New Timeline: HSF Sorties to assist the German 1918 Spring Offensive
- Thread starter Eternity
- Start date
Hi all,
Due to further looking online and trolling through books, I have adjusted a few items on the ship lists. The SMS Von Der Tann is now attached to the Channel Squadron, and I have created a "Mine-Barrier Squadron". This squadron is to sortie with the Channel Squadron, but pull ahead during the night, attack the known mine barriers of the Allies, and then rejoin the Channel Squadron once a path is cleared. I have included the II Flotilla and also the 1916Mob torpedo boats giving them 17 vessels, but supported by the big guns of the Channel Squadron which has 10 further torpedo boats for defence.
Also, who would be suitable for command of the Mine-Laying Squadron? I am aware of Admirals Indogen and Phol (sp I know), but they had both "retired" by 1918. Who else is suitable to command that squadron? I have also tweaked that Grobes to Grosses.
Below is the next portion. March 20th 1918 & the fleet sailing. Given the Kaiser has ordered that the HSF turn back if detected prior to the attack, I have removed the submarine sightings I had in my origional TL & they will only be detected in the Channel, in the next portion.
Comments please!
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March 20th 1918 - The Day History Changed
As dawn broke in the Schillig Roads off Wilhelmshaven Admiral Reinhard Scheer looked out from the bridge wing over the ships at anchor there awaiting required time in their orders to slip their mooring lines and head to sea. Although he couldn't see many of his ships due to the thick fog, he could hear some of them. He knew that he had over 150 ships, the bulk of the High Seas Fleet, ready and waiting for action. His mind was turned to the attention of battle formations and the fleet signals he would need to command all these ships when his eye was caught by the sight of a small launch heading for his flagship, the SMS Baden. Although she was only commissioned just over 17 long war-torn months earlier on October 19th 1916 she was still the most advanced and powerful battleship in the German Fleet, and as such, his chosen flagship.
[SIZE=-1]NOTE: For those that think giving the High Seas Fleet 150+ ships is unrealistic, I am taking that number as including all ships listed on the previous page as being included in the operation. As you can see, the majority are torpedo boats.[/SIZE]
As his ships were all already fully provisioned and crewed, and he had already given the captains their sealed orders and final briefings, the approaching launch could only carry orders and intelligence from the Naval High Command. As the launch pulled alongside he walked back into the bridge to find out what new information or orders had arrived for him. He did not have to wait long as a few minutes later he was surprised by the arrival of Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, the head of the Kaiserliche Admiralstab (German Imperial Admiralty) and reporting directly to the Kaiser. This thought Admiral Hipper can only be bad news. The only reason to stop the operation was the sailing of the Grand Fleet, so it must have sailed during the night.
This was not the case however. Admiral Holtzendorff told him that he there was no reports of the GF sailing, and as such, he was free to proceed with the operation, and that he had come to tell him in person so that he could wish him luck in his attack, for if he succeeded then the German Army may have an easy time in it's big push and as such, force the Allies to the negotiating table. Germany, he reminded Admiral Scheer, could not carry on fighting much longer. With that he turned and left the SMS Baden to return to the Naval High Command and the Kaiser.
With nothing further to do, Admiral Scheer retired to breakfast. Afterwards he ordered Admiral Hipper aboard for a final conversation before the fleet sailed at midday. There was no need for this as Admiral Hipper had helped him plan the sortie, and was well aware of the consequences of failure, but he wanted to know if Admiral Hipper had had any final thoughts on the operation.
As it happened, Admiral Hipper had wondered about the Mine-Barrier Squadron. He was aware that his Battle-Cruisers were to cover them, but wished to push through the barrier as fast as possible, and therefore thought it was worth dispatching all of his torpedo boats for this phase of the operation, instead of the 17 assigned vessels. The additional 10 torpedo boats that were staying with his Battle-Cruisers could in theory speed up the sweeping by a third. Admiral Scheer knew that the Mine-Sweeping Squadron was a relatively late addition to the plans, as the Dover-Calais Mine Barrier had been swept the previous month, but reminded Admiral Hipper that the sealed orders detailing the respective tasks of the ships captains were already issued, and also that he may require those 10 torpedo boats if any Allied destroyers intercepted his Battle-Cruisers during the sweeping operation. For those reasons, there was to be no change in orders.
At 12:00 hours Admiral Scheer returned to the bridge of the SMS Baden to watch the first sections of the fleet leaving harbor. The destroyers and torpedo boats assigned to the Mine-Barrier, Channel and Mine-Laying Squadrons were already slipping their moorings and preparing to leave harbor to sweep for submarines, before meeting up with and leading their respective charges towards the English Channel. He ordered the signalman to make a signal to Admiral Hipper wishing him luck and surprise for his assault on the Channel Fleet of the Royal Navy.
