Napoleon wins the Battle of Znaim 11 - 12 July 1809

[alexmilman]

The Saxons were not ill-prepared as such. Their doctrine was still of the linear ancien regime style (after the 1806 Prussian Army. Actually, the first rout happened during the 5 July evening assault (see for example Gill With Eagles to Glory) when the Saxons, in white uniforms became the victims of Friendly Fire. The secod and more infamous rout happened on the second day. The withdrawal from Aderklaa early on the first day is considered to have been against orders and was a further question mark against Bernadotte. He had failed in 1806 when he did not commit his corps to either Jena or Auerstadt - rather like an early d'Erlon failing to intervene at either Ligny or Quatre Bras, except without the catastrophic results of 1815. Napoleon would have regarded Bernadotte poorly after 1809 and may have seen his election as King of Sweden in 1810 as an opportunity to quietly get rid of him. That won't change in this timeline.

Retelling the questionable stories without trying to analyze them is not a good idea (no offense). The Saxons were in the bad shape at the start of campaign and there is a recorded trail of Bernadotte’s reports on that account and requests to relieve him of command of these troops. There is nothing unusual or “infamous” in the situation when 6,000 infantry troops, already exhausted by the earlier fight against a stronger enemy, can’t stand to assault of two army corps. The French troops at this battle had been fleeing with the lesser odds. What’s omitted is that the Saxons rallied and continued fighting suffering at least 50% losses in the battle. For all practical purposes the IX corps ceased to exist and was reformed into a single infantry division.

Jena story had been addressed in more than one thread. This was Napoleon’s (or if you prefer, Berthier’s) screwup: Bernadotte’s corps had been sent on a route from which he could not get out (a narrow defile) before reaching Apolda. There are reports of the subordinated division commanders regarding terrible condition of the road and bridges. The truth of the matter is that Napoleon failed to do elementary reconnaissance and had no idea that he is facing a smaller Prussian army. Neither he nor Davout had a clue about the whereabouts of the main Prussian army until Davout bumped into it on a march. By which time Bernadotte was well along the road and could not get out of it before reaching Apolda. Actually, when he finally did, appearance of his troops on Apolda Heights compelled Prussians to withdraw. After Jena-Auerstedt Bernadotte was left in charge of his corps, defeated Prussian army at Halle (Napoleon acknowledged that he would not risk to attack such a strong position with less than 50,000, Bernadotte had 20,000) and chased Prussians all the way to Lubeck, which he stormed forcing Blucher to capitulate. Napoleon could not make an “issue” out of Jena-Auerstedt (even if Davout went hysterical) without compromising his own reputation: missing the whole enemy’s army surely was not a typical sign of a military genus. All these stories that he did not want to get Desire upset originated, IIRC, from Saint Helena where he was busily re-writing the history.

In the Swedish part you are also seemingly following the “stories” invented post-factum. Bernadotte was not Napoleon’s first choice: he preferred the King of Denmark and then was OK with the Swedish choice of preference, Prince Frederick Christian of Denmark. Bernadotte run a pretty much modern election campaign in Sweden (story about a single Swedish lieutenant triggering the whole schema does not hold the water: to start with, he was sent to Paris with clearly invented mission by much more influential people ) and Napoleon (with whom he was again on the good terms) did not have an option but to agree with the Swedish proposal stipulating that he would still prefer his own candidate but Bernadotte is also OK. Officially, Napoleon was acting strictly in an advisory capacity: Sweden was within Russian “sphere of interests” and Alexander’s approval was necessary (this angle Bernadotte already had covered).

“Getting rid” of him was not the goal: Napoleon wanted active Swedish alliance for the coming war with Russia and was quite “generous” promising Bernadotte Finland. Needless to say that Nappy, rather typically, managed to screw up his own schema by occupying Swedish Pomerania. This action pretty much killed the French party in Sweden.

