While not wanting to dismiss the terrible crimes of other fascist powers, Naziism to me had a uniquely high level of genocidal evil and expansionist aim, not just in practice but inherent in its ideology. What if a different populist right wing autocracy took over in the absence of Hitler? One that was more in line with Italian, Spanish and Portuguese fascism? How would that have made German decisions differently and what are the implications for the international system?
More "normal" right wing authoritarianism takes over in 193ps Germany
- Thread starter Socrates
- Start date
The standard go-to answer on this board is von Lettow-Vorbeck takes over with a "conventional" far-right autocratic regime. The whole thing/world will get rabidly anti-communist as one probability.
On the top of my head one scenario is that we see a USSR trying to spread the revolution violently, promting a the fromation of a right european bloc (including Franco-German rapprochement).
Edit: Forgot a word.
With respect to foreign policy, what distinguished Hitler from other European autocrats of his day was his willingness to risk a big war in order to obtain a relatively small advantage. This difference in foreign policy was, in turn, a function of the character of National Socialism. That is, in sharp contrast to the corporatist autocracies of countries such as Spain, Portugal, Austria, and Poland, which were conservative in both theory and practice, and pre-war Fascism, which was totalitarian in theory and rhetoric but largely conservative in practice, the National Socialist regime of our time was explicitly revolutionary.
So, if we replace Hitler with someone who thought and acted like Franco, Salazar, Dollfuss, or Pilsudski, we would get a Germany that, while eager for rearmament, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, union with Austria and the Sudetenland, and perhaps even the recovery of Danzig, would pursue those goals in a more measured manner. Likewise, if we replace Hitler with someone like Mussolini, we would get a Germany that, notwithstanding a great deal of bluster, would be much less likely to practice the sort of brinkmanship that, in the end, led to the outbreak of the Second World War.
So, if we replace Hitler with someone who thought and acted like Franco, Salazar, Dollfuss, or Pilsudski, we would get a Germany that, while eager for rearmament, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, union with Austria and the Sudetenland, and perhaps even the recovery of Danzig, would pursue those goals in a more measured manner. Likewise, if we replace Hitler with someone like Mussolini, we would get a Germany that, notwithstanding a great deal of bluster, would be much less likely to practice the sort of brinkmanship that, in the end, led to the outbreak of the Second World War.
Having mulled it over and having read your list of Dictators and Strongmen (I had forgotten how many there were) of the era, I have a possible scenario in mind:
- After one crisis too many, the Weimar Republic dies a quiet, unmourned death in '32. A "Government of National Salvation" lead is instituted by Lettow-is-too-stereotypical (seriously...Papen is too frail, Schleicher too backstabby [nomen est omen in this case]).
- It declares that "Germans everywhere must be united" and "Death to Communists!"
- To further the first point, they deploy a mixture of threats and bribes to the various countries with German minorities (i.e. Poland, Czecheslovakia, France, Yugoslavia, Lithuania)
- Anschluss (and subsequent poaching of the Sudetenland) is only in the Cards if the WAllies of WW I show strong unwill to enforce the the VT. Sudetenland may result in compensation to Czecheslovakia.
- Against the Commies, they'll probably try to form an Alliance of Proper Westerners, including Franco, Salazar, Dollfuss (if not Anschlussed), Horty, Pilsudski, Mussolini
- Membership of France depends on internal political development. Afaik, France could have gone both ways.
- They sit there, concernded with themselves, rearming a bit...
- Uncle Joe decides that Poland/Finland/Western Europe looks weak and and ripe for revolution and invades, triggering ATL WWII
- Afterwards, you get a World Order which is far more static than ours
Would von Lettow and the DNVP be able to be populist enough to come to power? One gets the impression they were rather aristocratic and did not appeal to the common man the way someone like Mussolini did.
How aggressive would he be in taking territory from Austria, Bohemia and Poland? Would Britain and France be more understanding with a "conventional" autocratic conservative than they would be to Hitler?
How aggressive would he be in taking territory from Austria, Bohemia and Poland? Would Britain and France be more understanding with a "conventional" autocratic conservative than they would be to Hitler?
More aggressive than a lot of people think. During the Rhineland crisis it was the "autocratic conservative" von Neurath who held his nerve, not Hitler or von Blomberg.
Austria hadn't been doing well economically and there was probably a genuine (if slightly smaller than the Nazi figures) majority in favour of German reunification. Conservatives would have been more hesitant but probably eventually moved in the same direction as the Nazis. If they restored the German monarchs, might even win over people like Janka and the old conservatives.
Goebbels was very good at propaganda and convinced a lot of people that the Czechs were discriminating against the Sudeten Germans but even a less talented propagandist could have put that point across (it helped that the Czechs were, slightly!) A more moderate "autocratic conservative" regime might even have attracted Liechtenstein into association with them rather than Switzerland. Might have done slightly better up until 1938 in fact!
Where Hitler convinced the Western allies that he couldn't be trusted was when he moved in and occupied the rest of the Czech lands. Up to then, he had been more or less given the benefit of the doubt that his desire was for German reunification rather than territorial aggrandisement.
Danzig had a genuine majority in favour of reunification with Germany and Lithuania was in no real position to refuse the return of the Memelland, particularly as Stalin was starting to get assertive. Probably seen as an acceptable price to pay for Germany guaranteeing their independence and remaining borders.
However Germany got away with a lot under Hitler because, at the time, a lot of people thought that the obliging Austrian was much preferable to a resurgence of Prussian militarism. And Hitler co-operated more with the Poles than any Weimar regime, right up until he was ready to strike. The "autocratic conservatives" probably less duplicitous.
Britain generally felt Germany had been hard done by however and, as long as the face of the regime was not an Anglophobe or a caricature Prussian, probably would not have strongly objected. And France wasn't willing to act without British support. Right wing in both countries wanted Germany as a bulwark against Stalin's Russia.
However a more conservative regime might have stopped at that. Polish corridor too big a risk at this time. Bargaining chip at some later point if Poland needed German help against Russia. We have regained much of the lost territories already. If Mussolini under more pressure over Ethiopia TTL with Germany seen as less of a threat, might bargain over territorial readjustments in Tyrol in return for support....
That's a good point about the populism, but on the flip side, weren't Hindenburg and others within the conservative "establishment" wary of Hitler and the Nazis, only giving them a chance because all the other political factions had failed to maintain control of the situation? So maybe they'd have thrown their full weight behind somebody like von Lettow or the DNVP to an extent that they initially didn't for the Nazis. (I suppose a question to be considered in that scenario is whether it strengthens the hand of the Communists if they seem to be the only place to go for populist resistance.)
Britain and France were actually pretty patient with Hitler for a long time - I'm not sure if they didn't realize quite what a lunatic he was or if they just hoped he could be kept under control anyway. Given that they allowed Hitler to take Austria and part of Czechoslovakia without going to war, I imagine they'd at least have let a more conventional autocrat do the same if he chose to push the issue. My guess is that if the Germans had stopped there and otherwise left the rest of the world alone, Britain and France would have reluctantly tolerated the situation.
A related question might be what this does to the general pro-democracy consensus in what we now think of as the West. Of all the pre-1990 NATO members, only three - Greece, Portugal, and Spain - were at one point or another under an undemocratic government, and Spain didn't join NATO until after the Franco regime was gone. What happens if NATO, or some other version of the anti-communist bloc, also includes dictatorships in Germany, Italy, and Austria? Or Poland, if they haven't fallen under Soviet domination?
I discussed this in a soc.history.what-if post back in 1997...
***
A couple of weeks ago, I mentioned that I had been reading *Hitler's Thirty
Days to Power: January 1933* by Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., of Yale
University. As I mentioned, Turner emphasized that as of the beginning of
1933, Hitler's ascension to power was far from inevitable--in particular he
thinks it would never have happened if Schleicher had been more astute, or
if Gregor Strasser had split the NSDAP, etc. In his last chapter, Turner
goes on to consider the most likely alternative to Hitler--a military
regime. (As he notes, the usual consequence of failure of elected
government in interwar Europe was a military or semi-military regime, not
the triumph of a fascist movement. In fact, the latter did not happen in
peacetime anywhere except Germany and Italy.)
He thinks that the results of a German military regime (which btw would be
able to take credit, just as Hitler did in OTL, for the economic recovery
that was already under way in January 1933) would be as follows:
(1) No official anti-Semitism (let alone the Holocaust).
(2) There very likely would have been another war, but only with Poland.
The generals had no great desire for Alsace-Lorraine--the Alsatians and
Lorrainers had from their viewpoint made very poor Germans from 1871 to
1918. Nor were the generals much interested in Austria and the
Sudetenland. Finally, they did not dream of Lebensraum in the East and did
not harbor hostility to the USSR. In fact, they had been working with the
Soviet military for years to circumvent the disarmament clauses of the
Versailles Treaty.
(3) With respect to Poland, things were different. The generals, like most
other Germans, did want the Corridor back, and the Poles were unlikely to
yield on this. So a German-Polish war was likely. But it is doubtful that
this would have been a *world* war. A great deal of prior provocation on
Hitler's part was necessary to have Britain and France issue guarantees to
Poland. By holding on to limited demands (which it could justify on
grounds of self-determination, especially for Danzig and much of the
Corridor), Germany could probably avoid British or French intervention.
Soviet intervention would be avoided, as in OTL, by giving the USSR eastern
Poland (or if you prefer, western Ukraine and western Belorussia). But in
order to avoid western intervention, the Germans would allow a Polish state
to remain (shorn of some territories, such as the Corridor). Essentially,
everyone would be satisfied with the results except the Poles--and even
they of course would fare much better than in OTL.
(4) As mentioned, he doesn't think a triumphant Germany would turn on the
Soviet Union. He doesn't devote much attention to the other
possibility--the USSR invading Germany--but this seems unlikely. This
would involve military conflict not only with Germany but potentially with
Britain and France as well (which in this TL enjoy reasonably good
relations with Germany).
(5) Without a war in Europe, Turner also doesn't think there would be a
Pacific War. China was not sufficient to cause such a war. It was only
after Hitler had defeated the Dutch and French, greatly weakened the
British, and forced the USSR to concentrate its troops in Europe that Japan
became sufficiently emboldened to strike against the Western powers,
including the United States.
(6) Finally, the German military regime, though it could have lasted a
considerable time, would be unlikely to long survive its dominant
personality. Eventually, the generals would have fallen out among
themselves and republicanism would have reasserted itself. (I don't think
Turner gives sufficient attention to the possibility that National
Socialism might have reasserted itself in such an event. The fact that
Hitler was in eclipse at the end of 1932, and that his comeback in January
of 1933 was not inevitable, does not mean that he might not have staged a
*later* comeback after the eventual fall of a German military regime.)
As I said, this last chapter of the book (Chapter 7--"Determinacy,
Contingency, and Responsibility") interests me because it has one of the
few extended treatments of counterfactual history I have seen by a
professional historian.
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/q_BF1kUdBHs/vE1thhuMqGcJ
***
Later in that thread I argue that the remilitarization of the Rhineland and an end to the military restrictions of Versailles were inevitable with or without Hitler:
An end to the military restrictions of the Versailles agreement and to the
demilitarization of the Rhineland were inevitable with or without Hitler.
Hitler's actions in the Rhineland were not as risky as they seemed, but he
could have played it even safer by simply declaring the 14,000
Landespolizei in the Rhineland incorporated into the German Army. (There
were in fact plenty of armed paramilitary and police units in the Rhineland
by 1936.) The chances of France intervening were small in any event, but
there is no way they would have intervened to prevent a "remilitarization"
that would simply have changed the uniforms of German personnel already in
the Rhineland. Then, once the principle of German full sovereignty in the
Rhineland was established, the number of troops could gradually have been
increased.
(I don't know why Hitler didn't choose this low-risk approach to
remilitarization. Probably it was--as James Thomas Emmerson suggested in
his book *The Rhineland Crisis: 7 March 1936*-- because he
wanted a *dramatic* proof to the Germans that their "slavery" had
ended--troops marching across the bridges, aircraft over the Cologne
Cathedral, etc.)
The truth is that Britain--and without Britain, France was unwilling and
perhaps unable to act alone--was not willing to go to war with *any* German
regime for actions taken on German soil. If they weren't willing to do so
with Hitler, they certainly wouldn't with a less menacing regime. By the
1930's the West had a bad conscience over Versailles, and any German regime
would have capitalized on this fact. Even before Hitler came to power, in
December 1932. the Western powers recognized in principle Germany's right
to parity in armaments.
To quote Turner (p. 82): "Although exactly what that concession would mean
in practical terms remained uncertain, it cleared the way, in Schleicher's
view, for formation of a compulsory militia that would serve as the first
step to the resumption of universal conscription. He planned, that is, to
commit his cabinet to the cause of rearmament and reap the political credit
for ending Germany's military impotence."
BTW, don't forget that a military regime (whether headed by Schleicher or
someone else) would have had a perfect bargaining weapon with Britain and
France: "If our regime falls, the Nazis or Communists will take over." In
other words, if in OTL Hitler could earn credit in the West for being an
alleged "bulwark against Bolshevism" the German military regime could claim
to be a bulwark against both Naziism and Bolshevism.
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/q_BF1kUdBHs/bhkrQm1DwssJ
***
To this I would only add that
(1) In Germany, establishing a conservative-authoritarian regime would not even require any obvious coup d'etat; President Hindenburg's power to rule by decree provided a "legal" basis for transition to authoritarianism.
(2) Of course the regime will crack down hard on the KPD but that doesn't mean it will necessarily have bad relations with the USSR. (Which, remember, did not border on Germany and did not control any territories claimed by the mainstream German Right.) Even if the USSR considers the regime "fascist"--the KPD was already referring to Germany as a "maturing" fascist dictatorship under Bruening!--this need not make much difference in Soviet-German relations. As Stalin said in 1934, "Of course, we are far from being enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany. But it is not a question of fascism here, if only for the reason that fascism in Italy, for example, has not prevented the U.S.S.R. from establishing the best relations with that country." https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1934/01/26.htm
***
A couple of weeks ago, I mentioned that I had been reading *Hitler's Thirty
Days to Power: January 1933* by Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., of Yale
University. As I mentioned, Turner emphasized that as of the beginning of
1933, Hitler's ascension to power was far from inevitable--in particular he
thinks it would never have happened if Schleicher had been more astute, or
if Gregor Strasser had split the NSDAP, etc. In his last chapter, Turner
goes on to consider the most likely alternative to Hitler--a military
regime. (As he notes, the usual consequence of failure of elected
government in interwar Europe was a military or semi-military regime, not
the triumph of a fascist movement. In fact, the latter did not happen in
peacetime anywhere except Germany and Italy.)
He thinks that the results of a German military regime (which btw would be
able to take credit, just as Hitler did in OTL, for the economic recovery
that was already under way in January 1933) would be as follows:
(1) No official anti-Semitism (let alone the Holocaust).
(2) There very likely would have been another war, but only with Poland.
The generals had no great desire for Alsace-Lorraine--the Alsatians and
Lorrainers had from their viewpoint made very poor Germans from 1871 to
1918. Nor were the generals much interested in Austria and the
Sudetenland. Finally, they did not dream of Lebensraum in the East and did
not harbor hostility to the USSR. In fact, they had been working with the
Soviet military for years to circumvent the disarmament clauses of the
Versailles Treaty.
(3) With respect to Poland, things were different. The generals, like most
other Germans, did want the Corridor back, and the Poles were unlikely to
yield on this. So a German-Polish war was likely. But it is doubtful that
this would have been a *world* war. A great deal of prior provocation on
Hitler's part was necessary to have Britain and France issue guarantees to
Poland. By holding on to limited demands (which it could justify on
grounds of self-determination, especially for Danzig and much of the
Corridor), Germany could probably avoid British or French intervention.
Soviet intervention would be avoided, as in OTL, by giving the USSR eastern
Poland (or if you prefer, western Ukraine and western Belorussia). But in
order to avoid western intervention, the Germans would allow a Polish state
to remain (shorn of some territories, such as the Corridor). Essentially,
everyone would be satisfied with the results except the Poles--and even
they of course would fare much better than in OTL.
(4) As mentioned, he doesn't think a triumphant Germany would turn on the
Soviet Union. He doesn't devote much attention to the other
possibility--the USSR invading Germany--but this seems unlikely. This
would involve military conflict not only with Germany but potentially with
Britain and France as well (which in this TL enjoy reasonably good
relations with Germany).
(5) Without a war in Europe, Turner also doesn't think there would be a
Pacific War. China was not sufficient to cause such a war. It was only
after Hitler had defeated the Dutch and French, greatly weakened the
British, and forced the USSR to concentrate its troops in Europe that Japan
became sufficiently emboldened to strike against the Western powers,
including the United States.
(6) Finally, the German military regime, though it could have lasted a
considerable time, would be unlikely to long survive its dominant
personality. Eventually, the generals would have fallen out among
themselves and republicanism would have reasserted itself. (I don't think
Turner gives sufficient attention to the possibility that National
Socialism might have reasserted itself in such an event. The fact that
Hitler was in eclipse at the end of 1932, and that his comeback in January
of 1933 was not inevitable, does not mean that he might not have staged a
*later* comeback after the eventual fall of a German military regime.)
As I said, this last chapter of the book (Chapter 7--"Determinacy,
Contingency, and Responsibility") interests me because it has one of the
few extended treatments of counterfactual history I have seen by a
professional historian.
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/q_BF1kUdBHs/vE1thhuMqGcJ
***
Later in that thread I argue that the remilitarization of the Rhineland and an end to the military restrictions of Versailles were inevitable with or without Hitler:
An end to the military restrictions of the Versailles agreement and to the
demilitarization of the Rhineland were inevitable with or without Hitler.
Hitler's actions in the Rhineland were not as risky as they seemed, but he
could have played it even safer by simply declaring the 14,000
Landespolizei in the Rhineland incorporated into the German Army. (There
were in fact plenty of armed paramilitary and police units in the Rhineland
by 1936.) The chances of France intervening were small in any event, but
there is no way they would have intervened to prevent a "remilitarization"
that would simply have changed the uniforms of German personnel already in
the Rhineland. Then, once the principle of German full sovereignty in the
Rhineland was established, the number of troops could gradually have been
increased.
(I don't know why Hitler didn't choose this low-risk approach to
remilitarization. Probably it was--as James Thomas Emmerson suggested in
his book *The Rhineland Crisis: 7 March 1936*-- because he
wanted a *dramatic* proof to the Germans that their "slavery" had
ended--troops marching across the bridges, aircraft over the Cologne
Cathedral, etc.)
The truth is that Britain--and without Britain, France was unwilling and
perhaps unable to act alone--was not willing to go to war with *any* German
regime for actions taken on German soil. If they weren't willing to do so
with Hitler, they certainly wouldn't with a less menacing regime. By the
1930's the West had a bad conscience over Versailles, and any German regime
would have capitalized on this fact. Even before Hitler came to power, in
December 1932. the Western powers recognized in principle Germany's right
to parity in armaments.
To quote Turner (p. 82): "Although exactly what that concession would mean
in practical terms remained uncertain, it cleared the way, in Schleicher's
view, for formation of a compulsory militia that would serve as the first
step to the resumption of universal conscription. He planned, that is, to
commit his cabinet to the cause of rearmament and reap the political credit
for ending Germany's military impotence."
BTW, don't forget that a military regime (whether headed by Schleicher or
someone else) would have had a perfect bargaining weapon with Britain and
France: "If our regime falls, the Nazis or Communists will take over." In
other words, if in OTL Hitler could earn credit in the West for being an
alleged "bulwark against Bolshevism" the German military regime could claim
to be a bulwark against both Naziism and Bolshevism.
