Normandy 1943.

Allied landing in Normandy 1943.
Compared to 1944 the Nazi forces and defences are squat in Normandy in 1943, theres no Panzer reserve available, the Nazis are commited to Kursk.
The Sicilian landings used more landing craft and shipping than Overlord, ok
what about a port, take Cherbourg its undefended at this time.
 
Allied landing in Normandy 1943.
Compared to 1944 the Nazi forces and defences are squat in Normandy in 1943, theres no Panzer reserve available, the Nazis are commited to Kursk.
The Sicilian landings used more landing craft and shipping than Overlord, ok
what about a port, take Cherbourg its undefended at this time.

there where 6 panzer divisions in france when the kursk offensive was going on... assuming this is at the expense of huskey 3 more can be transferred from italy; there are also 25 german infantry divisions in france

dieppe proved direct assaults on ports are a bad idea; and following dieppe cherbourg and other channel ports had been heavily fortified (Cherbourg was already fortified by the french, but the germans installed larger cannons, bunkers, trench lines, interlocking machine gun bunkers etc)

the allied army is also massively smaller, they have less combat experienced divisions, the air force is smaller and doesn't have total superiority vis a vis the LW


the best case scenario for the allies in a july 43 overlord would be penetrating some distance inland to get their supply depots out of artillery range followed by prolonged stalemate until additional american divisions can be brought in to give them enough striking power to break out

worst case, they get pushed into the drink by the germans

middle to worst case, they penetrate a bit, hold for a while, winter comes and they have to withdraw as bad weather makes their supply network untenable
 
I am sure there are people who can put this more eloquently and detailed than me. Off the top of my head:

1) Nowhere near enough landing Craft for Europe and the Pacific at the same time.

2) Ongoing ops in North Africa.

3) IIRC FDR felt that US troops needed more training.

4) No Paras to help.

5) Not enough shipping.

6) And zilch in the way of intelligence. Even if the Allies knew of Kursk ahead of time I doubt they could have re-scheduled their plan (which I think by 1943 was already sheduled for late spring 1944) on time.
 
normandy 1943 means:
no air superiority... the allied had not air superiority in this year
kursk is important, but with the invasion in the normandy (so no landing in italy, right? cause after september 43 it is no good idea to cross the channel with an invasion...) the germans have enough forces, better trained, way more experienced as the allied counterparts

the germans have much more weapons superior to the allied ones
the allies lack the advantage of much superior asw... they have started the defeat of the subs, not finished it...

the american troops are green, what happend to green yankees playing with experienced germans could be seen in africa late 1942...

multiply this with 20, cause if the germans cancel kursk, they withdraw the 2nd SS-Tank-corps and bring it to the normandy... even if the allies have mega luck and achive a large bridgehead, the second the german troops from the east are here, it is game over...
why? cause you have no chance to stop em with the allied air force... and the helpless allied tankers fighting the most experienced german troops in tank combat will be very onesided... so it could lightly be a second "frisian experience"... extreme high allied losses achiving nothing.

the germans will be very happy with all the stuff they take from the 200.000 prisoners they will make.

also, without kursk the germans do not throw away their tank reserves... but could draw a lot troops after the massacre from the west

also, without italy invaded (after DDD43 (D-Day-Debacle) it will be free from allied soldiers for around a year) the germans have one front less to care about...

no, normandy 43 is self murderer or a BIG german wank...
 
Massive defeat of WAllies even if they made a successful landing - reasons already posted...
And pushing second (if) try years away.... or as some people say, welcome to nuked Europe - brrrrrr

Maybe making possible the Anglo Nazi War posted by CalBear.....
 
Storming ashore in 1943 is pretty much what the US war plan was in Spring 1942. Whatever you say about Churchill he agreed with his experts that this was a "Bad Idea" Anglo-American relations for the next two years pretty much consist of " Can we invade yet?" "No not yet" "Can we invade yet? " "We get there when we get there!". Until the US had enough men and material in England to make British excuses sound like cowardice. Of course even with everything in favour in 1944 it was a damned close run thing.

I blame strategic war games where it is possible to launch an invasion without preperation.
 
Normandy 43?

