
Napoléon may give his consent to the Frankfurt proposals right away but the actual peace treaty will probably take months to negotiate, just like Amiens did. I don't think the war in America is really much different here.
I disagree. While I think Napoleon would, if peace could be made, try to keep the peace for a long time in self-preservation, he wasn't always sluggish in his later campaigns. Note his brilliant Six Days' Campaign of 1814 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Days'_Campaign). He defeated Blücher's 50,000-56,000 troops with an army of 30,000, and inflicted 17,750 casualties in four battles while losing only 3,400 men. Sure, he was getting old and his later campaigns left much to be desired, but I don't think it can all be explained by age.He was also getting old.His later campaigns lacked the energy that he showed in his younger days.
And Daladier. We anglophones tend to overlook the role of France, which was an equal partner with Britain in that decision.WW2 was technically started by Chamberlain...
The first shots were fired by Germany. The war was two days old when Britain and France declared war.but we still -- rightly -- consider the Nazis the aggressors in that conflict.
Considering that TTL peace treaty is probably also signed in early 1814, the timeline of the war in America probably is not too different from OTL.
Adams finishes first by one EV and Crawford third; Clay is excluded. Jackson, enraged and frustrated, makes a deal with Clay (giving away the kitchen sink to overcome Clay's distaste). Adams supporters raise the howl. Then President Jackson finds he cannot stomach letting Clay run the government for him (per the Deal) and fires him. Jackson is reviled as a double-dealer, and for corruption due to his aggressive practice of the "spoils" system.
They made big demands at Ghent in OTL when it was a draw, so any TL where Britain puts even an iota of extra effort it means they're going to make demands. Clay was willing to cave until Adams put some spine in him and held out until the outcome of the campaign season meant that Britain made no serious headway. Plattsburgh and Baltimore were very near run things in OTL, a few extra ships or more troops could make the difference between OTL and hefty demands.My feeling is that the British are not going to insist on much more favorable peace terms from the Americans than those of Ghent. They know perfectly well that this peace with Napoleon might not last longer than that of Amiens and don't want to have too many troops bogged down in fighting in North America.
They made big demands at Ghent in OTL when it was a draw, so any TL where Britain puts even an iota of extra effort it means they're going to make demands. Clay was willing to cave until Adams put some spine in him and held out until the outcome of the campaign season meant that Britain made no serious headway. Plattsburgh and Baltimore were very near run things in OTL, a few extra ships or more troops could make the difference between OTL and hefty demands.
My feeling is that the British are not going to insist on much more favorable peace terms from the Americans than those of Ghent. They know perfectly well that this peace with Napoleon might not last longer than that of Amiens and don't want to have too many troops bogged down in fighting in North America.
It's worth noting that - historically - Napoleon abdicated, and renounced any claims for his heirs (the first time) on April 6 1814, and that treaty was ratified 13 April. The British reinforced their expeditionary forces in North America and attacked at Plattsburgh (with an 11,000 strong force) in September, 1814; they attacked at Baltimore (with a 5,000-strong force, plus the fleet) the same month. The Treaty of Ghent was signed on Christmas Eve, 1814. The British (with an 8,000-strong force) attacked at New Orleans Jan. 8, 1815. Ghent was fully ratified in February.
Napoleon landed in France from Elba on March 1, 1815. Waterloo was over (essentially) June 18, 1815.
If Napoleon accepted the Frankfurt Terms in November, 1813, the reality is whatever "extra" forces the British the British can spare for North America - based on what they were able to do historically in 1814, maybe 10,000 or so - are still facing crossing the North Atlantic in the winter of 1813-14, waiting for the thaw and spring rainy season to pass, and then (possibly) launch attacks on the northern border, the Atlantic Coast, or the Gulf Coast, or all three - in the summer ... so, maybe rather than launching offensives in September, they may get them underway three or four months earlier, so ... May or June, 1814?
For what it's worth, the lines hadn't changed much since 1813, when the Americans had won Lake Erie in September and had won the Thames in October, 1813. Since the death of Tecumseh at the Thames was pretty close to the end of any real prospect of a "native" alliance in the Old Northwest, it's a reasonable conclusion that the side that lost the most in the 1812-15 war had already lost the war.
Doesn't seem like a huge differentiator, actually.
It seems like an article of faith around here that just as literally any POD before June 1940 leads to France curbstomping the Wehrmacht and carrying through to Berlin by Christmas, any POD before January 1815 leads to the entire Northwest Territory, Louisiana Purchase, and half of Maine being taken by the British.
I should add real quick that the Duke of Wellington opposed the hardline negotiating at Ghent, saying the campaigns had gone too poorly to make serious demands.
Haven't been here long enough to see that, but just looking at the calendar and what the British actually could "spare" in 1814 after Boney dropped out the first time, it doesn't seem like a huge change.
And even if Napoleon is somewhat cowed in November, 1813 and agrees to the Frankfurt terms, as long as he's still on the throne, especially in a France that is stronger than it was historically, is it really likely the British are going to send more - or even as many - reinforcements across the Atlantic, in a situation where he was (ostensibly) down for the count and locked up on Elba?
If anything, given the OP, the British are less likely to send more forces westward in 1814 than they did historically.
Yeah, but would Wellington know about it?