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/q_BF1kUdBHs/bhkrQm1DwssJ
***
To this I would only add that
(1) In Germany, establishing a conservative-authoritarian regime would not even require any obvious coup d'etat; President Hindenburg's power to rule by decree provided a "legal" basis for transition to authoritarianism.
(2) Of course the regime will crack down hard on the KPD but that doesn't mean it will necessarily have bad relations with the USSR. (Which, remember, did not border on Germany and did not control any territories claimed by the mainstream German Right.) Even if the USSR considers the regime "fascist"--the KPD was already referring to Germany as a "maturing" fascist dictatorship under Bruening!--this need not make much difference in Soviet-German relations. As Stalin said in 1934, "Of course, we are far from being enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany. But it is not a question of fascism here, if only for the reason that fascism in Italy, for example, has not prevented the U.S.S.R. from establishing the best relations with that country." https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1934/01/26.htm
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NoMommsen
Kicked
I think kind of a 'fascistoid' party would rise to ... some prominence even without Hitler, though perhaps not as much.
The DAP, DSP, DVFP and other 'völkisch' parties were founded before and without Hitler. He 'only' managed - to a grat extent due to his 'charisma' - to unite them under his command.
But the guys, who did the 'field work' for him : Göring, Strasser (both, esp. Gregor), Goebbels etc. were still around.
The DNVP and other 'traditional' rightist (beside Zentrum) were from 1931 onwards on a clear downwards part. I'm quite sure the autocrats of prussian origin would feast on such a right-wing movement to get at least some public support. In 1932 Schleicher was almost completly without such. ... not the least reason he wasn't successfull with his coup-de-etat plans with the rest of the establishment.
And as mentionend above in part :
Hitler was in his first years VERY cautious in foreign politics. In May 1933 the military as well as Neurath voted strongly for exit from League of Nations.
But Hitler delivered a 'peace'-speech.
The exit only came in october then.
Same with Rheinland-remilitarisation. as sais above : Hitler was shivering in his boots about it, while the military - who demanded it for rearmament - and the conservatives (neurath) were relativly (and righteous) cool about it.
Just my 2 cents.
The DAP, DSP, DVFP and other 'völkisch' parties were founded before and without Hitler. He 'only' managed - to a grat extent due to his 'charisma' - to unite them under his command.
But the guys, who did the 'field work' for him : Göring, Strasser (both, esp. Gregor), Goebbels etc. were still around.
The DNVP and other 'traditional' rightist (beside Zentrum) were from 1931 onwards on a clear downwards part. I'm quite sure the autocrats of prussian origin would feast on such a right-wing movement to get at least some public support. In 1932 Schleicher was almost completly without such. ... not the least reason he wasn't successfull with his coup-de-etat plans with the rest of the establishment.
And as mentionend above in part :
Hitler was in his first years VERY cautious in foreign politics. In May 1933 the military as well as Neurath voted strongly for exit from League of Nations.
But Hitler delivered a 'peace'-speech.
The exit only came in october then.
Same with Rheinland-remilitarisation. as sais above : Hitler was shivering in his boots about it, while the military - who demanded it for rearmament - and the conservatives (neurath) were relativly (and righteous) cool about it.
Just my 2 cents.
Hitler's recklessness was partly motivated by Germany's financial problems- he needed conquests to sustain his economic/rearmament model. Even a "normal" RWA authoritarian government might decided to roll the dice under those same circumstances-but perhaps with more conservative financial management under a more competent German government they could avoid that dilemma entirely? This would however necessitate slower rearmament and weaker economic recovery.
If they did subjugate Poland first, and assuming the West grudgingly tolerates that as they did Czechslovakia OTL, they might not even *need* to invade Czechslovakia. If Hungary can be persuaded to occupy Slovakia while Germany is still officially at peace/negotiating with Prague, the Czechs will be surrounded on all sides by the Germans and Hungarians and can be blockaded. The question then is whether the Western allies would regard this blockade as an act of war and declare war on Germany, or whether they'd continue to "negotiate" even while Czechia's economy is being strangled.
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