1. Normandy was never a close run thing. The odds in 1944 were so overwheelmingly in favour of the alies that the debate should be, how could the germans keep them locked up in Normandy for so long.
2. The odds in 43 would be far worst, but not impossible, the balance of forces would not be dissimilar to the one in Italy at the start of the allied assault.
3. The offensive against japan could be placed on hold and marines and amphibious assault material be released for use in Europe. That might be the wrong choice on the long run, but would solve a few logistic problems.
4. The offensive could be timed to coincide with Citadel. The Russians knew they were going to be attacked, and more or less when. They could pass that intel to the allies.
5. German forces in Italy would have to stay there, which means a good decepcion plan. That was what the alies did best.
6.The whole logic of the Air offensive against Germany would have to change.
In the long run, the war on the Pacific would still be ended by the manhatam project and the iron wall could be pushed back a couple of countries, if all went well...
 
In 43, with less experienced US troops, much less landing ships, contested air war over the beaches and no tank with 17 pdr / 76mm gun - can't see the WAllies having a chance.
BTW, in 43 the damage done to the industry / railroads is much less also and the short fuel problems that Germany have in 44 is in the horizon but not yet in action...
Add also, less info on germany troops / positions.
 
In 43, with less experienced US troops, much less landing ships, contested air war over the beaches and no tank with 17 pdr / 76mm gun - can't see the WAllies having a chance.
BTW, in 43 the damage done to the industry / railroads is much less also and the short fuel problems that Germany have in 44 is in the horizon but not yet in action...
Add also, less info on germany troops / positions.


and the much better quality of german troops... if we see how many troops hitler draw from to the west after d-day, someone could imagine what would happen in 1943... here the russians had been not so dangerous, so a shorter defence line is possible...

the whole plot with kursk, you know that the invasion need the right weather and sea conditions... so you have only a few days in summer...

it isn´t smart to invade to late... bad weather means no supply... not so good, esp. in 1943 with not so much mullberry parts (means one harbor, if this is damaged, the allies really have serious problems... no, they cannot win this scenario... german army in 1943 is maybe 3-4times as strong as in 1944 - unit for unit... also, kursk as a battle wasn´t the german problem, the battle AFTER kursk, from august-october 1943...

i hope nobody want to invade in autum in normandy, right? :eek::D:p
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Allied landing in Normandy 1943.
Compared to 1944 the Nazi forces and defences are squat in Normandy in 1943, theres no Panzer reserve available, the Nazis are commited to Kursk.
The Sicilian landings used more landing craft and shipping than Overlord, ok
what about a port, take Cherbourg its undefended at this time.

Amphibious assaults on fortified ports did not work. It was tried in 1942, and the idea was abandoned.

The allied commanders rejected a 1943 invasion of France, and this was the right call for many reasons. It takes months to prepare, train and plan for a major operation like this one. The troops and ships would largely need to be in England by the Winter of 1942/43.

1) This means no Sicily, and Italy remains in the war. Italian divisions are generally second class divisions, but better more second class divisions compared to none.

2) It likely means no invasion of North Africa. These troops would have been diverted to England. The Axis have a much better opportunity to pull troops out of Africa. This may even butterfly into things like Malta falling. North Africa is in a vastly better situation for the Germans.

3) The Luftwaffe was broken in February/March 1944. An early invasion means a massive and decisive air battle over the skies of northern France in 1943. Lack of air supremacy makes the landing much harder.

4) Much of the intelligence work and specialized equipment is not completed in 1943.

5) The US army is going in with totally green troops and leaders. For example, we lost tanks in North Africa because the ammo was training rounds, not live rounds. Imagine similar type mistakes in Northern France.

6) If the the Allies are successful and secure Normandy, the Allies lack the reserves for a decisive breakout. The best realistic case scenario for the Allies is that Normandy is secured, air superiority is slowly established, and the Allies are ready to launch the breakout offensive in April 1942. The worst case is that the Allies are forced to withdraw or surrender. A failed landing in 1943 makes it difficult to try again in 1944.

7) The Axis have a lot more troops from North Africa and Italy that they can transfer to northern France.

Nothing is certain in war, but a 1943 attack on France had huge risks without a lot of upside.
 