Admiral Scheer hoped that the Grand Fleet would not sail before hearing reports of the attack by the HSF on the Channel, as he had orders from the Kaiser to abandon the operation if it sailed before this time. By 13:00 hours, all ships of the Channel and Mine-Laying squadrons had sailed, and were making their way West towards the English Channel under the strictest radio silence. They were only to break silence after the attack began, or if they were intercepted by capital ships of the Grand Fleet, at which point they were to lead them to himself and the HSF. He therefore returned to his cabin to check any signals he had received before the bulk of the HSF sailed at 14:00 hours, two hours behind the other squadrons to cover them.
At 14:00 hours exactly Admiral Scheer felt the engines vibrate the deck beneath his feet as the Captain called for power to move the SMS Baden away from her berth and into the channel to join the fleet assembling in the Schilling Roads. This thought Admiral Scheer was going to be the finest operation of the HSF, and he hoped that the Battle-Cruiser Squadron of the Grand Fleet did intercept him so that he could deliver a blow against the might of the Royal Navy at last.
The fleet was formed up by 15:00 hours and underway to cover the Channel Squadrons and what was more important to Admiral Scheer, during the entire sailing process no submarine warnings had been signaled. He therefore hoped that his sailing was unknown to the Allies and that they would fall upon them with complete surprise. If any signals of Royal Navy origin were detected along the path that the fleet had sailed, then the Admiralstab was to send a general fleet signal to the effect and give the position of the signal based on radio-direction finding plots. It would then be down to Admiral Scheer to decide weather to abandon the operation based on the disposition of the fleet and how far away from their objectives they were. He would break radio silence and signal Admiral Hipper only if he decided to abandon the operation.
Throughout the remainder of the day and into the night, the luck of the HSF seemed to hold as no signals were received from anybody indicating that the fleet was undetected. At midnight Admiral Hipper made a signal by signal lamp to his accompanying torpedo boats and destroyers ordering the Mine-Barrier Squadron to proceed with their portion of the operation, and watched in the gloom as their shapes accelerated away to find and sweep the Dover-Calais Mine Barrier to allow his ships through to proceed with their attack.
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I can't edit the ship list on the previous page so here are the adjustments.
Mine-Barrier Squadron
Torpedobootzerstorer
B97, B98, V100, B109, B110, B111, B112
Grosses Torpedoboot 1916Mob
G96, V125, V126, V127, V128, V129, V130, S131, S123, S133
Channel Squadron
Derfflinger Class (8x12", 26.5 Knots)
SMS Derfflinger
SMS Hindenburg (Flagship, Admiral Hipper)
Seydlitz Class (10x11.2", 26.5 Knots)
SMS Seydlitz
Moltke Class (10x11", 25.5 Knots)
SMS Moltke
Von der Tann Class (8x11", 24.8 Knots)
SMS Von der Tann
Torpedoboot 1916
A71, A72, A73, A74, A75, A76, A77, A78, A79, A80
The Mine-Barrier squadron was taken from the Main Fleet and the Channel Squadron, and will sail with the Channel Squadron until detached to sweep the Dover-Calais Mine barrier.
I have also written the next part of this - the inital assault, but would like your thoughts on that section before I post further.
Due to further looking online and trolling through books, I have adjusted a few items on the ship lists. The SMS Von Der Tann is now attached to the Channel Squadron, and I have created a "Mine-Barrier Squadron". This squadron is to sortie with the Channel Squadron, but pull ahead during the night, attack the known mine barriers of the Allies, and then rejoin the Channel Squadron once a path is cleared. I have included the II Flotilla and also the 1916Mob torpedo boats giving them 17 vessels, but supported by the big guns of the Channel Squadron which has 10 further torpedo boats for defence.
Also, who would be suitable for command of the Mine-Laying Squadron? I am aware of Admirals Indogen and Phol (sp I know), but they had both "retired" by 1918. Who else is suitable to command that squadron? I have also tweaked that Grobes to Grosses.
Below is the next portion. March 20th 1918 & the fleet sailing. Given the Kaiser has ordered that the HSF turn back if detected prior to the attack, I have removed the submarine sightings I had in my origional TL & they will only be detected in the Channel, in the next portion.
Comments please!
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 20th 1918 - The Day History Changed
As dawn broke in the Schillig Roads off Wilhelmshaven Admiral Reinhard Scheer looked out from the bridge wing over the ships at anchor there awaiting required time in their orders to slip their mooring lines and head to sea. Although he couldn't see many of his ships due to the thick fog, he could hear some of them. He knew that he had over 150 ships, the bulk of the High Seas Fleet, ready and waiting for action. His mind was turned to the attention of battle formations and the fleet signals he would need to command all these ships when his eye was caught by the sight of a small launch heading for his flagship, the SMS Baden. Although she was only commissioned just over 17 long war-torn months earlier on October 19th 1916 she was still the most advanced and powerful battleship in the German Fleet, and as such, his chosen flagship.
