No Pearl Harbour raid. Victory for Japan?

There actually was a Japanese landing planned and discussed for Oahu as an adjunct to Pearl Harbor. It was written up by Watanabe and Genda, the former believing 30,000 troops would be needed while the latter believed it would only need 15,000.

I believe the landing sites were at or near Waialua and Kanehoe Bay. I don't recall Johnson Island or Big Island as part of it. The idea was to secure the main bases on Oahu then spread out from there counting on the locals to help reinforce their hold on the island. There were few tanks on Hawaii at the time and yes the fleet would need reinforcement but in the immediate aftermath of a successful Pearl Harbor raid it might not be impossible. Do the Japanese have any sort of paratroopers they can use?

I wonder what they were smoking at IJN HQ to count on that!:p
 
I wonder what they were smoking at IJN HQ to count on that!:p
The same drugs that made them think that the US would negotiate peace after they launched a sneak attack killing thousands, and doing so when literally hundreds of warships were being built in the US to literally more than double the USN's size within three years
 

nbcman

Donor
It did not stop anything for more than 8 hours (see the actual quote), and it most certainly is not less than weather you could expect at Oahu north shore.

Might you look at this.

You will immediately notice the high riding keel and open ocean form of the landing craft. It will cut through high surf that will broach flatter bottomed Higgins boat.

Some background.

And then get a hold of this.

Jentschura, Hansgeorg; Jung, Dieter; and Mickel, Peter. Translated by Brown, J.D. 1977. Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869-1945. Naval Institute Press.

And READ THIS.

It actually describes the Japanese landings under the terrible conditions they faced, so you see, I am certain you realize that I do not and will never agree with your assumptions and descriptions at all. The RTL history of what happened is the evidence.

As you've acknowledged, the high surf DID stop operations on a temporary basis IOTL. Now if those same surf conditions or worse were occurring on an hourly / daily basis, what would the Japanese do?

With respect to the second link, there is no mention of the exact wave conditions there other than 'heavy surf', 'high seas', and 'heavily buffeted'. Do you have proof that the wave conditions were at least equal to the North Shore of Oahu?

And if the wave conditions were at least as bad at as the conditions for Lingayen Gulf that was cited in the second link, the Japanese had no working radios ashore, limited tanks and no heavy equipment plus some of their landing craft were flipped on the shore.
The transfer of the troops to the landing craft had proved extremely difficult because of high seas. The light craft were heavily buffeted on the way to shore and the men and equipment soaked by the spray. The radios were made useless by salt water, and there was no communication with the first waves ashore. Even ship-to-ship communication was inadequate. The men had a difficult time in the heavy surf, and it proved impossible to land heavy equipment. The high seas threw many of the landing craft up on the beach, overturning some and beaching others so firmly that they could not be put back into operation for a full day. The northermost convoy finally had to seek shelter near San Fernando point, where the sea was calmer. The second wave could not land as planned, with the result that the entire landing schedule was disrupted. The infantry, mountain artillery, and some of the armor got ashore during the day, but few of the heavy units required for support were able to land.
How long can the Japanese run an invasion at Haleiwa when their landing craft are being battered to such an extent on a daily basis and that they can't get heavier equipment and supplies unloaded?

However, you've made it clear that your opinion of the abilities of the Japanese in the absence of any proof that they could handle the 6-12+ feet wave conditions at the North Shore of Oahu so I'll leave you to that opinion.
 

thaddeus

Donor
Those that were left, chose to make the best war they could and they botched it. I mean there IS ONLY ONE MOVE THAT HAS A SNOWBALL'S CHANCE.

It takes everything Japan has, all 15 divisions they have allotted for the Southern Resources Area, all their lift, and everything they can scrap up that floats and flies and they better not miss when the PACFLT fights them, cause if they lose that one battle in their one main-chance gamble, they are DONE. The US will crush them like an egg in the riposte.

the German suggestion was that seizure of Singapore in 1940(-ish)? would have had similar effects.

what is your view of Pearl Harbor raid that destroyed the facilities? a raiding party if you will, under the estimation that the fuel tank farms could not be destroyed from the air? (have read diametrically opposing views on the reconstruction times/ recovery times)
 
In all fairness Turner did end up being pretty good at comanding amphibious assault fleets

He did. Eventually.

