The Saxons were not ill-prepared as such. Their doctrine was still of the linear ancien regime style (after the 1806 Prussian Army. Actually, the first rout happened during the 5 July evening assault (see for example Gill With Eagles to Glory) when the Saxons, in white uniforms became the victims of Friendly Fire. The secod and more infamous rout happened on the second day. The withdrawal from Aderklaa early on the first day is considered to have been against orders and was a further question mark against Bernadotte. He had failed in 1806 when he did not commit his corps to either Jena or Auerstadt - rather like an early d'Erlon failing to intervene at either Ligny or Quatre Bras, except without the catastrophic results of 1815. Napoleon would have regarded Bernadotte poorly after 1809 and may have seen his election as King of Sweden in 1810 as an opportunity to quietly get rid of him. That won't change in this timeline.
Retelling the questionable stories without trying to analyze them is not a good idea (no offense). The Saxons were in the bad shape at the start of campaign and there is a recorded trail of Bernadotte’s reports on that account and requests to relieve him of command of these troops. There is nothing unusual or “infamous” in the situation when 6,000 infantry troops, already exhausted by the earlier fight against a stronger enemy, can’t stand to assault of two army corps. The French troops at this battle had been fleeing with the lesser odds. What’s omitted is that the Saxons rallied and continued fighting suffering at least 50% losses in the battle. For all practical purposes the IX corps ceased to exist and was reformed into a single infantry division.
Jena story had been addressed in more than one thread. This was Napoleon’s (or if you prefer, Berthier’s) screwup: Bernadotte’s corps had been sent on a route from which he could not get out (a narrow defile) before reaching Apolda. There are reports of the subordinated division commanders regarding terrible condition of the road and bridges. The truth of the matter is that Napoleon failed to do elementary reconnaissance and had no idea that he is facing a smaller Prussian army. Neither he nor Davout had a clue about the whereabouts of the main Prussian army until Davout bumped into it on a march. By which time Bernadotte was well along the road and could not get out of it before reaching Apolda. Actually, when he finally did, appearance of his troops on Apolda Heights compelled Prussians to withdraw. After Jena-Auerstedt Bernadotte was left in charge of his corps, defeated Prussian army at Halle (Napoleon acknowledged that he would not risk to attack such a strong position with less than 50,000, Bernadotte had 20,000) and chased Prussians all the way to Lubeck, which he stormed forcing Blucher to capitulate. Napoleon could not make an “issue” out of Jena-Auerstedt (even if Davout went hysterical) without compromising his own reputation: missing the whole enemy’s army surely was not a typical sign of a military genus. All these stories that he did not want to get Desire upset originated, IIRC, from Saint Helena where he was busily re-writing the history.
In the Swedish part you are also seemingly following the “stories” invented post-factum. Bernadotte was not Napoleon’s first choice: he preferred the King of Denmark and then was OK with the Swedish choice of preference, Prince Frederick Christian of Denmark. Bernadotte run a pretty much modern election campaign in Sweden (story about a single Swedish lieutenant triggering the whole schema does not hold the water: to start with, he was sent to Paris with clearly invented mission by much more influential people ) and Napoleon (with whom he was again on the good terms) did not have an option but to agree with the Swedish proposal stipulating that he would still prefer his own candidate but Bernadotte is also OK. Officially, Napoleon was acting strictly in an advisory capacity: Sweden was within Russian “sphere of interests” and Alexander’s approval was necessary (this angle Bernadotte already had covered).
“Getting rid” of him was not the goal: Napoleon wanted active Swedish alliance for the coming war with Russia and was quite “generous” promising Bernadotte Finland. Needless to say that Nappy, rather typically, managed to screw up his own schema by occupying Swedish Pomerania. This action pretty much killed the French party in Sweden.
The changes you are talking about most probably are going to speed up the military preparations in Russia. In OTL prior to 1810 they were mostly limited to reform of the artillery. The same goes for the conscription. In 1809-11 314,000 of new troops had been raised. In 1812 there were 3 rounds of conscription bringing additional 320,000 but there was no time to train them and they did not participate in the campaign of 1812. Additional 200,000 had been raised in 1813. So in this TL probably at least 2 rounds would be moved from 1812 to 1811 producing approximately 200,000 more trained troops by 1812. Administrative reorganization was completed by 1812.A strong theme in this timeline is actually going to be Austria, military reforms after 1809 and the changes to the 812 - 1814 War of the 6th Coalition
Last edited: