No Pearl Harbour raid. Victory for Japan?

marathag

Banned
From that

What did I write about screwed up landing gear?
The original ready date for that XB-36 for May, 1944, was before Pearl Harbor.

Then then later the B-36 program had priority reduced to 'low' back up to 'high' for a few months, before back to medium and low again.

The ATL Hawaii captured, you think things will work out the exact same way?

No, they will not. The USAAF will want the B-36 and B-35 ASAP, and the USN will want Midway Plus sized carrier to fly, and recover Neptunes, a design also sidelined for the B-29
 

McPherson

Banned
The original ready date for that XB-36 for May, 1944, was before Pearl Harbor.

Then then later the B-36 program had priority reduced to 'low' back up to 'high' for a few months, before back to medium and low again.

The ATL Hawaii captured, you think things will work out the exact same way?

No, they will not. The USAAF will want the B-36 and B-35 ASAP, and the USN will want Midway Plus sized carrier to fly, and recover Neptunes, a design also sidelined for the B-29

風洞の飛行機よりも空の飛行機 ( (Airplane that works now is better than dream never.) or how about; 小洞不补,大洞吃苦。(Xiǎodòng bù bǔ, dàdòng chī kǔ.'small hole not mend; big hole eat hardship') — If small holes aren't fixed, then big holes will bring hardship.

Translated into B-36ese... @#$$ up the landing gear on your bomber and you will fix it just in time to retire the bird to the boneyard.
 

marathag

Banned
風洞の飛行機よりも空の飛行機 ( (Airplane that works now is better than dream never.) or how about; 小洞不补,大洞吃苦。(Xiǎodòng bù bǔ, dàdòng chī kǔ.'small hole not mend; big hole eat hardship') — If small holes aren't fixed, then big holes will bring hardship.

Translated into B-36ese... @#$$ up the landing gear on your bomber and you will fix it just in time to retire the bird to the boneyard.
Don't need to fix the LG right away, one of the few bits of tarmac that could handle a B-36 was available South California, thanks to Douglas building the B-19.

And thick pours of concrete isn't a hardship for a nation that made Hoover Dam.
 
Even Parshall on combinedfleet concedes that it is not impossible that a full-scale IJN invasion of Oahu in 1941 *could* have succeeded (though I think even he overstates the probability), albeit with a much larger force than even Genda and Watanabe were considering. His biggest beef, crappy logistics aside, is that the strategic opportunity cost is just way, way too high.

Because it certainly jeopardizes taking the DEI oil fields and refineries in a timely fashion. But even Glenn conceded the point, when I raised it, that the real danger is that every day you delay seizing those facilities, the probability of comprehensive sabotage by retreating Dutch and British garrisons goes up. And Japan absolutely needs that oil, if it's going to be sustaining any combat ops in 1943. (Glenn's response was ultimately to shift some forces to seizing the oil fields more quickly, though it strikes me as a moot point, if you're leaving the Americans in place in the Philippines - as Glenn does - able to base as many subs as it wants out of there to sink all the tanker hulls you need to haul that gas back to Japan.)

A successful December 1941 invasion of Oahu is not quite the ASB impossibility that Unternehmen Seelöwe would have been, though a summer 1942 attempt certainly would have been. But the risks of failure would still have been quite high; and the opportunity costs of trying it, fatal.

Japan's best move was not to play.

Picking this one at random to jump into the DEI...


How much does it matter if Japan doesn't get the DEI? Yes it was the reason to push South etc. But OTL how useful was it? Were the resources able to be brought back to Japan for processing in useful amounts? Or did they mostly supply local garrisons?
 
Picking this one at random to jump into the DEI...

How much does it matter if Japan doesn't get the DEI? Yes it was the reason to push South etc. But OTL how useful was it? Were the resources able to be brought back to Japan for processing in useful amounts? Or did they mostly supply local garrisons?