But given the talent base of the USN at that point, I like to think we could have found someone else to do the job about as well.

He was at least as responsible for Pearl Harbor as Short and Kimmel were, and deserved to share the same fate, in all justice.
 
How did this thread end up with thinking the problem with the Japanese attack was that it wasn't severe enough? An invasion of Hawaii will just make American people even angrier. Unless Washington was invaded in a blitzkrieg the USA would settle down for a long war, especially since they don't have to suffer from blitz

So how about:

What would be the differences in the Pacific war if Japan did everything the same but didn't attack the Philippines or Hawaii?

Scenario 1 USA doesn't join

Scenario 2 Roosevelt manages to pass a declaration through Congress

How would the timeline be impacted? Would the resources not devoted to the USA mean Japan can invade Australia or India?

When would the USA join? How bad would hostile Philippines be for Japanese supply?
 
What would be the differences in the Pacific war if Japan did everything the same but didn't attack the Philippines or Hawaii?

America does not join the war as quickly because FDR cannot get congressional support to defend European colonial possessions in SE Asia.

But the U.S. would go to something close to a full war footing, and ratchet up its buildup of forces in the Philippines, such that by the time the U.S. does go to war, it will be impregnable to Japanese assault. Which is a disaster for the Japanese, since the Philippines are sitting directly astride their lines of supply to the Dutch East Indies, where all the oil they need is sitting.
 

McPherson

Banned
In all fairness Turner did end up being pretty good at comanding amphibious assault fleets

You could not prove it at Guadalcanal or Tarawa. The lessons learned were USMC about 90%.

There actually was a Japanese landing planned and discussed for Oahu as an adjunct to Pearl Harbor. It was written up by Watanabe and Genda, the former believing 30,000 troops would be needed while the latter believed it would only need 15,000

Seriously? Were they nuts? I suppose they thought all that coast artillery plonked there was just going to stay silent and the PACFLT bands were going to play march music while the SNLF waded ashore?

I believe the landing sites were at or near Waialua and Kanehoe Bay. I don't recall Johnson Island or Big Island as part of it. The idea was to secure the main bases on Oahu then spread out from there counting on the locals to help reinforce their hold on the island. There were few tanks on Hawaii at the time and yes the fleet would need reinforcement but in the immediate aftermath of a successful Pearl Harbor raid it might not be impossible. Do the Japanese have any sort of paratroopers they can use?

I seriously looked at Kanehoe Bay. There is a nasty cross current about 4-8 km offshore (Might be good for surfers, horrible for ships for that shoves you generally SE so you have to sea anchor and station keep.). About half of the south coast batteries and those on the east side on Oahu 15.5 cm bore size or larger and including all the railroad guns will be blowing up transports like somebody had sent everybody in the coast artillery present there, gun-bunny on up to coast artillery gun heaven.
 
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A nation with Japan's resources can "win" a war against the US. But that war isn't going to be the Pacific War, that victory isn't going to be a decisive smash, and that nation isn't going to be Japan. There's no way WW2 Japan is going to fight a very passive war, with the exclusive purpose of making American intervention a full ocean away as much as a daunting prospect as possible. You'd need fewer atrocities to tone down American indignation, no surprise attacks to avoid stoking their spirit, and just focus on smashing supply lines whenever possible.

All about this requires a leadership - in its entirety, civilian and military in all its branches - completely different from what Japan had back then.
 
Seriously? Were they nuts? I suppose they thought all that coast artillery plonked there was just going to stay silent and the PACFLT bands were going to play march music while the SNLF waded ashore?

Even a 30,000 man force would be outnumbered by the U.S. force structure in place in Oahu on December 7, 1941.

Not exactly a recipe for success, even setting aside the superb defensive terrain, coastal artillery, and fortifications.
 

McPherson

Banned
As you've acknowledged, the high surf DID stop operations on a temporary basis IOTL. Now if those same surf conditions or worse were occurring on an hourly / daily basis, what would the Japanese do?

With respect to the second link, there is no mention of the exact wave conditions there other than 'heavy surf', 'high seas', and 'heavily buffeted'. Do you have proof that the wave conditions were at least equal to the North Shore of Oahu?

