Make Bataan a fortress

[imperial empire]

I've been reading Fire and Fortitude by John C. McManus and while I know MacArthurs' leadership was terrible I am shocked at how terrible it was. So that being said how would YOU with POD of 1936 defend the Philippines and what changes would be necessary both operationally and as an organization to defend them? My goal is to turn this into the 1942 version of the siege of Port Arthur for Japan. Inflicted as many casualties as possible and sucking in resources. Some examples
1) Maginot type fortifications for the Bataan peninsula and not abandoning War Plan Orange
2) More effective conscription for the Philippines
3) Investing in a smaller but more maneuver focused force to throw any Japanese landings back into the sea.

There are a few caveats and guidelines
1) You only have roughly the same resources as otl so a few extra units here or there is fine but nothing too extravagant.
2) You only command the ground forces, not the FEAF or the Asiatic Fleet. If necessary think of yourself as MacArthur but only in charge of the ground forces.
3) Bataan and Corregidor WILL fall, its just too far away from any help, but again the goal should be inflicting as many casualties and forcing Japan to divert as many resources as possible.

Good Luck

 

[marathag]

3) Investing in a smaller but more maneuver focused force to throw any Japanese landings back into the sea.

Just too much coast where landings can be made most any month ofnthe year, and the PI cannot afford the 2million man army to have a good chance at that.
With 5 divisions and forts, you might be able to hold central Luzon for a time. But you are likely not to get more than 2

But best to build a lot of cheap rifles to hand out to local militia, knowing that will be really troublesome in the future

 

[jsb]

1) You only have roughly the same resources as otl so a few extra units here or there is fine but nothing too extravagant.

You can't with OTL cash and most of what was spent was too late to help much.

I would simply have the small US garrison hold Corregidor with good supplies in deep bunkers and have the rest run south with the Asiatic Fleet (so saving most of it as well) you then send the Scouts into the hills with radios, explosives and guns (with orders not to start anything that will lead to hurting the locals before IJA does) and declare the Philippines mostly and open undefended area, sending the Philippine army home with as much of the stocks of food as payment for wages as you can?

Money and troops saved are used for the relief force you are slowly building in California.....(actually sent to North Africa)

 

[fester]

In my timeline, I had the Phillipines garrison act as the US Army finishing school for promising officers in the context of a higher level of general preparedness pre-September 1939. That meant the US garrison plus the Scouts were routinely in the field and routinely firing a lot of live ammunition which identified the problem of lots of duds and created a routine inflow of new, factory fresh ammunition to enter the magazines of the garrison even as individual and unit weapons profiency increased dramatically.

 

[Zheng He]

I think Fearless Leader deals with this issue in his TL - https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...etter-alamo-the-battle-for-wake-atoll.291180/

 

[Major Major]

The Philippine Division is mostly the Philippine Scouts, Filipino enlisted men and American officers (with some Filipino American-trained officers). Think the British Indian Army. There is one American infantry regiment, the 31st. In addition, the 4th Marines have been withdrawn from China (less the bones of Peking Man) and are available.

Therefore: The three Philippine Scout regiments (45th, 57th, and the single battalion of the 43rd) will be, as @jsb proposed, sent to lie up in the hills as the cadres of future guerilla units. The 14th Engineer Battalion (PS) and the 12th Medical Regiment (PS) will join the garrison of Corregidor, along with the 31st and 4th Marines (which is understrength, though), as they will be useful in the defense.

The Philippine Division artillery isn't all that great. The men can be used to augment the infantry, or sent to the gunnery units of the harbor forts (Corregidor, Fort Frank, and Fort Drum). The garrison of Corregidor already has two Philippine Scouts coast artillery regiments along with two US Regular coast artillery regiments.

As for the Philippine Army, it can be ordered to lair up in the hills and prepare to resist.

There are things the Asiatic Fleet and the FEAF can do, but we don't have command of them,

 

[jsb]

Therefore: The three Philippine Scout regiments (45th, 57th, and the single battalion of the 43rd) will be, as @jsb proposed, sent to lie up in the hills as the cadres of future guerilla units. The 14th Engineer Battalion (PS) and the 12th Medical Regiment (PS) will join the garrison of Corregidor, along with the 31st and 4th Marines (which is understrength, though), as they will be useful in the defense.

The Philippine Division artillery isn't all that great. The men can be used to augment the infantry, or sent to the gunnery units of the harbor forts (Corregidor, Fort Frank, and Fort Drum). The garrison of Corregidor already has two Philippine Scouts coast artillery regiments along with two US Regular coast artillery regiments.

I question if its worth keeping any of the Scouts (including coastal artillery) together rather than pretending they have all been demobilized and actually have them take as much useful stuff as they can carry and bury it in the mountains for future guerilla units (and at first just passive coastal watchers with binoculars and radios)? They should also be spread out over all the major islands rather than mostly on Luzon.

Having them fight adds very little and simply make more of them end up in POW camps rather than out in the wild and you can burn all the record (including civilian & church) to make finding or identifying them or families hard?

I question if just having the pre-war pre-build up small US garrison holding a well stocked Corregidor (with more deeper pre-war built bunkers and forts) would not hold for nearly as long denying Japan Manila as OTL with far fewer forces lost?

 

[David Floyd]

Start by expelling civilians and moving as much food, medical supplies, and ammunition as possible from day 1 of the Invasion. Don't contest the invasion at the beaches, but use screening forces to cover a phased withdrawal to Bataan with the best quality forces available, allowing the rest to fade into the countryside with their rifles/small arms.

Do literally nothing else, and Bataan/Corregidor hold out much longer, long enough to suck in IJA reinforcements and upset their timetable.

 

[jsb]

Do literally nothing else, and Bataan/Corregidor hold out much longer, long enough to suck in IJA reinforcements and upset their timetable.

If you have time is Bataan/Corregidor even the best place to defend?

Knowing that IJA/N could probably not resist attacking anything you hold in the entire chain rather than allowing it to wither especially if you have plenty of time to stock it with food would one of the more isolated (ie out of artillery range) not be even stronger?

Say Lubang Island followed by other fortified islands to the south (Agutaya, Sullano or Sulu chain)? Could small islands that require direct beach assaults not be made very strong and hard to take without massive support from the IJN?

My only reservation is that the defenders will likely end up like the men on wake after they fall to such hard fights but it might eat up the IJN forces for months to support the invasions thus reducing the early war pressure, especially if they have even limited facilities for PT boats/Subs or float planes to make Japan attack them?

 

[Blue cat]

If you have time is Bataan/Corregidor even the best place to defend?

Knowing that IJA/N could probably not resist attacking anything you hold in the entire chain rather than allowing it to wither especially if you have plenty of time to stock it with food would one of the more isolated (ie out of artillery range) not be even stronger?

Say Lubang Island followed by other fortified islands to the south (Agutaya, Sullano or Sulu chain)? Could small islands that require direct beach assaults not be made very strong and hard to take without massive support from the IJN?

My only reservation is that the defenders will likely end up like the men on wake after they fall to such hard fights but it might eat up the IJN forces for months to support the invasions thus reducing the early war pressure, especially if they have even limited facilities for PT boats/Subs or float planes to make Japan attack them?

I was under the impression that denying Japanese access to Manila Bay was helpful, so my vote would be to continue to at least hold Corregidor as long as possible ? That likely requires also holding Battan as long as possible to preclude shore based artillery from firing on Correigdor.

All that being said, I suppose if there were extra personell and material avalaible, with the benefit of hindsight fortifying some other islands might also have been helpful if only to tie down Japanese assets.

 

[David Floyd]

Well, there's definitely an argument for withdrawing from Luzon altogether, but then again, control of Manila Bay was crucial.

I'd also wonder whether the capability to transport ammunition, medical supplies, troops, etc, to other positions than Bataan really existed. Withdrawing to Bataan as I understand it was the plan from the beginning.

My opinion is that's it's better to concentrate 90,000+ men, well supplied with ammunition, food, and medical supplies, in a crucial chokepoint than it is to disperse them all over the place.

 

[Major Major]

I question if its worth keeping any of the Scouts (including coastal artillery) together rather than pretending they have all been demobilized and actually have them take as much useful stuff as they can carry and bury it in the mountains for future guerilla units (and at first just passive coastal watchers with binoculars and radios)? They should also be spread out over all the major islands rather than mostly on Luzon.

Having them fight adds very little and simply make more of them end up in POW camps rather than out in the wild and you can burn all the record (including civilian & church) to make finding or identifying them or families hard?

I question if just having the pre-war pre-build up small US garrison holding a well stocked Corregidor (with more deeper pre-war built bunkers and forts) would not hold for nearly as long denying Japan Manila as OTL with far fewer forces lost?

There are already two units of Philippine Scout coastal artillery on Corregidor. They are half the artillery component of the garrison. The more men to man the guns, the longer the island can hold out. As for the Philippine Division units, one regiment has 2.95 inch mountain guns and the other has 75 mm guns. Bury the guns, but the men might be useful augmenting the defenders of the island.

The protection of the main guns could probably be improved, but do they bear on the shore of Bataan? The fourteen inch guns on Fort Drum might be able to bear --- in OTL they fired on the Japanese invading Corregidor.

Unless the aim is to present the Philippines as welcoming the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, except for a few backwoodsmen (all those Scouts who are in the bush, waiting for their opportunity), and opposing the colonial oppressor.

 

[Zheng He]

How crucial was Manila Bay to the Japanese? I know it was important from the US perspective but once the Japanese had Singapore and other points further south, I'm not sure that access to Manila Bay was all that crucial. Keep in mind they successfully executed their entire initial war plan without any access to Manila Bay.

 

[fester]

If you have time is Bataan/Corregidor even the best place to defend?

Pretty much as denying the use of Manilla Bay is about the only useful thing the defenders can do that is more than mere annoyance to the Japanese.