This would have been a political and military disaster and its only effects would have been to strengthen the Soviet advances in the East in the later part of 1943 when Hitler overreacts and moves a shitload of troops to France to keep that from ever happening again. The result will be to magnify the Soviet victories of 1943 from Kursk onward and that just puts the USSR in an even better position for 1944, as Hitler will overreact to this, it was in his nature as a leader to do that after something like Dieppe, and this would produce the same but more.
 
multiply this with 20, cause if the germans cancel kursk, they withdraw the 2nd SS-Tank-corps and bring it to the normandy... even if the allies have mega luck and achive a large bridgehead, the second the german troops from the east are here, it is game over...
why? cause you have no chance to stop em with the allied air force... and the helpless allied tankers fighting the most experienced german troops in tank combat will be very onesided... so it could lightly be a second "frisian experience"... extreme high allied losses achiving nothing.

the germans will be very happy with all the stuff they take from the 200.000 prisoners they will make.

also, without kursk the germans do not throw away their tank reserves... but could draw a lot troops after the massacre from the west

also, without italy invaded (after DDD43 (D-Day-Debacle) it will be free from allied soldiers for around a year) the germans have one front less to care about...

no, normandy 43 is self murderer or a BIG german wank...

If the Germans cancel Kursk that's an admission that not only has the USSR won the initiative but the Germans won't even be making efforts to regain it, which you'd better believe the Soviet Union will be making this into a propaganda triumph because well, it is one. If the Germans are moving their best troops to the West, then all the Soviets have to do is start striking with local superiority of forces at weak points in the German line, and when that line starts crumbling move at other weak points as they did IOTL and then Germany's buggered anyway, as it either sends those troops back East and so loses in the West or starts really withdrawing from the East and ensures local Soviet victories turn into general victories.

and the much better quality of german troops... if we see how many troops hitler draw from to the west after d-day, someone could imagine what would happen in 1943... here the russians had been not so dangerous, so a shorter defence line is possible...

the whole plot with kursk, you know that the invasion need the right weather and sea conditions... so you have only a few days in summer...

it isn´t smart to invade to late... bad weather means no supply... not so good, esp. in 1943 with not so much mullberry parts (means one harbor, if this is damaged, the allies really have serious problems... no, they cannot win this scenario... german army in 1943 is maybe 3-4times as strong as in 1944 - unit for unit... also, kursk as a battle wasn´t the german problem, the battle AFTER kursk, from august-october 1943...

i hope nobody want to invade in autum in normandy, right? :eek::D:p

There's one minor issue with this analysis: if the Germans are weakening their overall lines in the East to shore up the West, the Soviets can find weak spots to start battering through and making good use of their numbers, and with a front that scale there will be the aforementioned weak spots, and it only takes one such weakness to turn a small hole into a Henry-Donelson style clusterfuck with the Germans playing Buckner and Zhukov playing Grant.

The Germans can't maintain a cordon defense in the East, and the Soviets only need to adopt their OTL concept of the staggered offensive to ensure a consistent momentum and the complete collapse of Germany's positions, take far less losses doing so against much weaker German forces, and presto! instant WarPac Empire.
 
why would the germans need to pull forces from the east; they have 2300 combat aircraft in france and germany plus 500 in Italy that can be called on (certainly enough to put up a vigorous defense of their field army in France in 1943)... they have 25 infantry divisions in place plus 6 panzer divisions (plus more that can be called on in Italy)

the allies in july 1943 would be more than lucky if they could supply and maintain 20 divisions in France, the forces available in France and Italy would be more than enough to vigorously oppose those forces (especially since nearly all of them would have no combat experience)
 
why would the germans need to pull forces from the east; they have 2300 combat aircraft in france and germany plus 500 in Italy that can be called on (certainly enough to put up a vigorous defense of their field army in France in 1943)... they have 25 infantry divisions in place plus 6 panzer divisions (plus more that can be called on in Italy)

the allies in july 1943 would be more than lucky if they could supply and maintain 20 divisions in France, the forces available in France and Italy would be more than enough to vigorously oppose those forces (especially since nearly all of them would have no combat experience)

The reason they'd do that is Hitler really overreacted to things like Operation Husky and Torch IOTL, and this is the same but more so. The Germans won't send any troops from Italy, that defeats the purpose of Hitler's strategy there, and sending troops from the East to prevent disaster in the West might enable Hitler to avoid facing up to the propaganda reality of what he's really doing.