[SIZE=-1]NOTE: For those that think giving the High Seas Fleet 150+ ships is unrealistic, I am taking that number as including all ships listed on the previous page as being included in the operation. As you can see, the majority are torpedo boats.[/SIZE]
As his ships were all already fully provisioned and crewed, and he had already given the captains their sealed orders and final briefings, the approaching launch could only carry orders and intelligence from the Naval High Command. As the launch pulled alongside he walked back into the bridge to find out what new information or orders had arrived for him. He did not have to wait long as a few minutes later he was surprised by the arrival of Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, the head of the Kaiserliche Admiralstab (German Imperial Admiralty) and reporting directly to the Kaiser. This thought Admiral Hipper can only be bad news. The only reason to stop the operation was the sailing of the Grand Fleet, so it must have sailed during the night.
This was not the case however. Admiral Holtzendorff told him that he there was no reports of the GF sailing, and as such, he was free to proceed with the operation, and that he had come to tell him in person so that he could wish him luck in his attack, for if he succeeded then the German Army may have an easy time in it's big push and as such, force the Allies to the negotiating table. Germany, he reminded Admiral Scheer, could not carry on fighting much longer. With that he turned and left the SMS Baden to return to the Naval High Command and the Kaiser.
With nothing further to do, Admiral Scheer retired to breakfast. Afterwards he ordered Admiral Hipper aboard for a final conversation before the fleet sailed at midday. There was no need for this as Admiral Hipper had helped him plan the sortie, and was well aware of the consequences of failure, but he wanted to know if Admiral Hipper had had any final thoughts on the operation.
As it happened, Admiral Hipper had wondered about the Mine-Barrier Squadron. He was aware that his Battle-Cruisers were to cover them, but wished to push through the barrier as fast as possible, and therefore thought it was worth dispatching all of his torpedo boats for this phase of the operation, instead of the 17 assigned vessels. The additional 10 torpedo boats that were staying with his Battle-Cruisers could in theory speed up the sweeping by a third. Admiral Scheer knew that the Mine-Sweeping Squadron was a relatively late addition to the plans, as the Dover-Calais Mine Barrier had been swept the previous month, but reminded Admiral Hipper that the sealed orders detailing the respective tasks of the ships captains were already issued, and also that he may require those 10 torpedo boats if any Allied destroyers intercepted his Battle-Cruisers during the sweeping operation. For those reasons, there was to be no change in orders.
At 12:00 hours Admiral Scheer returned to the bridge of the SMS Baden to watch the first sections of the fleet leaving harbor. The destroyers and torpedo boats assigned to the Mine-Barrier, Channel and Mine-Laying Squadrons were already slipping their moorings and preparing to leave harbor to sweep for submarines, before meeting up with and leading their respective charges towards the English Channel. He ordered the signalman to make a signal to Admiral Hipper wishing him luck and surprise for his assault on the Channel Fleet of the Royal Navy.
Admiral Scheer hoped that the Grand Fleet would not sail before hearing reports of the attack by the HSF on the Channel, as he had orders from the Kaiser to abandon the operation if it sailed before this time. By 13:00 hours, all ships of the Channel and Mine-Laying squadrons had sailed, and were making their way West towards the English Channel under the strictest radio silence. They were only to break silence after the attack began, or if they were intercepted by capital ships of the Grand Fleet, at which point they were to lead them to himself and the HSF. He therefore returned to his cabin to check any signals he had received before the bulk of the HSF sailed at 14:00 hours, two hours behind the other squadrons to cover them.
At 14:00 hours exactly Admiral Scheer felt the engines vibrate the deck beneath his feet as the Captain called for power to move the SMS Baden away from her berth and into the channel to join the fleet assembling in the Schilling Roads. This thought Admiral Scheer was going to be the finest operation of the HSF, and he hoped that the Battle-Cruiser Squadron of the Grand Fleet did intercept him so that he could deliver a blow against the might of the Royal Navy at last.
The fleet was formed up by 15:00 hours and underway to cover the Channel Squadrons and what was more important to Admiral Scheer, during the entire sailing process no submarine warnings had been signaled. He therefore hoped that his sailing was unknown to the Allies and that they would fall upon them with complete surprise. If any signals of Royal Navy origin were detected along the path that the fleet had sailed, then the Admiralstab was to send a general fleet signal to the effect and give the position of the signal based on radio-direction finding plots. It would then be down to Admiral Scheer to decide weather to abandon the operation based on the disposition of the fleet and how far away from their objectives they were. He would break radio silence and signal Admiral Hipper only if he decided to abandon the operation.
Throughout the remainder of the day and into the night, the luck of the HSF seemed to hold as no signals were received from anybody indicating that the fleet was undetected. At midnight Admiral Hipper made a signal by signal lamp to his accompanying torpedo boats and destroyers ordering the Mine-Barrier Squadron to proceed with their portion of the operation, and watched in the gloom as their shapes accelerated away to find and sweep the Dover-Calais Mine Barrier to allow his ships through to proceed with their attack.
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I can't edit the ship list on the previous page so here are the adjustments.
Mine-Barrier Squadron
Torpedobootzerstorer
B97, B98, V100, B109, B110, B111, B112
Grosses Torpedoboot 1916Mob
G96, V125, V126, V127, V128, V129, V130, S131, S123, S133
Channel Squadron
Derfflinger Class (8x12", 26.5 Knots)
SMS Derfflinger
SMS Hindenburg (Flagship, Admiral Hipper)
Seydlitz Class (10x11.2", 26.5 Knots)
SMS Seydlitz
Moltke Class (10x11", 25.5 Knots)
SMS Moltke
Von der Tann Class (8x11", 24.8 Knots)
SMS Von der Tann
Torpedoboot 1916
A71, A72, A73, A74, A75, A76, A77, A78, A79, A80
The Mine-Barrier squadron was taken from the Main Fleet and the Channel Squadron, and will sail with the Channel Squadron until detached to sweep the Dover-Calais Mine barrier.
I have also written the next part of this - the inital assault, but would like your thoughts on that section before I post further.
March 21st 1918
[SIZE=-1]Dawn till 10:00[/SIZE]
Admiral Scheer was not disturbed during the night and was woken at 06:30 hours as he had instructed. No signals were waiting for his attention, so he assumed that his forces were still on schedule and un-detected by Allied forces. He was aware that by that time, the Mine-Barrier Squadron of the HSF would be starting their sweep of the Dover-Calais Mine Barrier to clear the way for the Channel and Mine-Laying Squadrons. They were detailed to clear a channel by 09:00 hours to allow the Channel Squadron to be in the English Channel by 09:30 hours.
As the morning progressed, no signals were received by Admiral Scheer, so he believed that the operation was proceeding to plan. As the HSF approached their designated rendezvous area with the other squadrons at 07:45 hours Admiral Scheer was on his way to the bridge of the SMS Baden when a rating ran up to him, saluted and handed him a signal. It was from the Commander in charge of the Mine-Barrier Squadron and was directed to Admiral Hipper, but as the SMS Baden had picked it up, it was given to him. The signal was brief and to the point. It read:
To Commander Cover Squadron from Commander Mine-Barrier Squadron.
Am sweeping and have sighted Allied Destroyers. They are moving to engage. Request cover by main squadron. Am going to engage them.
Admiral Scheer knew that the Allies were now aware that the HSF was at sea, but how much they would not know. Hopefully they would believe that it was just a small squadron. He would not therefore break radio silence to alert them to his presence. As the choice was his as to whether the operation continued or not, his silence would mean that he deemed it acceptable to continue as planned. Admiral Hipper knew this and would act accordingly.
With the British now aware of the presence of 17 destroyers and torpedo boats of the HSF at the entrance to the channel, the Admiralty ordered reinforcements to sea in the form of light cruisers as the 8 British destroyers were outnumbered. The HMS Dreadnought and HMS Dominion - The core of the Channel Fleet - were also ordered to sea with their 8 escort destroyers in case they were needed. The Admiralty did not believe that they would be, but they could not be too careful in case the German ships defeated their destroyers and evaded the light cruisers dispatched to reinforce the out numbered destroyers now attacking the German forces. The last thing they needed with a German assault underway in France was delayed supply sailings.
The Allied destroyers fought valiantly and in the best traditions of the Royal Navy, but out numbered there was only one possible outcome for the fight. By the time that the Battle-Cruisers came within extreme range 35 minutes later, 3 of the British destroyers were sunk, 2 were sinking and the remaining 3 were putting up a stubborn defense as they retired at high speed towards the light cruisers, hoping to lure the German ships onto the waiting guns. In return for the destruction of 5 British destroyers, the HSF had lost 2 torpedo boats sunk, 1 in sinking condition, 1 destroyer heavily damaged but watertight and 3 ships lightly damaged.
Admiral Hipper, aware of what was happening, and having given orders for his ships only to fire if they saw his ship - the SMS Hindenburg - open fire decided to hold his fire so as to conceal his presence to the British. Due to the darkness at the hour and the range of the German ships fron the British, the British destroyers did not see his ships approaching and therefore did not warn the approaching British Light Cruisers to the presence of the German Battle-Cruisers. The Mine-Barrier Squadron was under orders not to be drawn from their duties - even if they could win - and returned to their sweeping duties and the rescue of survivors from both sides from the water. Once the British destroyers were out of sight, Admiral Hipper flashed a request for a status update from the Commander of the Mine-Barrier Squadron. Once appraised, he ordered the torpedo boat in sinking condition to be scuttled and the heavily damaged destroyer to turn for the HSF rendezvous point at best speed. Survivors were to be transferred to the Battle-Cruisers. The three lightly damaged ships were to remain with his squadron. Once the 09:30 radio silence deadline was passed, the retiring destroyer was free to alert Admiral Scheer as to the situation and its approach.