The U.S. had supplied something close to 90% of Japan's oil imports. The U.S. embargo was therefore catastrophic for their economy, let alone the military.

However, the ultimate factor that decided the start of offensive operations was the status of the Japanese fuel stockpile. The Japanese realized that oil was the bottleneck in their fighting strength; any lengthy delay in securing an oil source would be disastrous. Indeed, it was stated at a conference in late October 1941 that Japan needed to occupy the oilfields in the southern areas by March. If this did not occur, adding in such factors as normal stockpile depletion and getting the oilfields back into production, the Japanese would run out of oil in about 18 months. By September 1941, Japanese reserves had dropped to 50 million barrels, and their navy alone was burning 2,900 barrels of oil every hour. The Japanese had reached a crossroads. If they did nothing, they would be out of oil and options in less than 2 years, If they chose war, there was a good chance they could lose a protracted conflict. Given the possibility of success with the second option, versus none with the first option, the Japanese chose war.​

Source: "Oil logistics: in the Pacific War," Air Force Journal of Logistics, Spring 2004. It's got the footnotes for the primary sources on those figures.

So the Japanese had only a finite time - even on peacetime tempos - before they exhausted their reserves. And the only oil within reach that they could grab was in Borne and the DEI. And they had an even smaller window in which they had to seize those oil fields and facilities.

And peacetime tempos led them to underestimate wartime usage. As it turned out, for example, the Battle of Midway operation alone had consumed more fuel than the Japanese Navy had ever used before in an entire year of peacetime operations.

To answer the other question, Japan actually did not have enough tankers to haul all the oil available in the DEI/Borneo fields back to Japan. This is why they ended up basing a sizable part of the Combined Fleet down near Lingga Roads by 1943, so that they would be close to the oil sources.
 
Seriously? Were they nuts?

Not as much as the task force itself might have sounded the year before the attack. I give it one chance in six but if they succeed it means serious butterflies elsewhere and maybe adds 12-18 months on the war and brings Japan ahead in several areas. The F4Fs, B17s, and P38s alone could create major butterflies. That also gets the German V-101 potenrially into mass production as well.
 
The issue about the Japanese capturing Pearl Harbor is that they would need to base a significant part of their fleet and air force there to stop the Americans doing to them what they had done in 1941. Especially with their awful radar. Wasn't until well into 1942 that the Japanese Navy had any ground based radar at all.
 
I still want to know what Japan is giving up to pull this off? Japan can’t just make trips, ships and supplies appear out of thin air.

So where do the resources to invade come from?
Where do the resources to occupy Hawaii come from ? (As far as I know Hawaii was a sink for resources not a gain. Unless you have need for a lot of Pineapples.

Frankly I think ultimately this screws Japan. As they will have to give something up for it and they just went from Germany first to Japan NOW. And I think you will find that the US pulls together an invasion fleet sooner then you may think. As priorities will change and the Atlantic will not get ANYTHING until Hawaii and California are both safe.
After Japan proves they can invade Hawaii then the west coast will have “proof” that they can be attacked/invaded. So ALL effort goes to protecting the West Coast and retaking Hawaii. The only thing going East is things that are of NO use in the Pacific. At least until Hawaii is safe and even after that Germany will be a side show.

Actually the real question should be If Japan invades Hawaii does Germany win? As it helps Germany more then it helps Japan.
As very little support is going to England and nothing will go to Russia. If you tell the American people that Hawaii is invaded and we can’t take it back because we don’t have enough resources then you try to give The USSR resources you will see such a backlash that you will end up with Roosevelt being Impeached.
So Germany will get a boost as the US won’t be bombing them. The US Navy will not be hunting German subs as much. The US will be sending a LOT less to England and NOTHING to the USSR.

So while Germany will still ultimately loss unless they get very lucky the reality is they will do better the originally and they have a very slight chance to come to terms.

Oh and I would expect that Germany could avoid war with the US in this case if they don’t declare war in the US as congress will never declare war on Germany until California is safe and Hawaii liberated.
 

nbcman

Donor
Ever tried to pour a foot thick concrete runway on Oahu?
I assume that they did IOTL in 1944-45 to support the movement of B-29s. The research and development to build air bases to support heavy A/C such as the B-19 was ongoing from 1941 through 1944 so an earlier deployment of B-19s or B-29s would be a problem since the Engineers were still figuring out how to make the super airbases.

The first time an unloaded XB-19 was towed out from Douglas' Hanger at Clover Field, it broke through the surface to a depth of a foot.

Link to US Army Engineers Construction website
.
 

McPherson

Banned
Since a Japanese held Hawaiian Island chain would be bombed from the West Coast, not sure the Japanese would be building B-36 capable runways.

Uhm. Since it is 8,500-9,000 km round trip from USAAF bases in California to Hawaii, and the only American aircraft capable of the round trip is the B-36 in development and the darn thing is NRFPT by 1946 at the earliest, why would the Japanese be building B-36 capable runways? I might also suggest that since a bomber base to pound Oahu is necessary with the tools to hand and which the Japanese cannot reach after Walrus, that one consult the US bomber line available and in soon development and look for that island.

Kiritimati_island_77.jpg


Kuritimati (Christmas Island).

Distance to Oahu? 2,300 km. (4,000 round trip)

That rules out the B-17 and the B-24. Leaves B-29 and the B-32.

And this...

p1624983780-3.jpg


From here:(credit; not my research McP.)

The success and availability of the Boeing B-17 "Flying Fortress" heavy bomber in World War 2 (1939-1945) meant that there were many related projects centered on getting more out of this Boeing product. The XB-38 was a short-lived program by the company to test the feasibility of replacing the original B-17's air-cooled radial piston engines with Allison inline piston types. A B-17 airframe was pulled from the existing stock and modified in this way and the prototype served in several flights before several major issues ended the program in full.

The engine of choice became the Allison V-1710-97 turbo-supercharged V12 liquid-cooled inline piston engine of 1,425 horsepower. These were set across four individual nacelles with two engines per wing (as in the original B-17 arrangement). One major, physical difference in the installations was in their streamlined appearance as air-cooling was no longer necessary in the liquid-cooled powerplants. This gave the B-17 a unique look as the three-bladed propellers now sat on large, conical spinners. Beyond this physical change, the bomber retained much of its original form (and function).

In testing, the aircraft was able to make 327 mph and cruise at 226 mph. Range was out to 3,300 miles and service ceiling reached 29,600 feet. The aircraft was made faster than previous iterations of the B-17. However, the trade-off was in a lower service ceiling which was a poor quality for a strategic bomber to have. In comparison, the popular B-17G production model reached a maximum speed of 287 mph and cruised at 182 mph but the service ceiling was substantially higher at 35,600 feet.

Two key issues served to end the XB-38 program: Firstly the V-1710 engine being a standard fit on several other important fighter products of the war including the Lockheed P-38 "Lightning" and the North American "P-51" Mustang (A-models). As such, the availability of these powerplants would be in question should the XB-38 have entered serial production for there was already much demand for the engines elsewhere. Secondly the sole prototype was lost during the ninth flight of its test phase. On June 16th, 1943, one of the engines caught fire resulting in a bailout by the crew and the aircraft crashing. With nothing to show for the efforts, the XB-38 was written off and the project cancelled.

Specifications:

YEAR: 1943
MANUFACTURER(S): Boeing Company - USA
PRODUCTION: 1
CREW: 10
LENGTH: 73.98 ft (22.55 m)
WIDTH: 103.84 ft (31.65 m)
HEIGHT: 19.19 ft (5.85 m)
EMPTY WEIGHT: 34,745 lb (15,760 kg)
MTOW: 64,000 lb (29,030 kg)
POWER: 4 x Allison V-1710-97 turbo-supercharged V12 liquid-cooled inline piston engines developing 1,425 horsepower each.
SPEED: 326 mph (525 kph; 283 kts)
CEILING: 29,593 feet (9,020 m; 5.6 miles)
RANGE: 3,299 miles (5,310 km; 2,867 nm) (nominal 2,000 kg bombs carried.)
OPERATORS: United States (cancelled)

Armament

10 x 0.50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns along various positions of the aircraft including a dorsal turret, belly turret, tail emplacement, and nose and beam positions.

I think a better aspiration and a better power egg (Allison V-1710-111/113 V-12) would help with service ceiling. I also think that "Chuckles" Lindbergh could help extend that range a bit with a little technical training to the bomber crews, but the "point" is that you start with a proven design in the air and "that plane" is production ready NLT 1944 RTL if you need it. With the Pacific War, this ATL, you need it. And given the situation and the geography, you might see it sooner.

It also can fly off graded and crowned crushed gravel and coral island runways built on your usual atoll. Just the kind of ad hockery you need in the Pacific environment, where "concrete" is in very very very short supply.
 

McPherson

Banned
The U.S. had supplied something close to 90% of Japan's oil imports. The U.S. embargo was therefore catastrophic for their economy, let alone the military.

However, the ultimate factor that decided the start of offensive operations was the status of the Japanese fuel stockpile. The Japanese realized that oil was the bottleneck in their fighting strength; any lengthy delay in securing an oil source would be disastrous. Indeed, it was stated at a conference in late October 1941 that Japan needed to occupy the oilfields in the southern areas by March. If this did not occur, adding in such factors as normal stockpile depletion and getting the oilfields back into production, the Japanese would run out of oil in about 18 months. By September 1941, Japanese reserves had dropped to 50 million barrels, and their navy alone was burning 2,900 barrels of oil every hour. The Japanese had reached a crossroads. If they did nothing, they would be out of oil and options in less than 2 years, If they chose war, there was a good chance they could lose a protracted conflict. Given the possibility of success with the second option, versus none with the first option, the Japanese chose war.​

Source: "Oil logistics: in the Pacific War," Air Force Journal of Logistics, Spring 2004. It's got the footnotes for the primary sources on those figures.

So the Japanese had only a finite time - even on peacetime tempos - before they exhausted their reserves. And the only oil within reach that they could grab was in Borne and the DEI. And they had an even smaller window in which they had to seize those oil fields and facilities.

And peacetime tempos led them to underestimate wartime usage. As it turned out, for example, the Battle of Midway operation alone had consumed more fuel than the Japanese Navy had ever used before in an entire year of peacetime operations.

To answer the other question, Japan actually did not have enough tankers to haul all the oil available in the DEI/Borneo fields back to Japan. This is why they ended up basing a sizable part of the Combined Fleet down near Lingga Roads by 1943(^1 McP), so that they would be close to the oil sources.

^1944. They did have enough tankers until early 1944. (80 + hulls at 4,000 tonnes capacity each) to fulfill fleet and aviation requirements.

I know we don't agree on much, but the Japanese oil question is well covered here and I applaud your attention and detail in explaining its importance and why Indonesian oil was vital to a sustained war. Kudos. I will add this; as I noted here and elsewhere, the Dutch had done a professional job in sabotaging the oil refinery system in place in Indonesia before the SRA campaign engulfed them. This left the IJN with nothing but raw stock that had to be shipped to Japan for processing. US submarine force staff were a little slow to pick this exploit and weakness up, though the Dutch started hitting tankers right away. it turned out that the IJN warships with their Kampon boilers could use unrefined Indonesian crude oil and burn it at the cost of brittling the boilers and ruining the turbine sets with sulfur contaminated water superheated steam as a result. What did that mean? Raw heavy fuel oil allowed the IJN in 1943-1944-1945 a maximum of maybe 2-3 major fleet evolutions at combat speeds, before their ship's boilers had to ripped out and replaced and the turbine sets likewise.

Think about that one.

If the USN had just merely run them ragged, in a circle jerk chase a few times, their whole navy would be floating scrap iron.
 

marathag

Banned
I would wonder if this might prompt additional B-19 production...
Like most of the early giants, powerplants were really not there yet. X Block Allisons were delayed, and never worked out just right. P&W had even more trouble with the dual 1830 and then 'X' series if H-blocks that were dumped for the later Wasp Major.Wright took the early R-3350 that ran acceptably, to the shitshow that took Dodge, of all companies, to sort out for the B-29.

The promises if the late '30s programs kept Chrysler and Lycoming out of the game, and were low priority, the early USAAC desire for 'hyper' engines really slowed things for v.large bomber engines, and delayed Continental Motors. The hyper engine goal was for 2400hp engines.
 

thaddeus

Donor
the German suggestion was that seizure of Singapore in 1940(-ish)? would have had similar effects.

what is your view of Pearl Harbor raid that destroyed the facilities? a raiding party if you will, under the estimation that the fuel tank farms could not be destroyed from the air? (have read diametrically opposing views on the reconstruction times/ recovery times)

The only upside to Plan Walrus is you take Pearl Harbor. All of a sudden you have a Class II naval base in hand <4,000 kilometers from the US mainland sea frontier.

The USN would get out what it could, and wreck what it can; but I got to figure a "Port Arthur like event" as to costs and repercussions.

Do you know know how many CLASS II allied bases there are in the Pacific? 6. San Francisco, Los Angeles/San Diego Bremerton, Portland and Singapore and Pearl Harbor.

Just so you know, a class II naval base can repair capital ships.

This is not a good outcome. And ASBs aside, if i am the Tokyo crew and I have gone that far into fantasyland and that includes Yamamoto, I look at it. I seriously look at it and pro/con it against the SRA option. From my point of view, as a rational person, 35% does not even approach "invade the Soviet Union Far East" numbers (around 40% if done during Barbarossa), but neither does SRA which also has ludricrous numbers in the 30s (Singapore and the Philippine Islands about 32% and 37% respectively) as well, presuming the Americans and British are not as gonzo as they prove to be.

mentioned the "destruction" option since, in the fantasyland we have wandered into, it would not be long term operation and they could return to the others? hell, why not all of them?

eliminate the fuel and repair facilities from Pearl Harbor with the forces sent to Aleutians (the plan at least), strike south per OTL, and seize the rest of Sakhalin (they perceived the Soviets had artificially throttled the oil production at a low level)
 

McPherson

Banned
I still want to know what Japan is giving up to pull this off? Japan can’t just make trips, ships and supplies appear out of thin air.

They delay the SRA campaign and probably have to restructure Singapore and Burma as overland campaigns. It also probably means an earlier Ichi-go to make the land adjustments to the southeast Asian components of the SRA campaign.

So where do the resources to invade come from?

eb10dedb9e493e6057dd388933cba0d6--military-gear-military-uniforms.jpg


if that is all you have, that is what you use.

Where do the resources to occupy Hawaii come from ? (As far as I know Hawaii was a sink for resources not a gain. Unless you have need for a lot of Pineapples.

The strategic reserve the Japanese government squirreled away from purchases on the US markets from 1938-1940. They estimated they had 2 years operating tempo for war. They were wrong. It was more like 8 months, but it was enough for the SRA campaign. Hawaii will burn up 4 months, so their cushion just evaporated.

Frankly I think ultimately this screws Japan. As they will have to give something up for it and they [the US] just went from Germany first to Japan NOW. And I think you will find that the US pulls together an invasion fleet sooner then you may think. As priorities will change and the Atlantic will not get ANYTHING until Hawaii and California are both safe.

This does not follow, and I will explain in a moment.

After Japan proves they can invade Hawaii then the west coast will have “proof” that they can be attacked/invaded. So ALL effort goes to protecting the West Coast and retaking Hawaii. The only thing going East is things that are of NO use in the Pacific. At least until Hawaii is safe and even after that Germany will be a side show.

The B-17, until it is modified (B-38) is of no use in the Pacific except insofar as it can be used in the southwest Pacific and that means Australia, New Guinea and the Solomon Islands groups. That geography and region however, with the lack of a powerful surface fleet to escort amphibious forces, means shore based anti-ship strike units (Rikkos to the IJN, named after the G4 "Betty" bombers they flew which they nicknamed "Rikkos") to cover allied assault forces. That means a whole flock of medium bombers (A-20s, B-25s, A-26s and B-26s) and the only long ranged US fighter present that is worth a damn, the P-38.

As for the west coast, they get fighters and the Rikko treatment, too. The US is a powerful nation. The UK will get what she needs too, to stay in the war. It will just be weirder than in OTL. AAA, oil, tanks, liberty ships, raw stock materials for industry and more help in the Atlantic to beat down Mister U-boat, since the USN has nothing better to do until the new fleet can be built to replace the one lost during Walrus.

This also has consequences for the SRA campaign because it is there that the US fights right away. An airplane takes 90 days to build from mine to roll out. A tank about the same. Time to Australia is 4 weeks by ship. If the Japanese take 120 days after Hawaii to organize and figure the new SRA campaign out, that means they will be fighting a much tougher defense than even they expect as they close on Australia by August 1942.

My bete idee of hanging onto Rabaul becomes practical and necessary. That reversal alone means the Japanese suddenly are in very very bad shape as they come to that party way too late. It, alone, shaves a whole year off the war. Geography drives a naval campaign. (Who said that? Mahan?)

Subs, subs and more subs.

If the Germans thought 1500 subs was something, what is Kaiser told to make along with liberty ships? From mine to hull in the water is 14 months in 1941. If it is Kaiserized, it can be 9 months (1944, only earlier). War of 1812 desperation? Any river bank that can claim a nearby railroad and a path to the sea, becomes a shipyard. Where is the bottleneck? Torpedoes. Goat Island? Fish don't work? Factor War of 1812 type desperation? Prison terms and private enterprise for all involved. Torpedo crisis still happens, but if that is the one weapon and the only one that sinks Japanese shipping THAT is your number 1 priority above everything. Albert Einstein's funny fish sees the light of day and American submariners learn to live with hydrogen peroxide as a fact of life. It takes time, about a year. Hawaii starves.

Actually the real question should be If Japan invades Hawaii does Germany win? As it helps Germany more then it helps Japan. As very little support is going to England and nothing will go to Russia. If you tell the American people that Hawaii is invaded and we can’t take it back because we don’t have enough resources then you try to give The USSR resources you will see such a backlash that you will end up with Roosevelt being Impeached.

FDR may be impeached anyway. But suppose he is not? Navy President and a Germany first guy. He will have a tough sell, but the Berlin maniac will help with his 11 December folly. The US will be at war with the Axis, so it is a given, that whoever is POTUS has to fix the Berlin maniac.

Fighters and medium bombers, troops and shipping is headed to Australia (RTL, this happened. First four months of the war, more stuff was headed to the Pacific and Australia than to the UK. Expect about the same.)

What can be headed to the UK way? Strategic bombers. Maritime patrol aircraft, fighters, raw stock, shipping and troops. You can train a US soldier in Egypt just as well as you can train him in California. So he picks up a few weird Britishisms? You go where the fight is, and you fight.

Russia needs oil, planes, railroad stock and trucks. What changes here? Nothing.

Australia changes, though. You know that dirt road from Alice Springs to Darwin? The AlCan highway was one Pacific War project. Guess where a lot of construction troops should be headed? More trucks, planes, oil, rolling stock, railroad rails and sleepers and so forth.

MacArthur? He's cooling his heels, in the Presidio, as Sam Rayburn fires him for not getting with the program.