A strong theme in this timeline is actually going to be Austria, military reforms after 1809 and the changes to the 812 - 1814 War of the 6th Coalition

The changes you are talking about most probably are going to speed up the military preparations in Russia. In OTL prior to 1810 they were mostly limited to reform of the artillery. The same goes for the conscription. In 1809-11 314,000 of new troops had been raised. In 1812 there were 3 rounds of conscription bringing additional 320,000 but there was no time to train them and they did not participate in the campaign of 1812. Additional 200,000 had been raised in 1813. So in this TL probably at least 2 rounds would be moved from 1812 to 1811 producing approximately 200,000 more trained troops by 1812. Administrative reorganization was completed by 1812.

 

[lucaswillen05]

Retelling the questionable stories without trying to analyze them is not a good idea (no offense). The Saxons were in the bad shape at the start of campaign and there is a recorded trail of Bernadotte’s reports on that account and requests to relieve him of command of these troops. There is nothing unusual or “infamous” in the situation when 6,000 infantry troops, already exhausted by the earlier fight against a stronger enemy, can’t stand to assault of two army corps. The French troops at this battle had been fleeing with the lesser odds. What’s omitted is that the Saxons rallied and continued fighting suffering at least 50% losses in the battle. For all practical purposes the IX corps ceased to exist and was reformed into a single infantry division.

Jena story had been addressed in more than one thread. This was Napoleon’s (or if you prefer, Berthier’s) screwup: Bernadotte’s corps had been sent on a route from which he could not get out (a narrow defile) before reaching Apolda. There are reports of the subordinated division commanders regarding terrible condition of the road and bridges. The truth of the matter is that Napoleon failed to do elementary reconnaissance and had no idea that he is facing a smaller Prussian army. Neither he nor Davout had a clue about the whereabouts of the main Prussian army until Davout bumped into it on a march. By which time Bernadotte was well along the road and could not get out of it before reaching Apolda. Actually, when he finally did, appearance of his troops on Apolda Heights compelled Prussians to withdraw. After Jena-Auerstedt Bernadotte was left in charge of his corps, defeated Prussian army at Halle (Napoleon acknowledged that he would not risk to attack such a strong position with less than 50,000, Bernadotte had 20,000) and chased Prussians all the way to Lubeck, which he stormed forcing Blucher to capitulate. Napoleon could not make an “issue” out of Jena-Auerstedt (even if Davout went hysterical) without compromising his own reputation: missing the whole enemy’s army surely was not a typical sign of a military genus. All these stories that he did not want to get Desire upset originated, IIRC, from Saint Helena where he was busily re-writing the history.

In the Swedish part you are also seemingly following the “stories” invented post-factum. Bernadotte was not Napoleon’s first choice: he preferred the King of Denmark and then was OK with the Swedish choice of preference, Prince Frederick Christian of Denmark. Bernadotte run a pretty much modern election campaign in Sweden (story about a single Swedish lieutenant triggering the whole schema does not hold the water: to start with, he was sent to Paris with clearly invented mission by much more influential people ) and Napoleon (with whom he was again on the good terms) did not have an option but to agree with the Swedish proposal stipulating that he would still prefer his own candidate but Bernadotte is also OK. Officially, Napoleon was acting strictly in an advisory capacity: Sweden was within Russian “sphere of interests” and Alexander’s approval was necessary (this angle Bernadotte already had covered).

“Getting rid” of him was not the goal: Napoleon wanted active Swedish alliance for the coming war with Russia and was quite “generous” promising Bernadotte Finland. Needless to say that Nappy, rather typically, managed to screw up his own schema by occupying Swedish Pomerania. This action pretty much killed the French party in Sweden.



The changes you are talking about most probably are going to speed up the military preparations in Russia. In OTL prior to 1810 they were mostly limited to reform of the artillery. The same goes for the conscription. In 1809-11 314,000 of new troops had been raised. In 1812 there were 3 rounds of conscription bringing additional 320,000 but there was no time to train them and they did not participate in the campaign of 1812. Additional 200,000 had been raised in 1813. So in this TL probably at least 2 rounds would be moved from 1812 to 1811 producing approximately 200,000 more trained troops by 1812. Administrative reorganization was completed by 1812.

Discussion of the Saxon rout is not relevant to the timeline. Regarding Bernadotte's move to Sweden, Napoleon probably saw it as ab opportunity to "shift Bernadotsideways. Again, the issue is not cental to TTL and won't have any real impact until 1813/ Yes there are going to be other motivations as well

The Russian crisis will develop at about the same space although Napoleon might decide to go to Spain himself in 1810 or 1811 but if he goes later rather rhan earlier he will be called away to deal with the Russian crisis. Maybe the 812 war will begin differently

 

[alexmilman]

Discussion of the Saxon rout is not relevant to the timeline. Regarding Bernadotte's move to Sweden, Napoleon probably saw it as ab opportunity to "shift Bernadotsideways. Again, the issue is not cental to TTL and won't have any real impact until 1813/ Yes there are going to be other motivations as well

The Russian crisis will develop at about the same space although Napoleon might decide to go to Spain himself in 1810 or 1811 but if he goes later rather rhan earlier he will be called away to deal with the Russian crisis. Maybe the 812 war will begin differently

Well, at least in OTL there was no crisis with Russia in 1810 and in 1811 it still was more or less marginal: most of the issues could be resolved diplomatically. There are some fundamental regional differences between OTL and your TL:
1. The Duchy in an absence of Davout would be most probably much less militarized. This removes one of the critical causes behind the crisis.
2. With a need to maintain a massive military presence in Hungary (at least) and a large-scale engagement in Spain Napoleon may be forced to scale down French military presence in Prussia. This removes another critical cause.
3. Strong French military presence in Hungary may be considered by Alexander as a threat which did not exist in OTL where only in 1812 Austria openly sided with Napoleon. So, depending upon the size of that force he may or may not decide to strengthen the 3rd Army at the expense of the 1st and 2nd or the Danube army. Of course, it is an open question which part of that French force could be used in the campaign and which has to be left to maintain control over Hungary.
4. While in OTL in 1812 Austria was acting at the start of campaign as a seemingly voluntarily ally of Napoleon, here it is in the same position as Prussia: it can be forced to provide some contingents but they had to be under overall French command and unwilling to fight.

As a side note, the OTL “crisis” triggering invasion of 1812 was mostly Napoleon’s initiative: practically until the point of invasion there were ongoing discussions between the French Minister of the Foreign Affairs and the Russian ambassador. Both sides agreed upon protocol of the mutually acceptable concessions but Napoleon considered the whole affair as a smoke screen for his mobilization. So he hardly could be “called” to deal with a crisis of his own creation. 😜 In your TL, taking into an account ##1 & 2, Alexander would be probably less confrontational than in OTL except, possibly, for #3. Which does not mean that he would scale down his mobilization efforts: if anything this TLs treatment of the Austrians demonstrates how dangerous is to be under strength with Napoleon as a neighbor.

 

[lucaswillen05]

Well, at least in OTL there was no crisis with Russia in 1810 and in 1811 it still was more or less marginal: most of the issues could be resolved diplomatically. There are some fundamental regional differences between OTL and your TL:
1. The Duchy in an absence of Davout would be most probably much less militarized. This removes one of the critical causes behind the crisis.
2. With a need to maintain a massive military presence in Hungary (at least) and a large-scale engagement in Spain Napoleon may be forced to scale down French military presence in Prussia. This removes another critical cause.
3. Strong French military presence in Hungary may be considered by Alexander as a threat which did not exist in OTL where only in 1812 Austria openly sided with Napoleon. So, depending upon the size of that force he may or may not decide to strengthen the 3rd Army at the expense of the 1st and 2nd or the Danube army. Of course, it is an open question which part of that French force could be used in the campaign and which has to be left to maintain control over Hungary.
4. While in OTL in 1812 Austria was acting at the start of campaign as a seemingly voluntarily ally of Napoleon, here it is in the same position as Prussia: it can be forced to provide some contingents but they had to be under overall French command and unwilling to fight.

As a side note, the OTL “crisis” triggering invasion of 1812 was mostly Napoleon’s initiative: practically until the point of invasion there were ongoing discussions between the French Minister of the Foreign Affairs and the Russian ambassador. Both sides agreed upon protocol of the mutually acceptable concessions but Napoleon considered the whole affair as a smoke screen for his mobilization. So he hardly could be “called” to deal with a crisis of his own creation. 😜 In your TL, taking into an account ##1 & 2, Alexander would be probably less confrontational than in OTL except, possibly, for #3. Which does not mean that he would scale down his mobilization efforts: if anything this TLs treatment of the Austrians demonstrates how dangerous is to be under strength with Napoleon as a neighbor.

Some sensible remarks there. Italy, Poland and maybe Saxony would provide the occupation troops with Davout's Corps and maybe some redeployment from Germany. Tghe rump state of Austria is going to be dragooned into an alliance with Napoleonic France. Napoleon will, if he goes to Spain be taking the Imperial Guard, possibly expanded, possibly with another corps from Germany but the French are getting a bit overextended with occupation duties. At the end of 1809 there is no real concern over war with Russia although there are certain reservations about Tsar Alexander's trustworthiness/

Napoleon's next campaign is likely going to be Spain again, either in 1810 or the spring of 1811. However, relations with Russia will be deteriorating. The 1812 war with Russia is going to happen. There will of course be issues over the Continental System and Poland/Duchy of Warsaw. Alexander II might be more cautious about going to war but may be pressured into it by events, some of his Ministers over the course of 1819 and 1811.. Napoleon himselg may commit some diplomatic errors leading to war in 1812. It will be broadly similar to OTL with the major change of a much weaker Austria.

I will also cover Davout's rule of Hungary, his reforms, the harshness of his policies and increasing popularity. The rump Austria will also see military, social and economic reforms, though not to the extent of Prussian reforms and not to the same level of success given the time that will actually be available, finances and the innate conservatism of the government. This will have an effect on the performance of the Austrian army in 1812 and beyond though with nothing like the effect of the Prussian reforms. The decisive defeat at Znaim is the shock needed to get reforms started that were far more radical tthan anything attempted by Archduke Charles (who will be permanently retired. Schwarzenburg will command the army for now but a certain young general by the name of Joseph Radetsky may be someone to watch....

One point to note is that the crisis with Russia started to develop from December 1810 when Alexander II left the Continental System. Tensions developed throughout 1811 over the Duchy of Warsaw/s Annexation of Western Galicia under the Treaty of Schonbrunn/ Since this Treaty is also signed in this timeline the same tensions will occur. The 1812 War is certainly not butterflied away. The factor that has changed is that Austria is now far weaker and this will significantly impact the 1813 campaign if the 1812 campaign follows the same course as our own history/ There are likely going to be effectss on the Peninsular War with Napoleon perhaps going in person in 1810 or early 1811 before the Russian Crisis really starts to develop.

 

[alexmilman]

Some sensible remarks there. Italy, Poland and maybe Saxony would provide the occupation troops with Davout's Corps and maybe some redeployment from Germany. Tghe rump state of Austria is going to be dragooned into an alliance with Napoleonic France. Napoleon will, if he goes to Spain be taking the Imperial Guard, possibly expanded, possibly with another corps from Germany but the French are getting a bit overextended with occupation duties. At the end of 1809 there is no real concern over war with Russia although there are certain reservations about Tsar Alexander's trustworthiness/

Napoleon's next campaign is likely going to be Spain again, either in 1810 or the spring of 1811. However, relations with Russia will be deteriorating. The 1812 war with Russia is going to happen. There will of course be issues over the Continental System and Poland/Duchy of Warsaw. Alexander II might be more cautious about going to war but may be pressured into it by events, some of his Ministers over the course of 1819 and 1811.. Napoleon himselg may commit some diplomatic errors leading to war in 1812. It will be broadly similar to OTL with the major change of a much weaker Austria.

At the time of AI the ministers served at the emperor’s pleasure and hardly could be pressing a monarch into something he did not want to do. 😂
Especially, this applies to the Minister of the Foreign Affairs who was pretty much an emperor’s spokesman rather than a person allowed to make his own policies as was later more or less the case with Nesselrode and Gorchakov.

But, AI intensively disliked Nappy and, with a good reason, did not trust him. Which is enough for a gradual escalation of the ill feelings.

I will also cover Davout's rule of Hungary, his reforms, the harshness of his policies and increasing popularity.

Davout as a popular ruler is a rather interesting idea. Judging by the contemporary comments he had all charm of an irritated skunk. Well, perhaps his womanizing may add to his popularity because it is not quite clear what else would. Definitely not being harsh to the Hungarian nobility. 😜

 

[lucaswillen05]

At the time of AI the ministers served at the emperor’s pleasure and hardly could be pressing a monarch into something he did not want to do. 😂
Especially, this applies to the Minister of the Foreign Affairs who was pretty much an emperor’s spokesman rather than a person allowed to make his own policies as was later more or less the case with Nesselrode and Gorchakov.

But, AI intensively disliked Nappy and, with a good reason, did not trust him. Which is enough for a gradual escalation of the ill feelings.

Davout as a popular ruler is a rather interesting idea. Judging by the contemporary comments he had all charm of an irritated skunk. Well, perhaps his womanizing may add to his popularity because it is not quite clear what else would. Definitely not being harsh to the Hungarian nobility. 😜

Should have read "unpopular" though Davout may be more popular with Bonapartists. Administrative and economic reforms will win him points though,

Regarding Napoleon and Alexander, there was I think talk of a marriage between Napoleon and a Russian princess, Anna Pavloova. Obviously. om this timeline that m with Alexander feeling somewhat slighted

New Haven and London Yale University Press

Anyway, after I have dealt with the marriage of Napoleon and Marie Louise I will be moving to Davout's activities in Hungary, Napoleon's new campaign in Spain, Bernadotte's move to Sweden, the Continental System, and the breakdown of relations with Russia. Also Austrian reforms between 1810 and 1812.

 

[lucaswillen05]

Napoleon remained in Austria for some months after his victory at Znaim,, narrowly escaping an assassination attempt by Friederoch Stapps. Consideration of a dynastic union between Napoleon and a Russian princess, Anna Pavlona caused a degree of panic in Austria which feared being carved up by the Tsar and Napoleon. Napoleon had no such intention/ Having effectively neutered the Austrians he now intended to include them as a subordinate, hopefully in time-friendly, partner in his new Napoleonic Empire. After discussion with Metternich (the new Austrian Prime minister to King Ferdinand), marriage was agreed between Napoleon and the 18-year-old Austrian princess.Marie Louise. Although she had been raised to hate Napoleon and all things french it was fervently hoped that she could be persuaded as a gesture of reconciliation between France and Austria and as a dynastic union between the House of Bonaparte and the House of Hapsburg/ The former Emperor Francis II was still to be held captive in France but, over time, his conditions of captivity could be ameliorated as relations improved as anticipated.

On 10 January 1810 Napoleon amicably divorced Josephine for "reasons of state. The proxy wedding took place in Vienna at St Augustine Church with Archduke Charles, now released from captivity. This was to be his last official act before retiring, ib=n some disgrace, into private life. As John H.Gill argues in his three-volume History of the 1809 war Thunder on the Danube and his recently published The Battle of Znaim: Napoleon, the Habsburgs and the end of the war of 1809 the Archduke had never believed in the war and had always foreseen disaster. The Archduke was now scapegoated for that disaster along with Stadion who, as Gill describes, was actually responsible

The official civil wedding between Napoleon and Marie Louise has held in the Salon Carre chapel of the Louvre witnessed by the Marshals of France with Cardinal Josepeph Fesch offiating. In celebration of the wedding, numerous honours were awarded, the most important being Davout Prince of Hungary being awarded the title Duke of Znaim and 3 million livres for his key role inb the decisive battle as well as his performance throughout the 1809 campaign and at Wagram. It was Davout's 3rd Corps that had made the deciive attack on the Archduke Charles# left around the village of Beelitz, smashing through the Austrian position and pinning the Archduke's hapless and by this time collapsing army against the banks of the River Thaya

By July Marie Louise was pregnant. Napoleon fervently hoped that this would be the male heir he needed to secure his dynasty

 

[lucaswillen05]

The victory at Znaim was not a cheaply won affair by any means. In addition to the losses of Wagram Napoleon lost, according to Gill The Battle of Znaim . 14000 men. TheGerman contingents present (the Hesse Darmstadt Brigade, the Baden Brigade and 2nd Bavarian Division(under Minuccii (Wrede had been wounded at Wagram) suffered particularly heavy losses. Davout himself lost 3000 men. Casualties would have been significantly lighter had Marshal Oudinot's 2nd Corps arrived when they were expected. They were delayed due to staff errors. Consequently, the Father of the Grenadiers arrived only in the evening after the battle was won. He therefore received no special honours for Znaim but, for his good service in the 1809 Campaign, he was still awarded the title of Duke of Reggio and a large grant from the Imperial Treasury in honour of Napoleon's wedding in April 1810. Numerous other awards were also granted.

 

[lucaswillen05]

In1810 the Peninsular War continued to go well for Napoleon. The Spanish armies had largely been beaten in 1809 although the guerrillascontinued to be preblematical. In January 1810 60000 French troops comprising the corps of Victor, Mortier and Sebastiani. Aiezaga's Spanish army was simply overwhelmed . This resulted in revolution and the flight of the Spanish Central Junta to Cadiz where they were besieged. The Junta was soon replaced by a Regency Council but this could do little to change the strategic situation.

In Portugal Lord Wellington, anticipating a French invasion, began construction of the Lines of Torres Vedras in late 1809. That invasion began with Ney's Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo (April - July 1810) which was followed by a major offensive under Marshal Massena, fresh from his glory in the Austrian campaign.. Wellington took up a strong defensive position giving Massena a bloody nose at the Battle of Bussaco (September 27 1810) after which Wellington retired to the Lines of Torres Vedras for the winter. The French soon found that the Lines were all but impregnable and settled down for the winter. Tjhe Royal Navy kept Wellington supplies but thousands of unfortunate Portuguese civillians faced starvation in Lisbon with several thousand dying of malnutrition and famine. Nevertheless, the British bastion in Portugal was secure

 

[lucaswillen05]

Immediately upon his accession as Prince of Hungary in October 1809, Davout set about a radical program of reform to modernize his new and. His methods were harsh, both against his own men, executing several for looting, murder, and the rape of local women/ He was equally strict with the local population, rapidly implementing the Code Napoleon in full, along with the Criminal Code, the Code of Civil procedure the Commercial Code and the Code of Criminal Instruction. These reforms were not always universally popular. Hungarian nobility, who had sometimes profited from questionable commercial and financial dealings sometimes found that such practices were strictly punished. Court proceedings were much fairer though accused people frequently spent long periods on remand before trial. Crimes made criminal by superstition , such as witchcraft were now no longer criminal offenses. Although no always popular, by 1812 this modernization of the Hungarian state was efficiently implemented and run under Davout. By the time the 1812 War with Russia broke out the success of the modernization program, rn along French lines was starting to become apparent, despite a strong degree of residual unpopularity. Given more time the positive impact of Davout's reforms would have dramatically improved the social and economic affairs of the Principality of Hungary.

The Hungarian Insurrectio, which had performed universally poorly during the War of 1809 was abolished by the end of the year. French-style conscription was introduced with newly raised regiments organized and trained along French lines that were not trusted to remain for long Hungarian regiments were dispatched for garrison duty in the German States, Prussia, and on Walcheren following the British evacuation of the island. Many troops garrisoned on Walcheran, like the British, suffered from Walcheran Fever with hundreds of deaths. This posting was, quite naturally, unpopular with the Hungarians.

Almost as unpopular was the posting to Spain where several Hungarian regiments served between 1810 and 1812. For the most part these were line of communication, garrison and anti-guerrilla forces. None served against the British but a few units served against Spanish regulars, performing adequately but not with distinction, mostly through a lack of experience through their discipline, having been trained under Davout's watchful and exacting eye, was first class. Given more time to develop their experience Napoleon's Hungarian Regiments could have developed into a highly effective fighting force.

Sadly, this was not to be.

