Discussion in 'Alternate History Discussion: After 1900' started by Draconis, Jul 1, 2019.
Perfect...then no one expects the Zalopha Japonicus!
I wonder what they were smoking at IJN HQ to count on that!
The same drugs that made them think that the US would negotiate peace after they launched a sneak attack killing thousands, and doing so when literally hundreds of warships were being built in the US to literally more than double the USN's size within three years
As you've acknowledged, the high surf DID stop operations on a temporary basis IOTL. Now if those same surf conditions or worse were occurring on an hourly / daily basis, what would the Japanese do?
With respect to the second link, there is no mention of the exact wave conditions there other than 'heavy surf', 'high seas', and 'heavily buffeted'. Do you have proof that the wave conditions were at least equal to the North Shore of Oahu?
And if the wave conditions were at least as bad at as the conditions for Lingayen Gulf that was cited in the second link, the Japanese had no working radios ashore, limited tanks and no heavy equipment plus some of their landing craft were flipped on the shore.
How long can the Japanese run an invasion at Haleiwa when their landing craft are being battered to such an extent on a daily basis and that they can't get heavier equipment and supplies unloaded?
However, you've made it clear that your opinion of the abilities of the Japanese in the absence of any proof that they could handle the 6-12+ feet wave conditions at the North Shore of Oahu so I'll leave you to that opinion.
the German suggestion was that seizure of Singapore in 1940(-ish)? would have had similar effects.
what is your view of Pearl Harbor raid that destroyed the facilities? a raiding party if you will, under the estimation that the fuel tank farms could not be destroyed from the air? (have read diametrically opposing views on the reconstruction times/ recovery times)
He did. Eventually.
But given the talent base of the USN at that point, I like to think we could have found someone else to do the job about as well.
He was at least as responsible for Pearl Harbor as Short and Kimmel were, and deserved to share the same fate, in all justice.
How did this thread end up with thinking the problem with the Japanese attack was that it wasn't severe enough? An invasion of Hawaii will just make American people even angrier. Unless Washington was invaded in a blitzkrieg the USA would settle down for a long war, especially since they don't have to suffer from blitz
So how about:
What would be the differences in the Pacific war if Japan did everything the same but didn't attack the Philippines or Hawaii?
Scenario 1 USA doesn't join
Scenario 2 Roosevelt manages to pass a declaration through Congress
How would the timeline be impacted? Would the resources not devoted to the USA mean Japan can invade Australia or India?
When would the USA join? How bad would hostile Philippines be for Japanese supply?
America does not join the war as quickly because FDR cannot get congressional support to defend European colonial possessions in SE Asia.
But the U.S. would go to something close to a full war footing, and ratchet up its buildup of forces in the Philippines, such that by the time the U.S. does go to war, it will be impregnable to Japanese assault. Which is a disaster for the Japanese, since the Philippines are sitting directly astride their lines of supply to the Dutch East Indies, where all the oil they need is sitting.
You could not prove it at Guadalcanal or Tarawa. The lessons learned were USMC about 90%.
Seriously? Were they nuts? I suppose they thought all that coast artillery plonked there was just going to stay silent and the PACFLT bands were going to play march music while the SNLF waded ashore?
I seriously looked at Kanehoe Bay. There is a nasty cross current about 4-8 km offshore (Might be good for surfers, horrible for ships for that shoves you generally SE so you have to sea anchor and station keep.). About half of the south coast batteries and those on the east side on Oahu 15.5 cm bore size or larger and including all the railroad guns will be blowing up transports like somebody had sent everybody in the coast artillery present there, gun-bunny on up to coast artillery gun heaven.
A nation with Japan's resources can "win" a war against the US. But that war isn't going to be the Pacific War, that victory isn't going to be a decisive smash, and that nation isn't going to be Japan. There's no way WW2 Japan is going to fight a very passive war, with the exclusive purpose of making American intervention a full ocean away as much as a daunting prospect as possible. You'd need fewer atrocities to tone down American indignation, no surprise attacks to avoid stoking their spirit, and just focus on smashing supply lines whenever possible.
All about this requires a leadership - in its entirety, civilian and military in all its branches - completely different from what Japan had back then.
Even a 30,000 man force would be outnumbered by the U.S. force structure in place in Oahu on December 7, 1941.
Not exactly a recipe for success, even setting aside the superb defensive terrain, coastal artillery, and fortifications.
1. There was nothing in what I said in the 8 hour operation hiatus that supports your case. You still seem to think that was significant? The way I interpret the temporary and I mean temporary ship to shore movement interruption, is that stevedoring was affected. Not troop movement since troops had landed before and after the interruption.
2. If the Japanese have trouble with landing troops, then things must be very rough indeed. Daihatsus operated in open ocean.
3. Off a wharf? As long as Fatso William Rufus Schafter ran his operations off Santiago de Cuba using a one pier setup at Daiquiri in 1898. We're talking landing siege guns and a lot of seasick infantry on a jetty that was four mules wide and no longer than a 100 meter long freighter using hawser cranes and longboats. Besides, ye olde Imperial Japanese Navy had adopted IJA thinking and commissioned these toys as I've mentioned which have better open water capacity than anything the allies have short of true ships..
4. See... the actual evidence is that the Japanese ran tougher operations (barge war, Solomon Islands and Indonesia for example) in rougher seas than anything toward which you object about Haleiwa beach landing operations and based on your misinterpretation of the historical record both of us have presented, I must conclude it is your evidence which does not support your case.
And that is the last from me on the HALEIWA question (Plan Walrus), too.
They'd have to avoid attacking other US territories such as Guam, Wake and various US Marine defended locations in China. Additionally, there were elements of the US Asiatic Squadron that were around Borneo on 8 December 'waiting further instructions' such as USS Marblehead and DDs from TF5. The Japanese would have to be careful to avoid attacking US ships in the South China Sea assuming the US ships returned to the PI.
Were there any of those left in 1941?
There were a few with about a company between them
Well they'd managed to avoid bringing the USA to war in China already so that's not so hard. Guam and Wake seem easy enough to avoid. The Philippines are the issue since they're right in the middle of it.
But yes, the hardest would be not engaging USA ships, and you know that Roosevelt would tell his navy to sail into Japanese fleets repeatedly to incite an incident. After all they tried to do this in OTL.
If they do engage there has to be immediate apologies and reparations but still Japan was constantly apologising for its army overstretching so I don't think anyone cares about what they say
Without a need to wait for the surprise attack fleet would they go to war earlier? Isn't the best time to attack in SEA early November to be finished by March?
According to the Wiki page for the 4th Marine Regiment, there was a detachment left at Chinwangtao.
You use the bums you have. Harold Stark (see citation about Turner) was about as useless as Grigory Kulik was to Stalin (Patsy for a lot of Stalin mistakes, Kulik was the guy who screwed up the Winter War when 500,000 Russian soldiers froze to death because his grasp on logistics and the op-art involved in it was Napoleonic. I mean that observation in the most derogatory way possible to both Kulik and Bonaparte who never understood weather effects on combat.), but FDR used Harold Stark as his CYA boy for unpopular things he needed done that was distasteful to the USN; the Plan Dog memo and violating the Second London Naval Treaty being two of them. Note that after a brief period of time; Stark was kicked out as CNO and sent to Europe (the UK) where his "diplomatic skills" and Henry Halleck like capacity for clerical work and office administration would serve the USN adequately in a tense naval coexistence environment with the RN. THE REAL NAVY gets cracking after King comes in and shakes everything up. FDR sent for the SOBs to run things.
One of those SOBs happened to be Turner, who could run an amphibious operation on a shoestring even if he screwed it all up on the op-art side like Guadalcanal and Tarawa. He just could not fight a naval battle and after Savo island was never allowed to have that chance again. Sort of like Marc Mitscher...
I agree with your observation. And others have posted similar comments here previously. With the mindset the Imperial Japanese had they fought the Pacific War with an arrogance and self-delusion that can scarcely be believed looking back at it. They did have other more realistic options but they weren't capable of exercising them.
Nevertheless as unrealistic as Japan following any other options is has been enjoyable reading the different viewpoints and concepts being put forth here.
I'm just not convinced that the USN couldn't have done quite well at amphibious operations without Turner.
I think, with Prange, that the verdict of the Navy, and punishment it dispensed, to Kimmel and Short was not unjust. But it rightly stuck in their craw that Turner and MacArthur got off scot-free and went on to great commands, despite errors pretty arguably even graver than those of Short. And after all, Kimmel was by his record a quite capable commander, and had he remained in harness, there is no reason not to think that he would have acquitted himself reasonably well (if perhaps a bit shy of Nimitz).
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