The Allies, aware that their ships had been forced to retire, decided that reinforcements would be required and ordered the HMS Dreadnought and HMS Dominion along with their accompanying destroyers to head for the point where the Germans were sweeping the Dover-Calais mine barrier. At the same time, they ordered additional destroyers to join the Light Cruisers heading for that point.
At 08:30 the Admiralstab using Direction-Finding equipment realized that the Channel Fleet and a Light Cruiser Squadron were heading for the Mine-Barrier Squadron, and so sent a signal to them informing them and recommending they retire. Admiral Hippers and Scheer also read this signal, and Admiral Hipper knowing that Admiral Scheer's silence was an order to continue the attack, signaled the Mine-Barrier ships ordering them to disregard the Admiralstab and continue sweeping as fast as they could. This was a regrettable mistake by Admiral Hipper, as in their haste, the sweeping ships missed a cluster of mines, and one of the torpedo boats strayed onto them. Hitting by a mine that flodded her engine room and disabled her, she drifted onto two more and quickly sunk with most of her crew.
By 09:00 the German Destroyers had swept a channel through the Dover-Calais Mine Barrier, and sailed through, closely followed by the Channel and Mine-Laying Squadrons. Admiral Hipper ordered all his destroyers and torpedo boats ahead of him to scout for the Channel Fleet of the Royal Navy, and the Mine-Laying Squadron to the South, away from the Channel Fleet. His task was now simple. Cause as much damage as he could before he had to retire at 13:00. He knew that he could not delay past this time as, as soon as he was sighted by the Channel Fleet, the Grand Fleet would sortie in an attempt to intercept and destroy him.
At 09:45 his destroyers 15 miles ahead of him signaled that they could see smoke on the horizon. This would mean that they had sighted the Channel Squadron so as soon as the destroyers identified the HMS Dreadnought and HMS Dominion, Admiral Hipper signaled his light forces to return to him and accelerated to 25 knots. Admiral Hipper also signaled Admiral Scheer that he had sighted and was engaging the Channel Squadron. There was no point in radio silence now as the Allies would be aware soon enough that he was in the Channel.
Shortly after 10:00, Admiral Hipper was informed that the men in his spotting top could see the smoke of two large ships on the Horizon, approaching at speed. Knowing that they were the HMS Dreadnought and HMS Dominion, he told his ships that once they identified which ship was their assigned target that that they were to engage their respective targets and use their superior speed to attempt to avoid taking damage themselves.
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I gave the British destroyers 8 ships as that seemed squadron sized. Against 17 German ones, the outcome would be a German victory. As the Light Cruisers only sortied when the British destroyers radio'd the presence of the Germans, it will be a few hours before they arrive with their destroyer escorts. I also gave Dreadnought and Dominion 10 destroyers I think. I don't know how many consorts they would have had, so if anybody does know then I would be grateful if you could let me know!
Comments welcome as usual.
Thanks, David.
[SIZE=-1]Dawn till 10:00[/SIZE]
Admiral Scheer was not disturbed during the night and was woken at 06:30 hours as he had instructed. No signals were waiting for his attention, so he assumed that his forces were still on schedule and un-detected by Allied forces. He was aware that by that time, the Mine-Barrier Squadron of the HSF would be starting their sweep of the Dover-Calais Mine Barrier to clear the way for the Channel and Mine-Laying Squadrons. They were detailed to clear a channel by 09:00 hours to allow the Channel Squadron to be in the English Channel by 09:30 hours.
As the morning progressed, no signals were received by Admiral Scheer, so he believed that the operation was proceeding to plan. As the HSF approached their designated rendezvous area with the other squadrons at 07:45 hours Admiral Scheer was on his way to the bridge of the SMS Baden when a rating ran up to him, saluted and handed him a signal. It was from the Commander in charge of the Mine-Barrier Squadron and was directed to Admiral Hipper, but as the SMS Baden had picked it up, it was given to him. The signal was brief and to the point. It read:
To Commander Cover Squadron from Commander Mine-Barrier Squadron.
Am sweeping and have sighted Allied Destroyers. They are moving to engage. Request cover by main squadron. Am going to engage them.
Admiral Scheer knew that the Allies were now aware that the HSF was at sea, but how much they would not know. Hopefully they would believe that it was just a small squadron. He would not therefore break radio silence to alert them to his presence. As the choice was his as to whether the operation continued or not, his silence would mean that he deemed it acceptable to continue as planned. Admiral Hipper knew this and would act accordingly.
With the British now aware of the presence of 17 destroyers and torpedo boats of the HSF at the entrance to the channel, the Admiralty ordered reinforcements to sea in the form of light cruisers as the 8 British destroyers were outnumbered. The HMS Dreadnought and HMS Dominion - The core of the Channel Fleet - were also ordered to sea with their 8 escort destroyers in case they were needed. The Admiralty did not believe that they would be, but they could not be too careful in case the German ships defeated their destroyers and evaded the light cruisers dispatched to reinforce the out numbered destroyers now attacking the German forces. The last thing they needed with a German assault underway in France was delayed supply sailings.