 

[lucaswillen05]

For the Austrians, the disastrous defeat of 1809 was a wake-up call. Though the Austrian army had performed far better than it had in 1805 the organizational change to the corps structure had not been popular with the traditionally minded Austrian military and, was, for the time being, abandoned. The key changes in 1810 were a change in command and administrative reforms. In place of the disgraced Archduke Charle the new commander was Shwarzebberg, now released from French captivity (he was captured with the main army at Znaim. The very able Radetsky whose Corps had not been present at Znaim was appointed as Chief of the General Staff, a new organization organized along similar lines to the Prussian General Staff. Radetsky began a radical reform of the ~Hofkriegsrat and a program of formally educating staff officers in the duties of the post in imitation of French and Prussian practice since 1807.

The Austrians had lost most of their non-German-speaking recruiting grounds such as Hungary. This would turn out to be of help to military reforms as now training and the dissemination of ideas could be, dfor the most part, carried out using a common language, German thereby permitting a mutual understanding and common doctrinal practice. A major German recruiting ground had also been lost. This shrank the army as Bohemian regiments were also largely disbanded, just as the Hungarian regiments were. This assisted the Austrian exchequer despite the crippling war reparations. A smaller, leaner Austrian army could, given time, be shaped into something far more practical and efficient than the old army.

How much time Schwarzenburg and Radetsky would actually have before a new war remained to be seen,.. Equally important was whether the young and thrusting Radetsky could overcome the strength of Austrian conservatism. Radetsky would certainly attempt to push through further reforms

 

[lucaswillen05]

Radetsky and Schwarzenberg implemented a number of reforms in 1810 and 1811, modernizing Austrian drill, staff training and organizational structure. With many of the non German-speaking areas now in French hands some, albeit highly cautious efforts to appeal to Austrian nationalism could be made similar to the reforms in Prussia following the 1806 - 07 defeat. Similar to the Prussian reforms increased emphasis was placed on military education and opening up lower officer ranks to the middle classes. Archduke Charles' disciplinary reforms were likewise continued improving conditions for the ordinary soldier. Training for the Landwehr was stepped up. The Corps structure was, in early 1811 re-branded as Abteilung. Despite increased training for staff officers, the army's grand tactical doctrine remained clumsy though the corps structurehad proved durable in 1809

Apart from innate Austrian conservatism the main impediment to reform was lack of funding due to the expense of previous wars and war reparations demanded by Napoleon. Metternich would use his influence to reform the economy and tax systems which served to ameliorate the financial pressure on the Austrian state but the economy remained poor throughout 1810 and 1811 thereby limiting the needed military funding for truly effective reforms.

Nevertheless, the Austrian army of 1812 was a more homogenous, better trained, and more efficient organization than the army of 1809. Under Radetsky as Chief of Staff procedures were streamlined, while not to the same level as Prussia or France. The real strength was that the army was, for the first time a truly Germaan force though what would happen if lost territories were recovered remained to be seen.

 

[lucaswillen05]

In 1811 JosephbCount Wallis was appointed Finance Minister, taking measures to improve the economy, recalling old papr notes and coins for "Redemption Nonds , The bew legal tender would be used for taxation, payment of government salaries, pensions,. The new policy was initially helpful to those living on fixedincomes but failed to bring down prices/ It did help slash military expenditure alongside other measures such as Bellegarde's military pay freezes, hiring troops out for public works, reduction of rations, freezing the production of weapons and uniforms while old stocks were depleted

The loss of the non-German speaking areas and Bohemia allowed the disbanding of the Hungarian Regiments, the Gewnzer, and the Bohemian regiments hereby reducing expenditure on the army but many officers were retained on half-pay to permit a rapid future expansion in the event of war/

As demanded by Napoleon the Landwehr had been stood down. The generals disliked this "popular force" but the men were kept on the books to be used to form the 4th battalions of the German Regiments in the event of war. Conscription laws remained in force being utilized to call up and train reservists for annual three to for week training periods. This was intended to permit a rapid expansion of the army using trained manpower should war break out/

These policies served to ameliorate the fiscal challenges to a degree while retaining some capability of trained manpower permitting future rapid expansion of the army

 

[lucaswillen05]

The distinctly out of favour Bernadotte who had disgraced himself so badly at Wagram (there were rumours, according to Marbot, that Napoleon had in fact dfired Bernadotte on the field of battle_through the rout of the Saxon Corps and his post-battle Order of the Day praising the Saxons was just off to take up his new posting when some rather unexpected news arrived. There was something of a succession crisis in Sweden where the childless Charles XII following the death of Prince Charles August of Denmark (his adopted heir) was looking for a successor. Charles XII. Following a period of court and international intrigues, Baron Morner nominated Bernadotte who was considered surprisingly acceptable to all parties. For Napoleon, it was, perhaps, a means of ridding himself of a Marshal who had become a serious embarrassment. He agreed on the condition that Bernadotte would never take up arms against France, a promise that would, in due course, be broken by \Bernadotte. In November 1810 Bernadotte officially became Crown Prince of Sweden

 

[lucaswillen05]

By the end of October 1810 it was clear to Massena that he was not going to penetrate the Lines of Torres Vedras. He could not winter out in the open , decidng to withraw to winter quarters between Santarem and Rio Major. Elsewhere in Spain, the Siege of Cadiz continued until a British relief force inflicted a sharp defeat on Victor at Barossa (5 March 1811) The Anglo Spanish did little to exploit the victory allowing Victor to renew the blockade.. Badajoz and Olivenza fell to Soult in March but this was insufficient to resolve Massena's supply problems. Massena retreated in March 1811, fighting a series of rearguard actions against Wellington.

The French position in Spain was more of a stalemate by March 1811. It would take Napoleon's personal intervention to improve the situation/ At the end of #~March Napoleon left Paris with the Imperial Gaurd, leaving Davout in charge of observing the apparently stable situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Napoleon's destination was Spain and, specifically the #Portuguese border. Would Wellington clash with the greatest commander of the era and what would the result of such a battle be?

 

[lucaswillen05]

On May 3 1811 Napoleon, with the Imperial Gaurd and Massena's Army of Portugal caught up with Wellington at Fuentes d'Onoro/ The first day of the battle saw ferocious fighting for the village. May 4 was spent recovering and considering plans for a renewed battle which began at first light on May 5 with a surprise attack on the elite British light Division by Montbrun and three infantry divisions (Solignac, Mermet and Marchand) under the personal command of Massena while Napoleon himself pinned Wellington at Fuentes d'Onoro. The Light Division made a fighting withdrawal suffering heavy casualties against well-coordinated and sustained combined arms assaults. At 2.30 PM the Imperial Gaurd stormed the village of Fuentes d'Onoro forcing a difficult retreat for Wellington across the River Coa.It required all of Wellington's generalship to save his army though heavy losses were incurred in the process

Wellington, for the first time in his career, had suffered a serious military defeat. As he ruefully commented, "Boney was here and we were beat".

A few days later, on 16 May, Marshal Soult won a similar victory against Beresford at Albuera employing similar tactics to those employed at Fuentes d'Onoro/ The Spanish Contingent under Joachim Blake was particularly badly mauled ass was Colbourne's Brigade who were caught in line by Polish cavalry. Hoghton's Brigade gallantly sacrificed itse;lf in a rearguard action immortalized by the last stand of 57th Foot immortalized by the dying words of their commander, Colonel Inglis, exorting his regiment to "Die hard 57th, die hard!"

For the second time the British army retired into the Lines of Torres Vedras/ With Napoleon himself present and two serious defeats in ten days it appeared hat the Peninsular Campaign was ending in failure with Wellington seriously contemplating evacuation from Portugal. Then, on ay 28 at his headquarters in Badajoz Napoleon reced news that the diplomatic situation with Russia had deteriorated badly in his absence, Russia was opeenly fluting the Continental Sstem, trading with Britain With the Royal Navy openly operating in the Baltic, Alexander II suggesting that Russia would flout treaty commitments and leave the Continental Syster=m and the Swedes also lukewarm Napoleons presense in Paris was urgently required. With the Spanish campaign apparently wo, Napoleon felt that his Marshals in the theatre could handle the mopping up. On June 2 Napoleon, with the Imperial Gaurd, began the return journey to Pais. By the end of the month Napoleon was back in Paris, handling the development of the Russian Crisis which, a year later, would lead to war with Russia.