So Germany will get a boost as the US won’t be bombing them. The US Navy will not be hunting German subs as much. The US will be sending a LOT less to England and NOTHING to the USSR.

Nope. Rainbow 5 is still in effect. Marshall has not gone anywhere, neither has Stinson or Knox. It may look a bit different (For example; the British 8th Army may have an American component instead of Torch.), but the usual outlines of a Mediterranean, Italy first, and then invade France outline geographically follows. SEAPOWER is defined by coastal proximities. Where navies touch shores expect invasions. Goes for airpower, too, in a similar fashion. Where the fighter bomber reaches, expect an amphibious assault soon thereafter.

So while Germany will still ultimately lose unless they get very lucky the reality is they will do better the originally and they have a very slight chance to come to terms.

Berlin goes poof.

Oh and I would expect that Germany could avoid war with the US in this case if they don’t declare war in the US as congress will never declare war on Germany until California is safe and Hawaii liberated.

This presupposes that the Berlin maniac shows different behavior from OTL. I have seen nothing in any credible circumstance that deviates from or indicates he will not make his 11 December 1941 mistake. He's toast. It just depends who gets him first, Churchill or Stalin. And with Manhattan, the US is in the hunt, too.
 

McPherson

Banned
I assume that they did IOTL in 1944-45 to support the movement of B-29s. The research and development to build air bases to support heavy A/C such as the B-19 was ongoing from 1941 through 1944 so an earlier deployment of B-19s or B-29s would be a problem since the Engineers were still figuring out how to make the super airbases.

The first time an unloaded XB-19 was towed out from Douglas' Hanger at Clover Field, it broke through the surface to a depth of a foot.

Link to US Army Engineers Construction website
.

Crushed coral (gravel) about a half meter thick on the hardest ground (lava beds if there were any) they could find. Tinian and Saipan. I think Guam, too. It was mined and imported.
 

nbcman

Donor
Crushed coral (gravel) about a half meter thick on the hardest ground (lava beds if there were any) they could find. Tinian and Saipan. I think Guam, too. It was mined and imported.
They even used tanks firing AP ammo to assist in the breaking up the coral beds at Tinian:
The airfields on Tinian were the largest construction projects that Naval Construction Battalions had ever undertaken up to that time. They built seven huge B-29 bomber strips, each a mile and one half long and a block wide, along with eleven miles of taxi ways with "hardstands" sufficient to park 300 aircraft. The SeaBees dug, blasted, scraped and moved eleven million cubic yards of earth and coral on Tinian. Piled on a city block, the earth and coral they moved could form a pyramid two-thirds of a mile in height. Their equipment was kept busy 20 hours a day while maintenance crews worked to repair bulldozers, shovels and trucks damaged as a result of the rough construction activity. One SeaBee crew had a Marine tank team fire armor-piercing shells into the side of a hill so dynamite charges could be placed to break up the coral.
 

McPherson

Banned
mentioned the "destruction" option since, in the fantasyland we have wandered into, it would not be long term operation and they could return to the others? hell, why not all of them?

Not enough lift to do them all at the same time. Parshall and Tully are right about that one. Even the SRA campaign was a staged 3 phase event due to lack of hulls..

eliminate the fuel and repair facilities from Pearl Harbor with the forces sent to Aleutians (the plan at least), strike south per OTL, and seize the rest of Sakhalin (they perceived the Soviets had artificially throttled the oil production at a low level)

Ploesti argument. The Americans were decidedly better than the Japanese at bombing hardened targets and they were better at fixing bombed refineries, too. (Russia and Baku). Also, we discussed the oil tank farm at Pearl in another thread with its catch berms and the consensus was that bombing it was a waste of time and effort. You can't even set the heavy oil on fire with the Japanese stuff to hand in 1941 very well without someone putting it out, quickly and recovering the spillage for use.

Only option is this guy.

eb10dedb9e493e6057dd388933cba0d6--military-gear-military-uniforms.jpg


And he is not likely to make it off Haleiwa.
 
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