The Allied destroyers fought valiantly and in the best traditions of the Royal Navy, but out numbered there was only one possible outcome for the fight. By the time that the Battle-Cruisers came within extreme range 35 minutes later, 3 of the British destroyers were sunk, 2 were sinking and the remaining 3 were putting up a stubborn defense as they retired at high speed towards the light cruisers, hoping to lure the German ships onto the waiting guns. In return for the destruction of 5 British destroyers, the HSF had lost 2 torpedo boats sunk, 1 in sinking condition, 1 destroyer heavily damaged but watertight and 3 ships lightly damaged.
Admiral Hipper, aware of what was happening, and having given orders for his ships only to fire if they saw his ship - the SMS Hindenburg - open fire decided to hold his fire so as to conceal his presence to the British. Due to the darkness at the hour and the range of the German ships fron the British, the British destroyers did not see his ships approaching and therefore did not warn the approaching British Light Cruisers to the presence of the German Battle-Cruisers. The Mine-Barrier Squadron was under orders not to be drawn from their duties - even if they could win - and returned to their sweeping duties and the rescue of survivors from both sides from the water. Once the British destroyers were out of sight, Admiral Hipper flashed a request for a status update from the Commander of the Mine-Barrier Squadron. Once appraised, he ordered the torpedo boat in sinking condition to be scuttled and the heavily damaged destroyer to turn for the HSF rendezvous point at best speed. Survivors were to be transferred to the Battle-Cruisers. The three lightly damaged ships were to remain with his squadron. Once the 09:30 radio silence deadline was passed, the retiring destroyer was free to alert Admiral Scheer as to the situation and its approach.
The Allies, aware that their ships had been forced to retire, decided that reinforcements would be required and ordered the HMS Dreadnought and HMS Dominion along with their accompanying destroyers to head for the point where the Germans were sweeping the Dover-Calais mine barrier. At the same time, they ordered additional destroyers to join the Light Cruisers heading for that point.
At 08:30 the Admiralstab using Direction-Finding equipment realized that the Channel Fleet and a Light Cruiser Squadron were heading for the Mine-Barrier Squadron, and so sent a signal to them informing them and recommending they retire. Admiral Hippers and Scheer also read this signal, and Admiral Hipper knowing that Admiral Scheer's silence was an order to continue the attack, signaled the Mine-Barrier ships ordering them to disregard the Admiralstab and continue sweeping as fast as they could. This was a regrettable mistake by Admiral Hipper, as in their haste, the sweeping ships missed a cluster of mines, and one of the torpedo boats strayed onto them. Hitting by a mine that flodded her engine room and disabled her, she drifted onto two more and quickly sunk with most of her crew.
By 09:00 the German Destroyers had swept a channel through the Dover-Calais Mine Barrier, and sailed through, closely followed by the Channel and Mine-Laying Squadrons. Admiral Hipper ordered all his destroyers and torpedo boats ahead of him to scout for the Channel Fleet of the Royal Navy, and the Mine-Laying Squadron to the South, away from the Channel Fleet. His task was now simple. Cause as much damage as he could before he had to retire at 13:00. He knew that he could not delay past this time as, as soon as he was sighted by the Channel Fleet, the Grand Fleet would sortie in an attempt to intercept and destroy him.
At 09:45 his destroyers 15 miles ahead of him signaled that they could see smoke on the horizon. This would mean that they had sighted the Channel Squadron so as soon as the destroyers identified the HMS Dreadnought and HMS Dominion, Admiral Hipper signaled his light forces to return to him and accelerated to 25 knots. Admiral Hipper also signaled Admiral Scheer that he had sighted and was engaging the Channel Squadron. There was no point in radio silence now as the Allies would be aware soon enough that he was in the Channel.
Shortly after 10:00, Admiral Hipper was informed that the men in his spotting top could see the smoke of two large ships on the Horizon, approaching at speed. Knowing that they were the HMS Dreadnought and HMS Dominion, he told his ships that once they identified which ship was their assigned target that that they were to engage their respective targets and use their superior speed to attempt to avoid taking damage themselves.
----------------------------------------------------------
I gave the British destroyers 8 ships as that seemed squadron sized. Against 17 German ones, the outcome would be a German victory. As the Light Cruisers only sortied when the British destroyers radio'd the presence of the Germans, it will be a few hours before they arrive with their destroyer escorts. I also gave Dreadnought and Dominion 10 destroyers I think. I don't know how many consorts they would have had, so if anybody does know then I would be grateful if you could let me know!
Comments welcome as usual.
Thanks, David.
What about the Flanders U-Boats? The breaching of the Dover Barrage would be their chance to slip through and spread some havoc to Trans-Channel traffic.
Some 20 boats were available for laying mines and/or torpedoing. The UC II Boats (most successful class of all) could carry 18 mines and 9 torpedoes.
Some 20 boats were available for laying mines and/or torpedoing. The UC II Boats (most successful class of all) could carry 18 mines and 9 torpedoes.