He's going to need to avoid looking politically weak next to the Soviets and Sledgehammer is the perfect pretext for that, and this lets him shift to a defensive policy with plausibility....and then reality sets in.
 
Nothing is certain in war, but a 1943 attack on France had huge risks without a lot of upside.

Now, this obviously requires no invasion of Sicily and Italy. Italy stays in war as a net loss to Germany. In the Pacific the Japanese are left to rot.

An Allied landing in 1943 would also lock both German Army and Luftwaffe into a fight they can't win. While a breakthrough in 1943 is probably impossible, a static fight of attrition would play on Allied strenghts. Germans don't have industrial machinery to pound Allied supply depots into smithereens with air power and artillery while their armour is wasted in useless assaults against Allied lines which have advantage of massive airpower superiority and more importantly, massive artillery superiority.

Luftwaffe is broken more quickly and with less Allied casualties as the crucial fights are fought closer to Britain than OTL, making full use of RAF's Fighter Command.

By Spring 1944 the Allied break through the German lines and at the same time Operation Dragoon opens a new front in Southern France.

In hindsight, I think it's completely doable and might well result in earlier Allied victory with less European civilian casualties than OTL. However, like with other Allied landing options used in AH's, it's more risky and Allied leaders did not play wargames, they were making decisions using real people and thus decided to take less risky road of landing in 1944.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Now, this obviously requires no invasion of Sicily and Italy. Italy stays in war as a net loss to Germany. In the Pacific the Japanese are left to rot.

An Allied landing in 1943 would also lock both German Army and Luftwaffe into a fight they can't win. While a breakthrough in 1943 is probably impossible, a static fight of attrition would play on Allied strenghts. Germans don't have industrial machinery to pound Allied supply depots into smithereens with air power and artillery while their armour is wasted in useless assaults against Allied lines which have advantage of massive airpower superiority and more importantly, massive artillery superiority.

Luftwaffe is broken more quickly and with less Allied casualties as the crucial fights are fought closer to Britain than OTL, making full use of RAF's Fighter Command.

By Spring 1944 the Allied break through the German lines and at the same time Operation Dragoon opens a new front in Southern France.

In hindsight, I think it's completely doable and might well result in earlier Allied victory with less European civilian casualties than OTL. However, like with other Allied landing options used in AH's, it's more risky and Allied leaders did not play wargames, they were making decisions using real people and thus decided to take less risky road of landing in 1944.

To invade Normandy in 1943 requires no operation Torch. No Torch = no invasion of southern France. Also, the entire Africa Corp is available for transfer to France, as is most of the Italian Army. While it is possible it speeds up the war a little, it is much more likely to slow down the war.
 
In 43 the WAllies don't have massive air superiority...... only in 44.
In 43 the US troops are green, more if you remove Torch and Italy invasions.
So, if you try one operation of that magnitude with half (or more) of your forces green untested soldiers under a contested air space - be my guest...
But you don't like the bill.
 
Factors

In 43 the WAllies don't have massive air superiority...... only in 44.
In 43 the US troops are green, more if you remove Torch and Italy invasions.
So, if you try one operation of that magnitude with half (or more) of your forces green untested soldiers under a contested air space - be my guest...
But you don't like the bill.

All the 1943 panther production was sent to Russia. The Italian front got a few tigers in late 43. In 43 the inicial attack would be facing much lighter opposition
The means to secure air superiority were there in 43. They were being used to try to win the war by bombing Germany out of it
Does it take two and a half years to have trained troops? The crack units that faced the allies in normandy 44 were at kursk in 43. The oposition would be of less quality too
How many lives is a free Poland, Hungary, etc worth?
How many lives do you save by gaining a year?

The real risk with a 43 landing in France, Normandy being an option, not a mandatory site, is that you get a winter 43 counter offensive, not necesserely in the ardennes, that can bring about unexpected results.
 
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