And if the wave conditions were at least as bad at as the conditions for Lingayen Gulf that was cited in the second link, the Japanese had no working radios ashore, limited tanks and no heavy equipment plus some of their landing craft were flipped on the shore.

How long can the Japanese run an invasion at Haleiwa when their landing craft are being battered to such an extent on a daily basis and that they can't get heavier equipment and supplies unloaded?

However, you've made it clear that your opinion of the abilities of the Japanese in the absence of any proof that they could handle the 6-12+ feet wave conditions at the North Shore of Oahu so I'll leave you to that opinion.

1. There was nothing in what I said in the 8 hour operation hiatus that supports your case. You still seem to think that was significant? The way I interpret the temporary and I mean temporary ship to shore movement interruption, is that stevedoring was affected. Not troop movement since troops had landed before and after the interruption.

2. If the Japanese have trouble with landing troops, then things must be very rough indeed. Daihatsus operated in open ocean.

3. Off a wharf? As long as Fatso William Rufus Schafter ran his operations off Santiago de Cuba using a one pier setup at Daiquiri in 1898. We're talking landing siege guns and a lot of seasick infantry on a jetty that was four mules wide and no longer than a 100 meter long freighter using hawser cranes and longboats. Besides, ye olde Imperial Japanese Navy had adopted IJA thinking and commissioned these toys as I've mentioned which have better open water capacity than anything the allies have short of true ships..

4. See... the actual evidence is that the Japanese ran tougher operations (barge war, Solomon Islands and Indonesia for example) in rougher seas than anything toward which you object about Haleiwa beach landing operations and based on your misinterpretation of the historical record both of us have presented, I must conclude it is your evidence which does not support your case.

And that is the last from me on the HALEIWA question (Plan Walrus), too.
 
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nbcman

Donor
How did this thread end up with thinking the problem with the Japanese attack was that it wasn't severe enough? An invasion of Hawaii will just make American people even angrier. Unless Washington was invaded in a blitzkrieg the USA would settle down for a long war, especially since they don't have to suffer from blitz

So how about:

What would be the differences in the Pacific war if Japan did everything the same but didn't attack the Philippines or Hawaii?

Scenario 1 USA doesn't join

Scenario 2 Roosevelt manages to pass a declaration through Congress

How would the timeline be impacted? Would the resources not devoted to the USA mean Japan can invade Australia or India?

When would the USA join? How bad would hostile Philippines be for Japanese supply?
They'd have to avoid attacking other US territories such as Guam, Wake and various US Marine defended locations in China. Additionally, there were elements of the US Asiatic Squadron that were around Borneo on 8 December 'waiting further instructions' such as USS Marblehead and DDs from TF5. The Japanese would have to be careful to avoid attacking US ships in the South China Sea assuming the US ships returned to the PI.
 
They'd have to avoid attacking other US territories such as Guam, Wake and various US Marine defended locations in China. Additionally, there were elements of the US Asiatic Squadron that were around Borneo on 8 December 'waiting further instructions' such as USS Marblehead and DDs from TF5. The Japanese would have to be careful to avoid attacking US ships in the South China Sea assuming the US ships returned to the PI.

Well they'd managed to avoid bringing the USA to war in China already so that's not so hard. Guam and Wake seem easy enough to avoid. The Philippines are the issue since they're right in the middle of it.

But yes, the hardest would be not engaging USA ships, and you know that Roosevelt would tell his navy to sail into Japanese fleets repeatedly to incite an incident. After all they tried to do this in OTL.

If they do engage there has to be immediate apologies and reparations but still Japan was constantly apologising for its army overstretching so I don't think anyone cares about what they say

Without a need to wait for the surprise attack fleet would they go to war earlier? Isn't the best time to attack in SEA early November to be finished by March?
 

nbcman

Donor
Were there any of those left in 1941?
According to the Wiki page for the 4th Marine Regiment, there was a detachment left at Chinwangtao.