All available submarines that could be spared from Atlantic duties have been sent to lay minefields outside RN anchorage harbors and along the most probable lines of GF approch, and also to lay in wait to attack the GF as it heads South.
From post 13, this topic.
From post 13, this topic.
Light German forces will be able to range to the Dover-Calais mine barrier at any time remember. Also after the attack, the RN will re-lay the mine barrier thus trapping any submarines in the channel. Somewhere I wrote that Admirals Scheer and Hipper suggested that the Army only attack Dunkirk and that it is used as a submarine base/re-supply port for Channel attacks. If the German Army does capture Dunkirk, then the Navy is already prepared to move into the town and begin operations. General Hindenburg liked that idea, but has ordered the attack to proceed as historically planned - for now.
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Yes, but: - The Flanders boats were made for operations in littoral waters, they could go up to the Themse estuary - or into the Channel.
Covering the GF bases up north was a task for the high seas U-Boats, not for the small Flanders boats, it was beyond their capabilities.
The Dover Barrage was constantly guarded by the British. These guards have just been sunk. Without guarding and illumination by night, the Flanders boats could slip out later, even if the British manage to close the gap again.
It would, anyway, be worth the risk. The loss of 400 sailors against a serious disruption of Trans-Channel traffic at the moment when the land offensive is declenched...
Covering the GF bases up north was a task for the high seas U-Boats, not for the small Flanders boats, it was beyond their capabilities.
The Dover Barrage was constantly guarded by the British. These guards have just been sunk. Without guarding and illumination by night, the Flanders boats could slip out later, even if the British manage to close the gap again.
It would, anyway, be worth the risk. The loss of 400 sailors against a serious disruption of Trans-Channel traffic at the moment when the land offensive is declenched...
I must be honest here rast... U-Boats are not my area of knowledge! Type VII, IX and XXI I am fairly good on but they are WWII boats. WWI boats I am sketchey on at best. I didn't think that German subs attacked the East coast of England to be honest. I thought they left that to TB, DD & CA's much like WWII.
Further reading is required on my part and alterations to the background, as if sufficant boats could be made available as you suggest, then they would need to be planned in to slip through after the HSF leaves the Channel so that the submarines and surface forces do not get in the way of each other.
If they could reach the Thames Estuary, then a number of the boats would be stationed there to intercept light Allied forces that move South (the CAs & DDs comming to the "rescue"!)
Further reading is required on my part and alterations to the background, as if sufficant boats could be made available as you suggest, then they would need to be planned in to slip through after the HSF leaves the Channel so that the submarines and surface forces do not get in the way of each other.
If they could reach the Thames Estuary, then a number of the boats would be stationed there to intercept light Allied forces that move South (the CAs & DDs comming to the "rescue"!)
Well, UB Is and IIs from Flanders had been used to screen the northern GF bases in 1916 - in the operation which became the Battle of Jutland.
And the slow beasts had achieved nothing, seen nothing, sunk nothing.
So, one at least would think that the Germans have learned from this failure and now have pushed Hochseeboote from Germany to Scotland and the Orkneys - or at least UC IIs, the jacks of all trades.
And the slow beasts had achieved nothing, seen nothing, sunk nothing.
So, one at least would think that the Germans have learned from this failure and now have pushed Hochseeboote from Germany to Scotland and the Orkneys - or at least UC IIs, the jacks of all trades.
So why bother to use them in the operation then? lol
Maybe have some of them go towards the Thames Estuary as DDs & CAs were stationed around there. They may be able to hit something or at least report ships heading South? They would of course be sent out so that they are on station before the HSF sorties on the 20th, so they may have some chance of intercepting.
If they were THAT slow and under-armed, then there would be little point in sending them into the Channel as they would have limited use - especially as the German CAs are going to mine the Eastern shipping lanes and harbors. A submarine with better torpedo capacity and range would be of more use really.
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Too slow and undergunned for warships. But merchanters of the era also weren't really fast.
They would hardly be able to engage a troop transport, these were escorted and ran fast. But they could sink some freighters carrying horsefodder or ammunition, just enough to scare most ships into port.
They would hardly be able to engage a troop transport, these were escorted and ran fast. But they could sink some freighters carrying horsefodder or ammunition, just enough to scare most ships into port.
Rast - and all!
I am having trouble finding reliable information regarding the disposition of the German submarine fleet in 1918. What bases there were, what class of submarine they had, how many they had and so on.
Does anybody know where online I can find such information?
I have found a set of sub charts with total numbers for each year (Built, lost, available etc). I also know that bases were in Flanders, Zubagree (sp) and Germany, but apart from that I don't know much, so any help would be good!
Thanks, David
I am having trouble finding reliable information regarding the disposition of the German submarine fleet in 1918. What bases there were, what class of submarine they had, how many they had and so on.
Does anybody know where online I can find such information?
I have found a set of sub charts with total numbers for each year (Built, lost, available etc). I also know that bases were in Flanders, Zubagree (sp) and Germany, but apart from that I don't know much, so any help would be good!
Thanks, David
Out of my head:
Flanders, two submarine flotillas with together 34 boats, thereof 27 recorded serviceable in March 1918.
From the 34, 12 were UC (mines and torpedoes), the rest UB (torpedoes) types.
Some 20 boats in Austro-Hungarian ports and 5 in Ottoman, thus 25 for the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
Two or three older boats in the Baltic.
All the rest: German North Sea ports.
Flanders, two submarine flotillas with together 34 boats, thereof 27 recorded serviceable in March 1918.
From the 34, 12 were UC (mines and torpedoes), the rest UB (torpedoes) types.
Some 20 boats in Austro-Hungarian ports and 5 in Ottoman, thus 25 for the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
Two or three older boats in the Baltic.
All the rest: German North Sea ports.
All I'm going to say to everybody is don't epect an update any time soon! I am trawling through a list of German WWI U-Boats I found on uboat.net. Complete listing of all subs built, sunk, interned etc with dates, so I am trying to figure out what was sunk, what was on patrol, patrol dates etc.
Going to be a while doing this I think!!!
I'll do a big update once I add subs - if possible etc. I'll also post a sub list so rast can tell me if it is reasonable
David.
Going to be a while doing this I think!!!
I'll do a big update once I add subs - if possible etc. I'll also post a sub list so rast can tell me if it is reasonable David.
Very good and interesting idea, Eternity. I liked also your previous timeline (the Plan 19) and I wished it to be continued.
I don't understand just one thing: why you are thinking to a sortie in March 1918, when HSF did make a large incursion in the North Sea just one month later? On April 18th 1918, during Kaiserschlacht, all the HSF tried to intercept the Scandinavian Convoy near Norway's cost, but they missed the target because of bad intellingence. HSF came back to its bases because of a structural damage in Moltke's engine. That same day, the GF (+Us battleships) tried to intercept the HSF but it was too late, because the Room 40 (which was not omnipotent) failed to intercept revealing German's message's before Moltke's call of help.
If you want to re-create a possible final naval battle, larger then Jutland and with American ships involved, I think that the April's sortie is the best and most realistic scenario.
I don't understand just one thing: why you are thinking to a sortie in March 1918, when HSF did make a large incursion in the North Sea just one month later? On April 18th 1918, during Kaiserschlacht, all the HSF tried to intercept the Scandinavian Convoy near Norway's cost, but they missed the target because of bad intellingence. HSF came back to its bases because of a structural damage in Moltke's engine. That same day, the GF (+Us battleships) tried to intercept the HSF but it was too late, because the Room 40 (which was not omnipotent) failed to intercept revealing German's message's before Moltke's call of help.
If you want to re-create a possible final naval battle, larger then Jutland and with American ships involved, I think that the April's sortie is the best and most realistic scenario.
Well I havn't deleted it from my hard drive so..... Maybe
Because I get to have Hindenburg ask for the sortie - which will allow me certain other changes to history. I may go back and write a stand alone "story" (Plan 19) but the inital concept was to be a change in history. This timeline will attempt to do that through changes to the Spring Offensive that were introduced by this HSF sortie I am writing.
In March 1918 there were 55 Fleet U-Boats (Flottenboote) and 7 U-Boat cruisers deployed at the German North Sea ports (or on tour around the British Isles).
The Flanders Flotillas (albeit in May 1918) had the following boats:
I.F: UC 4, 11, 17, 56, 77; UCV 78; UB 55, 57, 59, 74, 78, 80, 88, 103, 108, 109
II.F: UB 10, 12, 16, 30, 31, 40, 64; UC 70, 71, 75, 31, 49, 104; UB 107, 110, 111, 112, 113.
The Flanders Flotillas (albeit in May 1918) had the following boats:
I.F: UC 4, 11, 17, 56, 77; UCV 78; UB 55, 57, 59, 74, 78, 80, 88, 103, 108, 109
II.F: UB 10, 12, 16, 30, 31, 40, 64; UC 70, 71, 75, 31, 49, 104; UB 107, 110, 111, 112, 113.
Thanks Rast. I am looking into the historys of those subs (Which were on patrol etc) so will get an update out soon I hope.
In the meantime, does anybody know who the Captain of HMS Dreadnought was in March 1918? I can find her Captain in 1906/7 and 1915/6 but not later
Anybody got any ideas? Thanks.
In the meantime, does anybody know who the Captain of HMS Dreadnought was in March 1918? I can find her Captain in 1906/7 and 1915/6 but not later
Anybody got any ideas? Thanks.
Paul MacQ
Monthly Donor
Just for a little help regarding the U-boats
This is the WW! Section for Uboat.net
http://www.uboat.net/articles/index.html?article=46
Great timeline I like.
This is the WW! Section for Uboat.net
http://www.uboat.net/articles/index.html?article=46
Great timeline I like.