Malê Rising

I really can't wait to see where this goes, especially East Africa. I really want to know what'll happen to Franco-Russian Eritrea.

Also, what happened in Aceh?

Don't think we've heard from Aceh since the Ottomans bailed them out...

Another question: what's the fate of the Kurds in this timeline?

Thanks! You'll hear more about Aceh at the tail end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Aceh will be one of the vectors through which Islamic liberalism reaches Indonesia, with the other being the Hadhrami merchant diaspora. Although the theology of the two modernist currents will be roughly similar, their politics will be very different, with one focusing on resistance to colonialism and the other on state-building. The Acehnese state itself is drifting toward alliance with the British Malay states at this point in the timeline, and the urban merchant class is starting to demand political reforms.

Eritrea will reappear soon. Russian rule actually isn't bad for the local Orthodox Christians; in Russian attitudes of the time, religion tended to trump race, and in OTL, they were prepared to deal with Ethiopia on more equal terms than other European powers. The Russians will be quite a bit worse to the Eritrean Muslims, but on the other hand, the French will treat them well - there will definitely be a tendency for the Christians to be pro-Russian and the Muslims to be pro-French.

The Kurds... hmmm, I haven't really thought about them yet. Those who are Persian subjects are probably faring much the same as OTL, given that the changes in the Persian empire haven't been that great. Those in the Ottoman empire are benefitting from modernization and participatory government along with everyone else: the landowning families, which were angered by the Tanzimat in OTL, have been somewhat mollified by their influence over rural elections and the provincial councils. The big question is whether the Porte will play them off against the Armenians as in OTL, and whether they'll feel threatened by the Russian Turkic refugees who will settle in Anatolia. I'll have to think more about how this would play out, although much of it will happen offstage.

lol, what the hell happened to the Shona?

The Shona state was split up between the Ndebele and the Portuguese by this time, wasn't it? The contemporary maps I was working from show Matabeleland in approximately the area shown here, although obviously, the extent of King Lobenguela's control over the outlying areas was open to question. If I'm wrong about any of this, I'm certainly willing to be corrected.

(I'm assuming that Lobenguela will still be the Ndebele king in this timeline; he was born after the POD, but not long after, and the changes in this part of Africa weren't yet profound at the time he became king.)

Hmm, and Lake Karibas and Cahora Bassa have been included into the base map!

Oh hell, I always miss something, don't I? I was using a downloaded base map showing the coasts and rivers, and forgot to check for geographical changes. I'll correct that the next time I map southern Africa.
 
Eritrea will reappear soon. Russian rule actually isn't bad for the local Orthodox Christians; in Russian attitudes of the time, religion tended to trump race, and in OTL, they were prepared to deal with Ethiopia on more equal terms than other European powers. .

That's going to change over the next generation or so, innit? I'm pretty sure Pan-Slavism was more influential than Pan-Orthodoxy by 1914.

Bruce
 
Thanks! You'll hear more about Aceh at the tail end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Aceh will be one of the vectors through which Islamic liberalism reaches Indonesia, with the other being the Hadhrami merchant diaspora. Although the theology of the two modernist currents will be roughly similar, their politics will be very different, with one focusing on resistance to colonialism and the other on state-building. The Acehnese state itself is drifting toward alliance with the British Malay states at this point in the timeline, and the urban merchant class is starting to demand political reforms.

Eritrea will reappear soon. Russian rule actually isn't bad for the local Orthodox Christians; in Russian attitudes of the time, religion tended to trump race, and in OTL, they were prepared to deal with Ethiopia on more equal terms than other European powers. The Russians will be quite a bit worse to the Eritrean Muslims, but on the other hand, the French will treat them well - there will definitely be a tendency for the Christians to be pro-Russian and the Muslims to be pro-French.

The Kurds... hmmm, I haven't really thought about them yet. Those who are Persian subjects are probably faring much the same as OTL, given that the changes in the Persian empire haven't been that great. Those in the Ottoman empire are benefitting from modernization and participatory government along with everyone else: the landowning families, which were angered by the Tanzimat in OTL, have been somewhat mollified by their influence over rural elections and the provincial councils. The big question is whether the Porte will play them off against the Armenians as in OTL, and whether they'll feel threatened by the Russian Turkic refugees who will settle in Anatolia. I'll have to think more about how this would play out, although much of it will happen offstage.



The Shona state was split up between the Ndebele and the Portuguese by this time, wasn't it? The contemporary maps I was working from show Matabeleland in approximately the area shown here, although obviously, the extent of King Lobenguela's control over the outlying areas was open to question. If I'm wrong about any of this, I'm certainly willing to be corrected.

(I'm assuming that Lobenguela will still be the Ndebele king in this timeline; he was born after the POD, but not long after, and the changes in this part of Africa weren't yet profound at the time he became king.)



Oh hell, I always miss something, don't I? I was using a downloaded base map showing the coasts and rivers, and forgot to check for geographical changes. I'll correct that the next time I map southern Africa.

JE, if this is the worst mistake you make, then I wouldn't be too worried!
 
That's going to change over the next generation or so, innit? I'm pretty sure Pan-Slavism was more influential than Pan-Orthodoxy by 1914.

Bruce

I think maybe the essence of the divergent direction this timeline has gone in is to somewhat discredit the whole racialist paradigm, or at least muddy it up a lot. With confidence in white superiority cast into some doubt, societies in need of quick and dirty distinctions to rally nations to might fall back on religion in particular and culture (language, traditions) in general more than OTL. In the case of Pan-Slavism, it would be a matter of stunting the growth of this ethnic, essentially racialist, concept in favor of developing more sophisticated and subtle versions of Pan-Orthodoxy.

After all, in the Balkans, the Turks are in a stronger position to assert themselves as "protectors of the Muslims" in Christian-ruled realms. It may be all the more important to offset the erosion of the claims one can make on all the people in predominantly but not exclusively Christian Slavic lands by asserting interests in the Christian minority in predominantly Islamic lands; being picky about their ethnicity as well may defeat the purpose. Meanwhile in Africa where the Turks and Omanis cannot serve as "defenders of Islam" the French are trying to take up that mantle, challenged by the British of course!

So staying focused on Orthodoxy may give the Tsarists more leverage and more clarity as to their mission, while it also serves to underscore the essential role of the Tsar himself. Any number of political factions can claim to be Pan-Slavic, anywhere on the spectrum. But only the Orthodox religious hierarchy itself, or other Orthodox secular rulers (all of whom are currently rather abjectly dependent on the Russian Tsar at this point) could challenge the claim of the Tsar of Russia, of Moscow, of the "Third Rome," to be the natural, God-ordained supreme ruler of a Pan-Orthodox hegemony. It sets up a bulwark against the erosive tides of modernity. Which is I guess why it was set aside in favor of the more racist Pan-Slavism OTL, but here there is more being done in the sphere of updating a religious world-view to engage modernity; perhaps the various progressive forms of Islam have inspired a more creative modernization of Orthodoxy too.

Pan-Orthodoxy has its obvious drawbacks for the Russians; it is an actual obstacle in trying to integrate people like the Poles or Lithuanians (or other Baltic peoples, for that matter, they being Protestant), let alone trying to assimilate the Muslim peoples of Central Asia. But OTL shifting from a religious to an ethnic concept of the Russian Empire did not help win over any Poles anyway; the Central Asians are screwed from either perspective (and now have Turks somewhat closer and significantly stronger to inspire unrest among them, not to mention an intellectual ferment due to the modernized strains of Islam spreading among them too). But with a somewhat theocratic regime, it is possible to negotiate a partition of power whereby the potentates of a subjugated people's religion are recruited into the larger power structure--the Turks of course doing this characteristically. Can the Tsars come to some kind of accommodation with the Catholic Church regarding Poland and Lithuania, whereby the Roman Church will seek to reconcile these peoples to their status as Russian subjects in return for dignity and authority within the acknowledged Catholic parts of the realm? If it weren't for the mess the latest war with Turkey made of Russia, the short time before we're told the Great War is upon them, and my skepticism about finding wisdom among Romanovs and their cronies, I might think the Tsars might pull off greater integrity and efficiency in their empire by playing the religion card to the hilt rather than drifting away from it. As things are there won't be much time for the different approaches to make that much of a difference, but I suspect that it will always seem more sensible to stick to the confessional frame rather than flirt with the newfangled ethnic one.
 
That's going to change over the next generation or so, innit? I'm pretty sure Pan-Slavism was more influential than Pan-Orthodoxy by 1914.
In that part of the world, Pan-Slavism isn't really going to make a direct impact. :) I assume that Pan-Slavists would argue that Ethiopia should take a back seat to helping the Slavic Brethren in Europe if one goal would conflict with the other (in assigning ressources, chosing political alliances, etc.), but it still would leave the positive attitude to Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox Christians unchanged.
 
Pan-Slavism can, and did in OTL, exist alongside pan-Orthodoxy. Pan-Slavism is ultimately about unity: the notion is that all Slavs are a single culture and that they should be united under a single ruler (the Tsar, naturally). It doesn't necessarily import Slavic superiority or dominion over non-Slavic peoples; they have their own natural rulers. This is a long way from my area of expertise, and I'm willing to be corrected, but I don't recall any pan-Slavic thinkers denigrating (for example) the Greeks.

Russia in OTL provided Ethiopia with artillery, and there were Russian advisors with the Ethiopian army at Adowa. The plans for the abortive Sagallo colony of OTL included a Russo-Ethiopian alliance, in which Russia would have armed Ethiopia well beyond what any other African state had at the time. All this happened at a time when pan-Slavism was rife, so it seems plausible to me that in this timeline, a mature Russo-Ethiopian alliance, and a relatively benign attitude by Russian colonialists toward the Eritrean Orthodox population, can coexist with pan-Slavic aspirations for the "near abroad."

Not to mention that, as Shevek23 says, racial paradigms are somewhat muddied in this timeline (although they certainly still exist, and wield considerable influence over Western European colonialism), and the very modernity of "scientific" racism may make an Orthodoxy-centered, anti-modern approach more popular among the reactionaries who will dominate the Russian court in the 1880s. Of course, the various revolutionary currents in Russia will have their own ideas about religion and race, but they'll have to wait until they come to power before trying to realize any of those visions.
 
The Shona state was split up between the Ndebele and the Portuguese by this time, wasn't it? The contemporary maps I was working from show Matabeleland in approximately the area shown here, although obviously, the extent of King Lobenguela's control over the outlying areas was open to question. If I'm wrong about any of this, I'm certainly willing to be corrected.

(I'm assuming that Lobenguela will still be the Ndebele king in this timeline; he was born after the POD, but not long after, and the changes in this part of Africa weren't yet profound at the time he became king.).

The original Mutapa state was partially conquered by the Rozwi and Portuguese, the Matebele didn't completely conquer the Rozvi until the mid 1800's though.
 
Looks like Africa is going to fare better than OTL, Jonathan.

I'm impressed.

Can't wait for the next update.

My hunch on the antiwar U.S. voice is...Teddy Roosevelt (I guessed it from the hint).
 
The original Mutapa state was partially conquered by the Rozwi and Portuguese, the Matebele didn't completely conquer the Rozvi until the mid 1800's though.

The map is for 1880, so by that time, the Rozvi would be conquered. It's safe to say, though, that the Shona - especially the eastern ones in the region disputed between Portugal and Britain/Oman - will play a part in the story, and that they will make themselves heard in colonial Matabeleland.

My hunch on the antiwar U.S. voice is...Teddy Roosevelt (I guessed it from the hint).

Well, not exactly. And that's all I'll say right now.

Update hopefully tonight.
 
Ram Prasad Sharma, After the Hunger: India in the 1880s (Bombay: Prakash, 2004)

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… If the Great Rebellion was the last dying gasp of pre-colonial India, then post-colonial India was born in the Great Famine.

In the early 1870s, strange as it no doubt seemed even ten years later, famine relief was one of the chief arguments of the Raj’s defenders. The British authorities had responded quickly and effectively to the 1869 Rajputana famine of and the Bihar famine of 1873-74. In Bihar, there were almost no fatalities, and while a million people died in Rajputana, most of these were in the princely states (of which only Udaipur made any significant relief effort) or in the districts that were overwhelmed by refugees from those states. Even many critics of British rule compared the Raj’s efforts favorably with those of the maharajahs, of whom many were uninterested in famine relief and others were constrained by limited resources.

All that changed with the Deccan crop failure of 1876.

Successful as the Bihar relief effort had been, it had its critics both in London and within the Government of India, many of whom accused the provincial government of excessive spending. The colonial administration provided two types of relief in times of famine: “relief works,” or public-works projects that provided able-bodied workers with a basic ration and a small wage, and “charitable relief” for those unable to work. By 1876, it had responded to the fiscal criticism by tightening the standards for both types of relief as well as reducing the rations provided at the relief-work camps – measures intended both to impose fiscal economies and to prevent “demoralization,” or dependency, within the Indian population.

This diminished relief program was utterly unable to deal with the Great Famine. The drought of 1876 and the resulting crop failures caused hunger throughout southern India, and by mid-1877, the famine had spread to the Central Provinces and the northwest. In all, some 60 million people were affected.

To say that the results were disastrous would be an understatement. Many skilled tradesmen and their families, who were not considered poor enough to meet the more stringent relief criteria, were turned away from the camps. Those who did find places in the relief works fared hardly better, because the ration provided – one pound of grain a day for men, and less for women and able-bodied children – was insufficient to sustain life for heavy laborers. And with the qualifications for charitable relief also tightened, many who were only marginally capable of physical labor were directed to the works.

As the famine progressed, and as hundreds of thousands and then millions perished, an outcry arose not only from Indian leaders but from many British officials and civilians. William Digby, a journalist then working in India, organized a charitable fund to supplement the governmental relief programs, and wrote fiery despatches to British newspapers castigating the colonial government. When the administration confidently proclaimed that the hunger was “under control,” he responded that “a famine can scarcely be said to be adequately controlled which leaves one fourth of the people dead.” [1]

Another who joined the outcry was Sarah Child, a Dorsetshire widow who studied nursing after her husband’s death and took up a post in India, which she had developed a fascination for as a young woman. She used her immunity as an Englishwoman to confront the Regent of Hyderabad in his palace, personally shaming him into tripling his relief effort, and she did the same to British district officers and commissioners throughout the southern provinces. She was arrested and jailed on numerous occasions, but was released each time after an outcry by her supporters, who included several members of Parliament. It is estimated that, through her campaign, more than two hundred thousand people were fed – but on the scale of the Great Famine, this was no more than a drop in the bucket.

Ultimately, after the Prime Minister himself joined the chorus of outrage – famously responding to a supporter of fiscal economy with the statement that “an Empire which cannot feed its subjects has no claim to be an Empire” – the relief program was increased. The ration at the relief works was increased to a pound and a half of grain and three ounces of dhal, more funds were budgeted for charitable relief, and the Government of India began importing rice from Burma, which it had hitherto refused to do. But this was too late to prevent the hunger from being the worst to afflict India since the Skull Famine of the previous century, with a death toll somewhere between five and eight million. [2]

In the aftermath of the famine, the British government empaneled a commission, which resulted in the adoption of provincial famine codes, stockpiling of food reserves and implementation of a standard famine-relief ration of rice, sugar and pulses. The response of the Indian elites was slower, but more profound. For them, the Raj’s response to the Great Famine masked what had been hidden in the 1869 and 1873-74 crop failures: that British famine relief efforts were a matter of grace that could be withdrawn at any time, and that the debate over the life and death of Indians had been carried on in their hearing but without their participation. The famine, even more than conquest – when, at least, they had stood in their ranks and fired, and chosen which side to support – had taught them the helplessness of colonialism. Their response would be both political and religious…

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Mirza Ghulam Ahmad

… Abacarism had achieved its first foothold in India during the 1860s, brought there by Hadhrami traders who had heard of it in Mecca. It had been an Indian, in fact, who introduced Tippu Tip to Abacarist doctrines in Zanzibar. In the wake of the famine, it would be the large Indian merchant community of Zanzibar who would bring Tip’s prophetic Abacarist Ibadism back across the ocean, where its ecstatic ritual would mesh well with the apocalyptic social landscape and where its emphasis on equality and justice between ruler and ruled would answer to the people’s demands. By the early 1880s, this would give Ibadism its first significant presence in India.

At the same time, another prophetic reformer, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was himself combining Abacarism with Belloist and Mouride notions of communal solidarity. Like Tippu Tip, Ahmad claimed that he was a lesser, non-law-bearing prophet, announcing in 1882 that he had been divinely appointed as a reformer. In addition to several heterodox beliefs regarding cyclical history and the continuation of divine revelation, Ahmad borrowed Belloist pacifism, rejecting bloodshed and emphasizing the struggle for individual and communal perfection. From the Mourides, he adopted the principles of self-sufficiency and mutual support as a means of achieving social justice. [3]

These prophetic movements, combined with more conventional Abacarist thinking (if the word “conventional” can be applied at all to Abacarism), soon began to manifest themselves politically: doctrines with such strong components of social justice, democratic consultation and consensus-building could not be confined solely to the metaphysical sphere. The political Islam of the 1880s was opposed to both the excesses of British colonialism and the autocracy of the princely rulers, which it held equally responsible for ignoring the people’s needs and exacerbating the famine. In the words of Hyderabadi poet and reformer Muqtedar Khan, the district officers and the maharajahs were two sides of the same coin, and an unjust Indian ruler was no less to be opposed than an unjust British one.

It was in Hyderabad, in fact, that the reformers would score their first victory. The capital city, which had an Islamic majority (unlike the kingdom as a whole) was the largest Muslim concentration in southern India, and had a large Hadhrami merchant community in which Abacarism had taken root even before the famine. In 1882, Muqtedar Khan and other like-minded individuals formed the Hyderabad Constitutional Union, demanding an elected legislature, a bill of rights and reforms in the civil service and education. Popular unrest struck the capital in 1884, and the Nizam’s army, in which reformist officers were strong, forced the resignation of the regent and the appointment of a new regency council. This council, in turn, appointed a commission to draft a constitution, on which the reformists were represented, and created a 60-member legislative assembly divided equally between Muslims and Hindus.

The assembly was far from everything the reformists wanted – only half its members were elected, voting qualifications were restricted, and its powers were little more than advisory – but it was the first step toward democratization that had been taken in any of the princely states. [4] It was also, most likely, all that could be done without provoking the intervention of British colonial authorities, which viewed popular movements in the princely states with alarm. Nevertheless, it was a foundation that could be built upon, and an example that reformers in other states could cite.

Further north, the nascent Ahmadi movement, which had gained strength among merchants, organized around opposition to trade and industrial restrictions, which in its eyes denied India the wealth to support itself. In addition to preaching against restraints on development, the Ahmadi communities functioned as capital pools, with their members combining resources to expand their businesses and enter the industries that were available to them. These industries included the news media; in 1886, Ali Ansari, a member of this community, founded the Reform Daily, which would become one of Bombay’s leading advocates for liberal policies …

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Allan Octavian Hume

… The Muslims found common cause with their Hindu and Parsi compatriots, who were also galvanized into action by the famine. The elite discontent found a home in the Reform Association, a club which had been founded to promote Indian recruitment to the senior civil service (which was theoretically open to all races, but which at the time could count its Indian members on the fingers of two hands). By the late 1870s, the association had become a political club, advocating not only civil service reform but elected provincial governments and the elimination of all legal distinctions between British and Indian.

During the years after the famine, the Reform Association’s leaders, urged on by sympathetic members of the colonial administration, began talking about developing a comprehensive political program and a national strategy for its implementation. It took several years to iron out disagreements between leading personalities and create a draft proposal that as many organizations as possible could agree with – and several leading figures did break with the movement along the way – but in 1883, the All-India Reform Congress met in Bombay. It was essentially a shadow constitutional convention, with all the constituent groups of Indian society were represented, including the British – the ornithologist Allan Octavian Hume was among the founders, and both Digby and Child were delegates – as well as an unprecedented show of unity between Hindu and Muslim.

The Congress’ political program, announced on January 11, 1884, did not challenge British rule as such. It called for full legal equality, representation of Indians at all levels of the civil service, democratically elected governments in the provinces and municipalities, devolution of fiscal and development policy to the provincial level, and universal education administered by the provinces. They were willing to concede a special position to the British in India, and to recognize Victoria as empress, as long as the rights of Indians were respected.

The British government, which had been chastened by the famines, did respond with a few concessions. It had already established an Indian Civil Service training course in Bombay, opening the senior service to educated Indians who could not afford to spend a two-year probationary period in Britain, and in 1885, the Local Self-Government (India) Act provided for a staged implementation of elected village and city governments in several provinces. [5] These measures weren’t enough to satisfy the Reform Association, however, and at the same time were too much for many colonial officials, facing widespread opposition within the administration.

With the post-famine reforms largely stalled, the Association faced the problem of implementation. As there were no representative institutions in British India, the most effective platform for change was the civil service, and the Reform Congress resolved to create scholarships to educate promising young Indians and prepare them for the senior service examinations. It also resolved that the Indians resident in Britain should, where possible, become involved with British political parties and even seek office, in order to get access to the bodies where decisions about India’s future would be made.

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Dadabhai Naoroji

One of those who took up this call was Dadabhai Naoroji, a former prime minister of the princely state of Baroda and member of the Bombay governor’s council. In 1885, he moved to London and became active in the Liberal Party, contesting the 1886 general election in the Holborn constituency. His candidacy that year was unsuccessful, but it would pave the way for his 1892 win in Finsbury Central, making him the first Indian member of the House of Commons. [6] But even before that, the presence of a strong voice for India in British political circles would have its effect…

______

[1] Everything up to this point happened in OTL, plus or minus a few details.

[2] As compared to 6-10 million in OTL. The lower figure is due partly to the fact that the relief-works ration was increased to the full amount recommended by the Madras sanitation commissioner (as opposed to increasing it halfway, which was done in OTL) and partly to the fat that the British government, which in this timeline is incrementally more sympathetic to its colonial subjects’ concerns, intervened sooner.

[3] In OTL, the Ahmadi movement was founded in 1889. Here, in an environment where revolutionary reformism is a stronger background presence, Ahmad went public with his inspiration a few years earlier. In addition, unlike OTL, this timeline’s Ahmadis will be anti-colonial.

[4] In OTL, Travancore was the first princely state to create a legislature, doing so in 1888. The Travancore legislative council was initially appointed, with the enabling regulation being amended in 1904 to provide for elected members.

[5] In OTL, local self-government was introduced in the Madras Presidency during the early 1890s. Madras seems to have been more willing than most provinces of the nineteenth-century Raj to allow Indian political participation; there were Indians on the governor’s council from the 1860s, and had an Indian high court judge as early as 1877. This timeline’s act applies across a wider portion of India, and is scheduled to be implemented in stages between 1890 and 1905 (with the more “backward” provinces getting their local councils last).

[6] This happened in OTL, believe it or not.
 
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I am enjoying reading this TL. I look forward to reading this. Your TL keeps me interested in coming back for more. Keep up the good work Jonathan. Joho:)
 

Admiral Matt

Gone Fishin'
I'd say Shevek has a point in saying that in TTL there will not just be less pure racism, but also more sectarianism.

In Russia, as we've mentioned previously, Orthodoxy is in a more defensive position relative to Islam, both due to the strength of the Ottomans, defeat by the same, loss of much of the Caucasus to Muslim statelets, and the exposure of previously sheltered Russian Central Asia.

But the decisive factor to my mind is the budding European alliance system. Historically, the Entente was Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox, with largely quiescent Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist subjects. Against them were lined up a Protestant power ruling Catholics, a Catholic power with Orthodox and Muslim subjects, and a Muslim power ruling a few Christians.

In this timeline the French-led alliance is much more clearly Catholic-Orthodox. Italy won't want two fronts, either, and so would be likely to look to that alliance first, even if the Pope did not. And as Britain and North Germany drift into alliance, coreligiousity will certainly be one thing talked up.

The mix of governing systems and faiths made OTL World War One kind of vague on the ideology at the beginning, except being about nationalism, and nominally against aggression. Otherwise I doubt anyone would have thought to link the Germans, of all people, to the Huns. Here though the lines roughly match religious frontiers in Europe. Who knows - maybe the same will be the case in West Africa, as well.
 

Hnau

Banned
Most interesting detour in India, Jonathan, I'm glad Abacarism is leading to so many butterflies in the wider world. Now, I wonder when you'll do an installment on Indonesia...
 
I'm starting to wonder about butterflies in China and Japan, myself.

Agreed on China, what with it having a relatively large Muslim minority and a few Christian converts.

Japan, while I suppose their's probably been some minor changes, I would'nt be surprised if things are more or less as they were IOTL at the time period, atleast until the 1890's.
 

Admiral Matt

Gone Fishin'
You know, it took a moment to register, but 19th century British political ideology is a bit horrifying, isn't it?

In defense of Free Trade, Ireland is allowed to halve in population. In the struggle against wasteful spending, millions of Indians are starved or worked to death. It's less the guiding-light-of-civilization feel you still get from the most unexpected places, and a bit more whoops-we're-accidentally-Nazis.

Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I hadn't known anything beyond the Famine's mere existence. And effects, I suppose.

Colonialism bad.
 
Most interesting detour in India, Jonathan, I'm glad Abacarism is leading to so many butterflies in the wider world. Now, I wonder when you'll do an installment on Indonesia...

I'm starting to wonder about butterflies in China and Japan, myself.

Agreed on China, what with it having a relatively large Muslim minority and a few Christian converts.

Japan, while I suppose their's probably been some minor changes, I wouldn't be surprised if things are more or less as they were IOTL at the time period, at least until the 1890's.

We'll visit Indonesia fairly soon. Remember that Hadhrami merchant-diaspora vector? They're in Java too. With Indonesia a colony, and with the Ethical Policy still not even a gleam in Holland's eye, there will be fertile ground for the Abacarist message. Aceh, on the other hand, won't go Abacarist - it will follow the Ottoman example of top-down reformism, at least for the time being.

And now that I mention it, I'll also have to work out what's happening in Yemen itself - maybe I'll include something on that in the next update that features the Omani-Zanzibari empire.

I'm not so sure what's going to happen in Japan and China. My knowledge of both is a lot sketchier than it should be. I anticipate that Japan will probably be much the same up to the mid-1880s, but the emergence of a conflict with Russia over Manchuria and Korea will change things after that. China could go a few ways, but I don't see Abacarism taking hold among its Muslims - there's no readily apparent vector, and the political conditions are wrong. What seems more likely is Ottoman liberalism/reformism entering China via the Turkic peoples of central Asia, possibly during or after the Great War. I'd certainly be interested in others' thoughts on the issue - events in east Asia will mostly take place offstage, but I'll need to know what's going on there when the war starts.

You know, it took a moment to register, but 19th century British political ideology is a bit horrifying, isn't it?

In defense of Free Trade, Ireland is allowed to halve in population. In the struggle against wasteful spending, millions of Indians are starved or worked to death. It's less the guiding-light-of-civilization feel you still get from the most unexpected places, and a bit more whoops-we're-accidentally-Nazis.

Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I hadn't known anything beyond the Famine's mere existence. And effects, I suppose.

Colonialism bad.

The idea that a social safety net encourages dependency, and that the poor are just a bunch of lazy bastards who need to be incentivized during hard times by being thrown on their own (nonexistent) resources, certainly isn't unique to nineteenth-century Britain - it's pretty much the Republican Party's raison d'etre these days. Granted, it's beyond the pale now to actually let people starve to death, but if the "let him die" episode is anything to go by, a substantial part of the base wishes that weren't so.

[/political rant]

But yeah, colonialism sucks. Droughts are Mother Nature's lookout, and crop failures are mostly that as well, but in the age of steamships and railroads, famines are mostly a matter of policy, and colonialism encourages the kind of disregard for human life that allows famine-inducing policies to go unchecked. I think "accidental Nazis" is a bit over the top - it's not like the Raj wanted to kill Indians, and the British government in OTL (as in the ATL) regarded the famine as a serious failure - but the legal term "depraved indifference" fits pretty well.

Anyway, I'd be very interested in Ganesha's thoughts (and Flocc's, if he's reading) about where things are likely to go from here. One of the key differences from OTL is that the Indian Muslims will be an integral and even leading part of the early self-rule movement, rather than a peripheral part of it. In OTL, there were only two Muslim delegates to the first Indian National Congress meeting (they were outnumbered by the British); in this timeline, they are represented in proportion to their share of the population. In addition, the movement for democratization in at least some of the princely states will develop in parallel to the self-rule movement in the Raj, and Ibadism - which is notably non-sectarian - will establish a significant presence among Indian Muslims, especially in the south. I'm wondering if these trends will make India an exception to the increased sectarianism of this timeline, and if Indian nationalism will proceed somewhat like Ba'athism in OTL, with minorities being full and unreserved partners. I'd like to hear from those who know more about India than I do.
 
In fact, there was a strong friendship between the family Hugo and the House of Jerome, especially between Prince Napoleon and Victor Hugo; this strong friendship originated from the times when the Red Prince as he was called under the second Republic was in opposition to his presidential cousin (he even felicitated Hugo for his 'Napoleon le petit' speech). In July 1851, Victor Hugo wrote to the Prince:
You are, you, the true nephew, the true Napoleon, the true great heart worthy of the great name
What's more, in the aftermath of the coup, Prince Napoleon obtained the liberation of the two sons of Hugo, whom one was in 1853 asking his help in an affair (after the closure of a newspaper by order of the censorship if I remember).
Since he is become Emperor ITTL, would Victor Hugo come back in France, consider that freedom has returned?
I wonder about Hugo because his influence would be far from neglectable on politics, and culture.
 
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