Sometimes associated with 4th Marines is the paleontological and anthropological mystery of loss of the Peking Man fossils.[note 3] The Chinese authorities requested the United States ambassador's help in evacuating the fossils and the custodians records indicate the fossils were crated and taken to the United States Legation in Peking.[14] There a detachment of Marines, sometimes associated with the 4th but actually the Legation Guard Marines from Peking and Tientsin (North China Marines), were to escort the crates to the Marine compound at Tienstin and evacuated aboard President Harrison which was to evacuate remaining military and civilians.[15][16] The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor came between the arrival of the crates at the Legation and the rest of the plan's execution.[17] President Harrison had completed the first evacuation of 4th Marines and was headed back leaving Manila on 4 December for Chingwangtao (Qinhuangdao) to evacuate about 300 Legation Guard Marines from Peking and Tientsin but the ship was shadowed by Japanese forces and eventually ordered to stop.[18] To prevent capture of President Harrison, now outfitted to carry troops, Master Orel A. Pierson decided to run aground in hopes of destroying the ship but the ship was salvaged, the crew taken prisoner and the ship refitted by the Japanese to eventually become Kachidoki Maru that was sunk with British prisoners of war by USS Pampanito on 12 September 1944.[18][19] The Legation Marines were taken prisoner and the crates with the fossils disappeared into the chaos of the war.[17][16] The question of what happened to the crates of fossils is one of the frequent and unanswerable questions posed to the Marine Corps historians.[20]
 

McPherson

Banned
He did. Eventually.

But given the talent base of the USN at that point, I like to think we could have found someone else to do the job about as well.

He was at least as responsible for Pearl Harbor as Short and Kimmel were, and deserved to share the same fate, in all justice.

You use the bums you have. Harold Stark (see citation about Turner) was about as useless as Grigory Kulik was to Stalin (Patsy for a lot of Stalin mistakes, Kulik was the guy who screwed up the Winter War when 500,000 Russian soldiers froze to death because his grasp on logistics and the op-art involved in it was Napoleonic. I mean that observation in the most derogatory way possible to both Kulik and Bonaparte who never understood weather effects on combat.), but FDR used Harold Stark as his CYA boy for unpopular things he needed done that was distasteful to the USN; the Plan Dog memo and violating the Second London Naval Treaty being two of them. Note that after a brief period of time; Stark was kicked out as CNO and sent to Europe (the UK) where his "diplomatic skills" and Henry Halleck like capacity for clerical work and office administration would serve the USN adequately in a tense naval coexistence environment with the RN. THE REAL NAVY gets cracking after King comes in and shakes everything up. FDR sent for the SOBs to run things.

One of those SOBs happened to be Turner, who could run an amphibious operation on a shoestring even if he screwed it all up on the op-art side like Guadalcanal and Tarawa. He just could not fight a naval battle and after Savo island was never allowed to have that chance again. Sort of like Marc Mitscher...
 
A nation with Japan's resources can "win" a war against the US. But that war isn't going to be the Pacific War, that victory isn't going to be a decisive smash, and that nation isn't going to be Japan. There's no way WW2 Japan is going to fight a very passive war, with the exclusive purpose of making American intervention a full ocean away as much as a daunting prospect as possible. You'd need fewer atrocities to tone down American indignation, no surprise attacks to avoid stoking their spirit, and just focus on smashing supply lines whenever possible.

All about this requires a leadership - in its entirety, civilian and military in all its branches - completely different from what Japan had back then.

I agree with your observation. And others have posted similar comments here previously. With the mindset the Imperial Japanese had they fought the Pacific War with an arrogance and self-delusion that can scarcely be believed looking back at it. They did have other more realistic options but they weren't capable of exercising them.

Nevertheless as unrealistic as Japan following any other options is has been enjoyable reading the different viewpoints and concepts being put forth here.
 
One of those SOBs happened to be Turner, who could run an amphibious operation on a shoestring even if he screwed it all up on the op-art side like Guadalcanal and Tarawa. He just could not fight a naval battle and after Savo island was never allowed to have that chance again. Sort of like Marc Mitscher...

I'm just not convinced that the USN couldn't have done quite well at amphibious operations without Turner.

I think, with Prange, that the verdict of the Navy, and punishment it dispensed, to Kimmel and Short was not unjust. But it rightly stuck in their craw that Turner and MacArthur got off scot-free and went on to great commands, despite errors pretty arguably even graver than those of Short. And after all, Kimmel was by his record a quite capable commander, and had he remained in harness, there is no reason not to think that he would have acquitted himself reasonably well (if perhaps a bit shy of Nimitz).
 
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