 

[jsb]

There are already two units of Philippine Scout coastal artillery on Corregidor. They are half the artillery component of the garrison. The more men to man the guns, the longer the island can hold out. As for the Philippine Division units, one regiment has 2.95 inch mountain guns and the other has 75 mm guns. Bury the guns, but the men might be useful augmenting the defenders of the island.

But would it not be better to simply swap out the Scouts for the surplus men from US units and let the scouts off into the mountains to form the core of recon/resistance units?

 

[Blue cat]

There are already two units of Philippine Scout coastal artillery on Corregidor. They are half the artillery component of the garrison. The more men to man the guns, the longer the island can hold out. As for the Philippine Division units, one regiment has 2.95 inch mountain guns and the other has 75 mm guns. Bury the guns, but the men might be useful augmenting the defenders of the island.

The protection of the main guns could probably be improved, but do they bear on the shore of Bataan? The fourteen inch guns on Fort Drum might be able to bear --- in OTL they fired on the Japanese invading Corregidor.

Unless the aim is to present the Philippines as welcoming the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, except for a few backwoodsmen (all those Scouts who are in the bush, waiting for their opportunity), and opposing the colonial oppressor.

My understanding is that Corregidor did fire on Japanese units on the shore but suitable HE rounds (vs AP rounds for use against warships) were in short supply for the 12" coastal defense mortars..

I seem to recall reading that the 14" guns on Fort Drum were barely within range of the forces attacking Correigdor and the higher than expected propellant temperatures helped extend the range of the 14" guns somewhat. (Edit to add, developing a special extended range 14" shell would probably have been difficult to justify / fund pre WW2 ?)

I suppose with the benefit of hindsight issues such as these might have been addressed before WW2, although I suspect practical issues such as space in the magazines might have made it complicated to keep more HE and or extended ranged rounds on hand.

I also seem to recall reading of shortages of 3" AA ammunition that had suitable time fuses to engage higher altitude air craft. I suspect with the benefit of hindsight there might be some issues that could have been addressed although I doubt the overall outcome would have changed.

 

[marathag]

I seem to recall reading that the 14" guns on Fort Drum were barely within range of the forces attacking Correigdor and the higher than expected propellant temperatures helped extend the range of the 14" guns somewhat. (Edit to add, developing a special extended range 14" shell would probably have been difficult to justify / fund pre WW2 ?)

I suppose with the benefit of hindsight issues such as these might have been addressed before WW2, although I suspect practical issues such as space in the magazines might have made it complicated to keep more HE and or extended ranged rounds on hand.

I also seem to recall reading of shortages of 3" AA ammunition that had suitable time fuses to engage higher altitude air craft. I suspect with the benefit of hindsight there might be some issues that could have been addressed although I doubt the overall outcome would have changed.

during WWI, around 20 14" USN tubes were mated to RR platforms, some saw combat in France

with this armored gunhouse, and some operated by the Army, without the armor
Postwar, some were used for coastal batteries.
These would have been more useful in the PI.
Coastal Artilery improvements would be an easy sell to even Isolationists: they weren't pacifists. Defending the USA was an easy sell, so that's one reason while the B-14 was sold as a maritime strike platform that it was totally unsuited for.

Anyway, money could have been raised for longer ranged shells.

in the same way, more 90mm would have been an easy sell to Congress

 

[Colin Haggett]

You can't with OTL cash and most of what was spent was too late to help much.

I would simply have the small US garrison hold Corregidor with good supplies in deep bunkers and have the rest run south with the Asiatic Fleet (so saving most of it as well) you then send the Scouts into the hills with radios, explosives and guns (with orders not to start anything that will lead to hurting the locals before IJA does) and declare the Philippines mostly and open undefended area, sending the Philippine army home with as much of the stocks of food as payment for wages as you can?

Money and troops saved are used for the relief force you are slowly building in California.....(actually sent to North Africa)

Corregidor is too close to Bataan. The peninsula has to be held far enough north to be out of range of Japanese 9.45 inch siege artillery. 14 km (8.7 miles)

 

[jsb]

Corregidor is too close to Bataan. The peninsula has to be held far enough north to be out of range of Japanese 9.45 inch siege artillery. 14 km (8.7 miles)

Is it not anyway only 6.5 mi (10.5 km) wide on the South side to Ternate in Cavite from Corregidor? If they properly built up Corregidor with lots of deep tunnels/bunkers and protected gun emplacements could it not hold out against invasion for almost as long as OTL it did with Battan support but fewer defences and supplies?

 

[jsb]

These would have been more useful in the PI.
Coastal Artilery improvements would be an easy sell to even Isolationists:

I would prefer it somewhere it would more likely to work ie Wake and Guam? Once IJA is ashore it's going to win the battle on the Philippines but IJN/A landing was not that of the USN/USMC of 1944 so a well defended island that cant be outflanked and needs air/sea to suppress them might well stop them or will at least use up major elements of the IJN preventing them doing OTL expansion efforts south?