Kalter Krieg - a TL of a three way cold war

[karikon]

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I was could not answer the random question when I was trying to register.


Do you know the answere to the random qouestion ?

 

[Kongzilla]

What's the Question?

 

[karikon]

Use the ___, Luke

 

[Kongzilla]

It's "Force".

 

[Kongzilla]

The end of the Arab-Israeli War and the union of Syria and Iraq has had far reaching consequences for the Middle East, and for global geopolitics as well. While Arab nationalism had been an ideology that affected the politics of the middle east for a long time, it was only after the formation of the UAS that it actually found a country that accepted it as its own ideology. And while Baathism was not the only political movement from the Arab Nationalism branch, nor the most radical even, it would become the most important one. For many in the west “Baathism”, “Arab fascism” and “Arab nationalism” would become synonymous terms, the UAS viewed as one of the fascist Axis Powers, and thus an opponent in the Cold War. Such a view wouldn’t be baseless, as the UAS would come closer to the central European fascist powers, joining many of its organization either directly (such as the anti-Comintern Pact) or as observers (the Berlin Pact), while also entering into numerous agreements with them. But the UAS moving closer towards the Axis states was more an effect of having common opponents and interests with the fascist states, rather than being opposed to either communism or capitalism ideologically. The UAS viewed the USSR, as well as the western states as powers that stood in the way of their goal of Arab unification, but cared little for their internal politics and ideas. The Baathist’s goals were thus completely concentrated on the region of the Middle East, their leaders not having global ambitions.

Constantin Zureiq, one of the chief philosophers of Arab Nationalism

With Iraq joining the UAS and becoming the dominant power in the now two-country state (sometimes even being called “Iraq-Syria”), the Baathist ideology went through certain changes. While calling for Arab unification and heightening the sense of Arab nationalism, being Pan-Arabic in its very core, it also began as a very much Syrian creation and with Syrian-centric views, much of its early leaders and philosophers originating from Syria, being educated either in France or according to the French system, but coming to grow disillusioned with the western democratic model, considering it inadequate for Arabia. German and Italian fascism proved to be more appealing to them, with their strong sense of national unity and pursuit of ending dependency on others, as well as its emphasis on “spiritual renewal”, something many Baathists thought Arabs needed after centuries of Turkish rule followed not by independence as it happened to various European nations after the Great War, but by yet another form of foreign domination. Basing their new ideology on those concepts, while altering it in a way to better suit Arabic culture and social structures, Baathist Pan-Arabic message managed to spread across the Arab population, particularly the lower-middle class of, but not only. Other countries, as well as various Baathist parties and groups in Arab states mostly just adopted Syrian thoughts and programs, taking over also its “Pan-Arabic nature”, while trying to reduce any kinds of “country-centrisms” some home-grown philosophers and “regional nationalists” (the way those who called for the establishment of various nation-states in the Arab world rather than a single Pan-Arab one were called) had, other than pointing out certain challenges and difficulties any “Pan Arabic” state would have to face in their own neighborhood. That was also the case of Egypt, where Nasser and his “Nasserists” simply adopted Baathist ideology and gave it a different name, while also adding the issue of the Maghrab states to the Baathist agenda. Egypt joining the UAS and later losing the war with Israel badly had however significantly reduced its prestige and ambitions, the country much more concerned with internal strife, dealing with pressure from Italy and recovering from the war overall, than trying to regain its position among Arab powers. That both Italy and Germany had been, as a rule of thumb, supportive of European colonialism was an important factor in Egypt splitting off from Baathism, stopping to even use the term and using “Nasserism” all the time. This was also in fact very much okay for the Iraqi Baathists who saw the Germans and Italians as their best allies and did not want to have serious conflicts with them over the Maghrab states at all, or to stand up to protect Egypt. Leaving it as a “plaything” of Italy meant, that Baghdad would have even less opposition in the Arab world to itself.

Iraqi Propaganda poster portraying Party Chief Saddam Hussein, as Assyrian king Ashurbanipal. The Baathist propaganda machine worked hard to re-write history to promote its ideology, presenting Iraq as the continuation of Mesopotamia.

Baathism under Iraqi command would have mostly maintain its Syrian heritage and propaganda, though it wouldn’t have the same goals as Syria, nor the same spirit. Maintaining the same propaganda and using the same “thinkers and philospohers”, including those such as Michael Aflaq and other Baathism founders served to give them credibility, even though their goals for Baathism and the UAS were somewhat different. Whereas for the “Syrian branch” baathism was meant as a revolutionary ideology meant for a complete reorganization of the Middle East, and global affairs as well, the Iraqi branch was more pragmatic and perceived the UAS as the “beginning of an Arab nation state” which ought to act as an “Arab nation state” - in accordance to its national interests, not romantic nationalism. This meant most importantly that its foreign and internal politics were conducted with different goals in mind, often much to the dislike of the Syrians – though few would dare to call it “betrayal of ideas”, fearing punishment, prison, or even simple removal from the little power they still held. Whereas Aflaq and his Syrian Baathism called for the unity of “Arab Lands”, the ultimate goal being the termination of any western presence in the Middle East, destruction of Israel, expulsion of Jews and other non-Arabs, its Iraqi branch was more restrained, its goals being the unification of the Arab people, and establishing Arabia as a great power on the cross-roads of Europe, Asia and Africa – without the necessity of “complete destruction” of perceived enemies as the Syrian branch sometimes demanded. It was, in a way, a matter of priorities – where Syria saw “Arab unification” as a means to the end of “eliminating outside influence”, Iraq saw “eliminating outside influence” as a means to the end of “Arab unification”. Thus while Syria did not, and could not, look towards finding a modus vivendi and way of coexistence with the west, Iraq could do that, if it wouldn’t go against its pursued goals. That the Baathist regime formed after the Arab-Israeli war was dominated by the latter, but still held elements of the former, made it an enigma for the west, which didn’t know whether to treat this state as a long-term threat, or a genuine power possible to compromise and achieve peace with.

Michel Aflaq and Saddam Hussein, the Party leaders of the Iraqi and Syrian branches of the Baathist Party

Baathism drew extensively from European fascist ideologies, as well as from European historic experiences. These were incorporated into the philosophy, and interpreted in a propaganda way, which nevertheless had proven effective. Whereas the radical type of Syrian baathism would lead many moderates to feel more dislike than approval for it, it’s Iraqi counterpart could find more support. In the words of Abdullah Rimawi, the Baathist chief ideologist, “Arabia is 100 years behind Europe” in terms of social development, roughly at the same stage as Germany and Italy had been prior to their unification. Having “mostly” defeated the “foreign powers” which prevented the people from getting on the path leading towards “unity, freedom and independence” (like the Germans and Italians did, after the Napoleonic Wars) and effectively established their own political institutions as well as a “national elite” (the creation of the “State of Iraq”, “State of Syria”, “State of Egypt”, those being the “Prussias and Piedmonts of Arabia”), the Arab people now stood before the challenge of being united “in spirit and belief, not only in body” – being able to work together and unite as Arabs for the creation of a single Arab State, not only being united in face of foreign threats. What the Arabs now needed was, according to Baathist ideology, their own “Bismarcks and Garibaldis” who would be able to mobilize those national sentiments and reforge them into a force of unification – Arabia being united not by “blood and iron”, but “gunpowder and oil” as the UAS was mostly that – an exporter of oil and petroleum products worldwide, revenue from which was spent on maintaining its strong military.

The UAS would be among the largest global producer of oil and petroleum products.

These sentiments of course led to certain parallels being drawn, many of them not being the most pleasant. That the UAS was stylized as the “Prussia of Arabia” led many to think that it would enter a similar path of conquests as Prussia did during the German unification – the war with Israel being just a prelude. The other smaller Arab states were thus compared to the countries of South Germany - Saudi Arabia specifically being called the “Austria of Arabia”, due to it being one of the stronger opponents of UAS domination within the Arab League (that organization in turn being compared to the German Confederation, both the UAS and Saudi Arabia fighting for domination in it, UAS standing on the side of the panarabists, nationalists, republicans, various “progressives”, while Saudi Arabia supported the “traditional” Arab monarchies, Islamic religion and conservatism). The termination of the “post Sevres order” was thus of similar importance for Baghdad, as the termination of Versailles was once for Berlin. According to the Baathists, the Arab people “missed their chance” of achieving unification after the Great War, specifically because the “great revolt” was led by monarchs – a “reactionary class” whose goal was never unification, but establishing themselves as local overlords. While for the west calls for “abolishing the borders in the arab word” sounded like a call for war, the Baathists wanting to ”repeat the Islamic conquests”, for the Baathists themselves it wasn’t that – the borders were considered artificial creations brought by a western dictate, abolishing which simply would mean uniting the already existing nation, not one conquering another. Their termination would however require a consensus on both sides of any border, and that in turn requiring a change of perspective of the border by the people living on both their sides. Thus for true unity to be achieved, the “national revolution” had to take place together with a “social revolution”, which had to mean the abolishment of “backwardness and exploitation” the monarchies stood for. The UAS thus strongly supported the anti-monarchist groups in the southern arab states, but not because it saw them as geopolitical opponents. To the contrary, it saw them as natural allies and strived for uniting with them, and only the royal houses (supported by the west) and the apathy of the “non-awakened” arabs standing in their way. The UAS was also meant to act as an example of progressiveness in the region, taking similar steps to the ones the European fascist states did – huge public works programs meant to show progress, regardless of their true effectiveness. Though to be fair, many of such projects were remarkable successes – the construction of pipelines from Iraqi oil fields to the Mediterranean was both a symbolic move, as well as economically very effective one, bypassing the Suez canal, giving hope for possibly extending it even further directly to southern Europe on the seafloor. Hydroelectric power plants, damns and water reservoir projects on the Tiger and Euphrates regulated those rivers preventing flooding, providing electricity and running water and what was important – arable soil, as water diverted from the river allowed for the irrigation of deserts. This “conquered land” was an important part of the UAS land reform, the state-owned farms established there providing workplaces for the unemployed, turning them into real settled farmers. These type of moves looked good for propaganda, as well as did create a real sense of “progress” being achieved, even if most of the benefits were concentrated in the cities, which were given electricity, running water, food and with time, also local industry. This type of “revolution” was meant as a way to combat the “regressives”, who could not offer anything in competition, great wealth being accumulated in the hands of a few and used to bribe those small groups who stood up to the regime.

Al-Bakr dam on the Euphrates river in Iraq. Large scale infrastructural projects meant to combat unemployment and once finished, producing massive revenue and other benefits, were yet another concept brought from fascist Europe to the UAS.

The presence of the UAS was a rather large problem for the monarchies from the Arab peninsula, as the royal families strongly feared the Baathist and their republicanism - the secular, republican ideology directly threatening their livelihood. The population there was much more supportive of it though, and the royals were the first target for Baathist organizations. The southern regimes thus found themselves in an increasingly difficult spot, having to oppose both their own population, and their tough, northern neighbor. The Arab League, formed originally as means of maintaining British influence in the Middle East, but which drifted away with time from that as the monarchies fought off British colonial presence and influence, would become among other things, a group meant to “contain” the Baathist threat. While Syria had been a strong opponent of the organization, much of it leaders considering the necessity of an “All-Arab” revolution to occur and the impossibility of a single Baathist state to exist for an extended period of time due to the lack of resources and population, Iraq had more favorable view of it, seeing it as potentially possible to be used to spread baathism among the arab world, or at least creating some sort of Arab unity, even between monarchist and non-monarchist countries. Thus whereas Syria was non-active in the Arab league since its independence, the Iraqi-led UAS took a much more active role within that organization, cynically obstructing efforts at fighting anti-monarchist sentiments while refusing to be restrained by it. Baghdad did believe that it can in fact maintain the UAS as an Iraqi-Syrian union state for an extended period of time thanks to its oil wealth, and more importantly – that their state would serve as the best proof of baathism being successful and thus attracting other Arabs to follow the ideology and strive to establish it in their own countries – even if it meant having to fight against their local “overlords”.

Arab League summit in Riyadh in 1976. The UAS was often considered a “pariah state” by other Arab countries, but it nevertheless held significant influence among them.

The relation between Baathism and Islam was a complex one. Officially Baathism proclaimed itself as a secular ideology, detached from any religion, being irrelevant to the issue of personal beliefs. A number of Baathists considered it actually necessary for “real Baathists” to be atheistic and outright hostile to religion – the various religious conflicts between Arabs groups, most importantly between the Sunni and Shia Muslim, being one of the main reasons Arabs found it hard to unite in the past and present. Unofficially, it was incapable of abandoning Islam and gave quiet consent for the religion to be practiced, even supporting Imams and Mullahs who preached Islamic teachings in line with baathism. The ideology, like all fascist ones, was inherently based on emphasizing “traditional culture” and idealizing “past glory” – in the case of Arabs, their culture and glory being all based on Islam. Thus it was impossible for any ideology stressing the importance of “combining traditional ways with progressive ones” not to adopt some of the products of past culture, even of religious origin. Sharia law, Islamic morality, glorification of past religious warriors (especially the ones who fought the “crusaders”) were thus all incorporated into Baathism. This of course never meant that the UAS leadership was in any way directed by religion – like its European equivalents, they only saw it as another way of controlling the population. For many Islamic fundamentalists, such treatment of the religion of Muhammad was of course unacceptable – the Baathists earning themselves the ire of not only the deeply religious southern monarchies, but also the Islamo-communists who much more closely tied religion and ideology, not hiding the connection. The latter were thus an especially hostile force to the Baathists, as much of their program was proving to more appealing to the lowest of classes from the Arab world – those who did want better livelihood, but were not willing to give up the religion of their ancestors. Thus whereas Baathism was more popular among the middle and lower-middle class, Islamo-communism found more appeal among those being even lower in the social structure.

Among the countries where Baathism quickly found considerable support was Lebanon, where Baathists held considerable influence since the country obtained independence in 1965. The Baathists quickly found themselves in conflict with both the Christian communities whom they considered “agents” of western influence, as well as the more religious Muslim groups. They were the main force which opposed any kind of “national pact” which was attempted to be reached in the multi-cultural state to prevent civil strife – and were successful at that. Lebanon, which when under French rule was one of the richer and more pleasant places of the middle east and where French administration managed to contain much of the conflicts there preventing an escalation, found it hard to cope with the newly formed democratic system, its first government managing to last only for nine months – and being the longest lasting one until the Arab-Israeli War. As many were dissatisfied with the government, opposed to the rather centralized administrative system (many of the popular political movements advocating turning Lebanon into a confederate state with a Swiss-like canton system, though that was not implemented for various reasons), their way of dealing the situation was simply to ignore the central powers and refuse to abide by new legislation, sticking to local, traditional laws. With police and the judicial administration proving incapable of remedying the situation quickly enough, the capital’s answer was to introduce more centralization. The Lebanese Army, initially a rather small formation (specifically made small to prevent giving the central authorities too much power) grew in size and influence, being dispatched to aid local administration in their efforts – even in such simple tasks as distributing water or collecting taxes in some cases. This in turn strengthened dislike for the government as well as distrust between neighboring communities – the country turning into a mosaic of various groups, many of which were barricaded in ghettoes or having their own armed militias.

Despite French attempts at disarming the population and calming down ethnic and religious tensions, Lebanon remained a highly unstable country from its foundation.

The Arab-Israeli War disturbed the fragile equilibrium that kept Lebanon peaceful through the previous years. The early Syrian successes in Israel motivated the powerful Baathist movement to take action, and since much of their members were members of the official Lebanese Army, they had the tools to do it. A popular uprising of Muslims (which’s “spontaneous character” would be heavily debated for decades to come, whether it was planned prior to the war and executed, or really just a popular uprising driven by ideological fervor) that started just a few days after the first Syrian offensive led to a silent military coup of the country, the government surrendering power to the military to “restore order”. Military rule has however proven to have political consequences, allowing the Baathists to finally get into power, something they have been denied for the past years despite being among the strongest (if not the strongest) political movement there – just not powerful enough to claim power by itself in the parliament, and not having any capacity to enter long-term coalitions. The popular uprising turned into a complete civil war after the Syrian defeat in early 1971, when the military which had de facto taken control of the country, much of which sympathized with the Baathist cause and the uprising. Demands for the military to stand down and surrender power back to the civilian authorities were in a large part ignored – with only less than a half of the Lebanese military standing beside the government. The rest, along with the Baathist rebels took up their arms against it and quickly managed to gain much success, surrounding and besieging the capital of Beirut, bombarding it with Syrian provided artillery. With much of the “loyalist” army being tied in the south, relief came too late and its offensive did not manage to lift the siege. The Lebanese government, which had initially decided to stay in the capital in order to uphold morale and counting on foreign intervention in their support , would eventually fold and decide to flee the capital going south to join it’s army. The escape was however compromised by Baathists infiltrating the government, the civilian plane on which both the prime minister and president and much of the cabinet was (along with 48 civilians and the plane’s crew) being shot down over the Mediterranean, leaving no survivors. By the time the peace conference between Israel and the UAS was taking place, Beirut has fallen, the Baathists installing their own government in the capital, the remnants of the Lebanese Army mostly deserting, retreating home to protect their own families, or joining one of the many organization and militias forming everywhere in the country. Lebanon collapsed into complete anarchy, the Baathist government not being recognized by most of the world, it’s army not being able to take or enforce control over much of the country, pre-war supplies having run out and only a little material support coming from the UAS. In the south swarms of Palestinian refugees and rebels flooded the cities and countryside, either joining the existing militias or creating their own –the most powerful and known being the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its many military wings. While the new Baathist government did request for the UAS to intervene and occupy the country, Baghdad refused, fearing what the British response would be, leaving the Lebanese people to deal with the chaos themselves.

The term “Intifada” would be coined in reference to the initial uprising, later adopted as generally referring to any “popular Arab revolt”.

The main power resisting the Baathist regime was the Lebanese People’s Army, which considered itself a successor of the Lebanese Army and later – also the Republic of Lebanon. Operating mostly in the south and west, compromising mostly of Christians (about 60% of its forces being Christian of different rites, including the Maronites) it fought a constant struggle over territory and cities, with both the Baathists as well as the Palestinians and Islamo-communists. The LPA had a certain degree of support from Israel and the UK, who perceived it as a power capable of keeping south Lebanon relatively stable, thus keeping part of the Israeli frontier safe-ish. Much like the Baathists, the LPA also requested foreign intervention from either Israel, the BCoN, or the LoN even – a call that wasn’t answered. The Lebanese civil war would take up much of the headlines of global press for years, being a ridiculous situation where the status quo was not accepted by anyone, but which was impossible to break without expected large casualties that any foreign intervention would bring. That the civil war rather quickly generated more casualties than any intervention was expected to - their numbers counted in millions by 1980 – made it an even greater failure of the international community. The expectation that the war can’t last forever and would have to end eventually – one way or other, and in the opinion of most analysists since it’s start “sooner rather than later” – did not come to fruition.

General Saad Hadad, Commander in Chief of the Lebanese People’s Army.

The UAS however never abandoned its ambitions towards and conducted its own type of work to somehow resolve the situation. With the UAS army being reformed and strengthened in the years after the war, it became more confident about asserting itself, and with the conflict in Lebanon not ending (much to the displeasure of the western societies who – it was felt –were growing more and more accepting to the thought of a foreign intervention being conducted by anyone just to end the bloodshed. As the Iraq-led UAS was able to rid itself of some of the bad reputation its previous Syrian-led incarnation had, many politicians thought that entering talks with the UAS over Lebanon and jointly taking action to end the conflict was the only way to go.

Reports of the conflict in Lebanon would often take the headlines of western newspapers.

Unofficial talks began in 1979, with a joint LoN resolution of a cease-fire between the struggling groups in Lebanon signed by the UAS, NCoN, Israel and other LoN members, being voted in on January 17th 1979. The resolution did stop the violence, but did create the hope of the first step towards that end being taken. Unfortunately, problems began already at the second step, as the UAS requested to be allowed to enter Lebanon to bring peace by force – even under international observation. That was something both the BCoN and Israel opposed. France on the other hand suggested the possibility of partitioning Lebanon into two states, together with a population transfer, with the UAS and the BCoN taking responsibility for one each. That in turn was opposed by the UAS, as much of its leadership perceived it as denying the Arab people land that was “rightfully theirs”. Baghdad misinterpreted the western lack of unity regarding Lebanon as a sign of their will and resolve weakening – and thus being vulnerable to a sudden move. With Israel also being considered unable to act unilaterally, being dependent on London regarding the use of force, the UAS took action. The decision to strike was also in part motivated by the recent change in UAS leadership, al-Bakr being replaced in the position of President of the UAS by the secretary of the Baathist Party, Saddam Hussein – the new leader needing a display of power to prove his worthiness before both the people and the state apparatus as well.

Saddam Hussein, second president of the United Arab States. Unlike most fascist states, the leaders of the UAS would not adopt any significant “titles” sticking to the term “President”. President Hussein would be known for his very populist and volkisch presentation in propaganda, rather than that of military man or a member of the “elite”.

The UAS forces entered Lebanon on December 20th 1980, officially with the consent of the (still barely recognized) government in Beirut. This move, meant place the world before a facti accompli, was done together with a huge diplomatic offensive on the western capitals and the LoN, the UAS bombarding them with countless proposals, suggestions and declarations regarding what went on – all meant to discourage western reaction. The strategy worked, but only in part, as Jerusalem would not watch idly as Lebanon was occupied by the UAS, nor accept what was unraveling – almost immediately launching a lightning fast counter-strike, while also informing the western powers it would not accept any UAS proposals until the UAS withdraws. This was a spectacular move by the Israeli Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Biegun (hebr. “Menachem Begin”) as the UAS proposals sent to London, Paris and Washington were in fact much different from each other, but close to the various suggestions and plans proposed by the western powers in the past. The aim was to cause them to bicker between each other over whose proposal was “best” or “most realistic” rather than to concentrate on what went on in Lebanon, once any answer was ready to have it be placed on a negotiations table while the UAS would have a free hand on doing what it wanted in Lebanon in the meantime. Israel’s firm stance that it would not join any such negotiations before a UAS withdrawal made Western speculations and plans null, as they were all impossible to put to practice without Israel working in that direction too – and Israel kept reminding the west of their past promises and the declarations of the UAS. The IDF moved into Lebanon from the south with the objective to secure as much territory as possible, though with orders to minimize engagements with the UAS. The Arab forces were coincidently given similar orders regarding non-engagement with the Israelis, its officers also given remarkably large privileges in signing field treaties with approached local militias. This did not prevent a number of skirmishes from occurring between the two militaries, especially in the south-east of the country, though casualties were low, only 23 killed and 58 wounded on both sides during the entire “invasion”. In just two days Lebanon was completely occupied, an undeclared ceasefire being present between the UAS and Israel – though with both sides preparing for war while disarming their occupation zones and looking for allies there. The middle east stood at the brink of yet another war.

Mieczyslaw Biegun, Prime Minister of Israel. His uncompromising stance and initiative was crucial in the battle of wits between Israel and the UAS during the Lebanon Crisis.

The goals of all sides were much different – whereas the UAS did seek to annex Lebanon, Israel sought to prevent that. Germany wanted to humiliate and weaken Israel, as well as to severe the “special relation” that connected Jerusalem and London. France and the USA just wanted for the fighting to stop, as well as to introduce a new democratic government to the country. The UK had the toughest nut to crack, having to both ensure the safety of Israel, peace in the entirety of the middle east, a change of the situation and system in Lebanon, calming down the Arab monarchies of the south – all with an occupation of Lebanon and guerrilla attacks still taking place there, with two trigger-happy forces having a stand-off there, while its own ability to use military threats impaired by the uncertain situation in Kuwait.
What was awkward, though not noticed, was the fact that neither the UAS nor Israel wanted a war with each other – merely accepted it as a last resort, though declaring things to the contrary, claiming complete willingness to protect their interests with force if necessary or provoked. This made all attempts at mediating in the conflict tough, as the mediators believed the opposing sides were much more willing to escalate the conflict than they really were. Neither was however capable of “loosing face” by backing out or down. A joint British-French-American diplomatic mission was dispatched to Baghdad, the fifteen-men group spending almost three weeks flying between Baghdad and Israel to prevent the war as well as open a dialogue. Diplomatic efforts to the same were also made in the LoN, as well as between Berlin, London and Moscow. The “armed peace” in Lebanon was a cauldron ready to burst, the locals not helping in finding a peaceful solution – to the contrary in fact, as opportunists on both sides were using the occasion before them to escalate the conflict and use it to fulfill their agenda. Mortar barrages and raids on towns and villages occupied by the opposing side or attacks on their patrols were not an uncommon occurrences, which also caused accusations of mutual provocations. Overall however, the UAS was more satisfied with the new status quo than Israel, as it well believed that it could “forcefully integrate” the part of Lebanon it held into the UAS regardless what Israel and the west did. It was Israel that neither wanted to be permanently tied with an occupation, or to have a longer border with the UAS. The UK was concerned about Israeli security, but more so about being forced to accept a facti accompli, or the effects of giving in to any UAS demands at that point. The question London raised, was what would strengthen Arab nationalism in the region (especially in the south) more: the UAS being defied and the UK together with Israel becoming once again “western imperialists” meddling in Arab affairs, the Arabs joining the Baathists out of spite for the west and in a sign of solidarity; or the UAS being allowed to be given some gains, but only once it would back out first, thus showing it that trying to bypass democratic procedures and international negotiations could not give it any benefits. The UK was a strong supporter of maintaining the existing international institutions despite their flaws and limitations, as it relied on them in part to keep its global position. It’s overall strategy of the defence of the various parts of its empire and the other realms of the Commonwealth relied not so much on the local troops and garrisons being able to withstand any aggression and resist until reinforcements arrived (the BCoN and the potential threats it faced were too large for that to be a reliable strategy), but on keeping a highly mobile and well trained military capable of annihilating any threat in a retaliatory “second strike” on the British Isles, as well as a powerful navy . Such a strategy however required a great deal of confidence and strong will, so as to maintain the resolve between a hostile first strike at any territory under it’s protection and the arrival of the “second strike” force. International support in the meantime was thus deemed important so as not to be viewed as an ”archaic empire” fighting overseas colonial wars, but as a protector of the established democratic, international order, potentially even gathering allies for its cause, giving them the “umbrella” of the BCoN to push through their own interests in the conflict area in question. This was exactly what the UK was facing now, though harder, as Israel wasn’t under UK protection per se. and the British troops still present in Israel weren’t targeted. In fact, it was Italy that would effectively ensure their safety, very strongly pushing Egypt into doing absolutely nothing for the duration of the crisis.

Edward Short, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Personally more interested in internal rather than foreign affairs, his handling of the Lebanon Crisis would be both praised and criticized for its lack of initiative, much “backroom diplomacy” and reliance on the BCoN, France and the USA in handling it.

The crisis took a step towards the worse when the UK eventually dispatched it’s Mediterranean Carrier Fleet to Israel as a sign of support, as well as began to threaten to recognize the LPA as the legitimate government of Lebanon, and to cause for the same to be done in the LoN. It was a sign of readiness by the UK for an actual war. Also, with the approval of the BCoN, the Indian Carrier Fleet set sail for the Gulf of Persia, threatening Iraq directly and showing conviction to protect Kuwait. With diplomatic attempts at preventing the Arab pendulum from swinging further succeeding, Britain was now mobilizing to push it back, speaking softly while pulling out its big stick. It’s display of “hard power” was coupled with USA “soft power” involvement – America offering considerable aid and support – material, financial, medical – to all Lebanese parties even for simply entering peace talks and giving up fighting (going so far as to straight out buy guns from armed militias) The UAS thus turned to Berlin for more diplomatic support, the Reich until that point operating from a distance and behind the scenes, to nullify the British threat. But Germany could not feel as certain in a direct confrontation with Britain as it once did, not with the west turning out to be quite united over the issue of Lebanon – and it itself certainly not wanting a war over it. The new German leadership however could not allow for an ally of Germany to be “pushed around by the Jews and their Rotshild gang in London” – in the words of chancellor von Thadden – and decided to act analogously to Britain, sending the “Sudsee Flugzeugtragerkampfgruppe” (Adriatic Sea Aircraft Carrier Battle Group) to the eastern Mediterranean in a display of strength (officially to act as escorts for UAS oil tankers going for central Europe), while also quietly suggesting for the UAS to seek a beneficial compromise – allow for free elections with LoN observers to take place while still upholding the occupation and accept one of the proposals for the new Lebanese constitution – the “confederal” one, which would allow for significant parts of the country to remain under Baathist control even after elections thanks to the proposed voting system. Germany would support this move, per usual as a way of protecting the right of nations for self-determination, thus leaving Lebanon a “grown apple waiting to fall to the Arab basket”, once Israel would withdraw and the new, internationally recognized government and state would be able to legitimately vote through “unification”.

The German Adriatic Sea Aircraft Carrier Battle Group in the eastern Mediterranean. Under von Thadden’s leadership, Germany would ignore the “gentleman’s agreement” it had with Italy regarding foreign policy in the Mediterranean zone and acted unilaterally, much to Italy’s frustration.

The “Schiller – Edwards Plan”, named after the German and American emissaries to the League of Nations tasked to handle the Lebanese conflict, would be accepted much as advertised by Berlin, despite significant Israeli grumbling. Lebanon was supposed to be divided into 112 “cantons” with free elections (in a first past the poll system) taking place while the occupation was still present to ensure its peaceful conduct. They were also meant to be guaranteed by LoN observers, and from these elections a National Assembly was to form, which was to appoint a new government, upon which both the Baathist government in Beirut and the LPA one were to disband, surrendering their powers to the new authority. Same was to happen with the few remaining militias, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization. With both Israel and the UAS having their presence gradually during the process, according to a pre-established “roadmap”, a new legitimate was to form in six months since from the signing of the Schiller-Edwards Plan (signed on the 15th of March 1981 in Geneva), a full withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon to occur within another 12 months. Israel agreed to the plan under British, French and American pressure, after being promised the Lebanese elections would be fair and the west would resist attempts at tampering with it or UAS attempts at annexation after it. The UAS agreed eventually under German pressures, who promised the elections would allow for the Baathists to come to power in Lebanon democratically and be internationally recognized, thus paving the way for a future Anschluss of Lebanon without threats of Israeli or British involvement – all the UAS would need was a little patience.

Hotel Victoria in Geneva, one of the meeting places of diplomats trying to resolve the Lebanese Crisis.

Neither of these promises would be fulfilled however. The elections were subject to significant fraud, both on the Arab and Israeli end. Israel refused to grant the right to vote to hundreds of thousands of people on the basis of them not being able to prove to be Lebanese citizens or other made up reasons, whereas the UAS would purposefully introduce people from the UAS to act as native Lebanese and settle them there, so as to give additional votes to the Baathists. While not as popular as they were years ago, they still performed exceptionally well, thanks to their unity; the non-Baathists group were able to create a common “National Bloc”, but failed to gather all the potential support they could into it, leading to their votes being divided in many cantons – the PLO had proven to be one of the most unruly parties in this regard, next to the various Islamo-communist groups backed by Moscow, which objected to the plan considerably. The result was an electoral victory of the Baathists who gathered 45 out of the 112 mandates in the National Assembly – not enough to form a majority government, not even in a coalition as numerous mandates went neither to them or the National Bloc (which gathered 38 mandates), but to various “independents” representing local communities, creating a strongly fractured parliament. The introduced “small constitution” also didn’t yet give the new central authorities much power, being thought of as a temporary measure for the duration where new institutions were to be established, in accordance to the new legislature – the legal framework to come before executive powers were granted. Staying true to the agreement though, both the Baathist government in Beirut and the LPA officially disbanded, surrendering their power to the new “national unity government” made up from most of the political factions in the National Assembly. The task of creating a new, permanent constitution along with an apolitical military and police force, as well as the reconstruction of the broken country being the first lying before it. The withdrawal of both the IDF and the UAS army began soon after the elections, though slowly, as neither side was really trusting towards the other – in fact, upholding the plan required periodical British and German pressures.

Voting in Lebanon. Adopting the first-past-the-poll system was criticized by France which feared it would lead to exclusion of much of the electorate in “countrywide” politics; the UK eased those concerns by emphasising the decentralized nature of the new Lebanese state, the “cantons” being allowed to choose their own election laws and given much self-rule.

Few believed this “temporary peace” would last. The National Assembly was incapable of conducting even the simplest reforms, its work being under constant mutual obstruction, the “national unity government” being completely disunited, cabinet members off different political parties hardly communicating with each other. Factionalism was strong, with the high ranking officials being more concentrated on keeping power in “their” cantons and relying on the still present foreign militaries there, as well as the local militias supportive of them. American aid had little effect due to the rampant corruption in the country, most of it falling into private or military hands. The cherry on top were the Palestinians and the Islamo-Communist factions, who, having failed at making themselves politically present (each managing to only win one mandate) resorted to once again using domestic violence and terrorism. With the IDF and the UAS army having their hands somewhat tied (though the former’s were tied more than less, while the latter the opposite)and the slowly created police and military being dramatically inefficient, most people believed more in doing things themselves and organizing into barricaded, closed communities, than relying on the “new free government”.

The prediction of inevitable collapse would come to fruition on March 21st 1982, when the MP’s of the Baathist Party walked out of the meeting of the National Assembly, resigning after yet another of their attempts at holding a vote of no-confidence against the National Bloc-aligned Minister of Internal Affairs Antoine Lahad was once again dismissed without a vote taking place by the President of the National Assembly. The Baathists had tried to use democratic mechanisms instrumentally on many occasions, offering multiple “constructive votes of no-confidence” on replacing cabinet members with their own loyalists, creating alliances of opportunity with various of the micro-factions in the national assembly. These failed most of the time, as the Parliament’s Presidents would not allow for them to be even voted on. Same went for attempted votes on the dismissing of either the whole cabinet or even the National Assembly itself and holding another election – the “coalition of fear” of the non-Baathists being terrified of potential results. Thus the attempt at introducing in Lebanon failed, both sides using democratic mechanisms so instrumentally, that they eventually broke. The resignation of the Baathists was followed by them invoking the right of nations for self-determination and declaring the independence of the “State of Lebanon” – the entire ruse in the National Assembly being done just to justify the declaration (legally speaking, the small constitution did not deny the right of any canton to secede from the Republic of Lebanon). A hasty referendum was to be organized to determine which of the cantons would choose to leave the Republic of Lebanon, but was immediately declared illegal by the state, action being taken to prevent it, both by the state police and the IDF. The west would too object to this move, calling it a breach of the Schiller – Edwards Plan. Germany however would display friendly neutrality towards it, pointing out that no “plan” can stand in the way of the self-determination of any people. With the UAS still not fully withdrawn and neither the Lebanese military or police being able to intervene in some areas, the referendum went ahead in the Baathist-controlled parts of the country. The IDF has been warned that it’s intervention in this “internal Lebanese matter” would cause a UAS reaction – a warning it did not heed. IDF troops did leave their bases, heading for those areas the government in Beirut had little or no control over, breaking through barricades and attacking the resisting population. The UAS did not remain idle, also moving in grabbing territory to “protect the Lebanese people’s right of self-determination from Israeli aggression” – though thankfully the relatively low number of soldiers on both sides prevented an immediate escalation of hostilities. Jerusalem called for London and Paris to uphold their promises in defending Lebanon, but both western powers were reluctant to do so – not when the UAS was not directly threatening Israel or even all of Lebanon, not with the German threat becoming real once again – the German Carrier Battle Group in the Adriatic Sea being set to full alert, the Reich declaring its determination to protect the right of nations to self-determination anywhere, especially from “The Jewish Menace”. Israel too did not have a good press in the west at the time, being considered at least partly guilty of the state of events, the idea that it used the west instrumentally to force through its agenda while not being willing to show enough good faith in the entire affair (both before, during and after the elections, Israeli meddling in the Lebanese National Assembly being a subject of much journalist investigations), and that dissolving Lebanon was the best what could happen to secure peace in the region being a common thought among political analysists and western media. Thus London and Paris expressed their dissatisfaction, broke off a number of oil and gas trade deals – but did not go to war, nor even embargo the UAS. Israel was not willing take further action without clear western support – and thus matters went their way.

UAS soldiers patrolling the streets of Tripoli.

The referendum obviously resulted in almost all of the Baathist/UAS controlled cantons choosing independence , with only six choosing to stay with the Republic – these six all being in the south east near the Golan Heights, which was thought the UAS chose not to take so as not to enlarge its border with Israel and keep the Republic of Lebanon as a buffer state (believing that given time, the Republic of Lebanon would itself demand the IDF to move out of the country). From these six the UAS peacefully withdrew. The Republic of Lebanon, now commonly known as “West Lebanon”, would not recognize the referendum or the “State of Lebanon” (now called “East Lebanon”). Diplomatic talks yielded no results, West Lebanon declaring the referendum a fraud, but not being willing for it to be repeated under any circumstance, invoking the rule of “territorial integrity” to dismiss the legality of the new country. The state itself would not exist for long, as it would last only five months before it’s new parliament voted to join the UAS as it’s third member state. Much to the displeasure of many, this secession would in fact improve the situation in West Lebanon, which could now try and begin a new “reconstruction”, albeit still facing many problems. With the Baathist Party being delegalized, so was the PLO as well as other violent militias, their members being arrested or outright exiled to the UAS – this fate also forced upon the Palestinian refugees from Israel, who would once again be forced to move from one country to another against their will, where they wouldn’t be cared about much. Lebanon did manage to introduce a new permanent constitution in later years, with a confederal character as well as a relatively competent police force – though corruption remained a big problem. The IDF would eventually withdraw from West Lebanon only in 1988, though the country would be given guarantees of its remaining territorial integrity from Israel, France and the whole of the BCoN, establishing a working relationship with all of them. Though not without problems, recovery started to take place, the country beginning to look into the future with more hope.

Division of West and East Lebanon

Arab nationalism wasn’t the only ideology to influence the political scene of the middle east. Apart from it, another powerful movement was the so-called “Islamocommunism” – a relatively new creation, combining Islamic faith with elements of Marxist doctrine. Although technically its origins went as far back as the times of the Great War, starting in Persia and the Soviets established there, it hasn’t truly developed and expanded until the 50’s during the late Stalin era, when the Middle East was seen as another domino piece of colonialism expected to fall, religious faith being seen as a motivating force for the population to take up arms and move them in the “right” direction.

Symbol of the Islamic Internationale

Islamocommunists became active during the Persian Crisis of 1958, which eventually led to the conversion of the Tudeh Party from a “traditional” Communist Party into a “Islamo-communist” one. The members of the Tudeh Party would be the one to form the majority of “Persian Government in exile”, and after the death of Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1963 – its entirety. The Tudeh Party would be strongly connected with the Communist Party of the USSR, and though it would operate legally in the USSR, it’s citizens would still be discouraged from joining it. Many still would despite that, and even making a career in Soviet ranks. The Tudeh Party would be a somewhat popular alternative for the youth of Central Asia, for whom the atheistic character of the CPSU was discouraging, though who still wanted to seek a better life in the country, Party membership being a necessity in order to do that. The 60’s were a time when the Islamocommunism rose in prominence, thanks to the conflicts in East Turkey, Pakistan, the Dutch East Indies and other areas of the globe where Muslims fought their “oppressors”. In each case, the “oppressed faithful workers” eagerly accepted Soviet guns to fight their wars, and with them, also the twisted religio-ideology. For not a few people in the USSR those were also opportunities for bettering their own careers – Muslims choosing Islamocommunism and receiving KGB or Red Army training would commonly be sent undercover to areas of conflict, training the locals in guerrilla warfare, as well as spread their propaganda and extend Soviet influence. This type of dangerous covert work would be highly prized by the USSR, providing the Red Army with firsthand experience of waging irregular warfare – experience gained in one place being put to practice elsewhere, making the Communist guerrillas among the most dangerous in any conflict they participated in. The Islamocommunists were the main power in fighting colonialism in the Muslim world, their work being felt and heard about from the shores of the Atlantic sea in Morocco to the Pacific Islands of Indonesia.

Training camp of Islamists paramilitary somewhere in Central Asia. The USSR would provide shelter, equipment and training for the “ready and willing” paramilitary groups fighting the western colonial empire, also indoctrinating them in Marists ideology.

Although present in the Arab world, Islamocommunism turned out not to be as dangerous and common as many expected it would be, once the phenomena came to the west’s attention. This was primarily attributed to the higher degree of secularization of much of the Arab societies, as well as nationalism being overall more popular – those countries still being more developed than those such as Afghanistan, Persia or the “backwater” of Pakistan. Arab nationalism arrived there earlier and once present – stayed there, often taking earlier and stronger action against Islamocommunism than the colonial powers did. This was both due to “Communism” and its “internationalism” being in clear opposition to the “Nationalism” of the Arab movement (though both technically proclaimed the goal of “uniting all Arabs”), as well as the Arab nationalists considering Muslim faith to be one of the factors that kept the Arabs back – emphasising and strengthening it having to have a negative effect on the social development of the Arab people (ironically, the slogan “Religion is the opium of the masses” would be used against the Communists in this instance). Apart from that, Islamocommunism faced the opposition of “traditional” Islam which viewed its Marxist interpretation as heresy, and the strong pro-royal sentiment many Arab people felt, particularly in the southern Arab monarchies (Marx’s prediction of the peasantry with a pro-royal sentiment and strong in religious faith being overall a “reactionary class” turning out to have much truth in it in the Arab world). Whereas Arab nationalism was particularly popular among the lower-middle class, Islamo-communism would find appeal among the lower classes, the most poor and the most uneducated – and most successful where the usual opposition to it in the form of nationalism, “organized” religion or pro-royal/pro-state sentiment did not exist – that being the non-urban areas of much of the colonized world, and the cleptocratic monarchies such as in Persia and Afghanistan. There, it only had to fight various superstitions and conservative preservationists who were de facto just apathetic – their apathy rather easily overpowered by “the zeal of the youth”. Pro-royal sentiment would be often non-existent, “royalty” itself not unusually associated with the “imperial west” (as the UK, Netherlands, Belgium and Italy were all monarchies, or in some cases, the ruling monarchs considered only puppets of the west, like in Persia or Afghanistan). It was in such conditions that calls such as “abolishment of the oppressors regime through a workers jihad” (the Islamic “holy war” being analogical to the Marxist “class revolution” – Islamo-communist doctrine usually claiming Muhammad had been “the first Marxist”, the crusades being early incarnations of “western imperialism”, etc.) was the most popular, especially with state institutions which would typically prevent militia/guerrilla structures to form being non-existent or too weak to prevent them. Islamo-communists had little problem with moving large quantities of weaponry from the USSR to neighbouring states to maintain the conflicts there – east Turkey, north Persia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. And where the means to fight were present, will to do so came with them, along with the belief that they can be used to achieve a “glorious better tomorrow”, and an improvement of their lives. Apart from providing tools of warfare, the USSR would also wage its battle for the hearts and minds, KGB-trained Mullahs being sent to those countries to preach the new religio-ideology, indoctrinating people, sending their own students further for them to keep on preaching. This had proven to be very effective, tales of “warrior-monks” who spread the “true message” of Islam and fought infidels at the same time, with the Koran in one hand and an AK-47 in the other, spreading fast ad attracting followers, not few picking up the ideology by themselves, even in such far away places as Yemen or Oman.

Despite the détente providing an opportunity for the country to reform its economy (and ideology) towards a more sustainable direction, like many of the fascist states did (as well as the western powers who reformed their colonial empires), the changes which had occurred were hardly of the type that would help Russia long term. Soviet Russia maintained its highly centralized, interventionist, central-planned economic model and did not introduce any kind of free-market reforms, preserving its economy in a state of steady-going decline and obsoleteness. Production plants of every type were protected from any competition, whether foreign–not even from the other countries of the COMECON - or internal. Their management was not oriented towards consumers, but towards the plans provided to them from superiors. Those superiors in turn had no way of knowing what the popular demand for various consumer goods was, maintaining the population in a state of poverty. Smuggle and “black market production” became very lucrative businesses, not a few entrepreneurs managing to sell even average-quality consumer goods smuggled from the fascist states or manufactured illegally for precious metals, jewels or works of art, which would later be moved out of the country and sold in the west for small fortunes. The leaders of Soviet economic planning were unable to learn of the changing trends, leading to organizational failures, as plans intended for a long time would be changed in rapid succession, preventing anything what was started to be ended. Such poor economic coordination was just as true for common goods, such as line of actually functional and quality-made water boilers being suddenly ended after just a few months (making them highly prized in the country) to large infrastructural projects – metal structures meant for bridges rusting away in the countryside.

“Bridge to nowhere”. Started and unfinished construction projects would often decorate the Russian countryside.

Technological innovations such as radios, television, affordable books and press as well as general education and a relative freedom of travel within the USSR had made the population completely aware of their situation, as well as that which was beyond the “anti-fascist wall” in the west. This knowledge led to a decline of the morale of the workforce, which saw no benefit in its work. Their efforts were in vain, as were those of their parents, as despite already decades having passed since the revolution, social conditions have become only remotely better – urbanization causing simply more people to live in cramped housing made mostly from large concrete blocks, the quality of those quarters not improving. While electricity and running were provided and made available, the quality of tap water was very much questioned (as it was often contaminated due to poor sanitation techniques) and electrical appliances hard to obtain. Petty theft from workplaces soared, as did other types of “crimes of opportunity”. Alcoholism became a national scourge, affecting all parts of the society – the efforts at creating an skilled workforce, and educated class of specialists and a powerful army being undermined by low morale and not able to compensate the poorly functioning economy, which could not use created talents. Military production was the only branch of industry that remained fully operational and effective, but even there, the fruits of the work were nil, as the USSR would replace old weaponry with new one, but in old weaponry being either given out for free to the “international struggle” and when sold – rarely above their production/maintenance price.

Soviet weaponry would be extremely common all around the world, being even sold-off by anti-colonial forces in the “third world” to terrorist groups in western Europe.

The agricultural sector was one among the most spectacular failures of the Soviet economy. The blacksoils of Ukraine, which many Nazis looked towards as their “Lebensraum” ad estimated them as being able to feed billions of people when properly managed, were wasted under collectivist agriculture, unable to feed even the few hundred million of Soviet citizens. Malenkov’s reforms allowed for small parts of otherwise uncultivated land to be leased to private people (known as “Worker’s Allotment Gardens”), reaching 4% of the arable land of the USSR – those few percent making about a quarter of the USSR’s total food production, often sustaining the people with hoarded food during winter. In the 70’s, the USSR had become a net importer of food, its rising population being urbanized, but the relatively shrinking rural population not being able to keep production sufficiently rising despite the benefits of the Green Revolution. Poor redistribution and organizational chaos had also led to much waste, of crops either not being harvested from the fields, or never making it to the market, rotting in silos.

Allotment Gardens would be an important part of the wealth of many families, often serving even as a place of retirement, elderly people intensively caring for the little land they were allowed to keep for themselves.

The USSR was able to maintain a cash flow thanks mostly to its sales of oil and natural gas abroad – large infrastructural projects in the far east allowing for Siberian natural wealth to be exported through the Pacific ports, mostly to the USA and other states of the Americas. But with the infrastructure declining, production becoming more costly and waste increasing, so did the price of exports – and thus, also competition. With the USA and some of the countries of Latin and South America being more vary of the USSR, the USA coming closer to joining the Cold War on the side of the “western democracies” rather than staying neutral or crafting its own “Pan-American” bloc, it was also trying to distance itself from being seen as the power to indirectly finance “communist wars”. The signing of the BAFTA treaty would become the ultimate turning point, American imports of oil and natural gas from the BCoN (particularly from Kuwait) increasing, while those from the USSR decreasing (though the USA maintained a remarkable diversity in its oil imports, buying oil also from fascist Italy, Venezuela, the Middle East, as well as maintaining domestic production in the Gulf of Mexico and continuing on German works in the creation of synthetic oil from mined coal and extraction of shale gas).

Black Thunder Coal Mine in Wyoming. America’s continued economic and population growth created constant growth on energy demand , the USA would seeking to diversify its fossil fuels imports, as well as invest in new technologies such as shale gas and oil sands.

The USSR would thus gradually lose its main source of hard currency, and with the fascist powers in Europe being adamant about not allowing any infrastructural Soviet projects to take place on their territory, or even for Soviet trade to pass through it, the USSR was feeling that it was being more and more “chocked” – and more and more in need in having to acquire “access to warm southern seas” and thus break the “surrounding coalition” of fascists and capitalists. Suslov has rekindled old hatreds, starting a new “secular tradition” (as it was ironically called) of “national hatred months” – each month being dedicated by the censorship and propaganda bureaus to be a propaganda offensive against a specific nation (usually Germany, Britain, France or Poland) on their past and present crimes, against the Russian people and others. Historic movies based on those themes would be played in public television, the press would place emphasis the occurrences in those particular countries and their actions, public officials would speak out their thoughts about them, etc. – all for the purpose of uniting the peoples through common hatred and fear.

Scene from the movie “Alexander Nevski” –a classic of film propaganda

Suslov perceived Malenkov’s foreign policy during the détente as too soft and too Euro-centric, one which had forgotten the ideals of the Soviet revolution and wrongly concentrated on European power-plays rather than furthering its goals. Malenkov’s policy of destabilizing the western democracies and collapsing their empires from the “top down” – weakening the metropolises will to keep the empires and their incentive to fight for them once a challenge would be called through supporting anti-war movements, anti-colonial movements, the social democrats calling for “less military, more welfare” and other such factions collectively described as “useful idiots” – was seen as wrong and ineffective, having given the west too much respite and allowing them to “keep what they could have lost”. The fact that the British Empire was allowed to reform into the British Commonwealth of Nations and France was allowed to keep its overseas departments were considered proof of Malenkov’s policies failing. Suslov perceived the “compromises” made between the European metropolises and their colonies as “neocolonialism” and compared it to what Marx described as “petite-bourgeois socialism”, only on an international scale rather than between classes. Just as “petite-bourgeois socialism” was considered to be ploy by the capitalists to keep the masses docile and content by providing them “scraps from the table” – higher wages, welfare benefits, some voting rights and other political freedoms – so was “neocolonialism” considered by him to be a ploy played against the colonized people, giving them the “perception of independence” and certain freedoms, but keeping full control over their capital and means of production. Thus, any struggle against the western powers could not be considered “finished and won” in any country with the western forces just withdrawing and recognizing some country’s independence, but having to be followed by a socialist revolution to remove any remaining capitalist influence in the country. As he said:



This was one of the reasons for a huge detachment between the communists and the “working people” who often perceived the same things very differently. Whereas the communists would for example consider the movement of manufacturing plants from the European metropolises to the colonies as an almost hostile act, meant to tie the colonized people with a workplace and deny them the opportunity to further advance in the social structure through the fear of being sacked while paying them scraps – the people employed in those factories would almost universally see it as a change for the better, an opportunity for social advancement and a better livelihood. Suslov was a firm believer in the necessity of having to take a “bottoms up” approach in fighting the colonial empires, through arming anti-colonial forces there and “bleeding the empires white” in long irregular wars. He kept to the belief that without the colonial possessions to sustain them, the imperial powers would collapse and fall, making way for a socialist revolution to take place. This was significantly different from Malenkov’s “top-down” approach, who saw the way of destroying the colonial empires as having to occur through the metropolises and political changes and applied pressure there. In his mind, the capitalists would never stop sending soldiers to fight colonial wars as long as there was a profit in them for it, thus such wars would only lead to the deaths of countless proletarians. If fought, they would have to be fought for a reason and used as a leverage against them, particularly for strengthening anti-colonial sentiments at home, “useful idiots” being used for that just as much as the “traditional left”. Fighting a war for the sake of fighting, even when done when not using your own manpower could not be considered a viable strategy.

The difficulties the USSR faced, and the growing discontent of parts of the population, had led many people to move away from socialist doctrines. A common direction was nationalism, particularly strong in the Ukraine. Suslov was strongly opposed to such movements, seeing them as a danger to state security, stability and integrity, the only nationalism to be allowed being Russian nationalism, meant to be used as a type of “glue” for sticking all the nations of the USSR together. Suslov did not reverse the reforms made by Malenkov in that direction, such as allowing for the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches to continue to operate under state oversight. But nevertheless, it was impossible for the USSR to truly compete in winning the Ukrainians to their side, as it faced considerable opposition – one, from the Ukrainian factions in Poland and Germany (who advocated the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state following the “inevitable final war” between fascism and communism), two, from the Ukrainian diaspora in the west, particularly strong in the USA and France. Paris had been the host of six Ukrainian World Congresses from 1965 to 1980 (those taking place in 1965, 1968, 1972, 1973, 1975 and 1979), and the “Ukrainian question” wasn’t ever a top priority for it, it would nevertheless be raised in the many diplomatic summits between the European great powers. For France, the Ukrainians had in a way taken the role the Poles had during the Great War, where championing their cause was meant as a way of gathering allies in both the east and the west (through the diaspora), in this case though – without the threat of alienating an ally, as while France did not consider Russia an enemy of great importance (with the loss of the great majority of its colonial empire, a strong ideological reason to be in conflict with each other was gone), it was far from being thought of as a partner against Germany (as France was still bitter about Soviet involvement in West and Equatorial Africas and them forcing the French out). This was an inconvenience for Moscow which mostly tried to blackwash the Ukrainian diaspora and the Ukrainian nationalists as “traitors” and “sellouts”, but found itself too often incapable of agreeing to even moderate demands for greater cultural and political autonomy brought by the more nation-conscious population. Soviet “internationalism”, when faced with “modern nationalisms” usually failed and had to resort to extraordinary measures to combat it – such as the termination of the Belarusian SSR, a move meant to end the still tiny, but growing, concept of separate Belarusian national identity before it could blossom.

Logo of the Ukrainian World Congress

Islamo-Communism had thus helped the USSR internally in the goal of weakening national sentiments in parts of the country where it hadn’t yet reached and taken root. The ideology would be used to keep the population supportive of the regime, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and to combat nationalism that may spring out there like they did in the Ukraine. The national awakening that took place there in the 50’s and 60’s was feared to be possible to spread further east, and just as Orthodoxy was deemed a potential tool to keep the people of eastern Europe together with Russia , so it was deemed that Islam could be used to the same goal – opposition towards nationalism, fascism, capitalism and liberalism. This was also exactly what allowed Islamocommunism to develop in the USSR in the first place, as it was only with time that the potential of using this combination of religion and ideology as an “offensive tool” in the “international struggle”, rather than a “defensive means”, was noticed.

A mosque in Moscow at Poklonnaya Gora. While still under heavy state control, organized religions would be allowed to operate openly, provided subjection to state authority.

The works of Constantin Zureiq, Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, Ali Shariati, and others have become very influential among the lower classes of the followers of the Prophet once released, spreading like wildfire. The successes of communism in terminating colonialism in some areas of Asia and Africa had bought the ideology credibility, and strengthened the perception of the USSR being the number one force in the global struggle against colonialism. Although it’s “pure Leninist” version did not manage to win the hearts and minds of the people outside the USSR, it’s “regional variations” based on the works of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, such as “Maoism” in China or the various “tribal socialism” ideologies in Africa, often did. Islamo-communism was thus nothing else than the regional variation of Marxism meant for the Middle East – the USSR recognizing it had much greater chances of increasing its influence by having that ideological variation of communism spread, than it would by sticking to the traditional teachings of Lenin. As many countries in the Islamic world lacked either an organized education system or industrial facilities where spreading ideology and organizing the masses was the easiest, but had a highly devout population which did attend Mosques or otherwise listen to the preachings of the clergy, those were the best gateways through which the “Islamic theology of liberation” could be spread – even more so, since Islam lacked a central authority like the Roman Catholic Church did, which could object to these type of “heresies”. The religio-ideology of “uniting all Muslims” regardless of which branch of Islam they followed and taking a pro-active stance towards the world, in contrast to the usual apathy, would quickly give results. The ongoing wars in east Turkey and Pakistan, as well as the historic victory in Afghanistan in 1972, did make Islamo-Communism, and by extension Moscow, a hugely important power in the decolonization process.

Overthrowing the Afghan monarchy in 1972 was the first great success of Islamo-communism, serving as motivation for others.

Thus Suslov’s coming to power played an important part in the rekindling of the cold war, his aggressive moves in Asia and Africa contributing to putting an end to the détente. With Turkey fighting the communist Kurds in east Turkey, Italy having to deal with growing unrest in East Africa, France having to withdraw from West and Equatorial Africas, the UK having to aid India in its fights in Pakistan – the conflicts between Islamo-communism and the European empires became more and more pivotal, even Germany experiencing the presence of African mujahedeen in Portuguese Africa and Spain having to deal with Morocco becoming the “go to” place for Islamo-communist refugees exiled from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The USSR once again began to speak more openly about assuming the mantle of the champion of anti-colonialism, no longer fighting its struggles in cabinets and palace halls, but in the cities and countrysides of colonized states. Suslov had little restrain in declaring the various fights to be “socialist revolutions”, thus also firmly announcing his support for a particular side in those conflicts. Such actions had to cause the reaction of the fascist states, Germany in particular, which had based its international prestige and status on sticking to its doctrine of “containment and liberation”, trying to stop communist expansion wherever in the world in threatened others, and pushing them back if possible. The western powers, who usually were the ones with the most interests in conflict-stricken areas, whether colonial, neocolonial, trade or investments, thus having to weight those loses against potential costs of military interventions – not being above opportunistically supporting anti-democratic anti-communist forces in various regions of the world just to protect their assets.

Persia would be a fine example of a place where the paths of the three global great powers and their ideologies collided. Since 1958, the country was ruled autocratically by the Shah Reza Pahlavi as a royal dictatorship. The Shah has strong backing of the United Kingdom and maintained an anti-communist stance, as it’s government technically wasn’t recognized by the USSR since 1958. Among the domestic supporters of the Shah were much of the military and the local fascist brigades, many of whom sought the establishment of a “total” fascist stats, complete with the complete militarization of the society, fascist legislature and economic model, propaganda proclaiming the greatness of the ancient Persian Empire etc. After 1958, the Shah continuously kept the fascists and his German connections around so as to play it and the UK against each other, seeking who would offer him more. The UK almost entirely won such “competitions”, but Germany never truly abandoned its ambitions, partly in pursuit of the oil there, partly out of simple prestige and the internally felt necessity of being present in all the corners in the world “like a proper global great power should”.

The royal family of Persia, of the Pahlavi dynasty.

Oil had been the main export of Persia, sustaining its economy, antiques being a distant second good on the exports list – the practice of selling “cultural heritage” for Pounds, Franks and Dollars being sanctioned by the cleptocratic monarchy. Both the BCoN and Persia drew significant profits from the extraction of processing of Persian oil and its export both into the countries of the BCoN and abroad. British policies of consolidation of various state-owned or partly state-owned enterprises into humongous conglomerates spanning all of the countries of the BCoN had spawned many gigantic companies, private owned, but with the BCoN members states having their own stakes or shares in them, this type of “unification” being considered a great way of keeping the BCoN together and eliminating competition between its member states, as well as reducing the feeling of “UK economic domination”, as such unification allowed for many non-UK citizens to enter the boards of these companies, many even choosing to move their headquarters out of London – the movement of industrial facilities from the “developed states” to the “developing one” being one of the trademark moves of British decolonization. This economic practice had produced giants such as the British Airways which operated up to 70% of the flight connections within the BCoN, or the British Steel, which was the fourth largest steel producer in the world. But among the most important creations was the foundation of British Petroleum, which was the result of numerous mergers and takeovers of oil companies and refineries both within the member states of the BCoN and outside them. BP, which had begun as a state-owned enterprize founded from the AIOC was partly privatized in 1956, and later done so completely in 1975, though with various countries still holding significant amounts of its shares. The company managed to obtain the assets of the Royal Dutch Shell Company, Kuwait Oil, Australian Gas and Oil Corporation and other oil companies of the BCoN countries, along with some outside it, such as Nigerian Oil. Through BP, the BCoN collectively, and the UK in specific, controlled the production and exports of Persian oil, which mostly found its way to the countries of the BCoN. The relatively low price of it was to be thanked by underhanded tactics of the British who had no problem bribing the Persians into allowing such contracts, as well as them turning a blind eye on the low wages and terrible working conditions of Persian oil workers. The nationalization of the oil industry, which was the source of the crisis in 1958, was never attempted again, the Shah being content with the enormous amounts of Pounds coming his way, though he and those surrounding him were perfectly aware that their country was de facto at the mercy of the BP board – as they couldn’t even hope on having a monopoly on oil production, the total potential production of oil in non-Persian facilities and fields owned by BP far surpassing the demand of the BCoN and other buyers.

BP Tower in London, headqurters of British Petroleum, one of the largest companies in the world.

The luxurious lives of the royal family and their suppression of freedoms in the country was the reason for much hatred aimed towards it by the population. The “westernization” the Shah proclaimed and allowed to occur in the country mostly just meant the presence of western made goods in shops, including alcohol, tobacco and pornography, deemed unethical and immoral by much of the traditional and conservative population, breeding moral decay. The “positive aspects” of westernization were almost unseen, the country not undergoing any major industrialization, electrification, construction of running water infrastructure or railways or any of these sort. Neither were political or social freedoms allowed, political opposition being banned in the years after 1958, much of which ended up emigrating and giving up on the country. By the end of the 70’s, the only meaningful and heard about opposition was the Tudeh Party and the Islamo-Communists, along with the “regular” Islamic fundamentalists. With no one else to turn to, the Tudeh Party being the only opposition with organized structures, which additionally could operate in the relative safety of the USSR and later also Afghanistan, much of the dissatisfied population opposed to the royal dictatorship came to join the Islamo-Communists, not necessarily for ideological reasons, but giving them strength nonetheless.

The non-improving economic situation, hedonism of the royal family, sales of national treasures and other ways “Persian culture” was being destroyed by the regime (such as the infamous “westernization”), growing demand for reforms fueled by the knowledge of the improving situation in even such “backwards countries” like the East African Federation, was what brought the Persian population to a demand for a revolution. While the Persian secret police had been successful in tracking down, arresting, expelling and killing political dissidents, it couldn’t really hope to catch all of them, their numbers constantly growing. The death of the Shah on 27th July 1980 brought a great new surge of hope, as not long after his death being announced, masses of Persians took to the street cheering, crying with happiness, hoping that his death meant the end of their suffering. Tears of joy would turn into tears of pain as the Persian police would sweep the streets, beating the celebrating without mercy, arresting many for such “offenses”. With the death of the Shah, the throne was assumed by his wife, Empress Farah (Shahbanou Farah Pahlavi) the first women on the Persian throne since ancient times. Her ascension was hardly celebrated, as it was her luxurious lifestyle, including supposed baths taken in milk, drinking pearls and having hairdresser and dinners brought via plane from Paris just for her, making her extremely disliked. Further, the Empress had relatively little interest in state affairs, remaining just a side and consort to her husband for years, the influential military, fearing that her “womenhood” might negatively influence the Shah’s policies, effectively managing to keep her out of much of the state’s affairs. With her taking the throne, much of the state responsibilities were thus undertaken by the new Prime Minister of Persia, Kambiz Atabai, her personal favorite.

Empress Farah and Kambiz Atabai, the Prime Minister of Persia.

Atabai was inexperienced for his political role, but still understood the state the country was in much better than the Empress, who was isolated from everyday lives of her subjects and who knew next to nothing about running the country. After being sworn into office, he began a program aimed at remedying the situation of the state, trying to live up to the expectations of the public that with the death of the “evil Shah” things would change for the better. Among his first moves was providing a great number of pardons and amnesties for political dissidents, as well conducting a number of PR manoeuvres, such as cracking down on the antiques sales, ending gossips of the fantastically rich lives of the royal family and trying to portray the new Empress as much humble (as well as trying to pin the blame for former extravagancies on the dead Shah). State press and radio would inform about the Empress visiting orphanages and selling royal jewels to gather the funds for establishing schools and such. But many of these stories were either completely made up, of outright false, as despite the urges of the new Prime Minister for reducing the costs of the court and the Empress supporting him in fighting bribery and corruption (the Empress often folding to the pleadings of the wives of accused, or even convicted criminal to pardon them, granting them de facto immunity and very negatively impacting her image once stories of this went out), she was not willing to make such sacrifices. Thus the charade of creating the image of a “good Queen” failed miserably, the hopes of change died soon, and the population went back to hating the royal regime. Atabai’s attempts at introducing social and political reforms found the resistance of the military and had proven impossible to push through the Empress; neither would he be able to gather the funds for the creation of new workplaces, the only one he managed was signing a contract on the modernization of the Abadan refinery using Persian, rather than the “traditional” Hindu workforce – that such a thing required the actions of the Prime Minister himself proving just how low Persia had fallen through the decades.

Atabai resigned from his position on 15th November 1981, following yet another conflict with the military, in which he would not get the support of the Empress, and be replaced by general , Yusuf-i-nijad, the military’s choice. And just in time for him, as soon after that, the storm over Persia would start to gather. On May 1st 1982, a large demonstration would take to the streets of Teheran, in celebration of Worker’s Day, but also as a manifestation of support for the Communist cause. Communist slogans would be what provoked the police to an excessive answer, shots being fired at the crowd, leading to the death of twelve people. While the regime tried to cover up the incident, the communists used it in a brilliant popularity move, declaring a three month period of national mourning and calling for the people not to riot or demonstrate, but to stay at hope and contemplate. In this way, the communists not only discredited the regime which forcefully tried to bring state flags up to full mast or otherwise making it look like it ignored the tragedy of the deaths from May 1st, while also using the “forced silence” on the streets as a symbol of the fact that communists, not the regime, owning the loyalty of the people – politically unconnected civilians witnessing the empty streets, lack of parties, self-imposed alcohol prohibition, coming to the conclusion that the communists had more influence over the people than the government. It also created a very powerful sense of “the calm before the storm”. A little over three months after the “Teheran massacre” another, larger demonstration took place – this time not religious, but clearly political in nature, and not only in the capital, but all across the country. And once again it was responded to with the use of force, the military being brought to the streets to clear. Yet even in the military ranks of the common grunts morale fell low, as they too well realized the decadence of the higher officer ranks and the poverty their families or neighbours lived in, feeling little loyalty to the crowned heads and not being willing to shoot at their own countrymen. The army suddenly underwent a wave of desertions following the second event in Teheran, many public officials also feeling that the regime would not survive another upheaval, preferring to gather their savings and flee while there was still time. This demoralization created a “self-fulfilled prophecy”, as the lack of belief in being able or willing to combat the “ready and willing masses” had many choose to prefer to stay out of their way, or even join them – claiming, or honestly having a change of heart after the terrible events that unfolded.

Photos of the Teheran Massacre. The shooting of workers caused a global outrage, even in the fascist countries.

The “Iranian revolution” would thus finally start in December 1981. It was organized in a remarkable fashion, the USSR concentrating its forces on the Persian border in answer to what it claimed was “the potential hazard of the collapse of order in the Persian state”. This was answered with the Persian general staff ordering to move its forces north, along with gathering reservists – who now had no intention of being forced into joining the army. On the 15th on December 1981 the communists gave the signal to start the revolution, together with a general strike, great swaths of people taking to the streets. The army, concentrated in the north, and lacking manpower, found itself incapable of stemming the tide. Fighting broke out within its ranks, as junior officers and grunts refused to accept orders from their officers, even arresting them, to be placed before a “People’s tribunal”. In Teheran, the Royal Palace was stormed by the angry masses, who looked for the endless wealth hoarded by the queen and her cabinet, in a “storm on the winter palace” fashion – only to find it empty, the Empress having fled the capital at the first knowledge of the revolution starting, her plane being loaded with Persian gold, jewels, antiques and other valuables, flying straight for Bahrain, and further, to London. With the Empress gone, the People’s Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran was proclaimed in Teheran, its leader becoming Ali Shariati. Fighting between the rebels and the few remaining pockets of military resistance would be takinf place for the next few weeks, and the Tudeh Party would move along with its members from the USSR to Persia, the “Persian government in exile” being no longer in exile and officially surrendering the vestiges of its power to the new rulership. Persia was becoming the next acquisition to the communist bloc, the world faced with a terrible shift in the local situation in the middle east.

Ali Shariati Revolutionary leader of the People’s Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran.

Immediately after the revolution had started, the local garrison of the BCoN moved into Persia to occupy the Abadan refinery, as well as the royal navy seizing Persian tankers. The new government in Teheran immediately demanded from London for the Empress and other escapees to be handed over to them, along with the stolen national wealth, and leaving Abadan as well as releasing the captured ships and other assets (such as certain bank accounts of Persian companies being frozen). Persia obtained the immediate and total support of the USSR, for which the revolution was a true godsend – the country not having had any such success on the international stage since the revolution in Afghanistan. The members of the Tudeh Party living in the USSR would be sent en masse to Persia to replace the monarchist administration, their loyalty being divided between Teheran and Moscow, providing the USSR with another power boon. It completely changed the situation in the middle east and greatly impacted all power present there, as well as the global great powers. It was highly theorized, that the UAS’s actions in Lebanon were in a large part the result of the revolution having occurred – as it feared the potential of a war with Iran breaking out soon, a islamo-communist revolution taking place in the UAS itself or Lebanon for that matter, the possibility of a connection between Teheran and Israel being found aimed against the UAS – or otherwise, that the presence of this new power would weaken the UAS strategic standing towards Lebanon. Thus Baghdad had to cut its plans in the west short, so as to be able to prepare for what was coming in the east – a clash between the two middle eastern powers, acting as proxies for the two totalitarian, opposing ideologies of fascism and communism.

 

[Incognito]

Excellent as always. One of the best TLs on this site. I do wonder how and why the Belorussian SSR was dissolved? Belorussian was a recognized language and Belorussians a recognized ethnicity in the USSR after all.

(Yes, I know the author is not on this site)

 

[Germania09]

Come on UAS

 

[Enigmajones]

Pretty weird that with a POD in the 30's, Saddam Hussein still ends up as the leader of Iraq.

 

[Kongzilla]

The détente and the subsequent rekindling of the Cold War has had rather strong effects on the internal organization and relations between the countries within the three powers bloc, as well as the foreign policy approach of them towards other states outside their groups. The relative calmness during the détente era had led to national interests to re-arise, whereas they have been hidden underneath the carpet of the greater global struggle, exposing the internal differences of the powers forming the various blocs; the restarted competition that came afterwards confirmed that the blocs were so strongly united that they were perfectly able to put their own differences aside in face of a common ideological or political enemy. It has been proven that even the Global Great Powers had very little influence over the internal affairs of each other or their close partners, being only able make difference outside Europe in the colonial and post-colonial world. No power other than France was able to change the eventual outcome of the Algerian War, not even through the Casablanca Affair; no one could come to the “aid” of the various protesters in the fascist countries, nor help Poland when it was presented with a gun to its face; no one could stop the USSR from training and supplying anti-colonial Marxists militias on its soil and export them to conflict-ridden zones. The crises of the détente era, before, and later, were completely autonomous, not affecting the greater balance of global power, the division of at least parts of the world into spheres of influence confirmed in all ways.

This did not mean that the various powers did not try to subvert the unity of the other blocs. Attempts at this were actually commonplace, though with time, being gradually less believed to be able to be successful – ranging from diplomatic attempts at preventing allies to come to the others support (such as various German threats aimed towards France for its support for Israel and the UK in the Israeli-Arab Wars) through issues of average importance, negotiations on international treaties regarding marine borders and the authority of states over their waters, to almost petty ones, such as the positioning of the various countries booths on the World Fairs, or who would support who in hosting the Olympics. This type of petrification of the system has paradoxically also resulted in a stabilization of Europe itself that has not been around since the Congress of Vienna, and it was also this awkward stability that has allowed for numerous initiatives that would be impossible to achieve in “normal” European circumstances of changing alliances to come to life – such as the Scandinavian Integration. Once it became obvious that petty national interests would not be enough to harm the greater unity of the western powers – who uniquely stood together not because of the domination of one power over others, but due to mutual interests and beliefs – it was also possible for the obvious differences between them to be revealed and dealt with, especially with both their national, and the greater global political and economic situation changing. The gradual collapse of the colonial empires, the economic growth of the western powers and the USA, the technological developments in military has created a shift in the perception of many leaders of where their countries lied and where ought they go in the approaching future.

During the time of the détente, the League of Nations would finally succeed in becoming a global organization, almost every country in the world becoming a member.

The greatest divide in the idea of what “western unity” ought to be like and about was unsurprisingly between the United Kingdom and France, the two major great powers of western Europe. The fact that their association was entirely consensual has also made them the main target for attempts of splitting them. In the other two blocs, the differences weren’t as obvious, even if they were in fact larger. The fascist bloc had from its start been a place of competition between the influence of Germany, by far the most powerful country in the bloc, and Italy, which along with its “surrogate allies” such as Poland and Hungary tried to limit the Reich’s influence within the bloc, preventing total domination. As time went by however, their ability to do so grew weaker, not stronger, as economic difficulties struck Italy and its entire fascist model was no longer more attractive than the German one (in fact, no fascist model was for most of the subjugated fascist states). The death of Benito Mussolini was the turning point that ultimately unveiled Italy’s true weakness – whereas Il Duce could speak with leaders such as Goring and Hanke as equals, holding the prestige of the “founder of fascism”, that aura covered the obsolete industry, failing agriculture, not-overwhelming education and only an average military. His death and the subsequent political chaos within the Italian Fascist Party exposed the country for what it was – not a Great Power, but a regional power, not earning the right to be treated as an equal to the Reich in any way. Italy could not lead the fascist bloc, or even parts of it as it didn’t have the strength to do it, at best it could gather allies to veto some of the moves Germany did – but even that power of resistance had limits, especially when presented with brute force – such as in Czechia in 1955 or in Poland in 1980. Neither the West nor the East dared to take action against German domination in those areas, their attempts at trying to divide the western bloc concentrating in the countries of south Europe outside Germany’s reach – Portugal, Spain, Egypt and eventually Italy itself.

The situation of the Communist bloc was different , being for a long time perceived as being completely united and impossible to subvert or defeat from the inside – the only “strategy” to that end being trying to use the Ukrainian national sentiment to drive a wedge between the Ukrainians and Russians. The solidarity the communist states displayed in face of foreign conflicts, in Indochina, Africa, the Middle East, etc. fooled many into believing the Communist Bloc was a unified fortress – whereas the truth was much more complex. While the USSR was without doubt the leader within it, the People’s Republic of China was far from being “a SSR with a different name”, and often had different interests and goals than its northern neighbor, just not showing it. This was in a large degree the fault of China’s leader, Chairmen Mao, who pursued a foreign policy which was completely not understood by any of the European or American leaders (nor for most Asian either). While China managed to win the war with Japan, and later Mao won the civil war in China, both these victories came at a heavy price, and in both cases, the victories were attributed more to the USSR than to China itself. In the process, China lost much of its influence in the far east, Mongolia and Manchuria, as well as many national treasures shipped out to Taiwan. Like all communist leaders, Mao displayed solidarity with the Soviet Union on which it was dependent for a time, but at the same time considered the various treaties signed with Japan and later the USSR to be the next of the “unequal treaties” which were humiliating to China. Thus Mao tried to remedy China’s standing by throwing the country from one crisis to another, be it the Taiwan Crisis, the Sino-Indian War, the cultural revolution or the “Great Leap Forward” – in each case, the result being further harming China’s image and position, preserving it as a pariah state, the Soviet Union being it’s only “ally”. To all those failures, Mao reacted by initiating purges of the Party apparatus and the army, each time deepening the chaos. Mao’s declared willingness to risk global war, such as attacking India or its actions in the Indochina War, made him look like an unstable warmonger, shunned by the international community. Each of the global great powers have had their own interests in China’s “near abroad” and made any attempts at opening themselves and the world for the PRC dependent on Bejing accepting that – such as Britain demanding China accept a permanent boundary with India and stop supporting anti-colonial forces in Burma and Malaya, as well as reach a consensus regarding Hong Kong; Germany protecting Taiwan and Makau and not even recognizing the PRC as the Chinese state, reserving that status to Taiwan (the Republic of China), the USSR even having its own demands towards the PRC – mostly involving the right to use Chinese Naval Bases in the Pacific (as part of the USSR’s general shift towards the Pacific in terms on naval development) as well as the PRC abiding by the terms of its membership in the COMECON and accepting the USSR’s superiority in Korea and Japan (rather than turning them into co-dominions, like Mao wanted). For most of the world, China was an isolate state clinging to the USSR and being so dependent on it, it virtually had little autonomy and had to abide by the will of Moscow.

Stalin-era propaganda of “Soviet-Chinese friendship” – propaganda, war effort and diplomacy hid the differences between the two states, and their ideologies.

The truth was more complex, though not understood by the European powers. Mao had wanted to restore China to the position of a great power, if not through the means of economic development and military strength, then through diplomacy and throwing its weight around in its region. He also knew that China was perfectly safe from any western invasions, as the colonial empires have had enough trouble trying to keep what they had that they would not risk an intervention in China – and if they would, Mao was confident the Chinese people would be able to resist them. Thus he was perfectly willing to declare his willingness to risk war and sacrifice a lot o human lives, because he knew he would not be called on such a bluff. The only power Mao did fear in fact, was the USSR – as there were surprisingly many pro-Soviet people in his regime who would be perfectly willing to serve as the puppet leaders of China in his place, following a potential Soviet intervention. Through his unsubtle and heavy-handed speeches and actions he tried to place the rest of the world before a facti accompli that would force others into treating it as a great power and thus restore its status. That such a strategy did not work time and time again led to the growth of his frustration, as truly in each case the final result was the result of completely unexpected circumstances – the USSR’s willingness to sign a peace treaty with Japan rather than launching an invasion of the Japanese islands, Stalin’s decision to annex Manchuria and Mongolia, Germany’s successful intervention from the other side of the globe in the Taiwan Crisis, Vietnam’s refusal to fold to Chinese demands following their victory against the french and the UK remaining completely faithful to their commitments in India, aiding India in its war with China. It was only in 1975 in the Delhi Summit that China’s isolation was broken and it was allowed to the negotiations table without previous conditions – Mao’s strategy finally bearing fruit, though only in the last years of his life.

Mao’s death in 1976 would be the turning point in Chinese politics, the politics of east Asia and in fact – the entire world. Being very ill in his final years, even at the times of the Delhi Summit, Mao had relatively little influence on the state, power having leaked through his hands into the hands of his wife, Jiang Qing, and her group of allies called “the gang of four”. This group was the one in charge of much of the state affairs in the 70’s, despite not nominally holding significant positions power. The “gang of four” maintained its power through intimidation and organized termination of any organized opposition in the Central Committee of the Party and other organization, thus leaving them as the only ones to have a broader grasp and control of state affair – especially with Mao being indisposed. Instrumentally using his ill health, they managed to obtain his consent for the termination of much of the “Old Guard” of communists, many going so far as the times of the “Long March”, either physically or politically by expelling them. This fate was what awaited many of those who were even marginally popular among the people, such as the “reformists/liberals” centered around Deng Xiaopeng, who were once again removed from power and sentenced to “internal exile” in the west of the country after the success of the Delhi Summit – officially as punishment for their “lack of faith and revolutionary spirit”, as they were the ones who opposed the hardliner policy of “not one inch given to the capitalists” and opted for entering talks. Despite the Gang’s efforts though, they did not manage to secure their coming to power upon Mao’s death, who would eventually appoint Hua Guofeng to the position of Prime Minister of China, and brand him as his successor. Hua would have the honor of being the Chinese leader present in Delhi and for that reason, the Gang of Four would attempt to recruit him into their group rather than destroying him – so as to capitalize on “his” success. Hua would however not fall in line with the group, being too suspicious of them, and rather, choose to side with the only other authority still having the power necessary to break the “Gang of Four”- the People’s Liberation Army. With the aid of Liu Bocheng and a number of other high ranking, distinguished military leaders, Hua organized the arrest of the gang of four and their staged trial, while in turn, the military was able to suppress reaction from the gang’s followers, in the Red Guards and the Security Serivice. The trials of the Gang of Four cemented Hua as the undisputed leader of China and greatly expanded the power of the PLA in the country, paving the road to the changes in the country’s politics.

Hua Guofeng, after his appointment to the position of Party Chairman

Hua’s rise to power marked the moment that the PLA’s influence on the state started to expand exponentially. The Communist Party of China was internally divided, with even Hua, who was now both the Prime Minister and the First Secretary of the party having to take into consideration how his decisions will be reacted to. Not having the same authority as Mao, he reached for traditional means of control, that being the establishment of Mao’s cult of personality in Bejing and strong control of the population via the Army (including forceful conscription of people of all ages at any moment – this also being a way to terminate opposition elements among the population, their death while in service being claimed to be an “accident during routine training”) and secret police. China also saw a rise in Han Chinese nationalism, something also supported by the influential army. The military’s prime concerns were in the defense of the country and its strength, not in ideological purity – and in pursuing that, the Marshalls of China were willing to abandon some of the things that formerly restrained them. Thus ironically, it was the hard-head militarists that broke through the “ideological wall” that separated China from the rest of the world, as well as starting to make the “split” between China and Russia more visible. Among those signs (though again, not seen or understood by most of the world) was China’s insistence on border demarcation with the Soviet Union, something that has not been carried out completely since the end of the Far Eastern War and the Chinese Civil War. Russia was reluctant to do so, and unilateral attempts at doing so by the Chinese resulted in a number of border skirmishes and clashes, the process being slow.

Chinese – Soviet border pass in Shanhaikwan.

China’s change in attitude was not about starting new initiatives, but by reacting more openly to those started by others. In 1980, following his successful reelection, US president Morris Udall began the preparations for a “re-opening” on Asia, particularly China and Japan, which he considered to be ready for “breaking off” from the Soviet colossi in Asia – his political insight here being more far-reaching than that of other western political leaders, though it was also attributed to his naivety by his opponents – Udall’s charm, light attitude and proneness to making jokes on many occasions leading him to be underrated by many, and considered unprepared for the role of leading the USA at a time of the Cold War getting worse again. This was confirmed by his rather “relaxed” attitude during his first term, when he remained mostly concentrated on internal US matters, such as environmentalism (supporting acts on the diversification of energy production from fossil fuels to renewables), race and ethnic divides, scholarship programs for higher education and such. Udall would be able to hide his Parkinson’s Disease with which he was diagnosed in 1979, only revealing his condition in 1981, making him the first president to serve in office with such a permanent condition, also greatly raising awareness of the disease and other medical conditions nation-wide. Given these circumstances, his “adventures” in Asia were seen as a folly at worst, capable of antagonizing Russia, a “dead end” at best, as it was considered that nothing would be able to be achieved there, especially by him.

Morris Udall during his election campaign in 1980.

Reality was different. Udall’s administration recognized the changes that occurred in the Chinese leadership, that the new powers are less prone to negotiating from a position of ideological purity, romantic nationalism or with a confrontational attitude, treating any meeting as a battle with a „zero - one” outcome. Unlike other great powers, the USA did not have direct interests in China, only having obligations in defending the Philippines and having a general attitude of the Pacific Ocean being “their Ocean” as much as it was Russia’s or China’s. For the UK, real dialogue and reapproachment would require China accepting the border with India and mutually confirming the status of Hong Kong, as well as China stopping its support for Communist militias in south Asia. The UK, as well as the BCoN, had very much expected US solidarity here and would be most displeased if the USA were to pursue their own interests there alone, leaving the British hanging. France has kept a grudge against China for its involvement in the Indochinese War and was more interested in pursuing a policy of reapproachment with the USSR – and did not need to do anything that might upset Moscow, such as trying to get involved in China, where it no longer had strategic interests. Germany had not even recognized the PRC as the legitimate Chinese state, reserving that status to the Republic of China in Taiwan, and keeping the Ostasiengeschwader there for good measure – any attempts at breaking the PRC’s isolation having to be considered hostile to Taiwan and by extension, looked unfavorably at by Berlin. Normally, such an environment would be considered very hostile, as the interests of all European powers aligned in some way in the far east, the USA having to go against them all at once. But on the other hand, very little was done by them to change the status quo. For Washington, this meant that it would have some freedom of action, as it could count on the Europeans not trying to obstruct its work in China – which was truly all that the USA needed. It did not need the support of any of the European powers to pursue its own agenda, meant to protect its interests, just their neutrality, which it could reasonably expect, especially since US goals did not infringe directly on those of the Europeans – protection of the Philippines, opening trade, reducing Russian influence in Japan by offering Tokio an alternative to Soviet domination.

The USA’s first move towards the meeting of the heads of states of both countries began in March 1981 in Tokio, where an annual COMECON summit took place, together with a cultural exhibition of Asian countries. The USA delegation managed to obtain an invitation, officially for the purpose of talking through some minor issues with the Soviet trade delegation. Unofficially, it was meant to present an invitation for talks to the Chinese. This happened, with the Americans presenting the Chinese with a letter from President Udall to Chairman Hua, which the Chinese immediately demanded the Americans keep quiet about, promising an answer soon. The answer did come through the Chinese ambassador in Japan who had given Hua’s response to his American counterpart. The Chairman replied positively and offered for a meeting to take place in Shanghai, though demanded it me prepared in strict secrecy. Udall complied, and most of the preparations on the meeting as well as the subjects to be touched upon being conducted right under Russia’s nose in Tokio, between the special Chinese military attaché there, and numerous American officials. It was scheduled to take place starting on January 25 1982, though was announced officially only two day before that, and last for a week – the cover story being the US President participating in the celebrations of the Chinese New Year. The announcement surprised both the Soviet and European leaders, as well as much of the American administration – not to mention the public. Secrecy has worked.

Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, serving continuously in that post since 1972 until 1984 was credited for being one of the main proponents of “independent” American foreign policy in Asia.

The visit was a remarkable success, in a large part thanks to the preparations taken beforehand which eliminated some of the controversial issues from the program. While for a long time China officially demanded that the USA declare that Taiwan was a “rebel province” and proclaim its non-intent on ever interfering in the Taiwan strait, the visit changed that attitude, China no longer considering the USA not stating its position towards Taiwan (as well as Hong Kong and Makau) as an obstacle. American requests for establishing the naval border between China and the Philippines were heard and accepted, beginning the process of dividing the islands of the Macclesfield Bank between those to be placed under Philippinian and Chinese authority (despite most of them still being under Taiwan administration – Washington seeing no reason not to provide for the Philippines if the cost was to accept a Chinese claim the PRC could not enforce). The summit led to the formal establishment of a “true” diplomatic relation between the USA and the PRC, complete with promises of new trade agreements to be signed, regardless of Chinese obligations to the COMECON. While the attitude of the west towards the summit and the new US-Chinese dialogue were, as expected, mostly neutral, both Germany and the USSR were hostile towards it. The Soviet Union saw it as a betrayal of the communist cause by China and a “national deviation” of the Chinese. But for China the visit was a sign of proving before Moscow that it was perfectly capable of having an independent foreign policy and was not dependent on the USSR for all things. The process of changing the attitude towards China by the European powers had begun, the west realizing it was possible to deal with China on the issue of decolonization of Asia without the USSR present, either directly or even indirectly – leading to the “sino-soviet split” deepening throughout the 80’s.

In Europe, the assumption that the various fascist powers were not truly united against the world and that there were internal conflicts between the various countries were proven by the numerous crises that occurred in central Europe through the decades. And though the west was aware of those “splits” it could do relatively little to exploit them. While the rise of the German Reich had permanently forced the UK out of any “splendid isolation” attitudes, where it could remain an observer of European affairs and occasionally interfering to restore a balance of power, its “interventionist attitude” did not go so far east into areas under German control. An alliance with continental France was recognized as something necessary, though the exact nature of the alliance was a matter of constant debate, especially with the introduction of more modern weapons of war possessed by all sides, and later, with France regaining strength. The UK staunchly believed that its true interests lied within the Commonwealth, Europe being overall more of a problem than a solution. Keeping within the BCoN and strengthening it thus had to take priority over continental commitments, also meaning the necessity of devising military strategy plans with taking political matters into account – that meaning, that UK commitment in a war in Europe having to in some way having the support of the rest of the BCoN. A repetition of the Great War scenario where the UK was able to drag the realms under its rule into the war was no longer possible, and thus London’s plans for the case of war had to recognize that fact. The UK was not only a European power, but a global power as well, its power in Europe dependent on its power across the seas from which it drew its resources. Thus it was not willing to accept French proposals on that the defense of Europe ought to be based on the resources available in Europe and a single Franco-UK partnership with other potential countries as auxiliaries - though without doubt it was just as willing to defend Belgium or Elsass-Lorraine as Paris was.

French and British soldiers in common combat training. Coordination of command structures of the French and UK militaries was difficult, but necessary, as political differences prevented the formation of a singular “western allied general staff”.

The UK based its strategy of defense against local threats on maintaining the possibility of mobilizing tremendous forces in any area of the globe, greater than any other power, though gathering and deploying it taking time. This way, not only would it not alienate others by keeping large forces to overlook the locals, risking being seen as an occupant, but also was able to lower its spendings and upkeep of its armed forces, in later decades also moving parts of the costs on the countries of the BCoN themself. Such a strategy did require the UK leadership not only to possess great confidence in their military strength once gathered and prepared, it also required them to have a certain dose of arrogance, displayed in various talks with others who sought their support – as they would always have to tell them that they would aid them, but that it would take time for the proper forces to be gathered and sent there – time in which whatever crisis was looming, and which the local leaders thought could be best presented by a display of force, would be able to grow. Thus it wasn’t uncommon that those local leaders would effectively hear that aid would come, once the crisis was sufficiently large enough, as London would not bother itself with lesser matters – though being said in more polite and diplomatic words. Of course, the UK did keep plenty of garrisons scattered around the globe for the purpose of discouraging any opportunists, some of which were even considerably strong and active, such as the UK armed forces in India, which were for a long time involved in fighting various rebel forces in Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. London’s position as a great power thus did not come from it butting in to various local affairs and forcing events to take place specifically to their liking, but making itself seen as power willing to work with almost everyone, ready to hear anybody out, ignoring which would be deemed disconcerting. It’s interests would more often be the preservation of the ties with the countries of the BCoN for preservation sake, rather than having some parallel interest with the countries of the Commonwealth in need. The Cold War thus posed a challenge to the leadership, as while fighting “proxy wars” was relatively simple for the UK in political terms, supporting minors against the other global great powers was becoming more difficult. Much of the UK’s political scene did not think that small matters, such as Lebanon or Hong Kong were worth risking armageddon for, the memory of the policy of “appeasement” in the 30’s being a lesson understood differently by different people – either as a sign of folly, that giving in to demands would encourage more, and create greater problems in the future, or as a sign of wisdom, that jumping into needless war for the sake of “far away countries” would be suicidal and divert energy and attention from the really important matters, and that appeasement can be necessary for the purpose of buying the time needed for preparing to defend things that really mattered. Many would feel this type of British arrogance also from the practice of London to talk certain issues “over their heads” – the French particularly being sensitive to any British-German summits taking place without them, when they would be involving the question of European peace. London never wanted to “slug out” any challengers to its power, preferring to disarm any situation before it went too far – and in the case of dealing with the other global great powers, that would mean having to take unilateral action despite cries from allies, London presenting itself as a power with the backing of a quarter of the globe, not just “one out of many”, or even a “primus inter pares”.

German – UK bilateral agreements were almost always interpreted in a way that took into consideration the effects such deals had on third parties. Germany always preferred such treaties than multilateral ones, as it allowed them to present the rest of the world with a legal facti accompli.

Whereas the UK looked for “western unity” through integration of political and military resources and their “consolidation”, France looked for it through greater politico-military autonomy and mutual guarantees. And while the UK was committed to the integration of the resources of the BCoN and the establishment of both common military and political structures for their use and control, doing the same with non-BCoN members was for a long time mostly in name only, even with time passing, the process being inhibited by the cautiousness of the political leaders who could not escape the fact that commitment ran the constant risk of being tied up in someone else’s fight. For this reason, the UK did not participate in the French colonial wars, nor did France do it in British wars. Whereas historically alliances were usually held because the leaders of states realized that not upholding them would most certainly lead to a worse situation than the one that would happen if they did, the introduction of modern weaponry – tanks, bombers, strategic missiles, chemical, biological and eventually nuclear weapons – had created a radically different situation in which sticking to an alliance guaranteed destruction, while not sticking to it gave slim hopes of avoiding it. The three-sided nature of the Cold War was dangerous and unpredictable itself, the leaders of the global great powers knowing that not only could an apocalypse come due to their own action, but that it could occur without them taking any action at all, becoming a target for one of the two others who would fight, just to deny the possibility of anyone ending up as the “untouched power” that after a devastating war between the two would leave them as the strongest ones surviving. Further increasing the risk by giving allies the option of starting something (through unilateral guarantees or an equivalent) was thus hard for many to accept – though on the other hand, a number of speculators claimed that such a situation which increased the “chaoticness” of the situation was thus also one that prevented any power from taking rash steps, out of fear of not being able to predict the results.

Thus while Britain would constantly declare its determination of protecting France and others from potential threats under any circumstances, it would also remind others that it would have to reserve for itself the right to use certain weapons or taking certain actions based on its own agenda, in case of there being a “superior national interest”. This involved particularly the use of strategic missiles and WMD’s, such as the cluster chemical warheads in long range missiles or ICBM’s – later also nuclear warheads. While France had no wish to “pool together” such means of strategic deterrent, thinking them of as means of securing themselves from threats independently from the UK, the UK very much sought to establish some kind of body of military and political control of all of the wests WMD’s, so as to reduce the probability for them to be used without London’s consent or knowledge. On the other hand, British suggestions of creating such bodies for the use of various types of weaponries, or for taking combined actions in certain regions (such as the Middle East, especially regarding the Suez Canal) being answered with counter-suggestions on such bodies having to be of equal UK-French nature – without the involvement of third parties and with France as an equal partner. Paris was not willing to accept the UK’s strategy of defending the “free world” based on the concept of a “holding company”, where the UK was the largest shareholder and thus entitled to calling the shots, others being simply tools meant to do certain specified tasks and being supplemented by the UK should it be needed. Paris correctly realized that such a scenario would have to force France into a position of an underling which it was not able to accept. It could not base its defensive strategy against what was possibly the world’s single most powerful military machine with access to advanced weapons technologies on British goodwill and promises. As French President Gastin once pointed out:



The French would point out, that the UK was reluctant to aid France in its wars against common enemies, like “Communism in South East Asia” or “Arab Nationalism”(when it fought in Syria), and those were the reasons why they were hesitant to simply accept UK promises at face value. British answers that it had to differentiate between “colonial wars” and “european wars” sounded suspicious, when London was expecting France to participate in protecting “British colonial interests”, (like the Middle East) while not offering to do the same, even in the same region – a clear sign of the UK not considering the relation between it and France an equal one. British attitude towards the war in Algeria was yet another problem, as the UK never fully managed to grasp that France truly fought for what it perceived as a “natural part of France” and not “a colony with a different name”, all the talk about “protecting France and Frenchmen” being typical propaganda – rather than France really treating it in the same way as the UK treated northern Ireland. France had been fully cooperating with the UK when it came to police action in tracking down IRA fighters in France, or supply routes for the IRA going through the country, while London had never shown the same degree of resolve and initiative in tracking down and fighting those supporting the Algerians, not in the British Isles, nor in other countries of the BCoN.

The United Kingdom would for a long time base its relation with France on the idea of them having to defend France from the Germans, and expecting French gratitude, not further commitments. Such a policy grew increasingly obsolete as French power grew.

Gastin, like many French politicians would often claim that it was British policies that had allowed for the current global situation to develop as it did, and use that argument when criticizing London. That it was British “support” for Germany during the Versailles negotiations that allowed it to regain strength, and lack of involvement in Eastern Europe led to the formation of the USSR, - those became a standard part of French historiography, as was placing the entire blame for the failure of “appeasement” on the British (French support for it being quietly omitted and explained as “France being a loyal ally of the UK, and losing because of that”). He would defend his countries stance at preserving an autonomy in defense strategies of various countries on the grounds of:



Thus France straightforwardly preferred “traditional” military alliances and treating matters of national defense as a military problem, rather than a diplomatic one that would require a complex, global strategy. France had for a long time accepted its “second fiddle” status in its relation with the UK, recognizing its weakness, but with its relative strength growing, it empire being mostly lost (thus its interests in defense becoming limited to Europe) and the UK becoming more and more concentrated on the protection of the BCoN rather than Europe (in Paris’ eyes), it became increasingly inconvenienced with it. Examples involved France’s acceptance of ceding the matter of defending its northern ports to the Royal Navy (which according to British doctrine, was meant to fight the German Kriegsmarine) while it itself concentrating on the Mediterranean (and act as a counter for the Italian Regia Marina). Developments of rocket and missile technologies followed a similar pattern, the UK developing long range and intercontinental missiles, while France was developing short and mid-range ones. But the standard pattern broke after the German first successful nuclear test, and the start of the western nuclear programs. The UK, USA and France would immediately initiate their own ones, with France wanting to have an independent one. It was only under UK pressures that France agreed to join the British-American program, but under the condition of being given full clearance to the program and access to all works conducted. The west’s combined resources bore fruit quickly, as the first nuclear device was initiated by the British already in 1972, two years after the Germans – a matter of great celebration. But the success immediately created certain diplomatic problems, such as the handling and control of the “to be created” nuclear arsenal. During a rather routine visit to Paris in 1972, a few months after the successful trial the UK prime minister spoke with the French President, he asked how France would see the future integration of the nuclear forces, Gastin answered that France was preparing its own program and forces, though it was not planning on carrying out an individual nuclear test just yet. The answer took the prime minister by surprise, as he wasn’t prepared for it – his understanding of the “nuclear gentleman’s agreement” being that the UK would be housing the facilities meant for the production of nuclear weapons and further research into them, the weapons to be somehow shared among allies. France, having been given access to all information of the nuclear program was however at that point capable of simply copying it with its own domestic resources, its cadre of scientists being able to work independently from the Americans and the British. The French nuclear program would be completed already in 1975, with the detonation of the first French nuclear bomb in the Algerian desert.

First successful test of French nuclear device in Algeria, 1975.

France thus presented the problem nuclear weapons posed for the unity of any alliance, not only the west, but for the Axis and the Communist world as well. Even with more advanced types of weaponry, including thermonuclear warheads many times more powerful than the early fissionable bombs from the 70’s, being available in the arsenals of great powers, the danger of the use of any nuclear weapon at all was so great, that in order to avoid it, all countries had a tendency to follow their own national interests. This would usually mean having a distance towards its allies so as to lower the threat of nuclear annihilation in case of their actions, which in turn led them to seeking to possess nuclear weapons of their own so as not to be dependent on anyone. While this worked for France, and the USA (which would also gather a token nuclear arsenal, although its participation in the original nuclear program was consistently claimed to be of “civilian” nature, for the purpose of harnessing nuclear power for energy production), it did not work as well for the allies of Germany and the USSR, as these two powers jealously hoarded these weapons, both to threaten their “allies” as well as make them dependent on their defenses. The “distancing” from allies however brought yet another problem, as the three-sided nature of the cold war made it almost impossible for any great power to hope for being left out of a war, once any major one starts. This would thus require ensuring that alliances are kept, formed and maintained in a way that would reflect this situation – separate militaries, capable of defending their countries, but with a unified political oversight to prevent them from causing escalation, and significant cooperation to keep them powerful in case of a conventional confrontation. France understood well that the nature of the Cold War required such a development by the western powers as the only one possible and acceptable – the UK however tried to find a different answer to the puzzle, one that would not make the risk of total destruction so high, but never managed to find any that would not involve twisting someone’s arm in some way. The only other possibility would be working out a relation where the partners felt that they made an inseparable pair, which among established nation-states was proving impossible, as witnessed by the different attitudes towards the colonial wars of the other.

This was a point of complete non-understanding of each other between France and the UK. France saw the dilemma of nuclear deterrence, protection and war in the categories of a local European War, not a global conflict like the UK did. Thus it saw nuclear weapons as means of greatly expanding France’s ability of pursuing an independent foreign policy – their existence more as a political and diplomatic matter, rather than a military like the UK. For Paris, nuclear war would be a complete “game over”, even in the most limited form – Britain, and the BCoN specifically, were perceived as being more resistance to nuclear warfare. Thus nuclear weaponry were a means for France of further separating itself from the UK and act independently in Europe – particularly in regard towards the low countries. Nuclear war was not thought of as an option and thus France was adamant about its official policy of any aggression against it to be responded with a massive nuclear retaliation – which was unlike the British strategy, which saw the nuclear option as one being very far away one, regardless how matters developed, even if war broke. This French brinksmanship did manage to keep the Germans worried enough to introduce a copy of such a policy (though limited to German soil, not extended automatically to the countries of the Berlin Pact), as well as in part alienate France from the UK slightly, while also making it more attractive to the Low Countries, who were more interested, when discussing the possibility of abandoning technical neutrality in favor of military alliance, in having a “determined” ally, rather than a “withdrawn” one, as the UK looked in the eyes of some. Belgium was a particularly evident example, which for a long time honored, respected and thanked the British for their actions during the Great War, but which had to agree that it’s strategy, while being perfectly acceptable when fighting third world armies and irregular militias where the growth of troubles was usually gradual and visible, could not work as well when faced with massive, rapid, brute force, which required instant response and commitment – which Britain was for a long time hesitant to do, even the eventual decision of establishing permanent military bases in France remaining a hot topic in London’s political circles, and refusals to extend such a gesture to Belgium being a sign of the UK still considering Belgium as a “speed bump” for Germany in a greater conflict, invasion of occupation of which was a sign of things “getting more intense” rather than something to be treated as a matter of necessarily having to go “all in”.

Belgium’s position in the Cold War between the west and the fascist was peculiar. Unlike the Netherlands which for a long time tried to maintain a “balance” between the two through working with them, Belgium remained attached to its nominal “neutrality”, thus refusing to cooperate in any larger degree with either. Even during the Great War, Belgium never formally joined the allies, only “associating” themselves with them, and returned to neutrality just after the war ended. Belgium’s fears were, that stronger attachment with the west would cause Germany to renounce their recognition of Belgian neutrality, and by extension, the Rapallo treaties guaranteeing Belgium’s eastern border, where a German minority was still present. Belgium would thus refuse all French offers of common defense plans, projects of constructing a “Belgian Maginot Line” or even mutual protection pacts proposed by it – the ground for that being that any such “one-direction” move would be de facto a breach of their own neutrality. The problem was, that while Belgium was obsessed with its neutrality much like Switzerland, that was not the case with other countries, which did not particularly care about it. While UK’s unilateral guarantees for Belgian independence and territorial integrity where highly valued and thought of as the basis of Belgian defense, neither France nor Germany were willing to respect Belgian neutrality. Knowledge that all German war plans against France involved invading Belgium would gradually become common knowledge among the Belgian population, being absolutely contradictory to German declarations of respecting the border. France had been much more restricted here, its war plans being mostly defensive, and the offensive plans predicting a direct attack against the Rheinland – but also considered the possibility of entering Belgium in case of a German aggression against it regardless of the will of Brussels. While many Belgians thought that such a situation was one that would grant them protection – German attack having to cause the UK to protect Germany, forcing the Reich to repeat the scenario of the Great War, as the war paranoia of the Cold War grew, so did the anxiety of the Belgian people, who upon witnessing the growth of the fascist empire in central Europe and the military strength of the Reich, began to ask questions about what to in case a war started anyway – so as to avoid a second “rape of Belgium”.

While Belgian fortifications on its border with Germany were modern, they still paled compared to French ones.

During the era of Goring, Belgium did not dare to make a move that would aggravate the Germans much, whereas during the Hanke era, developing military alliances was starting to look like not being truly needed, going against the “spirit of the times”. Belgium’s concerns during that time was more about keeping down the German populations demand on “self determination” and allowing them to feely re-join Germany, dealing with the Wallonian and Flemish nationalisms and with growing problems in Congo. The growth of national sentiments in Europe and the development of national ideologies which tried to “romantically” explain the past, present and future of nations, giving them a sense of destiny and purpose, had negatively impacted the spirit of the Belgian people and their self-esteem. Belgium was deemed by many such “romantic nationalists” all over Europe as a mistake, an “artificial state”, the product of the whims of an aristocratic elite of a bygone era, an example of how a country should not form, as it went completely against the “volksgeist” and the inexorable laws of historical destiny. Rather than being formed out of the pursuit of nations for their freedom and encompassment of all of “their own” into nation-states, Belgium was carved out of a piece of land inhabited by two (later three) “great nations” – the French, Dutch and Germans – and resisted the tide of nationalism (which should have led to the “inevitable” unification of the “French Belgians” with France and the “French Dutch” with the Netherlands) by desperately clinging to some assumed “distinguishing features” (differentiating them from the “core folk” only slightly though) that were used by an aristocratic-banker elite to dissuade the people from moving towards their destiny by emphasizing those differences, thus preserving their privileges at the peoples expanse.

Such beliefs were justified by the remarkable lack of any “Belgians” – people who would consider “Belgianness” as their prime cultural identity (common joke having it that the only Belgians in Belgium were the Royal family, the football team and the Jews). The division of the country into Flemish, Wallonians and Germans made the country inherently more unstable than homogenous nation-states, especially when the “right of nations to self-determination” was becoming treated increasingly as an absolute right, and the concept of nationality being understood and treated as something objective, rather than subjective. Nationalists in France, Germany and the Netherlands would thus quite often invoke their intent of “unifying” their people at Belgium’s expanse., not uncommonly doing so together (the partition of Belgium being meant as a symbol of peace between the French, Germans and Dutch). And they weren’t alone, as their chorus would also often be joined by Flemish and Wallonian nationalists – who perceived the act of them joining their motherlands not as annexations, but as unifications. Participation in a great power like France or Germany (or even the Netherlands) was seen as preferable to being an ”insignificant people of an insignificant country”, being not unlike the sentiment held at a time by the Austrians, who sought to unify with Germany before the Anschluss.

German postal stamp. “Eupen Malmedy still German”

Yet what seemed to be a great problem in the 40’s and 50’s when fascism and European “modern” nationalisms were at their highest, turned out to be a perfectly solvable one in future decades. “Dissolution of Belgium” was not an agenda sought exclusively by nationalists, plenty of socialists and social-democrats pursued it too, and it was a supra-political matter overall, but the group least supportive of it (or more exactly, the one which had the least members who thought of it as of crucial importance) were the Liberals, who also were the main force behind pushing for constitutional changes to better reflect the character of the Belgian state. The country had traditionally been rather dominated by the French-speaking Wallonians, who also happened to make up a significant portion of its political and business elite – but that changed with time, as Flanders would grow into economic prosperity, eventually to a point where it actually surpassed Wallonia in terms of wealth. This brought demands for reforms which the Wallonians were hesitant to do, as they would undermine their power. And while for some secession was a way out, among the Liberals it was deemed that reforms meant to end the Unitarian and French-centered character of the state were preferable. Their idea was to equalize the relationship between the two parts of the country, as well as between the people. Since 1960, policies meant to promote bilingualism were introduces, and strongly so, including obligatory publication of all standing law (including local laws and court verdicts) in both French and Dutch, obligatory subtitles in the other language in TV-transmissions and cinemas in the language not spoke (both for foreign media), country-wide newspapers forced into publishing some of their columns (later pages) in a different language than the main one, etc. Bilingualism did not escape school, with both French and Dutch becoming obligatory languages countrywide. Permission to work in state administration also would require possessing both language skills. Though criticized, these reforms did manage to break the often still present language barrier between the people of the country. What further aided these “campaigns for saving Belgium” was the general rise of liberalism in western Europe in the 70’s coupled with the more and more apparent failures of the fascist states economies. As disintegration of the country was an agenda most associated with the fascists and nationalists, who often would claim such a move would bring about prosperity, the failing of the fascists in central Europe led to them also being viewed in such light, their ideas being dismissed overall, without looking into detail. The liberalization in Belgium also brought about a certain “cultural revolution”, where many young people would purposefully, in a sign of rebellion, abandon their “traditional” culture (Flemish or Wallonian) in favor of self-declaring themselves as Belgians. While only a small minority, most such “revolutionaries” reverting back to traditional cultural identities later in life, they did have an impact as future censuses would show - by 1981, 10% of the population declared their nationality as “Belgian”, without further stating a Flemish, Wallonian or German nationality.

Queen Elizabeth II and King Baudouin of Belgium. The Royal Family was one of the “unifying” factors of Belgium.

Coupled with such cultural and social changes, legal ones took place as well. The Kingdom of Belgium, traditionally a unitary state, would from around the 50’s slowly develop into a federal one, caused by numerous constitutional changes, along with new acts of parliament. Belgium would look towards the UK as inspiration for a “model multinational state” and try to replicate its system. A problem here involved the position of the German minority, which, while not very numerous and occupying only a small area, benefited greatly from the support of the Reich, which consistently demanded that the German’s in Belgium not be treated any worse than others. This meant, that whenever talks of “federalisation” or otherwise changing the status of the state began, the German lobby would demand for the Germans to have equal status to that of Flanders of Wallonia. German pressures, along with Belgium’s wish for remaining “neutral” (which would also mean not giving preferential treatment to any of its neighbors) have been effective for a long time. While complete federalization never officially occurred, nor were any plans for a “United Kingdom of Belgium” realized, constitutional reforms of the state eventually recognized the Germans as “equal” members of the state, by having Belgium be constitutionally established as a “state comprised of three communities: the Flemish Community, the French Community and the German Community”. These “communities” where meant to be the “federal subjects” of Belgium; official, “territorial” federalization not taking place out of fears that such a move would establish Eupen-Malmedy as a “state-like” entity, strengthening any potential secessionisms and disproportionally favor the Germans – who never made up more than 75 000 people in a state of few millions. Introducing a “ethnic” division corresponded with the growing popularity of “minorities rights” as an acceptable legal institution for providing various peoples within countries different rights, freedoms and privileges without destroying the principle of “all citizens being equal”. But while in central Europe this was used for segregation and ghettoization (voluntary and not), in the west it was a way of addressing the problem of “native” citizens and “naturalized” citizens having to be given the same rights by virtue of citizenship, despite the differences in their culture and level of “connection” to their state (not a few workers unions opposing giving “Travailleurs etrangers” who only recently arrived the same entitlements as “honest workers who spent years working and paying taxes”). For Belgium, the concept would further be used for giving the ethnic communities cultural freedoms, without having to introduce any type of “territorial autonomy”, “personal autonomy” being sufficient – thus also avoiding conflicts over whether places like Belgium territorially belonged to Flanders or Wallonia. This type of legal construction would make Belgium a one-of-a-kind state, being nominally neither “unitary” – as the power of the central government was not derived “from the people”, nor federal – as the power wasn’t derived from the “consent of states to form a union” either. It was something in between, often placed next to Switzerland when it went to dichotomic divisions of the countries of the world by their character.

The nationalists of various type in Belgium never managed to create a stable united front in part because of certain disagreement between them, primarily regarding the city Brussels and Congo, and who would receive them in case of a “divorce”. Congo was a particularly problematic matter, next to the “national question” – the largest thing that gave the Belgian government a headache. Belgian Congo was territorially as large as all of western Europe, its population considerably greater than Belgium’s: whereas in 1960 it was almost twice its size, by 1980 its population crossed the benchmark of 30 million, making over three times as populous as Belgium. While this would still make it relatively sparsely populated, the Congo was a home to hundreds of various ethnic tribes, and little work was done in the process of “creating” a Congolese national identity, either by the Belgians or the locals. Belgian colonial policy did not respect the traditional lifestyles of the tribes who practiced a hunter-gatherer lifestyle of nomads, not considering uninhabited lands as being of significant value. Such areas where thus simply seized by the Belgian state and later given to either European colonists and companies, or to “friendly tribes” – the latter being part of the Belgian “civilizing mission”, to be achieved first by settling the natives on some particular territory and using them as labor for resource extraction and agriculture – the Congo being an important global producer of cotton, rubber, bauxites, palm oil, tropical fruits. But what the Belgians called a “civilizing mission” and “advancement” was seen as “capitalist and colonial exploitation” by communists – and not unfairly, as the Belgians did make a hefty profit out of the colony, while leaving little for the natives themselves, apart from what they needed for their ends – railways, telegraphs, ports, hospitals. Dislike for the Belgians was growing among the tribes as well, tensions growing due to all kinds of problems – Belgian investments being carried out on land belonging to some tribe without its consent, the settlement of people being forceful, tribes being disallowed to enter the land once taken from them and given to colonists – emotional matters tied together with economic ones, such as poor working conditions, low wages for the labor carried out, brutal crushing of dissent. Anti-colonial sentiment grew in Congo as it did in all of Africa, finding communism – and the USSR – as a generous patron. Straightforwardly communist militias formed in Congo along with tribal ones, though the most common were a mixture of the two – groups with an “ideology” being a mixture of Marxism and local tribal beliefs, led by opportunistic warlords (as few of them had any specific and consistent ideological belief, much more often being simply hateful of the Belgians or other tribes, as well as powerhungry, using Marxism and tribal beliefs as tools).

Belgian soldier showing a Congolese recruit on the operation of a RPG.

But the “Belgian Bush War” did not come to be, at least, not in the same way as it took place in other parts of Africa, even the term “Bush War” not being used for referring to the events in Congo. Localized skirmishes between armed groups and Belgian colonial soldiers have started taking place already in 1960, but they did not manage to grow in scale for some time. Belgium took a keen interest in the colonial wars fought by the UK and France worldwide, trying to use their experiences in their own turf, but coming to only one conclusion – they would not be able to fight and win any large colonial conflict against a unified opponent by themselves. And since no outside power was willing to directly support Belgium in any fights in Congo, its own policy of neutrality also forbidding that, Belgium’s situation would be dire in case of a massive upheaval. Belgium’s political and diplomatic strategy was to maximally “balkanize” Congo through administrative reforms, where the lowest territorial unit would correspond to a single ethnic tribe, which was to be attached to it. This was meant to reduce ethnic tensions between the various tribes, but in reality ended up creating even more of them as the reform began to cover more and more territories. This inevitably lead to some tribes being given preferential treatment and given more valuable land, while others being given ones which were significantly worse. The changes were gradual, not taking place all at once, thus also creating a sense of uncertainty of the new borders. It also wasn’t unusual for the “designated area” of a tribe to be either far away from their current location, or in place where another tribe resided. Conflicts over land between tribes would grow more common, and with sophisticated weaponry arriving, so did bloodshed. As Belgium did not introduce any significant amount of settler-colonists in the land further away from the sea, for many tribes it would be another tribe that would be perceived as its main antagonist, rather than the Belgian authority. That “authority” would in turn be rarely seen, associated mostly with a single administrator/foreman sent to some remote area to oversee local production.

Belgium’s military strategy of dealing with violence was to maintain a considerable standing force of highly trained and well-equipped soldiers in the mouth of the Congo river and the cities there, which would also closely cooperate with police forces there, so as to ensure those areas being completely safe. In case of problems, they were to be dispatched to the “danger zone” and eliminate any threats – Belgium quickly learning the potential helicopters had in fighting irregular forces with only light equipment. What was unique about Belgian troops was their extremely harsh training and the practice of sending teams for very long periods of time (in most extreme cases lasting even months) into the jungle in pursuit of identified hostiles. Belgium avoided treating this military presence and operations as a “Bush War”, the government consistently pleading its media (as well as foreign) not to use to the term “war” in regard to the events in the Congo. To avoid social tensions, it would also eventually stop sending conscripts there. Observing the ongoing wars which the UK and France fought against insurgents, including in East Africa, Belgian military authorities recognized the impossibility of them winning any confrontation with popular uprising of that strength. And the possibility of that happening was growing with time, as anti-colonial sentiments grew. The Congo had been used as a “sanctuary” for various militias fighting wars in East and Central Africa, it also becoming a route through which supplies and troops moved. Belgian fears that interrupting theses movements would aggravate the natives, as well as its unwillingness to commit itself to anything that might end up as a long campaign, was what allowed them to continue. When fighting in East and Central Africa eventually stopped, many veterans of those fights saw the Congo as their next target, continuing their life of war there, motivating the locals to stand up and fight against their oppressors. Problem was, that most of those locals saw other tribes as their “first” enemy. Knowing this, Belgium would thus commonly respond to the restlessness of the locals by arming and training their neighbors for their “protection” – allowing such two groups to fight between each other with Belgium standing on the side. What started out as a lack of strategy, improvisation meant to serve political rather than military goals, turned out to become a standing strategy for a prolonged period time, though one possible solely thanks to the fact that the Congo was extremely diverse, and no group was ever able to mobilize its entire population against the Belgians.

Belgian soldiers in Congo. Service in Congo was initially also carried out by conscripts, the policy dropped in later years.

What “should” have thus become a “Congo Bush War” thus more resembled a “Congo Civil War”, as various tribes inhabiting it, armed with weapons provided by the USSR, Belgium and from the Central African Republic, fought between each other, while Belgium stood on the side, restricting itself to keeping the mouth of the Congo secure. Governmental authorities would gradually withdraw from the areas deeper inside the country, leaving it in a state of anarchy and non-rule. The Belgian military actions would not take the form of long, drawn-out campaigns against irregular formations, but as rapid “surgical strikes” against the “hearts” of any rebellious movements. Recognizing the fact that most such movements followed not any particular ideology, but a particular leader or group, destroying that group or leader was expected to shatter any semblance of unity of such movements. This philosophy went as far as to the Belgian military being used for straightforward assassination missions, meant to eliminate particular figures. Never allowing any group to gain too much control or power over any larger areas, nor taking firm control over it itself, Belgium allowed Congo to collapse. Its war, initially fought for the sake of profits, would end up being fought for the sake of imaginary “control”, the idea being that “if nobody else has a hold to it, then nominally we still have it”. Still, such a strategy, while it had allowed Belgium to minimalize its casualties had no long-term goal. Those Belgian soldiers, and auxiliaries recruited from the locals died for nothing – apart from their payment, and whatever money was still being made from Congo trade.

Helicopters would be extensively used by the Belgian army, for both assault and “medivac” purposes.

The “commercial” character of the Civil War in Congo would be one of the darker cards of Belgium’s history. Aiming to minimize costs and loses in lives, but not wanting for the Congo to fall into any other hands, the government in Brussels was increasingly willing to “privatize” the war, pushing its costs onto others. This meant primarily private companies and – what was particularly “gray” - mercenaries. Belgium had been paying many locals to serve on its side during the ongoing “emergency”, to act as guides and such, also trying to raise an army of locals to fight for them. But these had proven to not only be costly, but also ineffective in the longer run, many such hastily formed “battalions” joining other anti-colonial movement once their opponent were defeated with Belgian aid. The losses in lives were also constantly reported in the media, pressuring Brussels into folding to anti-colonial demands. The solution to these problems was hiring mercenaries to do the fighting for the Belgians instead – as they were deemed cheaper and more expandable. The idea, which was initially deemed disgusting by the Belgian politicians and only put into practice due to the local commanders hiring them on their own responsibility, quickly became an “acceptable” one, an open secret of Belgium. By 1978, the practice of hiring mercenaries reached immense proportions, around 80% of all Belgian action in the “Deep Congo” being carried out by mercenaries. In 1978, Belgium officially sanctioned the practice by significantly liberalizing its laws on the operations of “security companies”, allowing some of them to be retroactively enrolled into the Belgian Army after fulfilling certain criteria, granting them legal protection from prosecution and extradition, pensions, veteran benefits and such. This Belgian practice of “covering” mercenaries would be highly frowned upon by the rest of the world, but Belgium would stick to it. Mercenaries would be carrying out all kinds of missions, even those which nominally would be considered as illegal or as war crimes, assassinations of political leaders being among the lesser evils – other being execution of civilians for aiding and providing shelter to guerillas, incineration of entire villages (on some occasions even being carried using “borrowed” Belgian army military hardware – the relation between the military and the mercenaries being often very good at both “professional” and private levels) and other terror tactics – one particularly grotesque example being an attack on a Ngbandi village during which the mercenaries all covered themselves in blackface and wore clothing of Luba fashion, so as to provoke a conflict between the two groups – who were suspected of being potential allies of the “African Socialist Party”. The means of waging war would in time subsequently become the goal themselves, as the withdrawal of Belgian presence from the country did not go parallel with the withdrawal of commercial enterprises. Belgian, and other foreign companies would still seek to exploit the situation on Congo for their own ends, getting silent support of Brussels in doing that. Companies would routinely employ “security services” to protect their interests and investments, ending up being significant co-financers of the conflict, being allowed to keep any booty they gathered from Congo – as long as they shared at least part of it with the Belgian state and did not go too far in their actions. The “Congo Emergency” thus created a greatly dystopic situation, where shady connections of a cabal made from the Belgian government officials, military, private international corporations and mercenary group all covered, protected and supported themselves for the purpose of maintain profits from extracting resources from Congo, doing so through preserving a state of constant chaos, anarchy and infighting between the tribes, so as not to allow them to unite against this cabal.

Mercenaries in Congo. They would be recruited from all over the world, not a few coming from fascists states, Switzerland or even South Africa.

Not that attempts at trying to alter the situation in Congo did not take place. While the diverse nature of Congo demographics prevented any national movement from getting popular support, “federalists” suggesting the possibility of turning Congo into an independent federal state made of numerous “tribe states” did exist and gathered some support. Same went for some Marxists movements, the largest being the “African Socialist Party” which advocated the termination of any “tribal afflictions” on favor of a single “African worker” identity. The lack of state authority in the jungles of Congo also meant, that there were plenty of opportunities for ambitious peoples or adventurers to form their own countries, whether large ones or small enclaves. One such example was the formation of the short-lived “State of Katanga” which emerged in 1972, proclaimed by Godefroid Munongo, the leader of the “federalist” CONAKAT party. The non-recognized state was to cover much of the southern Congo and even had some limited from the Belgians, who (uniquely) saw its establishment as potentially beneficial, a buffer state from the recently formed Socialist Republic of Central Africa, and its leadership considered rather friendly to the west. It also enjoyed relatively large support from some of the local tribes. This would however not last for long, as Munongo, who proclaimed himself “President of Katanga” would be assassinated by Marxists only four month after the proclamation of independence – a retaliation for his actions against the Marxists who still were present in south Congo, who he wanted to get rid of. His death would shatter the fragile unity of the pro-independent Katanga movement, which would in turn collapse completely after being hijacked by the Marxists led by Laurent Kabila. In a rather awkward move, Kabila intended to unite the Kantangan “independence supporters” with his own (and other) Marxist movements and secure Katanga as an independent Soviet Republic. To that end, he quickly obtained the support of the both the USSR and Central Africa, though it was mostly just nominal, as Kabila had previously not presented his intent of launching such a revolution to Moscow. Thus this poorly organized revolution would quickly fail, as the Belgian military offensive would destroy the fledgling state, whereas in a move of complete bravado, a mercenary company (whose identity was never established) managed to kidnap Kabila during his attempted escape and fly him back via helicopter to stand trial before the Belgians. Katanga would never obtain formal international recognition, nor would any of the almost a dozen of various “secessionist states” that would declare themselves independent from Congo in the times of Belgian presence there.

More than one ”self-proclaimed” state in Congo was put down by “mercenary armies”, using Belgian Army hardware.

The “Congo Emergency” would overall destroy the state, leading to over 1.5 million people being killed in constant warfare between 1950 and 1990. Belgium would eventually leave the country, not due to having suffered considerable losses or even political/foreign pressures, but simply because it had given up on trying to keep it or use it. The costs of staying there had gone too high, and were no longer covered by the profits made from it. Commercial colonialism had perfectly shown its face in Congo, being the reason of untold misery and suffering of people, and being ended simply due to no longer being profitable. While the war in Congo would later be sometimes depicted as a “traditional” colonial conflict where the Belgians used natives to fight their enemies or as an ideological conflict between the “capitalist” west and “anti-colonial communists”, reality was that there was no ideology to the war, just financial and political calculations. This nihilism was recognized by many even while the war was still taking place, and stimulated many artists of using the conflict in their works of fiction. Whether dramas about troubled youth going to Congo to escape something in Europe, with the intent of “doing good” there and undergoing catharsis, or action movies about super-commandos fighting “evil commies”, the conflict in Congo would be a very common background for Belgian fiction. It would also become the symbol of the most dark face of capitalism, which casually sacrifices human lives for money – and abandons everything once money was no longer to be made.

 

[Kongzilla]

In the decades following the Great War, France has gradually been losing power and influence worldwide, giving in to the rising Global Great Powers of the German Reich and the USSR, as well as standing in the shadow of the UK and the British Commonwealth of Nation. Losing its alliance system in central-east Europe, allowing for the shameful German invasion of Yugoslavia, loss of the war in Indochina, followed by the forced withdrawal from Syria and Lebanon had shaken the French people’s faith in their country. Algeria seemed to be the point where the pendulum of French weakness had reached its maximum, and from which it started to tilt back the other way, France regaining strength, confidence and standing. While it still was incapable of stopping the march of decolonization through Africa, letting go of Equatorial Africa, Western Africa, Madagascar, Tunisia and Morocco, those “withdrawals” were not as shameful as those from before, France even managing to secure some of its strategic interests in those areas, such as the right to use military bases on their soil, guarantees for the local white populations, beneficial trade deals and access to yet untapped resource areas and other such. Even the ongoing conflict in Algeria did not stop the “renaissance of France”, and the situation there gradually getting better, even if that still meant many checkpoints between cities, armed police and military patrols, car bombs still going off and other signs of civil unrest. Still, casualties had been dropping throughout the years since the birth of the French Fourth Republic, the Algerian War no longer thought of as a “war” per se, more like the French equivalent of “the Troubles” the United Kingdom had been facing in Northern Ireland.

Even heavy equipment would not be an uncommon sight in Algeria, trucks filled with explosives being a favored tactic among terrorists.

Gastin’s presidency was paramount for France to regain its confidence as an actual great power, having left a permanent mark on France, not only giving it a direction the country ought to follow, but also greatly contributing to “establishing” the way presidency ought to be handled under the new constitution of the Fourth French Republic. Following his electoral victory, the next parliamentary elections had led to the victory of a center-right coalition of Liberal-Conservatives, known as the “New Republican Party”. The party combined the conservative (in social affairs) right with the liberal (in economic affairs) center, its first victory being due to the introduction of a rather high electoral threshold of 10% in general elections, as well as the newly introduced right of “surrendering votes” – the parties that would not make it past the threshold being allowed to choose whom the votes they got would support (out of the parties that crossed the threshold). With the communist party banned and the left in disintegration, the New Republican Party was able to get hold of the votes of everyone from the extreme far-right fascists to the social-liberal center left, creating a stable majority. This majority would be maintained for almost two decades, a rather unusual occurrence in French politics, though one that would give the country much needed stability. The “New Republican Party” would itself be hard to define by the political standards of the time, being not quite a “conservative” party like the previous one, nor a liberal, but combining elements of the two in social and economic policies. It would thus eventually come to be dubbed as the “New Christian Democracy”, the term “Republican” in the names of many parties worldwide coming to mean having a similar type of program as the New Republican Party in France (the exception being the Republican Party in the USA, which was much different from the French). The “social conservative” and “economic liberal” elements of the party would come to represent the two largest branches within it as well, commonly known as the “Bonapartists” – the conservatives who also advocated stronger presidential powers and slightly greater state interventionism in economic affairs – and the “Orleanists” – the liberal wing which opted for keeping the Presidential powers in check in favour of the parliament and advocated greater economic freedoms. The general agreement of the two factions had been, that while the function of the President ought to be kept by one “branch”, at the same time the function of Prime Minister should be held by the other. Hence, while the “bonapartist” Paul Gastin was President, the position of Prime Minister of France (along with the majority of the cabinet ministers) was held by the “Orleanist” Rene Monory – the man responsible for much of the “day to day management” of French affairs, economic reforms and investments, as well as reorganizing French foreign policy.

Gastin’s persona and style of rule had come to define the position of the President of France in the state, the Fourth Republic being a newborn and procedures having to still be worked out. Unlike before, Gastin did not try to look like a member of the elite, much preferring the image of a “jolly wise old grandpa”, often even referring to himself as an “old fart” when in public. Despite his age, he remained vigorous and often appeared before the public, even in later years when his health was obviously failing and not hiding the fact, encouraging others to “try and live as long and much as he does”. Gastin had listened to much of the young experts he had surrounded himself which and employed in his Secretariat, copying the American model of public relations and accepting the importance of keeping an “image” both during presidency and during the elections. The way he was perceived, and went into legend, was just as much the result of his work to appear so, as it was of creative people around who worked towards that. And while Gastin had remained the number one figure, he did not completely overshadow the people in his employ, the Secretariat of the President of France becoming an important institution in the French legislative and executive branch, many future politicians actually starting their careers at a young age working in the Presidential Secretariat. Gastin would not become a “puppet President” as quite a few of the politicians who raised him to the position wanted, and would not only voice and push through his personal ideas, but also use his position to push through the ones presented to him by the young and very skilled people working for him – who had a much better understanding of the changes occurring in the world, the effects of technological advancement and globalisation. Presidential powers intended to be used “only in some cases”, such as the right to voice opinions and present changes to laws being worked on in parliamentary commissions, participate in governmental cabinet meetings, giving out decrees with the force of law (unless stricken down by a simple majority within 90 days) were used to their full extent. Gastin’s successors would follow suit, thus ensuring the French Republic’s transition into a full Presidential system country.

President Gastin and his Secreteriat standing before the Elysee Palace – one of the most iconic places of power in the world, next to the White House, Kremlin and the Reich Chancellery

The Fourth Republic’s first years of existence were a time of considerable decline of the left, though not because of some general change of attitude of the French people, but more due to the weakness of its political formations, who had “burned themselves out”. The experience of the “Paris revolt”, “Paris riot”, “Paris revolution” – the events of 1967 being called different names – had left a very bitter aftertaste in the French public, the fact that the capital had been the place of such violence and the utter incompetence of the politicians who both allowed it and managed it so poorly leaving an extremely bad impression. While the right had been able to slither away from it, condemning the radical nationalists and fascists as those responsible for it as “those who were responsible from the right wing” and cut itself away from them fast, the left was not as fortunate. Many of its politicians have declared their support in some way for the rioters themselves, or the slogans they carried, as well as voiced their outrage on the way the situation was being handled by the government. Those words had proven extremely damaging in hindsight, often repeated by media, making the left look like supporting the revolt and the damages caused by it. Also, it would make it look like the left was unwilling to “come clean” and show the responsible “from the left wing”. Unlike the right, the left was not ready to purge itself from either those “vocal supporters” or the participants who took part in the orgy of violence that went through Paris – the few exclusions and condemnations being “too little too late”. Such an attitude had severely discredited the socialists, both the old and the young ones. President Gastin would on a number of occasions, when asked about how his politics would affect the youth, voice out his “disappointment with that “lost generation” who brought shame to their families and France” and how their past actions spoke more than their words, not being a suitable partner for anyone to discuss anything with. Gastin’s strong sense of family values and his disappointment with the youth which had sided with the left went further than such declarations though, as he did advocate a number of changes in French civil laws regarding succession, such as by terminating the institution of the legitime, as well as having liberalized the laws on the creation of testaments, so as to grant greater freedom to families on how parents wealth was to be divided (the idea being having parents to give their inheritance to those children who were “raised right” while leaving those who were “raised poorly” out, the “anarchists and hooligans to learn how to work for their wealth, rather than destroy it and get more from parents”). Such an attitude had made Gastin quite popular among the French youth and young parents, though not a few teenagers would come to despise him, treating him as a symbol of the “old regime”.

The second thing that weakened the left was the outcome of the Casablanca Affair, the signing of the Marseilles Accords and the subsequent developments in Algeria. The left had for some time been internally opposed to colonialism, and when information about the planned exit from Algeria broke out in 1967, it didn’t deny it (unlike the conservative right, which denied their goal was an exit, and stuck to the story of making “plans” for “reforms” to be confirmed “by referendum” and other such). When the dust of the affair and martial law had fallen, a withdrawal being officially confirmed as out of the question, many people would come to see that decision as the right one, abandoning the Frenchmen in Algeria being completely being immoral. Even then some of the left-wing elements still opposed continued presence in Algeria, but in the later years, as the situation in Algeria seemed to come back under control (not in a small part thanks to the brutal crackdown of the military during the six weeks of complete military rule there in April and May 1967), it became obvious that in hindsight, choosing to stay was the right choice – those advocating escape becoming branded as “cowards”, “weaklings”, “defeatists”. As few wanted to be associated with “the losers”, support for the anti-colonialists on the left fell, the “we always wanted to stay in Algeria” part of the left being left to look ridiculous. What made the situation even worse, was the banning of the radical parties in France, including the Marxist and Communist ones, which would in part turn towards domestic terrorism. Car bombings, kidnappings for ransom, arson and other terrorist activities aimed against both the civilian population and the politicians/military veterans (even those of the Great War)/large companies executives had further affected the image of the left in general, and while the Social Democrats were wise enough to condemn such attacks and violence, the same attacks would serve as a constant source of fuel against the left, the “terrorists brothers in belief”, each such attack becoming a reminder of the Paris violence, commented as being “what They really want”.

Car bombs would be utilized by French Communist terrorist, such as the Fraction Armee Rouge, a tactic imported from Algeria – the connection between the Marxists on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea being strong, and secretly supported by Moscow.

And yet another thing that factored into the breaking of the left in France was a rapid black PR campaign against it waged by both the government and much of the media. This was among the grayer aspects of the foundation of the Fourth Republic, something that would be brought up in later decades. While politicians would attack the left with politics, the media would attack the same people with much more underhanded tricks, including exposing financial, social and sexual scandals the lefts prominent members were involved in. That the same amount of attention wasn’t paid by the media regarding the governing powers had seemed suspicious from early on, gossip about an “alliance of the government and the media” being common, though little proof for it being found, apart from later testimonies of some of the high ranking executives supposedly involved in the “conspiracy”. Journalists of prominent media companies were tireless in finding dirt on the opposition, the liberal government liberalizing much laws regarding publishment of various types of material (including pornographic) as well as the restrictions on the size media companies could grow (previous laws preventing for example the ownership of both TV stations and newspapers by the same company being repelled). Such liberalization had allowed for the rise of a number of French media titles to rise to worldwide prominence, including the FRANCE 24 tv network, as well as economy magazines such as the PARIS DAILY, in French, English and Spanish language formats, popular in the Americas and western Europe. And “in return” (as it was assumed) for allowing for such developments, the media were to be an “ally” – the “fourth power” in the three-division system. This including everything from tabloid newspapers criticizing the fashion choices of the wives of prominent politicians, to downright criminal accusations, such as child rape and pedophilia. Trials of left wing leaders such as Daniel Bendit would be widely televised and used as a depiction of the utter demoralization of the left, ending in convictions (though the fairness of the trials would be questioned in the future, evidence being claimed to be planted or extracted under duress, or outright false). Things like this would in later decades be a subject of controversy, being treated as a “black card” of the Fourth Republic by its opponents, or denied being true as by its supporters, who would keep claiming the Fourth Republic had been the greatest thing to happen to France since the victory in the Great War, discrediting it a sign of disloyalty and jealously for being “wrong”.

Trial of Daniel Bendit; French laws had introduced a general ban on the reporting and recording of ongoing trials without judges permissions – which were curiously granted very easily in the cases of French opposition politicians.

Truth was however that the establishment of the Fourth Republic did not end France’s problems. Through the 70’s France experienced only below-average economic growth, a considerable growth in national debt (going up from 65% in 1967 to 85% in 1980), continued conflict in Algeria and the necessity of having to withdraw from much of Africa, leaving it only with a number of military bases on the dark continent. It was only heavy police and military presence in Algeria that had kept relative peace there, along with a large number of investments made there (Algeria being the only department to experience above average growth in the 70’s, thanks to large governmental spending s and the movement of many industries from Metropolitan France to Overseas France). Much of those investments were financed from the loans Paris had taken – but invested wisely, as France would enter a period of economic prosperity in the 80’s. Considerable work was undertaken to transform the economy into a gas-powered one, including using gas for heating and transportation. Cities like Algiers and Marseilles would be the first to have 100% of their public transportation powered by LPG, the French automotive industry also preferring it as fuel (French laws placing large taxes on cars emitting more CO2 and other exhaust fumes than a threshold only possible to be met by LPG-powered cars). France resisted pressures of devaluating its currency in 70’s, the conservative government firmly believing that French industry can remain competitive globally thanks to its own innovation and lowering labour costs, not via financial tricks – the goal of many being for the French Frank to once again become a reserve currency if the world, next to the British Pound and the American Dollar. Austerity during the 70’s paid off in the 80’s, France being the complete opposite of the UK in the same time. While the United Kingdom has experienced decent growth during the 70’s, largely thanks to the BCoN, the 80’s had become much more troublesome for it, its ability to compete with the industry of the USA (or even modernizing France) as well as the labour costs of India being seriously undermined. The British colossi-sized companies found themselves in quite a growing pickle having to compete with American industrial powers ready to take over British markets (after having saturated their own one through the past decades, American companies going through significant reforms every decade or so to cope with new governmental policies and changes on global markets – the global great powers thirst for advanced mechanical goods being always unquenched), and even the smaller, French companies being able to penetrate British markets with their goods, typically being smaller and less fuel/electricity consuming than Anglo-Saxon equivalents.

Moulinex kitchen appliances. France would start the trend of “compact sized” household appliances, placing more emphasis on the design of even the most simple things, like blenders – kitchens being meant to be places in the house just as “fashionable” as living rooms.

French liberal tendencies were best summed up in the so called “French school of economics”, strongly influenced by the former “Austrian School” – Friedrich Hayek being a common visitor of Paris universities, eventually even moving to Paris from London. No having a commonwealth to work with, France compensated by involving itself in numerous bilateral agreements on free trade with various states worldwide, including South America and the Middle East. This was both an economic and political move, France’s tendency to “bug in” into others affairs and ability to do so successfully making it sometimes unwise to ignore it, thus necessary to hear it out. One such spectacular example was the Brazilian contract on Navy cruisers and submarines in 1982, part of Brazil’s program of military modernization. Whereas the UK had withdrawn from the auction as part of a “gentlemen’s agreement” with the USA, leaving the issue of arming American states to the USA, France would turn up with a proposal better than the American soon before the deadline of giving offers. This stunned the Americans who were certain of victory and had allowed French military shipyards to work for years. Situations like these would not be uncommon across the world, France priding itself on being able to offer all kinds of “custom made products” of any kind, make it at home and deliver in time anywhere in the globe. It also understood that when it came to sales, money spoke better than politicians and paper declarations, it being possible to subvert any unofficial deals with better offers (or through bribes). France went against the generally accepted economic dogma that “too great” economic globalization was a dangerous thing, as it would make states too dependent on each other and by extension – the uncontrollable forces of “global market”. “Global markets” were thought of as somewhat flawed constructs as they would combine economies of very different types, organizations and work ethic, making a crisis in only one part of it deadly to others, without those others having a way to prevent them. Thus to maintain sustainable growth, states ought to organize around blocs of countries with similar characteristics, where their combined efforts could overpower any market failures should they occur. The Great Depression was treated as an example of the results of the failure of “uncontrollable globalization”. But for the French School of Economy, such an attitude of there having to be some kind of “long leash” for economic forces, “blocs” not being supposed to be tools of protectionism, but areas of increasingly freed markets, regulated by the same freedom-giving norms. For industrialized countries that now lacked their “resource pools” in the form of their economies, having to rely of neo-colonial tactics to secure them or be bound by the “global market prices”, this new philosophy of free trade sounded quite encouraging, as a way of both getting access to raw resources “hidden” behind tariffs and barriers, as well as hungry markets for their manufactured goods to be sold in.

Frederick Hayek with his students on the College de France. He himself would admit his ideas had drawn some inspiration from the XIXth century “French Liberal School“, the “French School of Economics” thus being deemed a continuation of those traditions.

But even such slow growth in global presence was not enough for France to truly be able to aspire to the same position as the UK or Germany held – a true global great power in its own. France lacked the sheer “ideological strength” and global “political influence” (not just economic strength to match “Soviet Communism”, “German Fascism” or “British Capitalism”. Attempts at distancing continental ideas with UK ones to gain greater prestige and recognition would not be too successful, the differences between the “French system” and “Westminster system” being too negligible for rising democracies to treat them as separate. France also understood well the limitations it had as a single nation state when having to compete in influence with continental or sub-continental size powers like the BCoN, USA, USSR or German Mitteleuropa. To have something that would be able to play in such a league it had needed an empire which it lost; without an empire it needed allies, a “French bloc” of its own. And the only area where such a “bloc” could form was western Europe – France and the Low Countries. This general logic was what led many Frenchmen to first pursue, and then accept as the only possible way, “Western European Integration” or “European Unification” – aimed at having France as the first power within a United Europe.

Ideas of European Unification weren’t new, having been present both before and after the Great War – in fact, many deemed the Soviet ideas of “Global Social Soviet Republic” and German “Aryan Unity” concepts as being much like that, codewords for their domination over Europe. Most of the ideas of European unity throughout the ages pretty much went down to a single European state assuming control over the remaining ones. Concepts of European unity to be founded on consensual federalism, akin to that of the United States of America, could be traced to the times even before the Great War, though most “societies” with such an agenda were only founded afterwards, the destruction the conflict brought to the continent bringing many to believe such unity being the best way to prevent such a war from occurring again. Yet ethnic nationalism considerably curbed any such ambitions, the nation-states of Europe placing their national interests before any “European” ones, the stance of the west towards the expansion of totalitarianism making the flaws of “European unity” obvious – countries not being willing to fight wars they had no interests in waging. Such solidarity in face of danger would be among the first, most necessary things to happen, yet that was what was lacking. The rise of fascism and the concept of “Aryan unity” further contaminated the idea of “European unity”, tainting it with ideas of “European supremacy” and “joint imperialism”.

Ideas of “Uniting Europeans” or “Uniting True Europeans” was for a long time the domain of fascists; it was only much later that the democratic forces of western Europe had taken the idea up and began actually pursuing it.

Yet the idea never really died out, the formation of the Scandinavian Union proving that such integration of nation-states was indeed possible and could be very beneficial to all parties concerned. The formation of the British Commonwealth of Nations had further stimulated the fantasies of political philosophers, economists, scientists. Among the supporters of the idea was the French Prime Minister Rene Monory, who would be responsible for pushing through much of the negotiations with the Low Countries (curiously, President Paul Gastin was much less enthusiastic about it, especially in the form Monory suggested – freeing the trade of all goods, not only those France needed to import). Much inspiration for the form West European Integration would acquire would come the works of Alexandre Kojeve, who advocated the foundation of a “Latin European Empire” (to be composed of the Latin-culture countries of Europe and others in the Mediterranean) to counterbalance the “inevitable rise of a German-dominated Central Europe” (his works being written in the 40’s proving to be prophetical). That both Spain and Italy have ended up in the fascist bloc led the enthusiasts to the conclusion that the ”first step” ought to be taken by France in the northern direction towards the Low Countries; idealists believing that the process of further “uniting Europe” would continue with Italy and Spain being dragged out of the fascist bloc, along with other countries of the Mediterranean (like Greece and Portugal). And though the non-idealists heavily doubted the latter, they would come to see the former as genuinely worthy of pursuing. A United Europe spanning France and the Low Countries would still leave France as the dominant party in such a union, capable of effectively controlling it; with a combined metropolitan population nearing 80 million and an additional 60 million in territories overseas, such a power once united could hope to match the German Reich at least, its metropolitan population also being richer on average. Such a vision was popular among some circles in Paris, who honestly saw such a “West European Empire” as a first tier power in Europe and the globe, like the German Empire before the Great War; France playing the role of Prussia in such an empire.

Still, the ideas of European integration where not without opposition, both internal and external. The German Reich never abandoned its romantic nationalist view of the Dutch being a “offshoot of the German race” nor forgot about Eupen-Malmedy. From the German point of view, the Low Countries served the role of a potential “safety valve” in case of war with either the west or the USSR – or in case of a western naval blockade – as well as the pathway through which a German offensive against France would take place (despite nominal neutrality). This made in area of both military and economic interest. Too great economic cooperation with the west by the Low Countries were viewed as moves hostile towards the Reich – as they meant these countries were more likely to submit to Franco-British pressures in case of war, joining an possible anti-German blockade/embargo, denying it strategic resources. Too great military cooperation meant that German offensive plane would have a much tougher nut to crack, attacking a coordinated defensive alliance than a neutral party. As the Netherlands were a place Germany considered particularly important for its interests, Amsterdam’s gradual shift from trying to maintain neutrality and a policy “equal distance” from Germany and the UK, to siding with the west in more and more matters on the international stage, as well as its trade with Germany becoming less relevant, was becoming a concern for Berlin. Even more so, since both the process of Scandinavian integration and the reformation of the British Empire led to the new structures being also military alliances. Germany’s traditional tactics of trying to use the UK as an opposing force towards French ambitions in the Low Countries failed, as the UK still thought of Germany as a greater threat to them than France was – London giving a silent blessing to the “European integration” process. Thus in its view, it was facing a challenge of the west trying to broaden its flank against the Reich, also further decreasing its access to open ports and global trade.

The Reich Chancellery. Germany would often try to intimidate foreign leaders who went against the Reich by demanding them to travel for diplomatic talks to Berlin, its mere architecture being an intimidation factor; the Reich Chancellery being the place for conversations when crisis became large.

Yet Germany’s aggressive stance towards the entire idea had led to mixed results. On one hand, it did create a feeling of uncertainty among the countries of the Benelux strong enough to hesitate in joining any integrated military structures with France out of fear for German response; the threat of no longer recognizing the neutrality of the Low Countries working. On the other hand, it was too well understood that in case of war, such German declarations would be worthless – the difference in the German stance being essentially whether the German missiles and bombers were targeted for Belgium or the Netherlands at all times, or whether orders for re-targeting them having to come from Berlin beforehand. Also, the benefits of freeing trade between each other and inviting more French capital were too good to pass for them, there being a strong belief that investments and trade would be yet another reason for France to stand up for the Benelux in case of war. Whereas German arguments of it not being possible to treat “neutral” countries in military alliances with other non-neutral countries as “neutral” had grounds and merit, its opposition to multilateral trade agreements between France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands had none of that. Effectively the Reich could not prevent the signing of the Treaty of Brussels in 1981, which had officially established the “West European Economic Community” between the four countries – plus Monaco and Andorra being associated with it. It did however succeed in preventing the treaty from having military clauses in it, like the treaties binding together the Scandinavian states, or the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The WEEC was a purely economic organization created for the purpose of abolishing trade barriers and tariffs, freeing the movement of goods, capital, enterprises and people, as well as introducing common regulations on their integrated market – including the future establishment of a customs union. To deal with military matters, a separate organization was formed, the West European Treaty Organization, which was essentially a military alliance of the four countries in everything but name – guaranteeing the territorial integrity and the “respect for the neutrality” of the Low Countries by France, yet going so far as to allowing for the establishment of a Unified Command (if deemed necessary by the signing parties) and allowing for the mutual presence of each other’s militaries on their soil.

Just how serious France was about the treaty and its obligation towards the Low Countries became apparent soon after its signing, in spring of 1982. Germany’s response to the treaty was to significantly increase its military strength in the west, which had occurred through the winter of 1981/82. France, living up to the expectations that were present, had offered the Netherlands the right to “lease” their nuclear arsenal, including placing it under independent Dutch command. The French offer was accepted by Amsterdam, leading to the “nuclear spring” of 1982 when Germany threatened to move its own nuclear armed bombers west and annul existing border treaties, along with its recognition of Dutch neutrality, and demanded the immediate withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the Low Countries. Powerful diplomacy was used to defuse the situation, marking one of the moments when the UK would actually go against the French – their stance towards not allowing for nuclear weapons to be distributed freely taking priority over general alliances. After two months, the nukes would be withdrawn from the Netherlands, Germany promising to reduce its military presence and recall its bombers, along with re-targeting the missiles. And while overall the crisis was considered a success for Germany – which lost nothing and gained a degree of security – it had aided France even more in proving itself as an independent military power to be reckoned with and further assuring the Netherlands that their security was better looked after by Paris than London.

Fears of nuclear Armageddon brought by German nukes led different people to move either the direction of strict neutrality, or looking for adequate deterrents; this was true for countries both large and small.

 

[Kongzilla]

The Baltic States have been area of considerable importance for Germany during the Cold War, their strategic position between the Reich and the USSR, as well as their location in the east of the Baltic Sea making control over them pivotal for anyone seeking dominion over this area of water. Being among the youngest countries of Europe, they were also among the smallest, and most prone to falling under the influence of their powerful neighbours – Germany, Russia, and to a slighter degree, Poland. Although western literature and scientific studies would often lump them together, considering them a rather singular “area of interest” and assuming them to be somehow “politically connected” with each other – reality was that those countries never managed to obtain any significant degree of unity. Practically, the only thing that united them was their lousy geographic location and their will to try and minimalize their serfdom to others. Yet even there no common policy was ever found, each of the Baltic States trying to act independently in pursuit of their interests, each seeing a different path for itself – both in establishing their place in Europe, as well as their internal development as a country and as a people.

Map of the Baltic States, after the Memelland annexation.

During the Cold War, the United Kingdom and France did not pay any significant attention to the Baltic States, their interests in the region dying almost completely by the end of the 40’s. Both the British Foreign Office, and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had only a token sub-unit for dealing with the Baltic States, being positioned under the departments for the non-German Central European countries, often being reduced to only a single person. This was very different than what was in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had a constant interest in the region and maintained a diplomatic corps meant specifically for the Baltic States, also cooperating with the KGB on them. The Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs had too a non-irrelevant number of officials working on the matters of the Baltic States, also cooperating with the Auslands-Organization of the NSDAP as well as the numerous organizations of the Volksdeutsche in the Baltic States. This was, as matter of fact, a reflection of what interests the Global Great Powers had in the Baltic States. For the west, the Baltic States stopped being relevant the moment both Germany and Russia began to put too much pressure for them to handle, in a region rather outside their natural zone of influence – especially given that those countries had also internally abandoned liberal democracies and descended into autocracies of varying degree. For the Soviet Union, the Baltic States were an area of strategic military importance, territory through which any invasion against it (and against Leningrad) would have to take place, as well as through which the USSR would have to move if it sought to target Germany (East Prussia). They were also of great importance in regard of dominating the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. Russia was thus most interested in keeping as much foreign military outside that area as possible, constantly noting its own strategic interests there, including shipping through freezing waters and the status of the Russian minority in the Baltic States.

Russian icebreaker in the Gulf of Finland. The Gulf of Finland was not a all-year warm port, its freezing in winter hurting Soviet trade through sea – the only route for trade with Europe with fascist states blocking off land routes. Use of Baltic States ports was thus a necessity for the USSR for some time.

For Germany, the Baltic States were of great importance for a number of reasons. Dominion over the Baltic, control of the rest of the central-east Europe, “protection” of the German minority there, control over the “path” towards the USSR, import of foodstuffs like dairy and eggs, or raw materials like timber – all these matters have made the Baltic States an important target for the Reich, even at the very start of the Cold War. In fact, annexing Memelland was the very first important move of Hermann Goring as Reich Chancellor. But German ambitions could not stop there, and for the next decade, soft power was being used by Germany to have the Baltic States gravitate towards the Reich – the slow but steady growth of trade with Germany (which amounted to more than 70% of their trade by 1945), the demands of the German minority (which was among the best organized minorities in the world, capable of very effective campaigning, in close relation with both the German foreign ministry and the NSDAP), the turmoil in Poland and most importantly, the growing pressures of the USSR had all led to all three of them falling to German influence. That influence only grew with time, even after the Baltic States joined the Berlin Pace and the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1949. The German minority, which had already been an influential group there, owning a large portion of industries and estates, had proven to be very loyal to the Reich, its members appointed to positions of power and reporting to (as well as taking orders from) Berlin. Many investments in the Baltic States made thanks to German capital came with strings attached, the Germans being appointed to management positions. Control over the Baltic states was omni-present, from the Baltic Germans being nominated to senior positions in their countries general staffs (ensuring much control over their militaries) through the owners of large naval ports and docks (allowing them to control the flow of goods from and to the Baltic States) to humble railroad workers on junctions, who cooperated with the Germans for the purpose of maintain control over railways (going so far as to allow some crews to own firearms – the purpose being for them to be able to fend off attacks at these railroad points and keep control over them so as to either keep them open for arriving German troops from East Prussia, or to blow them up in case of invading Soviets). This sort of macro and micro-management of the Baltic States required a large governmental administration, not a few of those officials actually coming from the Baltic States themselves, leading to the number of officials in Berlin dealing with the Baltic States to be disproportionally large compared to those countries. In many matters, the Baltic States were even thought of as extensions of the Reich, though that was an overstatement – while German influence was felt, it wasn’t forceful; Germany wanting not direct control over the country, but a simple “leash” to be possible to use if such a need would arrive. It sought to be in a position where it could use power, but not necessary having to use it. Germany was capable of leaving the Baltic peoples to their own workings, provided they did not go against the interests of the Reich – those interests however getting broader as time went by, slowly reducing the freedoms of the people.

German minority in Latvia, waving the German and Latvian flags in celebration of Latvia joining the anti-comintern pact, 1949.

Recognition of the Baltic States as a region of German influence came fastest by the western powers, even though their early workings were aimed at avoiding precisely that. For a long time, it was the United Kingdom that was seen as the “true” ally of the Baltic States, “Anglophilia” being strong there (as opposed to the more common “Francophilia” in the rest of the countries emerging after the Great War). British trade was dominant for them in the 20’s though the great depression marked the turn from the UK to Germany, one which London failed to correct – the pro-British sentiment amongst the people there not being really returned. Whereas in 1939 the west was willing to stand up for the Baltic States, denying the USSR the right to unilaterally intervene in the Baltic States militarily, when negotiating the formation of some anti-German coalition in Europe, by 1949, neither the UK nor France had these objections. When yet another round of talks were taking place in Paris, both the French and English delegations had conceded the Russian right to “secure its national interests using any means necessary” in the Baltic States – de facto meaning a western approval for a Russian invasion of the Baltic States, so as to prevent them from falling to the Germans. This piece of knowledge did not remain secret though, both the Italian and Polish intelligence learning of this, and sharing that knowledge with Berlin and the Baltic States. This was the final straw that convinced the Baltic States (and Poland, as western approval went also for “possible alterations of the Polish-Soviet border” to join the Anti-Comintern Pace and the Berlin Pact, the Reich being seen as a lesser evil to the USSR. This matter would remain a point of controversy between the western and eastern historians, of what came first – western abandonment of the Baltic States, caused by their closeness to Germany and undemocratic character, or whether that closeness and growing authoritarianism was the result of the west withdrawing from the region prior to that. It was without doubt that the Baltic States were authoritarian states even before the rise of the Third Reich, but on the other hand, these regimes remained somewhat anti-German and much more oriented on cooperation with the west than looking forward to jumping in bed with Germany. Nevertheless, the Baltic States would join the Berlin Pact and receive German assurances of their borders before the Soviets could make their own demands. This move was taken as a very hostile one by Moscow and unpopular in the west – though the west was also quick to get over it and accept it, unlike the USSR which remained a constant threat to that status quo.

British caricature from 1949. With the Baltic States joining the Berlin Pact and the Anti-Comintern Pact, access to the USSR through them (still used by some western states) was blocked off, impairing trade and further isolating the USSR from the rest of Europe.

It would only be proven much later, after opening German archives, that the German game was aimed at precisely causing the chain of events that unravelled in the 40’s. Goring was aware of the anti-Russian sentiment in the Baltic States and Poland being stronger than any anti-German sentiment, as well as of the western weakness in protecting these countries. Threatening the west with an arms race, naval development, strengthening national anti-capitalist movements worldwide was expected to cause the west to try and re-start another Entente, as well as lead Russia to start demanding territories of its western neighbours. The more German pressure would be made on the west, the more desperate the west would be for some sort of alliance with the Soviets and the more willing to accept the abandonment of the central-east European countries to a communist fate. This would be where Germany would be able to step in, offering an alternative to them – one which could be reasonably taken, provided Germany would not be seen as a land-grabber, or otherwise as worse than the Soviets. Goring’s patience towards achieving that end, together with his economic policies and giving up on territorial demands thus bore fruit, leaving Germany with a completely dominant position in the Baltic region.

The Baltic States remained rather under industrialized, despite attempts at constructing a developed manufacturing base, using both domestic resources and foreign capital. Germany was particularly generous in financing certain projects, though these always went with strings attached. German economic policy did not envision other countries as being anything equal to Germany, rather being add-ons, providers of raw materials and parts, any advanced products made there being made primarily for the purpose of serving the German economy. Germany would maintain a large share in the ownership in any German-Baltic companies, Germans would dominate their boards of executives and management, the local population being reduced to menial labour in those factories. Much of the Baltic States population remained rural, “employed” in labour intensive agriculture (a statistical trick meant to show low unemployment) – not a few large landowners being in fact Germans. Germans would also own a disproportionally large amount of estates and buildings in cities. The connection between the privileges of the German minority and the economic performance of the Baltic people remained in the mentality of the people, the Germans being mostly seen as the reason for their poor performance – though on the other hands, those who were employed in German-owned or controlled enterprises did not always share that sentiment, unless they were prevented from advancement. Also, in Lithuania, the German minority was almost negligible, relations between the Lithuanians and Germans remaining actually quite good, despite the loss of Memelland.

The port in Riga. Germany would emphasise keeping the ownership of strategic infrastructure elements in the Baltic states in German hands, either the German state, German companies or Baltic Germans as sole owners or shareholders in them.

The Baltic States were too small to develop diversified economies, hence the fascist principles of autarky could hardly be executed there. Still, autarky remained their goal for quite a long time, considered necessary to be established at least in “strategic” areas, such as food, water and electricity. The Baltic States were however enthusiastic of the idea of greater “unity” among the countries of the OMEWZE, and would end up supporting Germany in its actions towards using that organization for “properly redistributing” resources and goods. Their economies were each dependent on some particular branch of industry, other parts of the country acting essentially as auxiliaries to that, and being dependent on it. For Latvia, its main industry had been the large naval works and shipyards of Riga, constructed from German funds in the 40’s, other factories in the country being meant for the production of parts necessary for shipbuilding – naval engines, propellers, metal sheathings, etc. For Estonia – large textile and leather industries, later also radio and telecommunications (including the popular “TELER” television equipment), supplemented by its electrical and electronics works. Lithuania would construct a considerable wood industry, including timer, furniture, construction materials, fiberboards, even matches, its sawmills bringing in lumber from all over Europe. Yet in each case the countries entire economies would be dependent on the sales of the “final products” of their economies – the sales going mainly to Germany, allowing Germany to control their wealth simply by choosing to buy from someone else. This threat was often sufficient to break the will of any opposition among the Baltic’s state leaderships. Attempts at breaking out of this hard situations were never successful. While Lithuania had never even tried, considering its alliance with Germany strategic and too important to jeopardize in any way, Latvia would occasionally try to turn towards the countries within the Axis opposed to German domination, such as Italy, Poland and Hungary for support – effects being mixed, and tactical at best. Estonia had attempted similar moves, also turning towards the countries of Scandinavia for aid – during the negotiations on the formation of the Scandinavian Economic Community, even trying to break away from the Axis and joining Scandinavia (the attempt failing due to German pressures, ceasing actions towards that end by the countries of Scandinavia being one of the “untold conditions” for Germany recognizing their neutrality) – but not successfully. Various “X year plans” implemented by the Baltic States were supervised by German “consultants” to ensure their compliance with German wishes, moves meant to take into account the necessities of the countries themselves being usually ignored, unless they coincided with German interests as well. The degree of freedom over controlling and planning their budgets and economies was a political matter, Germany using downright “stick and carrot” tactics to keep them obedient, and dependent on the Reich.

While all of the Baltic states introduced anti-semitic legislation, alongside “German minority protection” laws, the extent of those laws varied considerably from state to state. In Lithuania, where the German minority was insignificant, their protection was also the weakest; with the majority of the Germans from Lithuania concentrated in Memelland, its annexation has led to the remaining German population be only about 30 thousand strong, and mostly rural at that. The population exchange movement in the late 40’s and early 50’s had reduced that number further, an exception of the general rule of German policies of leaving the German diaspora in neighbouring states as leverage; with consent of both the Lithuanian President and Chancellor Goring, the plan of the Prussian Gaueleiter Darre to replace the Lithuanian and Polish populations of East Prussia with Baltic Germans was partly implemented, about 18 000 Germans from Lithuania being resettled in Memelland and the southern parts of the Gaue. In contrast to that, German legislation in Estonia, where the German minority made up almost 10% (partly thanks to the drop in the Jewish and Russian minorities numbers there) of the population, was very developed, guaranteeing the Germans considerable “personal autonomy”. Germans were identified by signing up in the official “cultural register” of the Auslander Organization NSDAP, joining providing numerous priviliges – exemption from certain taxes and draft, falling under a different judicial system, preferential treatment in employment in state enterprises, ethnic schools from elementary to college. German had become the official language countrywide, along with German language signs being visible in many streets and cities. The minorities rights were restrictively protected both by the “Volkspolizei” (a separate police force of Estonian Germans tasked with police duties in certain areas, semi-independent from the Estonian police) and the numerous political and cultural organizations of Estonian Germans who did not hesitate in sending complaints about any “breaches” of their rights to the German consulates or the local NSDAP cells – or even directly to Berlin. The main one, under which most of such organizations were organized and which was the direct political link of the German minority with Berlin was known as the “Estonian Self-Administration”, with an estimated 95% of all “Volksdeutsche” of Estonia being registered in it (though contrary to popular belief, membership was nor equivalent with membership in the NSDAP, nor was the Estonian Self-Administration subject to the Nazi Party, but to the German Foreign Ministry, even if connections between it and the NSDAP were common and wide). The Germans in Estonia were mockingly referred to as “kapten rassi” (meaning “master race”) by the Estonians, their privileged position, along with making up a disproportionally large part of the social and commercial elite greatly contributing to German-Estonian antagonisms in personal relations – segregation from each other being mutually desirable, growing to tragic levels, when Estonian and German hospitals and clinics would refuse to share their hospital supplies even at times of emergency, leading to people dying, or ethnic-based lynchings for “unpunished crimes” remaining unpursued by both sides.

In this regard, Latvia lied somewhere in between, being the most “diversified” of all Baltic states, with a sizeable German, Russian, Jewish and Polish minority, which altogether made up more than 20 % of the population (though it was the Russians rather than Germans that were the largest of them). Like elsewhere, ethnic legislation has sidelined the Jews removing them from the public, social and commercial life of the country, while promoting and privileging the Germans. Like the Estonians, the Latvians had overall a negative attitude towards the Germans (and as opposed to the Lithuanians), but unlike them, it was trying harder at not being reduced to a status of “semi-serfdom”. Latvia did so partly by relying on support from other fascist countries, primarily Italy and Poland, partly by having pro-German legislation be part of more general “minorities protection laws”, which also covered the Lithuanians, Estonians, Poles and eventually also the ethnic Russians (those who had passed “racial hygiene” tests, which determined the degree of their “contamination” from Mongolic and Semitic blood). Thus Latvia tried to reduce the strength of the German minority by sticking to the strategy of the German minority having to be only awarded as much “preferential treatment” as the other minorities, hoping that those “others” would more willingly support the Latvians against the Germans, rather than trying to force through the same treatment for their minorities that the Germans had. Latvia had partly succeeded at that, gaining the support of both Estonia and Poland and partly even the USSR (which however objected about the biological classifications of Russians into ”ethnic Russians” and “fraction part Russians”, even though 99% of all Russians were placed in the first category) – the last being most important, as it brought the debate on the status of the Baltic Germans in Latvia to higher level, one between the Reich and the USSR. The result had been that the Latvian Germans, while still benefiting from minorities protection, did not enjoy as many of them as their counterparts in the north and south. The status of the Germans in the various Baltic States was not surprisingly opposite to the status of the Jews. Whereas in Lithuania the German did not have much benefits due to their negligible numbers, the Jews there were subjected to extremely harsh laws, modeled on the Germans ones, altogether with biological clauses on sterilization and mix-breeding (as opposed to many fascist states where anti-semitism was economic in nature, rather than backed by racial ideologies). In Estonia, the attitude towards the Jews was very relaxed, anti-semitic legislation being mostly unenforced (at least by the Estonians, the German having a more strict attitude), “biological background checks” being very rare and ones “Jewishness” being ultimately self-determined by a simple self-declaration of ethnicity. While many Jews still escaped Estonia, many had also managed to blend in with the population, declaring themselves Estonian, baptizing themselves and destroying documents of their past, while also not telling of them to their children. Again, Latvia lied in between the two, the Jews being both persecuted by the Latvians and other minorities, as well as choosing to blend in, being granted Polish or Russian “ethnicity” the most common escape. Thus, while the drop in Lithuania’s Jewish population went together with an overall drop of population, the Jews from there fleeing abroad, the same was not felt in the same degree in either Latvia or Estonia, where the Jews in a large part “assimilated” with the native (or minority) population.

Map of the Ghetto in the Lithuanian capital Kaunas. Lithuanian anti-semitic legislation was considerably racial, rather than just cultural or economic like was the case in Latvia and Estonia.

The position of the Russian population was a peculiar one. Ethnic Russians have had a non-irrelevant presence in Latvia and Estonia, pockets of them being also present in Lithuania and to a lesser degrees, other countries of central Europe – mostly the émigrés of the White movement. However, the rise of fascism, coupled with strengthening national sentiments had also led to a growth of Russophobia. Through the decades, many “Whites” have come to choose emigration further west, to France and the USA. But many have stayed behind, Latvia becoming the country with the largest Russian minority overall, over 200.000 strong. And whereas the Russians ended up being “unwelcome” in the countries of central east Europe (especially Poland, Germany, Lithuania and Estonia), Latvia was restrained in any active persecution of them. Initially, that was due to fears of the reaction of the USSR, much like in Estonia; only later, with German pressures growing did this attitude change, the Russians being seen as a possible “counterbalance” to the German minorities demands (unlike what happened in Estonia, where Russians became a persecuted minority as “the other oppressor”, though one action against which was possible thanks to German protection, and even then, mistreatment was even weaker than of the Jews). Political wanderings and diplomatic works, including active Latvian work in the Minorities Committee in the League of Nations, starting its own Faculty of Minorities Rights at the University of Riga, as well as establishing a separate Ministry of Minorities Affairs had given some results in not only letting Latvia resist some of the pressures of the Germans, but also leading to Latvia becoming the only country to recognize the Russians as an official national minority. Future agreements with other fascist states had subsequently led to Latvia having to accept the obligation to harbor the Russians being expelled from the countries of central Europe. This had also quickly become a tool for other fascist countries to rid themselves of some of their “unwanted” east Slavic or Orthodox populations, such as the Rusyns from Hungarian Transcarpathia, the East Slavs from Eastern Poland, even the Belarusians from Lithuania. And though total numbers were not especially eye-catching – being barely over 100 000, mostly from Estonia and Lithuania, the Russians from all the other countries being counted in barely a few thousand – it was significant for Latvia, the Russian minority reaching a population of 400 000 by 1965. With a population of only a little more than 2.5 million, this made it a remarkably large minority for a fascist state – as the general doctrine of those was pursuing homogeneity and assimilation. Latvia was thus the second-most “diversified” of the fascist states after Poland (excluding Italy, which multinational character was the result of it possessing a colonial empire). Numbers were partly deceptive though, as the 400 000 figure also included the Belarusian and Ukrainian minority, many of these people hoping for a better living by declaring themselves “Russian” (becoming “Latvian” being usually impossible due to language and religious barriers, assimilation laws in fascist states being considerably more restrictive than in the west). While the Organization of Russians in Latvia (the official organization concentrating the ethnic Russians in Latvia and recognizing Russian immigrants as “Russians”, as well as serving as the hub for numerous other cultural, sports and economic organizations) would have a shaky relation with the Latvian government, as would be between the ethnic Russians and Latvians, it would nevertheless remain an somewhat important power in balancing out the influence of Germany over Latvia, particularly with Polish, Italian and Estonian aid within the Axis block, and the USSR when matters were raised to the international level of the League of Nations and bilateral talks between Germany and Russia.

Nativity Cathedral in Riga. Orthodoxy would remain an important part of the Russian Emigree cultural identity, the battle over whether the religious landmark in the Latvian capital ought to remain an Orthodox church or be converted to a Lutheran one getting even international attention.

This concentration of Russian people of various origin and personal history, a degree of suspiciousness towards them from the Latvians as well as the other minorities, coupled with actual, real rights of cultural autonomy and a persisting (despite Soviet efforts) anti-bolshevik sentiment and a willingness to prove themselves as being not any worse than the other “Aryans”, had made the Russian diaspora in Latvia much different in terms of culture that the Russians of the USSR. As much of that diaspora’s only element in common was being decedents of the Russian aristocracy or the veterans of the Russian Civil War fighting for the Whites, that common heritage trait had become the center of their identity. The Russians (as well as the Belarusians and Ukrainians) of Latvia would begin to treat themselves as the repositories of “true” Russian culture, untainted by bolshevism. The memory of the Russian Civil War would be cultivated, almost deified, being seen as the descendants of the “greatest resistors” and the “greatest victims” of bolshevism – the people who lost their ancestral homeland to them. This attitude would be kept by the officials of the Organization of Russians in Latvia, many leaders of which being former aristocrats or their children. This had a rather interesting effect on the culture of Russians in Latvia, as the organization would actively promote the “noble” character of Russian culture rather than the typical “peasant”/”volkish” culture with which East Slavic peoples were associated. Russian magazines would print out chapters of many important works of Russian literature to “raise” the people from “commoner” culture to “noble/intelligentsia” culture. Russian music festivals would present mostly classical pieces rather than folk songs. Russian museums would more often be associated with particular Russian noble families rather than “the Russian People”, these museums often having works of arts belonging to impoverished nobles sold to them. “Women’s catalogues” dedicated for the Russian minority would offer goods and interior decorations meant to resemble the Russian palaces of old, the idea being for any house or flat to have the feeling of being a “place of nobles”. This slow process would gradually lead to not only assimilating the incoming east Slavs into the “Russian” culture, but also to truly alter the Russian minorities culture during its gradual economic development – it being appealing to the poor people who were gradually getting richer to use their newfound wealth to imitate the old nobles, decorating their surroundings in old noble fashion, adopting their manners – especially in the presence of non-Russians, so as to keep up with, or even exceed, the Joneses.

Russians in Latvia. The White-Blue-Red flag and the naval ensign would be the symbols of the “White” Russians (or “Free Russians”), marking them as completely separate from Communist Russia (fighting the stereotype of “all Russians being Communists” an important part of their work in both western and central Europe)

At the same time however, the relation with the White diaspora in the west would often be cold, them being considered “withering monarchists”, a dying kind, more interested in wasting away the remains of their wealth and cultural heritage, assimilating with the locals, much like the “decadent Babylonians”, partying while the world around them crumbled. It was true that the numbers of the Russian minority in the west had been falling rapidly, the next generation of the emigrees almost completely assimilating themselves – the funds established by the Russian Latvians using this as an opportunity for buying out the remains of their art collections, silverware, crystals, jewelry and such. Russian tourists from Latvia who would manage to gain tourist visas to western countries would often direct themselves on the first opportunity to antique stores and various galleries known for keeping old, Russian things. These kind of things would remain in constant demand. It would also serve as the reason for much criminal activities, forgeries of known art pieces such as Faberge Eggs being made and sold, all types of smuggle coming in from the USSR (Soviet tourists allowed to enter the fascist states also trading off their ancestral possessions, like tsarist era coins, for other things), eventually also organized crime groups. In what would be uncovered as one of the largest scandals of the 80’s was “Operation Steel” conducted by the Latvian Intelligence in cooperation with the Organization of Russians in Latvia, which involved organizing outright robberies of jewel stores, art galleries, goldsmiths, pawnshops, private houses – anyplace where valuable goods were known to be. Latvian and Russian officers actively worked with local crime syndicates to carry out their missions, and though officially the Operation was meant simply to “repair the finances of the state”, the uncovering of the extent of the operation had proven that it was largely used for targeted thefts, commissioned by wealthy Latvians and Russians. With the scandal going public, much justification by the Russo-Latvian side was made around the concept of the “goods of the former Russian aristocracy being national goods, not allowed for private sale, the operation being a matter of national pride and preservation of culture, etc. etc.”. Needless to say, it did not serve the relation between the Russians in the west and in Latvia well.

Saint George and the Dragon by Raphael. The painting, sold by the State Hermitage Museum to the USA in the 30’s, would be stolen from the National Gallery of Arts while being on loan to the National Museum of Fine Arts in Stockholm, causing international outrage when it was discovered in Latvia, the theft being part of “Operation Steel”.

And while numerous museums of Russian history and heritage would be opened in Latvia, the Russian Empire and the Tsarist regime remained a silent topic among the Russian minority. Contrary to rumors sometimes circulating in the west, the Russian Latvians were hardly monarchists (in fact, they often despised the former aristocrats for either “selling them and their culture for Franks” or for losing Russia itself). The Organization of Russians in Latvia also wasn’t active in Latvian politics, except matters of minorities rights. It was very careful about not being a nuisance, nor a threat to Latvia, its leaders recognizing that their situation was the best they could hope for in their circumstances. Since Latvian-Russian history had mostly been bad, the Russian Empire was hardly never glorified; if these matters were brought forth, most of the “ideologists” of the Russian minority recognized the Tsars appetite for constant territorial gains regardless of the inhabitants of those lands as being one of the main reasons for Russia’s fall; Russian imperialism being condemned. Such cautiousness was prudent, as most Latvians still held a large dose of dislike for the Russians, regardless if Red or White. The Russian minority thus avoided participating in political affairs, cases in which Russians did give unpopular statements being quickly responded to with assurances of that being their “private opinion” and in no way representing the stance of the Organization of Russians in Latvia. And despite making up a large portion of the country’s population, the Russians were not granted any political representation in the Latvian Saeima. This had to do with the Organization itself being started contrary to the wishes of the Latvian government itself, and under the pressures of the USSR (in return for its support against German demands). Thus for much of its early history, the Organization was kept at a distance and watched over with suspiciousness of possible Soviet infiltration – the anti-Bolshevik and pro-White turn only coming with time. And even during that early history, it was attempted to be used by the Germans as well, Russians being promised the same privileges the Germans would get, if they declared their support for the Baltic Germans.
This was one of the early problems of leadership of the Organization of Russians in Latvia. It’s first chairman, from the moment of the its founding in 1947, was Vladimirs Petrovs, a renown chess champion, the choice of the Latvian government. Petrovs was thought as being one of the “loyal” Russians, and did indeed spend a lot of work ensuring that the newly found organization would not become a chauvinist or anti-Latvian one, recognizing the general sentiment of Latvians towards the Russians, and fearing what could happen should things worsen. Petrovs would encourage the people joining the Organization to learn Latvian language and culture, while not abandoning their own, and would set an example himself – during his foreign travels on international championships, or in interviews or when otherwise heard in public, he would only use Latvian. Russian sportsmen representing Latvia abroad would also be reminded not to use Russian or identify with their Russianness. Censorship of materials made by the Organization so as to be acceptable by the Latvian censor bureau was conducted, making the “historically and politically correct”. Petrovs would thus be judged as a good choice by the Latvian government, giving them little trouble, while also silently working towards some Russian-Latvian reconciliation. But such an attitude was not like by many of the more chauvinist Russians, as well as the Germans, for whom such a Latvian-loyal person was not convenient. Germany had its own plans for organizing the Russian minority in Latvia, through the much more known persona (both in Latvia and worldwide) of general Pavel Bermondt, one of the few surviving leaders of the original White movement.

General Pavel Bermondt (second from right) with the other leaders of the Organization of Russians in Latvia (Vladimirs Petrovs third from right)

Bermondt had remained in exile in Germany since the end of the civil war, where he was one of the founders and leaders of the Russian National Socialist Union, gathering the small Russian diaspora in Germany. Being briefly arrested in 1934, he was subsequently released. When exactly would he be recruited by the German Abwehr was unknown, but by 1945 he was already in its employ, being sent to Latvia for the purpose of organizing the Russian minority there in way suiting the Germans. Initially, according to German plans, his Russian National Socialist Union was to recruit members from the Russian population of Latvia using German support, for it to de facto become the only organized group of Russians in Latvia. The plan failed, first because of rather small support of the local Russians for National Socialism, even when such a figure like Bermondt was used to promote it, second, due to Latvian resistance towards allowing any form political groups to operate legally (especially those known to be on the German payroll), further by the statements of the League of Nations, which Minorities Committee officially stated the political parties gathering a certain ethnicity cannot be eligible for the status of a recognized national minority. Thus when the Organization of Russians in Latvia had formed, the Russian National Socialist Union was incorporated into it, Bermondt becoming a “honorary leader”. He still was the leader of the more aggressive, chauvinistic, “militant” faction, the main connection between it and the Russian All-Military Union as well as other such organizations in the west. To further his agenda, he restarted the “Brotherhood of Russian Truth” as the radical anti-Bolshevik group among the Latvian Russians, marking those “suspected of anti-Russian activities” and otherwise acting as a sort of “internal security” of the Russian minority. His demands towards the Latvian state, including territorial autonomy of “Russian governorates”, the formation of a “Russian selbschutz”, guaranteed political representation in the Saeima, general chauvinism and anti-Latvianism (as his statements about the country, the Latvian people and Russian history, including his own performance during the Russian Civil War were interpreted) made him very unpopular among the Latvians, and a reason for which Russo-Latvian relations remained poor. His eventual decline in the late 50’s would come due to his emerged anti-Germanism, Bermondt starting to demand privileges in Latvia being granted only to Russia, while denied to all others. Assumed to be the result of his age and collapsing mental health, this turning away from the Germans who remained his largest sponsors resulted in him becoming useless, and more a hazard than a benefit for the organization. While he nominally would remain the “honorary leader” of the Organization of Russians in Latvia, he would be cut off from any workings in it, reduced to ceremonial role, or sent on foreign missions for “artifact retrieval”, such as gathering old Tsarist Army banners.

The Russian National Socialist Union in Berlin, 1933, for a time strong allies of the Germans in the Baltic States and their “Trojan horses”.

Minorities issues would not be the central matter of internal politics of only Latvia, among the Baltic States. Lithuania would have a similar issue, though uniquely – not with Germans or Jews, but rather with Poles. Anti-Polish sentiment had been very strong among Lithuanians since the country’s foundation and even before that, the situation being made even worse and remaining that since 1920, when Poland regained the city of Wilno during the Polish-Bolshevik war – the declared capital of Lithuania which was briefly occupied by it during that war. The conflict over the city was the main reason of antagonisms, only getting worse on Lithuanian side with time. The abolishment of democracy in 1926 had denied the Poles any chance at political and “civil” resolution of the internal conflict in Lithuania. The loss of Memelland had further fueled the Lithuanian’s fury and desire to take out their anger at someone – the Poles and Jews being an easy target to pick on. Many Lithuanians have fallen under the delusion that Lithuania surrendering Memelland was not a unilateral concession, but that there was some “secret treaty” between Lithuania and Germany according to which the Reich was supposed to support Lithuania in annexing Wilno. The Lithuanian government never denied this, hoping that such delusions would be able to keep the population content – and that maybe in the future, such an agreement with Germany could indeed be made, should Lithuania prove sufficiently loyal. Lithuania had been among the few countries with which Germany had enjoyed a constant warm relation, even during the Weimar era – the Memelland matter not even being able to change that, as Germany remained seen as Lithuania’s most important ally. Apart from Berlin, good relations were also enjoyed with Konigsberg, its Gauleiter Darre, and in later times, universally with all people in that position. Germany was obviously Lithuania’s largest trade partner, by 1950 about 85% of its trade turnout being with Germany and more than 98% of all its exports at least passing through Germany – mainly the ports in Memelland and Konigsberg. The Gauleiters of Prussia enjoyed a rather special position in the German hierarchy of power, being considered equally as important in foreign affairs with Lithuania as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Lithuanian leadership also considering meetings with Prussian gauleiters as being on the same level as with Foreign affairs ministers.

Former Lithuanian Prime Minister Voldemaras in Berlin with his wife. Voldemaras was among the more pro-German prominent Lithuanian politicians, treated with courtesy in German circles

Lithuania had been an early example of the power of the German Reich had over its neighbours using sheer economic and political instruments. In late 1940, following Lithuanian refusal to a number of barter trade deals with the currency-short Reich, Germany responded with closing off the German-Lithuanian border including the ports in Memelland and Konigsberg, subsequently using it’s influence in Latvia to block off using it to circumvent the German blockade. The winter of 1940 and 1941 would thus be remembered as the “cold winter” in Lithuania, due to significant shortages of coal and gas and the introduction of food rationing. In the meantime, German intelligence aided financially a number of anti-Smetona agitations, providing paper, ink and currency for the spread of brochures and such. By summer 1941, tensions against the regime were very high, the people and the political opposition demanding the calling of the fifth Seimas, this time – one with opposition participation, including the right for the former Prime Minister Augustinas Voldemaras to return to the country. Smetona ignored these demands, breaking anti-government dissent. And while that had been easy during winter, when people were cold hungry, it was significantly harder in spring. In April 1941, a general strike was held in Lithuania demanding the resignation of Smetona and new elections. Those calls were answered, though from a side much closer to Smetona than expected – the Iron Wolf Association, known also as the Voldemarininkai. Using the general strike (which included railway workers and even some soldiers) and dissent, the members of the Iron Wolf stormed the Presidential Palace, forcing Smetona to resign and declare new election – almost at gunpoint. Smetona had appointed the leader of the coupists Antanas Maciuk to the position of temporary President until new elections were held, along with Algridas Sliesoratis as Prime Minister. The coup, once announced, was met with overwhelming support by the population, crowds going out to the streets in support of the change.

Antanas Maciuk announcing the toppling of Smetona

Soon after this, German restrictions were dropped and goods started flowing back to Lithuania, further calming the situation down. The elections to the fifth Seimas would take place on April 30 1941, and were performed rather awkwardly. While nominally free, with any registered party being allowed to participate, the political opposition to Smetona was very weak and disorganized, the only significant player being the League of Lithuanian Activists (LLA), led by Algridas Sliesoratis, a ‚open‘, ‚all-party‘, ‚democratic‘ opposition – though in fact, almost completely dominated in leadership by the Iron Wolf Association. Thus when elections were prepared, almost all candidates seeking to participate were convinced to join the LLA, under the promise of political parties to be formed later – not knowing that the LLA was already just a front for Lithuanian National Socialists of the Iron Wolf. The argument that only such a broad alliance would be able to send the right message against Smetona‘s Lithuanian Nationalist Union proved convincing, the elections ending with 85% of the population voting for the LLA, the LNU getting only around 10% - the rest not making it to the Seimas, being under the election threshold.

It was obvious to everyone that on its first gathering, the new Seimas would appoint the recently returned Augustinas Voldemaras to the post of President, as well as making Algirdas Sliesoratis Prime Minister. But this didn’t happen. In an echo the events in Berlin from 1933, on June 7th 1941 a huge explosion completely destroyed the LLA headquarters in Kaunas during a session of the “party” leaders. The attack had taken the lives of most of the great election victors, including Voldemaras, Sliesoratis, Maciuk and many others, leaving Lithuania almost completely leaderless. Without any clear successor, and with the Seimas having not yet officially gathered, it ended up with Aleksandras Lileikis, the chief of the capital’s police and the very fresh Minister of Interior (appointed by Maciuk as one of his few act) to declare himself as the one assuming both Presidential and Prime Ministerial power, promising to the people to find out who the culprits were and bring them to justice, suspending the gathering of the Seimas until that time.

Ruins of the LLA headquarters in Kaunas after the bombing

The investigation of the bombing would remain a matter of great controversy in Lithuania, the question who stood behind the bombing never fully answered. Likely suspects involved the pro-Smetona members of the Iron Wolf, who thought the death of the LLA leadership would restore him to power, or the Germans, who wanted to use it to eliminate the newly elected, anti-German people. Both these answers were wrong, the pro-Smetona group being under control at the time, the Germans having no interest in terminating the LLA, who were in fact very pro-German. The necessity of “establishing a working a mutually fruitful relationship with Germany” being one of the points of their program, many of the people who died being avid Nazis. When reports of the bombing and the casualties reached Berlin, the report from the German embassy straightforwardly stated it that was an extreme blow to the efforts of German diplomacy, the attack taking out many among the largest pro-German people in the country. Even the theory that Lileikis stood behind it, or Lileikis backed by Himmler, did not hold – it being very obvious to those around that Lileikis was completely unprepared for the task at hand, and was close to nervous breakdown in those early hours (he would later explain his actions that taking power was necessary to prevent anyone else from doing that). The official investigation reached the conclusion of the attack being carried out Communists who as the first shot of “The Revolution” – the Lithuanian Communist Party, despite being banned, becoming quite active in 1941, also considered responsible for starting the general strike in April. Show trials led to the execution of twenty two communist and Jews, though this did not satisfy the Lithuanian public which felt them being scapegoats and sought justice. Documents of the investigation, which remained secret, eventually led to the conclusion that the bombs were planted by the members of the Iron Wolf themselves, who sought to bomb their own HQ later that day after the building was emptied, the detonation simply occurring prematurely. And while the culprits who planted the explosives, people who provided them the materials and their motives were uncovered, the question remained whether they acted independently and came up with that plan themselves (as seemed to be the case), or whether there were in fact some powers behind them they didn’t speak of (as some of the investigators suspected).

Lileikis would quickly assume total power over the country ruling it like he ruled the police – the formation quickly growing in size. While the Seimas was eventually gathered, old promises of it being divided into parties were not respected, the LLA remaining a singular force rule solely by the (now legalized) Iron Wolf. The anti-fascist members of the LLA who quit it where stripped of their MP status; the members of the LNU being coerced into either quitting or joining the LLA. By 1946, when the next election took place, Lithuania was transformed back into a single-party state, the League of Lithuanian Activists being renamed into simply the “Iron Wolf”, Lithuania’s only legal, national socialist party. Being President, Lileikis would not assume any “Leader” title as was common among other fascist states. Lithuania’s transformation was greatly aided by Germany in those 5 years, being a time of remarkable prosperity brought by German-provided credits, keeping the population docile, as well as united against the country’s main enemies: Jews and Poles.

Anti-Polish and Anti-Jewish poster in Lithuania.

Lithuania would begin implementing and enforcing harsh anti-Slavic and anti-Jewish legislation already in 1942, starting with banning the presence of these races from free professions, public and private education, through entertainment, eventually also any governmental administration. Ownership of various types of businesses would be banned for them, those which would remain allowed being heavily taxed. Apart from such measures, Lithuania began to replicate Germans racial legislation of the Nuremberg Law type, excluding people with three of four Jewish and/or Slavic grandparents from citizen status, classifying them as Jews, Poles, Russians or “Cross-Breeds. To make matters worse, these laws were applied for the deceased without any limit, in practice meaning that the uncovering of archival proof of ones Lithuanian grandfather having a Jewish parent would mean their status being changes accordingly. This would soon become a tool of political power, archives being dug through for evidence of ones Jewish or Polish roots, forging them being a common practice. The “unwantables” would next be denied the right to own estates and such wealth being confiscated from them without compensation – often meaning a catastrophe for large Polish noble landowners who would lose everything. These measures would be commonly referred to as “Lithuanization”, the openly spoke purpose being the elimination of all non-Lithuanian and untolerable presence from Lithuania. It would go further than just persecution of people of certain race and reach into Lithuanian culture itself, such as language – words of Polish or Jewish origin being replaced with Lithuanian ones (such as “Seimas” being replaced by “Rinkimas”, or even the names of months being changed, such as “Lapkritis” (November) to “Balaninis” or “Liepa” (July) to “Šienapjūtis” ). Lithuanian education was reformed to eliminate Polish, Russian and Jewish literature. The use of Polish, Russian and Jewish languages (whether Hebrew of Yiddish) would be banned, not only in public, but even on religious occasions, such as mass. Same would go for the public depiction of these national symbols, like the White Eagle, the Star of David, or the Red Star/Two-headed Eagle – apart when used to brand the businesses or residences of the people of those nationalities.

“Judeopolonism” was made into the main enemy of Lithuania, not only its culture, but “blood purity” as well.

This type of racial legislation would be derived from Lithuania’s particular type of Nazi philosophy called “Vilkasizmas”. The ideology did not have much prior development - in fact the term itself would only start to be used after the Nazi takeover of power in 1941. It would start out as a simple populist ideology intermixed with calls of racial superiority of the Balts as the “purest of Aryans” (along with the Nordics and Celts) who have avoided contamination from Jewish blood (like the Germanics and Romanese) or Mongol blood (like the Slavs). The necessity of protecting that blood purity was what would call for total segregation and of races and further removal of any potential contaminants – those two being the reason for the past collapse of the great Lithuanian Empire of the middle ages. The ideology was drastically totalitarian calling for total subjection of the individual to the state, which itself was considered a “union of blood”, Vilkasizmas strongly emphasizing the nature of a nation being equal to that of a family or tribe, needed to be ruled and protected as such. The Lithuanian Nazis would find much in common with the Agrarians of the NSDAP, drawing much from their ideological works, and in fact being quite close to that particular faction of the German regime. This was held double as true for East Prussia, which Vilkasizmas still saw as a “land of Balts” who were simply germanophonic, but not Germanic per se, with which Lithuania maintained warm relations. The removal of the Germans from Lithuania was mostly seen as the partial completion of “solving the German question” following the loss of Memelland, both Lithuania and Germany agreeing not to allow any permanent settlement of their peoples in the other country. Still, trade with Germany flourished, as did other types of exchange, the University of Konigsberg having a developed faculty of Baltic studies, and overall being seen as a prestigious school in Lithuania.

The University of Konigsberg, while having fallen in prestige in Germany, remained a popular destination for student from the Baltic States.

The racial persecution of non-Lithuanians in Lithuania was the toughest to swallow for Poland, which protested against such treatment from the very start – to no avail. German protection of the country denied Poland a “military option”, and with there being little to no trade between the two, economic sanctions and border blockades were meaningless. In fact, they once introduced, they were praised by Lileikis as “further reduction of unwanted Polish presence”, the period between 1920 and 1938 also being deemed a great time, when “Polish influence was stopped and gradually removed, allowing us to resurrect our national spirit and stand on our own feet”. Cultural removal of Polishness had made room for Lithuanian culture to take its place and allow it to flourish. The idea of “life without Poles (and Jews and Russians)” had popular support and it was honestly contemplated if Lithuania shouldn’t break off relations with Poland once more, along with closing the border – though that did not happen. The lack of relations between the two also meaning the lack of leverage Poland could use against Lithuania, and having to resort to the little it had, such as reciprocity actions against Lithuanians in Poland. The problem Poland faced being however even identifying “Lithuanians” in the country, as the term had a dual meaning: “Polish Lithuanians” who identified “Lithuania” as a “Haimat of Poland”, and “Baltic Lithuanian” (Samogitians), who were the “Balts of Samogitia living in Poland”. While the most obvious distinction between them - on the language used by them – was used, even that proved problematic as most of them were bilingual peoples, aimed at being polonized rather than persecuted or expelled. Polish-Lithuanian relation went from worse to even worse, both countries holding propaganda campaigns against each other, speaking of the vile persecutions their peoples faced across the border.

Though “peaceful” emigration of Poles had been taking place through the entirety of the 40’s, it wasn’t enough for Lithuania. In the 50’s, with general population movements taking place across central Europe, a full scale “evacuation” of remaining Poles and Jews was organized in Lithuania, supported by the Germans. Poland responded with the same, rounding up identified “Baltic Lithuanians” and Jews meant as leverage against Lithuania, demands on stopping this action being sent to both Kaunas and Berlin. It wouldn’t help though, police and military rounding up the population transferring them to “temporary camps” near the Lithuanian-Polish border, their property being taken away. The entire operation lasted throughout 1952-1953, leading to over 300 000 people classified as Poles and Jews to be brought to the border and forced to cross it without the right to return; from Poland, the same fate awaited around 150 000 Lithuanians and Jews. This event would be greatly mourned in the history of the Jews in Israel, as Wilno was until that time an important city of Jewish culture, these times marking an end to that. As neither were the Poles willing to accept Lithuanian Jews, nor Lithuania to accept Polish Jews, most of them ended up emigrating, either moving to their relatives in the west, or to Israel – Jewish and Zionist organization showing remarkable talent at “paying off” state officials for allowing those peoples to leave. Lithuania would be declared as “Judenfrei” in 1960, with smaller expulsions (mainly from the west of the country) taking place throughout the 50’s, the census of 1961 showing the success of the entire Lithuanization campaign, the country being 98% Lithuanian, the only remaining minorities being the small number of Germans and Latvians.
Poland’s official reaction to Lithuania’s moves would be of outrage, but in fact it displayed remarkable cynicism in using the tragedy for furthering its own ends, particularly forcing the Jews and Lithuanians out of the north-west of the country, complete with their wealth being seized. While the Jews arriving from Lithuania were pretty much “sold” to the Zionist and Jewish organizations of the west (meaning train tickets to Gdynia and ship tickets to the west or Palestine), Poland had taken it upon itself to show how much it cared for the “persecuted Poles from abroad” extending considerable protection around them. Poles from Lithuania would be awarded cheap (or even free) flats and apartments in Wilno – the same ones “left behind” by their former inhabitants – for rent or ownership. Same went for the land owners in Lithuania, who were given the landholdings of Lithuanian peasants. Poland officially declared its intent at compensating every Pole who lost something to the Lithuanian state – and managed to live up to that promise thanks to seized Jewish and Lithuanian assets in the Wilno region. This “colonization of emptied Lithuanian space” would serve to strongly Polonize the city of Wilno, the newly arrived people there not only being thankful to Poland for harbouring and rewarding them, but also holding considerable anger against the Lithuanian state. While the city would lose much of its Jewish culture, it would not suffer in terms of Polish culture, the newly arrived Poles coming from all castes and classes, making the city an amalgamation of “Polish Lithuanian culture” – much to the infuriation of Kaunas which never withdrew its claims to the city, declaring Polish actions there as “colonization”, thus also the people there not being under the protection of the right of nations for self-determination, the main point invoked by Poland in disputes over the city.

Parade of Polish Lithuanians in Wilno. The sentiment of even „Baltic“ Lithuania being a „Haimat“ of Poland in some way wasn‘t quite dead in the city, which ironically also remained the most hostile towards the Lithuanian state.

Lithuanian hatred for Poland, coupled with its „new“ nationalism which emphasised the Baltic character of the Lithuanian people and opposition to Judeic and Polish influences had altogether led to Lithuania making yet another enemy – the Roman Catholic Church. Deemed as an element „alien“ to the Balts, a „Judeopolonic“ element brought by Poland and Jews, the strongly catholic character of the Poles clashed with Lithuanian political and social ambitions. Having been in conflict with the Vatican and the Church even before the Vilkasizmas rise to power, Lithuania began a large “Kulturkampf” aimed at eliminating church influence from the political and social life of the country. Anti-church sentiment fell on fertile ground in Lithuania, state propaganda depicting it as being in league with the Poles and Jews – the fact that a disproportionate number of clergymen in Lithuania were classified as Poles according to new racial legislation not helping matters. The Kulturkampf thus developed into a full “War against the church”, “reversal of the northern crusades” – altogether with the revival of paganism in Lithuania. Church assets were seized by the state, clergymen placed under arrest, people discouraged from attending masses. Christian holidays were replaced with “secular state celebration”. Religious symbols were removed from public sight. A ban on ringing bells on Sundays was introduced. Christian religions was only marginally less persecuted than Jewish ones, leading to complete ban on of the Roman Catholic Church, an official letter being sent to the Pope in 1962 declaring Lithuania “annulling its baptism”. The Vatican had broken off relations with Lithuania much before that, excommunicating many of Lithuania’s leaders. By 1965, the “struggle for culture” would be declared as having been “won” with the closing down of the last protestant gathering in Viekšniai.

Ruins of a church in Trokai. Abandoned structures like this would either be demolished or left for nature to deal with.

Lithuanian spiritual needs would not however be left unsatisfied. While atheism was generally accepted and Abrahamic religions shunned, Lithuanian “back to Baltic roots” ideology made a turn towards “traditional beliefs”, or “paganism”. The Lithuanian National Socialists understood well that state laws and state education were insufficient means of modeling an entire society, that a society needed an element of “faith” to “guide them” in situations which state regulations did not cover. Traditionally, when faced with such a situation, people would turn towards the teachings from the time of their upbringing, the “general and basic truths” taught to them – their religious beliefs. But with the destruction of the Church, that element of “guidance” had to be found somewhere else, preferably in an institution not directly associated with the state, so that even those who would not identify themselves with Nazi philosophy would still be able to serve it by abiding to the rules set by an “independent” institution. But “independent” only in name, as the totalitarian character of fascist states could not allow for much free-thinking, societies such as masonry having been banned as well, and any “religion” having to at least follow the basic teachings of the state. This was meant to create a society where individuals would be able to “solve problems” they encountered in everyday life in a “proper Vilkasizmas” fashion even when the ideology by itself would not give a straight answer to how to solve them; this meaning both very simple things like attitude towards sexuality or finances to much more complex ones, usually having to deal with the social effects of new technologies, like the birth control pill (completely banned in Lithuania, possession being penalized). The Lithuanian “Kulturkampf” was meant to move the Lithuanian society from “Judeochristian rails” onto “Lithuanian Rails”, where the general direction of the societies development would not be based on the teachings of the church (deemed to be too fatalistic and egocentric), but on “traditional” beliefs of “unity with nature” – once complete, letting the society continue on and develop “properly”. This demand on a proper religious institution was satisfied by the “Romuva” – a religious neo-pagan organization founded by Vilius Storosta in Memelland. After its annexation by Germany, Storosta was briefly arrested and subsequently released, voluntary moving to Lithuania during the German-Lithuanian population exchange – though his “volunteering” was suspected to be aided by German authorities who guaranteed him a position in the University of Kaunas, as well as secretly kept him on their payroll. While the Romuva was only a small congregation under Storosta, he would be considered its founding father, leaving behind numerous texts on pagan Baltic beliefs, celebrations of holidays, religious teachings and other philosophic and scientific works on which the Romuva religion would be based.

Vydunas memorial in Kaunas.

Romuva expanded rapidly during the anti-christian campaign in Lithuania, being a combination of actual pagan beliefs from old times, traditional folklore and superstitions, reimagining former Christian holidays into pagan ones and a mixture of general propaganda on the importance of family values, clan solidarity and bloodline purity. It was also then that it got the attention of the Lithuanian Ministry of Religious Affairs, which began to concentrate the disorganized pagan circles into a more unified and organized structure, officially named “Visuombye” – even though the term “Romuva” would stick and be more popular. It’s golden age would be during the 60’s and 70’s, only after the anti-church purges when it became apparent that it was not a “one time thing” and that repressive attitudes against Christians would remain in place. While non-membership in some Romuva congregations wasn’t punishable, presence on celebrations and some sort of participation in them was looked upon friendly by the state and state institutions, a sign of one not being a Christian or Atheist. The disobliging character of the Romuva religion was also a convenient excuse for social gatherings of the youth, “bonfires and rituals in the woods” while dressed in robes being a prelude to binge drinking outdoors. While Romuva would not have any dominant Holy Text by which all congregations would have to abide, a general philosophy of it would be established, based on the works of Vydunas and Visuomis, gathered together and “purified” by Trinkunas, the head of the Kaunas Romuva Congregation, which would also become the “supreme” congregation, and the High Elder of the entire Romuva religion in Lithuania (for one congregation to officially become part of Romuva and its leader become an official Elder, a permit by the High Elder had to be given). His greatest success would be not only pushing through the official “resignation of Christianity” by Lithuania, but also having Romuva established as the official religion of Lithuania in 1970, making it the first and only country in the world with a pagan religion as an official one, even if it wasn’t really mainstream or a majority – according to the 1975 Lithuanian census, only 19% of the population declared themselves part of Romuva or some other pagan congregation, the majority of the population simply stating a lack of any religion.

Romuva “mass” during the celebrations of the summer solstice.

Despite insignificant obstacles, Germany had overall managed to obtain a firm grip over the Baltic States, by the time of the 80’s even their political maneuvering not being able to cover the obvious truth of German economic, military and geopolitical domination over them. The situation of the German minority there being set to an acceptable status, their economies so tied with Germany, these countries had no chance to escape control. While the brief period of détente had allowed these countries to do a number of things their way, primarily finding alternate markets for their goods, it didn’t last, the reheating of the war also meaning the Baltic States having to fall in line with the Reich as its subjects. That was in fact what the relation between Germany and the three Baltic States was, “subjects” or “satellite states” which Germany used instrumentally for its own benefit. It didn’t stop itself from using them as “guinea pigs” for various social and technological experiences, such as the effects of some particular taxation system on the economy, opening faculties of university subjects otherwise forbidden in the Reich, testing prototypes of new technologies there, and so on. These would be forced through by “puppet leaders” of the Baltic States, the deaths or resignations of the first generation of fascist leaders being followed by the introduction of much more obedient successors. One such example of “example” of technological and social experimentation was with Estonia, which after the resignation of President Konstantin Päts in 1950 was ruled by Johan Eichfeld, the former Minister of Agriculture in the last of Pats cabinets. A much weaker leader than his predecessor, Eichfeld would be completely dominated by Germany and collaborative, though also seeing the potential benefits of a closer association with Germany. A biologist by trade, Eichfeld would eagerly submit his country to various agricultural experiments, involving the introduction of new varieties of grains, vegetables and fruits, meant to grow effectively in the colder northern climate; he would also be a great supporter of the Green Revolution, volunteering his country for the introduction of types of pesticides and other means of industrial food production – something that Germany treated as a social experiment on a grand scale, too see the health effects the new types of agriculture had on the population, the viability of new varieties, even the social effects of mechanizing agriculture (which some Nazis though would “disrupt the bond between the Man and his Land). Results would be mixed, as while the green revolution had eventually led to food production being increased, many of these experiments ended up in catastrophic failures for which Eichfeld would be blamed.

Yet another Estonian experiment was on the viability of oil shales as an energy source. The German pursuit of autarky had led to many hypothetical technologies being researched, one of which involved using oil shales (present in Estonia) as a fossil fuel for power plants. Estonia had already been using them for power generation since the 20’s, with a new experimental plant being constructed in 1956 using new German technologies and capital, meant to satisfy the demands for a considerable part of the country. And while ultimately deemed a failure by the Germans due to oil shales being more expensive as a fuel compared to coal or even imported Italian oil, Estonian interest in it remained. Being Estonia’s only fuel available at hand, considerable funds were invested into the new technology and for the expansion of the power plant – and while it never managed to get the same economic efficiency as the coal plants in Lithuania, Latvia and other parts of Estonia, fired using imported German coal, it remained operational. There was significant popular support for pursuing the development of oil shales in Estonia, even at the cost of higher energy prices, which was to be compensated by achieving (eventually) energy self-sufficiency, as well as keeping the money spent on more expensive fuels still in Estonia. By 1980, 60% of Estonia’s energy was generated from oil shales, plans being made for that number to reach 100% in two decades – only being stopped by German interventions which wanted for Estonia to remain dependent on German coal imports, like the rest of the Baltic States.

“Eesti” power plant at Narva, the pride of the Estonian state.

Military presence of Germany in the Baltic States were a constant hot topic and considered one of the possible flashpoints of a Axis-Soviet War. The USSR has made perfectly clear already in the 30’s that it would not tolerate foreign military presence in that region, as it would pose too much of a threat to it’s security; by 1949 it managed to even obtain western consent for unilateral actions there should Moscow see a threat. Russian reasoning wasn’t baseless, as the distance from the Estonian border to Leningrad was only 150 kilometers – possible for even the propeller powered bombers to cover in 20 minutes, that time getting even shorter with the introduction of jet engines and cruise missiles. The development of nuclear weapons technically meant, that should they be deployed in Estonia, they would be able to obliterate the second city of Russia within 5 minutes from launch; the 650 kilometers from Latvia to Moscow also not being sufficient for giving the Russians much reaction time in case of a first strike (though to be fair, France was able not to threaten war over the presence of German aircraft and missiles in the Rheinland, despite there being only 400 kilometers from the German border to Paris). While this was understood by the leaders of Germany, they would never exclude the possibility of moving its military to the Baltic States should it be deemed necessary – or even, should the Baltic States governments request that. This would be a matter of dispute among the Global Great Powers, as to how should a potential Baltic invitation of German armed forces be treated: as a hostile move by Germany against the USSR, which would justify Soviet reaction (even though it would not break any international treaty and be perfectly valid under the circumstance of all of them having a formal military alliance – the UK itself having its forces deployed all around the globe in allied countries), or a neutral move by Germany and a Soviet reaction being the hostile move, as it would be qualified as a war of aggression. The west has had a hard time escaping any official answer to that question, which would be sometimes asked to politicians, especially whenever German-Soviet tensions rose – nobody wanting to encourage either of the two to an any action. Nor would either France or the UK ever give Germany any official (or even unofficial) consent for military presence in the Baltic states, much to German dislike, since it was what the two did give to Russia.

Still, Goring understood the folly of unnecessary provocation of the Soviets, holding the belief that the lack of permanent German forces in the Baltic States could serve German interests as well – without them, and only with a “paper guarantee”, the three countries would have to feel a degree of uncertainty over whether Germany would come to their defence in case of war, even if Germany had proven to be willing to fight the expansion of communism even on the other side of the globe. Thus for a long time, German military presence in the Baltic region was limited to occasional visits of Kriegsmarine ships in Baltic ports, being displays of power. This was enough to infuriate the Russians by itself, even more so should these ships prolong their stay in Baltic countries than declared, and even more than that when they would be present in the ports of northern Estonia, observing the traffic in the Gulf of Finland. The USSR would deem all such cases as provocations and protest against them, going so far as to harass Estonian ships in the Gulf of Finland and engage in one case of exchange of fire between German and Soviet destroyers near Narva and the Estonian – Soviet naval border (the Soviet side claiming the German ship encroached on Soviet waters and opened fire, the German claiming to have remained in Estonian waters and only returning fire – the incident causing no casualties or damage to the ships). Naval incidents occurred also on the Baltic sea, where Germany would construct its own Sound Surveillance System to detect Soviet submarines, and which Germany strongly felt as being “their” sea. On three occasions, in 1955, 1970 and 1979 collisions between Soviet submarines and German destroyers/frigates took place, the 1979 ending in tragedy: the Soviet K-108 attack submarine suffering a breach of its hull and flooding two compartments, leading to 27 sailors dying and a massive diplomatic uproar. The USSR never gave up its ambitions of challenging Germany in the Baltic despite the former attempts, its submarine missions in that sea being both a means of training and reminding the Germans that they were not alone in the “East Sea”.

Disabled soviet K-108 Submarine, next to the German destroyer Z55

The USSR did not remain idle in keeping the Baltic States reminded of the consequences of an alliance with Germany. The construction of a radar array over Estonia and Latvia in the 50’s was done simultaneously with the Soviets, both the USSR and the Axis States creating their own centralized early warning and airspace control systems. With jet fighters and bombers entering Soviet service, the practice of Soviet air patrols occasionally intruding into Baltic airspace began, growing for a time in frequency and boldness – sometimes going so far as Soviet bombers being seen as far west as Riga. Latvian and Estonian protests did not help, nor did the introduction of modern SAM systems. In fact the last caused another round of uproar, as the new weapons were initially manned by German crews, and while Berlin claimed they were only “technical assistance and training”, they would not be withdrawn, rather only exchanged for a different one every few months. This in turn had caused yet another round of Axis-Soviet games, Soviet pilots testing the Baltic air defence whether it was able to track them, and showing considerable skill in eluding it. This escalated eventually into the Berlin Pact launching the “Baltic Air Defence” program in 1970, that being the deployment of Luftwaffe pilots to Baltic airbases, along with constructing new ones meant for bombers and much increasing the presence of German officers in their air force commands and staffs. This was seen as the first instance of Germany officially and permanently moving in its troops into the Baltic States, and thus was a subject of much controversy, especially that it occurred during the détente. Germany made sure that its case of doing so was made fully open to the world in the League of Nations, presenting evidence of Soviet actions and ensuring the world of it peaceful intentions, complete with the consent of the Baltic States and confirmation of the legality of such actions. Still, it wasn’t enough and while the west simply stayed silent on the issue, not agreeing nor condemning it, the Soviet response was hostile, the strength of the Soviet Air Force being increased there, the number of incidents of soviet planes entering the Baltic States and being pursued by German Luftwaffe increasing in the two years since its launch, later dropping as the program had proven to be effective in deterring the Soviet pilots from encroaching into German-protected airspace.

Amateur picture of Soviet fighter-bombers made in Latvia, 1980

The rekindling of the cold war would also mean tensions returning to the area – not that they were gone during that brief respite. While the policies of Hanke had allowed the Baltic States to extend the leash they were on, his successor, von Thadden was not so kindly. Wanting to ensure Germany’s position as a Global Great Power, he needed successes, at a time when Germany’s position was getting weaker compared to both the west and the east. Sabre-rattling and displays of force became his standard tactics, as was brinksmanship. In 1982, the largest Berlin-Pact maneuvers took place in the Baltic States, simulating an offensive against the USSR, where the newest weaponry of the fascist would be put to display, from modern amphibious assault barges to the newest generation of jet fighters. These exercises were taken very seriously by both the USSR and the west, even thought of as a possible preparation for a real invasion, a great diversion to justify the presence of Berlin Pact forces so close to the Soviet border. And these speculations were partly close to the truth, as they were in fact a preparation for permanently stationing Berlin Pact forces there. Not long after the storm over the size and type of maneuvers stopped, Germany would declare, in combination with the leaders of the Baltic states, their decision of allowing for the Wehrmacht, Polish and Romanian Armed Forces to be based in the Baltic states bases, along with the construction of additional facilities as part of the “modernization of defensive plans against the USSR” – though in fact, meant as a way of forcing through even greater German domination of the Axis bloc after the Third Danzig Crisis, where the Baltic states had shown “insufficient loyalty”. The uproar than had only began to calm down was restarted with even greater intensity, the USSR refusing to accept the decision, demanding immediate withdrawal of all foreign military presence from the Baltic States, also ordering its Navy into the Baltic and Black Seas, declaring partial mobilization and concentrating its troops all over the western border. Attempts made by western diplomats to influence a change in that decision failed, as did their attempts at forcing a change in the minds of the Kremlin hard-heads. Soviet mobilization provoked the same moves by the Poles and Romanians, and soon, the militaries of all of central and eastern Europe were set to alert, as were their bases worldwide. The crash-course on which the world was headed resulted in a game of chicken between Berlin and Moscow, where eventually, it was the USSR that backed down, accepting the situation without any conditions. That decision was motivated in part by the hostile situation in the Middle East, where the German-backed UAS was in direct conflict with Soviet-backed Iran, as well as due to the western attitude, which clearly was unwilling to take action against the German, even if unwilling to support it either. The Baltic crisis ended up being a propaganda success for Thadden, who managed to use his brinksmanship tactics into forcing “concessions” – though at the price of seriously enraging the USSR and the west with his reckless actions.

Part of the Amari Military Base complex in Estonia.

 

[Germania09]

Not gonna lie, the Kongo post was pretty depressing which goes to show how good this TL is written.

 

[Kongzilla]

The rekindling of the Cold War and the return of aggressive behaviors of Germany and the USSR in the late 70’s and 80’s was received with sadness by the people of the United Kingdom, for whom the decade of détente was a time of respite and a shimmer of hope for a better future. The country had carried the burden of being the bulwark against the expansion of totalitarian powers for decades, along with the burden of keeping the “empire on which the sun never set” functional. The decade of 1965-1975 was a time when many Britons have come to accept the world as it was – that the peaceful coexistence of the three Global Great Powers was possible, their mindset changing from the expectation of a “Second Great War” being upon them in the near future, to that of hoping that peace could be maintained, even if it meant having to cope with the existence of menacing empires from which the UK could not hide in “splendid isolation” as it had been doing in the previous centuries. Technology and treaties had brought the UK closer to western Europe, though mostly against it’s liking. Rise of nationalist sentiment worldwide was a challenge to its empire. Troubles were also present at home, with tensions growing in both Scotland and Northern Ireland. The time of the détente allowed the people of the UK to address those problems and deal with them in a much calmer atmosphere, rather than the hectic one of constant stress which was before.

The idylla of British life in the 70’s: A house in a small town, a car, a well-paid job and clean, safe streets.

The reformation of the British Empire into the British Commonwealth of Nations took some getting used to for many Britons, who were unsatisfied with the fact that their country had become just “one out of many partners” in a Commonwealth, rather than the centre of a planet-wide Domination. Like many peoples who had a powerful empire and lost it, they were filled with nostalgia – though in their case the Empire wasn’t truly lost, as not only did the UK keep a number of territories under its direct rule, it also remained a most important part of the Commonwealth itself. The graduality of the change made the reforms mostly acceptable to the already naturally stoic British people, the reforms coming with little shock, being extensively talked about and introduced with popular consent. The changes visible from the British islands themselves were in fact so minimal, that for years many people would still refer to the BCoN as the “British Empire” (even though this terminology was not looked favourably upon by the governmental administration and much of the media). Still, many commentators and scholars would point out that while the individual changes were small, they were constant and one directional, London’s unilateral power visibly shrinking. For example, whereas in 1971, just after the BCoN’s foundation, the citizens of the UK made up over 70% of the BCoN’s bureaucracy, making its workings strongly in favour of the UK, by 1990 that number had dropped to just above 30%, mostly due to the general growth of the BCoN administration. The Commonwealth was under a constant dilemma if its institutions ought to work on the principle of “proportionality”, and that the various member states ought to have their number representatives in the institutions based on their country’s population, or “equality”, where all member states were to be treated as equal regardless of size or population. Neither if implemented fully would be beneficial to the UK, India being the absolute dominant country in terms of population (which would make everyone else in the Commonwealth irrelevant too), the sheer number of members in the BCoN making UK’s lone voice quiet too. The UK tried to avoid the issue rather than wanting to solve it, supporting the notion of the BCoN being an “Commonwealth of equals” in principle while trying to keep control by placing its own people in key positions in its institutions, as well as pan-British corporations (both private and public owned). While such tactics did slow down the process of declining power of the UK itself, made the BCoN actually work in favour and benefit of the UK rather than being a burden (as was often the case before), it was still a one-way path towards reducing the individual power of the UK in favour of the combined strength of the Commonwealth. While the majority of Britons supported ideas that were simplified to “better have 40% control of 100% of the empire than 100% control of 40% of the empire”, a non-insignificant minority opposed it, treating it as a humiliation, pointing out that the figurative “40%” number was falling with time and that the UK would in fact be better off with a smaller Empire, but one concentrated under its control.

The relation between the UK and India would be one of the most important and complex form of mutual friendship and cooperation in the world, as well as among the most pivotal for global safety and security, next to the UK – France relations.

Such thoughts were not ridiculous, given that the UK was still in hold of numerous areas all around the world as its “personal” playground, with the population there either genuinely supportive of the UK (best example being Malta) or where UK military and political presence was sufficient to beat anti-colonial forces without needing to compromise with the opposition (such as British Somaliland). Guyana, Ghana, Somaliland, Sierra Leone, Gambia, British Cameroon, and various other colonies (the official name being changed to “Dependent Territory” in 1970 through the “Dependent Territories Act”) were all considerable providers of diverse resources for UK industry and agriculture, ranging from diamonds and titanium from Sierra Leone to simple cocoa from Ghana. Although London had to give up its title of the largest trading hub and financial centre of the world finances to New York, it still held a stable second position. The city also remained the seat for most of the world’s largest corporations, employment there or even simple promotions “to London” being a sign of prestige and a great achievement for many young people around the world. The UK was home to many of the world’s best universities, the elites of the BCoN countries (but not only those, their prestige being global, inviting students even from fascist and communist countries) often sending their children there to give them the best of education. The UK was by itself the world’s fourth largest economy (only overtaken by France in the 80’s) and boasted among the highest standards of living in the world. The Royal Navy remained the world’s largest marine force by itself (although many of its ships were old and obsolete, and its status as the world’s largest marine force was maintained to a large degree thanks to diplomatic work on preventing other countries from constructing larger fleets even though they could – the USA most importantly), capable of operating on all of the world’s oceans. These factors were reasons for which many believed the UK could fulfill the role of a Global Great Power alone – although the fact was that much of them were only possible thanks to the UK being part of the BCoN and the commercial benefits it brought.

HMS Invincible (also known as CVA-01), the pride of the Royal Navy, and the world’s first supercarrier, a symbol of British domination over all oceans.

Apart from material aspects, what also stood out about the UK was its importance in global culture. Historically not being associated with “high” or “refined” culture, that didn’t stop it from becoming one of the more important producers of cultural goods worldwide – primarily music, but also movies, theatre plays and literature. Rock music was by far the most important element of UK culture, being a symbol of the changes western societies were experiencing and also a symbol of “the west” itself in the fascist and communist world. The UK was home to a humongous amount of rock bands, starting to form around the 60’s and continuing on for the next decades. Much of its success was thanks to innovative types of music, experimentation with sounds and new technologies, creative lyrics as well as the faster and more rhythmic tunes which found appeal among the youth worldwide. Bands and people like “The Beatles”, “Bee Gees”, “Herman’s Hermits” or John Mayall have become extremely popular in the Anglophone world, influencing new trends and giving music overall a new direction. Bands made out of young musicians would pop up all over the world trying to emulate the successes of those precursors. In the post-colonial world, music had become a way to escape poverty for many talents, young people implementing elements of Hindu music and instruments into the “British style” music, spreading their sounds worldwide. While the UK and the USA remained the largest consumers and markets for this new type of music, interest in it grew with time in all of the Americas as well in the countries of the BCoN; possession of vinyl players and discs being a sign of status. Rock music made its way to France as well, though there it would find less interest – the French preferring their own type of rock music, concentrating more on the vocalist than the instrument players, as well as preferring lyrics to be in French. Similar problems were met in the communist world, where rock music was outright persecuted as “western degeneracy”, vinyl discs of them being almost a contraband. Similarly in the fascist world, “domestic music”, more inspired by marches, folk and classical music was looked upon more favourably by the authorities. This however still would not stop the presence of imported music which would grow in popularity – being a “breeze of fresh air of freedom” in the lives of people otherwise detached from global culture.

Freddie Mercury of “Queen”, the only band to be allowed to play o concert in the USSR “Live in Moscow”

And the UK’s importance in global culture would not be limited to the early Rock products of the 60’s – rather, that would only become the start of an avalanche. British experimentation with new sounds and instruments, not uncommonly borrowed from far away regions of the Commonwealth, would allow it to remain fresh and interesting for decades, the new types of music being created, even if shunned by some part of society, having always some nieche of fans to whom they appealed. Some of those new genres would even come to gain nation-wide popularity abroad. “Metal” music for example, with its massive sound, characterized by highly amplified distortion, extended guitar-drum solos, emphatic beats and rhythmic character would find great appeal in the German audience, appealing to their like for loudness and organized “march-like” rhythm. While the music would be often deemed as “satanic”, “militaristic” or “fascist” by social conservatives, its success as a new genre was undoubtful and served to break a lot of ice between the peoples on the opposing sides of the Cold War – among the more iconic moments being the performance of “Iron Maiden” in the Berlin Volkshalle with their “Piece of Mind” album in 1983. Heavy guitar and blues would find appeal among the Hispanic audience of South America, with bands like “Led Zeppelin” becoming even greater celebrities there than they were at home. The band would be an annual performer on the Brazilian “Rock in Rio” event since 1980, doing a great number of tours in the South American continent, their music being influenced by various folk elements from both the Spanish and Anglo-Saxon world, creating a truly unique mixture. The apparent unique ability of the British bands to mix and diversify their music performance by adopting elements of different cultures would serve them well, making the British Isles home to a great deal of musical events, drawing fans from all across the globe – these events also being used politically as a display of the possibility of uniting the world without hatred.

“Eddie the Head” graffiti used by the Ulster Defense Association.

The Cold War had been a time of both ups and down for the UK, both in terms of global significance and domestic matters. The UK steadily worked towards maintaining its status, its population proving to be willing to make sacrifices for that purpose. One significant example of that was the UK’s rather weak system of welfare and social benefits, compared to even France or the Low Countries – not to mention the highly developed systems of Scandinavia and the USA. This had largely to do with the UK having a considerably large military budget meant for both keeping a modern fighting force operational at all times (and fighting colonial wars which weren’t cheap) as well as maintaining the world’s largest Navy. Since funding would always be deemed insufficient by the military minds, spending money on welfare was strongly seen as a waste; the general sentiment being “guns before butter”, especially when the UK had to be keeping up with the guns Germany and the USSR were producing. The UK would discourage socialism and other socialist behavior deeming it “unbritish”, presenting ideas such as free trade, self-employment and private initiative to enterprise as the “way to go”. Unemployment would become a social stigma in UK society. The idea that unemployed people, people unable to find themselves a place in their lives, or otherwise “wanting the government to take care of them” need government aid was usually countered with the argument, that military service was always an option for them. In the 60’s programs went to de facto draft young unemployed people into military service and send them to the colonies were implemented (by making “auxiliary service” in the military an option for those looking for unemployment benefits, those denying the opportunity to work for the army being denied social aid). Later, the system was developed into outright presenting military service as an option for a career – and one where advancement opportunities were plenty, as the countries of the Commonwealth had always some area which was “heated” at some point – be it fighting straightforward colonial wars in Africa, through crossing the jungles in Burma looking for Marxists guerillas, to having a stressful “guard duty” in British Honduras, under the shadow of the Guatemalan Army. While such a system was often criticized by both the left-wingers (including much of the Labour Party) at home as well as various foreign powers for different reasons, it nevertheless remained in place. That the UK was “denying people the opportunity to work and live peacefully by denying them welfare, so as to have a steady supply of desperate young people to send of across seas to fight imperialistic-colonial wars for the interests of their capitalist/jewish overlords” was a common platitude, being altered only in a minor way depending who spoke it out. It was equally common among the Communists of the USSR who perceived the UK as the “Highest Stage of Imperialism” which forced proletarians of the word to fight each other; the Fascist Germans who considered such a system as “state-sponsored mercenarism”, soldiers fighting for money rather for an idea; even the anti-British elements of the USA, for which the UK remained a colonial-imperial power denying others freedom: both at home to let them be free to pursue a life of their choosing, as well as across the seas, by suppressing their self-determination and freedom-fighting struggles.

UK Army recruitment poster

There were grains of truth to such attitudes, as though the British Army had always prided itself on having a high espirit de corps and was rather reluctant to send recruits fresh from the boot camp into the fray, the great majority of the privates (and low-rank NCOs) were made up from the lower classes of society. The UK system of government wasn’t particularly good at dragging people out of poverty, even after the end of the great depression, its answer to such interventionist demands being calling it “unbritish” and invoking the Cold War as an excuse for not taking action in that direction. Those who answered such calls with proposals of staying out of the Cold War were branded as defeatists and stigmatized. The British Army was involved in many domestic activities that would be commonly thought as something meant to be done by civilian agencies – things like natural disaster prevention, certain construction works in undeveloped areas, weather forecasting using military radars, search and rescue operations in Scottish mountains – anywhere where military equipment could be used for a civilian cause, and putting it to such use being preferable than having it stay under key or buying two of the same, one for civilian, one for military use. Such organization had both ups and downs, many people choosing to serve in the military being frustrated by lack of combat training and months of menial labour – but this also building a very favourable view of the military by the civilians and creating a somewhat different ethos of the “modern British soldier”, one being not only a killing machine, but being genuinely interesting in “serving and protecting”, from both “military” and “civilian” threats. The presence of military personnel in public would not be an uncommon sight in British streets, though it would lead many observers to question the nature of the UK’s Armed Forces itself – whether it was an institution meant specifically for fighting wars as it was intended, or whether it was more of a “highly disciplined militia” involved in civilian activities, “weekend soldiers”, trying to keep up with real modern Armies. Such “training” would nevertheless find itself useful during operations in colonies where the Commonwealth blue insignia would be often associated more with aid and help than death and destruction, the average British grunt also having more developed “social skills” when dealing with “natives” than the grunts of other “imperial armies”.

Disaster relief would be part of the military service in the UK Army, whether natural disasters, construction accidents or other.

Yet while that was the general direction the UK developed to, it wasn’t without resistance or problems. Northern Ireland remained a rather difficult area for London, the conflict between it and Dublin, as well as internal strife between Catholics and Protestants in Ulster being problematic. After the winter bombing campaign of 1958-1959, the UK managed to prevent further attacks on its soil on such a scale, the IRA being pushed back into hiding in Ireland and falling into infighting between its various new forms. But they would not be destroyed, nor would they lose sympathy among parts of the public. Northern Ireland remained a somewhat “forgotten” area in terms of allocating funds for structural development, the problem made worse by the fact that the lines of “economic” division correlated with the religious divide – the Catholic districts being less developed than the protestant ones, state facilities like schools, hospitals or police being of better quality in protestant areas than I Catholic ones. Poverty contributed to numerous social ills, but the central government was reluctant to offer much direct aid or welfare. And while the lack of help had led to some anti-British sentiment, even more came from what was seen as government interventions against letting the people help themselves. Gerrymandering and other election tricks had effectively prevented Catholic groups to rise to power in regular elections in Northern Ireland. Urban development plans were made in a way that restricted construction and development in Catholic areas while not doing the same in Protestant ones. Fund raisers organized by the Catholic community were either prevented or heavily taxed. Even the Catholic church faced “persecution”, made evident by a scandal of revealing that Scotland Yard had illegally wiretapped some confession booths in churches. Thus the Catholic Irish not only felt “abandoned” by the government, it also felt that it was being kept down despite efforts towards “helping themselves”, as propaganda from the period expected people to do, rather than rely on government aid.

Decaying Catholic neighborhood in Ulster.

In 1965, a new organization formed meant to fight the injustice of the system, known as the Civil Rights Association, which sought to peacefully fight for the rights of the Catholics. It did so through heavy reporting of the many cases of administrative practices against the Irish, providing global media with information on them, hoping to increase pressure on the UK from the international community. Its rise was the result of both the weakness of the Nationalist Party of northern Ireland which wasn’t strong enough to represent the minorities interests, as well as the complete domination of the Unionist Party, which had continuously held power since 1921 and by that time grown rather corrupt, but not held responsible. It’s domination in various local councils was also a reason for anti-Unionism, as any time the Catholics did so little as coming close to gaining importance in them, procedures would be changed to prevent them from doing that. Smear campaigns against the Catholic minorities representatives were also not uncommon. As these councils would favour the interests of the protestants, Catholics found them harmful. The CRA postulated a reform in electoral procedures under the slogan “one man – one vote”, demanding a considerable reform in electoral districts, stopping anti-Catholic discrimination, as well as disbanding the Ulster Special Constabulary, the north Irish reserve police force responsible for much anti-Catholic activity. Unlike the Nationalist Party, it was a supra-religious and supra-ethnical initiative, combining both Irish and English, Catholics and Protestants, drawing heavily from the methods of the Civic Rights Movements in the USA, organizing rallies, piquets, public masses in both rites, and so on.

Civil Rights Association advert.

Yet its calls have mostly fallen on deaf ears, the government refusing to bow to any “socialist” demands of governmental aid. It also refuse to change the laws on suffrage, which granted votes only to taxpayers – many Catholics not paying those due to working in the black market or taking menial, temporary jobs. This was the closed circle that led to the Catholic minorities problems being ignored for decades – people not getting the right to vote because they didn’t pay taxes, people not paying taxes because they were poor, people being poor because of the actions of the government, people not changing the government because they didn’t get a right to vote. With both militiant actions of the IRA operating from Eire and local democratic activism having failed at achieving desired results, an increasing number of people chose to take matters into their own hands and headed for the streets. If the government would not change its attitude in face of bombs or petitions, then the people would choose to ignore it and introduce the changes it wanted by themselves, ignoring what the government wanted or banned.

What began the “Urban war” phase of the conflict in Northern Ireland was the case of the Walsh family in 1972. The Walsh family, an impoverished Catholic family of five children ran one of the Catholic children’s home in Dungannon. Poor conditions of the building had led to a lengthy battle with the administration with the Walsh family requesting a permission for repairing, modernizing and expanding their children’s home, the public administration seeking to close it down and move the children into Protestant orphanages. The battle was ultimately won by them, with the aid of a public fundraiser and the local church, which provided the money for the necessary works to be done. Construction works were completed in 1972,but only a few days after the decision on allowing for it was revoked on formal grounds, complete with a demand on razing the building on the grounds of land use violation. Protest in defence of the children’s home occurred including an occupational strike, but was broken by the police, the building forcefully razed, the Walsh family demanded to pay for the costs of the demolition. The outrage led to massive protests all over Northern Ireland, including a march in demonstration to take place in Dungannon itself. Initially allowed, it was meant to start in the nearby city of Coalisland and head towards Dungannon. But with the size of the demonstration, numbers counting in tens of thousands, that decision was revoked, the leaders of the march presented with it midway – the decision itself being motivated by fears of a possible counter-demonstration and clashes which the police was feared would not be able to contain. The demonstration ended at the gates of Dungannon with numerous fiery speeches being made and no violence having occurred, despite provocations from the protestant side. And while this event itself ended peacefully, it would be from that point that violence would begin to be present and common in the streets.

The marching people before Dungannon

Vandalism, assaults, arson, car demolishing, raiding of stores and other types of criminal activity would start to run rampant in Northern Ireland, the common people providing protection for the perpetrators, provided they attacked and stole from their foes. Such groups would organize themselves into gangs, and later, even into straightforward Abteilungen, complete with monocolored uniforms (usually blue for the Catholics, mimicking the “Blueshirts” of O’Duffy, green for the Protestants) and balaclavas. These gangs would prove to become the best possible recruitment pool for the radicals and militiant fighters on both sides, such as the Irish Republican Army and its off-shots. While the IRA had remained mostly silent through the 60’s, the stronger military presence at the UK-Irish border proving somewhat effective, the Irish organizations also falling into disarray and infighting over ideological beliefs, it was never crushed by either the UK or the Irish authorities. Yet after a decade, the situation somewhat stabilized, the heated atmosphere in Ulster bringing back the IRAs interests back towards the north. Small arms like pistols would be smuggled into Northern Ireland, IRA operatives increasing “recruitment”, opening secret gatherings, even moving some of the more driven youth to their bases in Eire for para-military training. First instances of shootings would be a shock for both the Catholic and Protestant community, both declaring their outrage – but both also accusing the other side of starting it and not being willing to accept blame for the actions of their own.

The Blue Balaclava. Wearing one would be treated as a sign of support of the Catholic cause, finding one in someone’s possession leading to many instances of police brutality.

On September 6th 1973 a student demonstration of Queens University in Belfast organized a demonstration under the home of Northern Ireland’s Minister of Interior Steven Bourne, an adamant Unionist and with a strong anti-Catholic bias. Minister Bourne would answer to demonstrators with very harsh and derogative words, that caused an uproar. On the next day a group of 500 students arrived before the City Hall. This has mobilized a hasty counter-demonstration. Upon learning about that, the student raided and occupied the City Hall, beating some of the workers and vandalizing the building. The arrival of the counter-demonstrators made the matter worse, as they would enter the building too, causing a three hour battle between them. Only after those three hours would the police arrive and break up the fighting. At the same time, the children of Steven Bourne would also get beaten up while playing in the school yard (by other children in a typical childish fight unrelated to the city hall events, but the media not reporting that in particular). This would start yet another conflict between the student bodies who joined the Civil Rights Association and operated by breaking into public buildings and organizing sit-in strikes, provoking counter-demonstrators and revealing police brutality. Answering these provocations, organizations such as the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee and Loyal Citizens of Ulster would form to fight the demands of the Catholic minority, their extremists using violent means and having the silent support of much of the authorities, or actually being made up from them. Situations where the catholic gatherings would be assaulted by Protestant extremists organizations, whose members would be the B-special policemen in civilian clothing, brutalizing the catholics while the regular police stood idly by, would become commonplace, displaying to all the ineffectiveness and biases of the law enforcement.

B-Specials in Belfast in riot gear

The situation would develop into something carrying the markings of domestic terrorism by 1974, when in March that year a bombing campaign took out a number of postal offices in Belfast as well as damaged the water treatment plant. The perpetrators were never identified, but where assumed to be the members of the Irish Republican Army and the Ulster Liberation Army. These events completely discredited the police authorities and the local government forcing it to resign. British Army units were moved from the border and into the more important administrative and industrial buildings in Ulster, the autonomy of Nothern Ireland also being reduced and placed under direct rule from London. But that was too little too late, as events would completely get out of hand. On August 4th 1973 a traditional march took place in Londonderry, despite opposition to it on how it could be endangered by extremists, as well as provoke counter-actions. The march did provoke what would come to known as the “Bogside Uprising”, the protestants being attacked by straightforward armed militas of the IRA, police units shot at with assault rifles, bombarded with grenades and petrol bombs. These IRA soldiers would be accompanied by a “popular uprising” of the Catholics, forcing out the protestants from the Catholic districts of Derry. The police was completely overwhelmed and forced to withdraw. Hundreds of buildings were set on fire, barricades set up on streets, people bringing out old guns from the attics and setting up barbed wired perimeters around their areas. The uprising led to sixteen people killed, eight policemen from the B-special forces, 4 IRA soldiers and 4 Catholic civilians. With no way to restore order, the North Irish Prime Minister requested London to use military force to crush the “uprising”, which it did – another twelve people being killed as 800 British Army soldiers stormed the city.

The Bogside Uprising

This began the introduction of the military occupation of Northern Ireland, the local North Irish government and parliament being suspended, London introducing direct rule over it. In a week’s time, the decision to increase military presence was made, the number of soldiers in all of Northern Ireland increasing to over 8000. Annunciations of how their presence and the means were “temporary” did not do much to calm the situation. The introduction of military occupation has even led to a notion being filed to the LoN on stripping the UK of control over Northern Ireland and turning it into a LoN mandate to be given to Ireland. The notion was filed for populist reasons by the Republic of Ireland, where the nationalist Fine Gael party came to power, but was vetoed. But parts of the Catholic community were actually happy about the development, for two reasons: one, it had ultimately proven the police, the B-specials and the North Irish government to be the reason for the conflict. The army did not harass the catholic districts and did not allow for street battles to take place, restoring some order. It had the image of a force capable of protecting the civilians from the extremists from both sides. A large number of the soldiers were in fact Catholics from Northern Ireland. However, the situation changed over time. Whereas upon start 80% of the occupation force was Catholic, after only one and a half year it had dropped to just 15%, the locals being replaced by soldiers from England. This was part of UK Army politics, which received a lot of complaints on how the soldiers did not protect the protestant population “sufficiently”, which was blamed on the lack of motivation to do so by the Catholic soldiers. Thus when a change in shift came, Catholics were phased out, replaced by Protestants. The temporary fall in tensions in 1973-1974 came to an end once the occupation authorities had once again allowed for marches of protestants to take place through Catholic districts, while not allowing for the opposite; the marching people being accompanied by soldiers themselves who protected the demonstrators, not acting even when they became violent, throwing rocks on Catholic buildings and such. In doing so, the army had turned from a “peacekeeping force” to an occupational force, those who fought them with arms turning from being “terrorists” to “freedom fighters” and “protectors”. The Irish Republican Army was coming back in full swing.

IRA fighters in the streets of Belfast.

After the “winter campaign” of 1958-1959, and the subsequent crackdown on it by the British authorities, the IRA had fallen on worse times. Being pushed out of Northern Ireland and under strong invigilation by the MI6 and other authorities (British and Irish) it was incapable of launching anything remotely as big as in the past. But, it wasn’t defeated either, and it remained in the minds of the people, media reporting on how various “suspects” could have “ties with the IRA”, the organization itself undertaking a number of attacks, amongst the most well known being a bank heist in Belfast in 1966, when twelve million pounds were stolen. While nominally illegal in Ireland, it did have a degree of support among the population, mostly from among the nationalists who sympathized with their irredentist agenda. IRA camps would only rarely be harassed, even when working without much cover as “survivalists” camps or other such. It’s main problem was however disunity, the original organization, while nationalist, having branches with straightforward fascist, and straightforward Marxist beliefs. The first split involved the separation of the Official Irish Republican Army from the IRA in 1964, which harbored the Socialist-Marxist-Left wing elements of the IRA. This split was accompanied by a division in its official political wing, the Sinn Fein. Further, in 1969, the remaining IRA split up yet again, dividing into the Provisional IRA, known also as “Provos” and the “regular” IRA. While the “regular” IRA maintained it’s rapid nationalist and fascist agenda, the Provos would eventually come to be the largest of the various “IRAs”, as well as other anti-British militiant groups. The split was strongly motivated by the electoral victory of the right-wing Fine Gael party in Ireland which sympathized with the nationalist, forming a coalition government with the minor 32 Counties Youth Movement, a Christian-Centrist Nationalist third-way group. The Provisional IRA would thus declare its loyalty to the” Republic of Ireland made from 32 Counties”, as proclaimed during the Easter Uprising, while simultaneously opposing further association with Germany, Fascism or Nazism, standing up to protect Republican ideals. And while the Provos group would take the majority of the fighters with them, the split was still mostly reported in such a way, as to make it look like it was the “republican minority” that broke off, leaving the “regular” IRA as “the fascist terrorists”. This was done on purpose by British media and was taken up by much of the global media as well, in part of a propaganda and information battle, aimed at making the IRA and it’s fighters look like “fascists”, by emphasizing the attacks made by the fascist splinter group and declaring it the “regular” IRA – the republican “Provisional IRA” being painted as a minority group, its Republican character being ignored.

The "Provos" standing appell

The UK authorities would purposely try to “dumb down” the conflict in Northern Ireland so as to make it look like a fight between a “fascist IRA” and “democratic British Army”. Reality would be much different, as both sides would have different groups acting independently with different agendas, sometimes even against each other. Apart from the marxist Official IRA, the fascist “regular” IRA and the republican Provisional IRA, the British would also face groups like the Ulster Liberation Army, an anarchist group made up from the inhabitants of Northern Ireland of both religions and ethnicities, or the Northern Ireland Liberation Front, and group advocating the secession of Northern Ireland from the UK without joining Eire. Numerous political movements would also pop up demanding the restoration of political freedoms in Northern Ireland and establishing a new relation between Northern Ireland and England – in similar vein as such movements in Scotland and Wales, who would also adopt “the right of nations for self-determination” as means of obtaining greater autonomy from London, even mentioning independence. On its own side, the UK would have various extremist groups, such as the Ulster Defence League or the Ulster Defence Association – who demanded maintaining the union between Ulster and England. Thus the conflict was much more than just “democratic army” against “fascist and Marxist terrorists” – but also had a religious, social, ethnic, and political background. That the conflict wasn’t as “simple” as London wanted it to be portrayed as would eventually manage to reach the international community, though not until a lot of time had passed.

In the meantime, the IRA would have managed to achieve its goal of being recognized as the military force of the Irish Catholics in northern Ireland, together with general support of the population. The Catholics would paint the walls of their homes white, so as to make the silhouettes of British soldiers more visible for IRA snipers. Inhabitants of Catholic districts would shelter IRA fighters and help them hide weapons and escape pursuit. The IRA would also act as a vigilante force, fighting organized and petty crime alike, ridding Catholic districts of drug dealers and extortion rackets. One of the largest ironies of the Troubles was, that the British occupation and IRA attacks, which led to shootings on the streets, arsons, bombings, house raids and such – would also lead to the streets of Northern Ireland being almost devoid of crime, drug dealers, car thieves, muggers being cleaned off the streets, lynched. The IRA would keep the entire trafficking in stolen goods market under its control, ensuring only goods stolen from Protestants being allowed for trade, and after getting its own cut – technically legalizing thefts. Still, vandalism on both sides would lead to uncountable amounts of property damage, windows being broken in every block, cars burnt or detonated in car-traps, streets littered with bricks and broken pieces of concrete. Barricades on streets topped with barbed wires would be set up. Even children going to school having to be escorted by police or military forces.

Street sign warning of the dangers of entering into "Provos" territory.

The Troubles would be a platform on which numerous protestant extremists or radicals would be able to gather political capital. Among the most known would be Enoch Powell, a member of the Conservative Party who had taken a deep interest in Northern Ireland already in the late 50’s during the winter campaign. He would get a lot of attention and support from his anti-Irish rhetoric, coupled with anti-immigration attitude and a strong Imperial/Unionist background. Powell supported the idea of a single British identity, regardless of one being English, Scottish, Welsh and opposed the idea of “multi-national state” which in his opinion had to breed conflict. Powell would thus become the most important UK spokesmen of the general idea of the “nation state” being the supreme form of state organization, adapting it to the multi-ethnic character of the UK. He strongly maintained his stance of keeping the United Kingdom strongly united with strong central rule, opposing overly broad autonomy of members; he was also opposed to the character of the British Commonwealth of Nations which he felt led to the UK being drained of resources and talents rather than increased it – his idea being the necessity of either maintaining imperial/mandate rule over overseas territories while giving those territories the option of joining the UK directly, or abandoning them to their own fate, without any obligations from London towards them. During the détente, he strongly advocated greater cooperation with France, considering the UK to be primarily a “west European state” rather than a “global empire” and that it should prioritize European matters over the matters of Asian or African colonies. In one of his interviews, he straightforwardly said, that he would be willing to allow India to fall to communism if that was the wish of the population, and that India ought to either accept British protection with all strings attached, or if not – accept its fate of being in the neighborhood of the Communist giants and deal with them by itself without counting on the UK. He held the same attitude towards other possessions of the UK which he felt ought to praise the burden the UK had taken upon itself to protect them from non-democratic forces, and if they were not showing sufficient gratitude, to be left to fend for themselves. Powell would become a strong point of the Conservative electorate who agreed with his attitude of “British Isles” first, “Brits being Europeans”, the dangers of multi-ethnical societies brought also by immigration – one of his most important works being participating in the creation of the Treaty of Delhi so as to limit the freedom of movement of people, preventing the UK from being “flooded” by Africans and Indians, while allowing token immigration of those who had shown themselves as “British” – the adjective being used for describing not only the people from the British Isles, but from anywhere in the British Empire, as long as they could be determined as “British”. Financing overseas colonies while Britons in northern Ireland were lacking was considered immoral. This sort of attitude extended towards the Irish Catholics who he felt did not belong in the UK, the Troubles being the inevitable result of multinationalism, only possible to solve by either the Catholics accepting “Britishness” and loyalty to London, or moving “back to Ireland”. His famous “Rivers foaming with much blood” Speech, while controversial and criticized when given in 1966, would quickly come to be seen as a prediction, once pictures of the streets of Belfast covered in pools of the blood of the killed would take the front pages of British magazines. Calls that “Powell Was Right” would allow for his career to be renewed in the 70’s, the Troubles being the opportunity for his “National Front” wing of the Conservative Party to gain more prominence.

National front rally in Yorkshire. The development of national conciousness worldwide and the spread of the consensus that nationality was more an "objective fact" than "subjective perception" had led to a renewed debate on the identity of Britons, whether they were a seperate nationality, or just a broader congloberate of Angles, Scotts, Welsh, Cornish, etc.

The Troubles would get international attention, from both Europe and the rest of the world. The USSR would covertly support the Official IRA in arms and training, accusing the UK of “imperialism” and “occupation of Ireland”. Similarly, Germany would support the “regular” IRA, declaring British occupation to be illegal on the grounds of the right of nations for self-determination – that right not being extended to “illegal colonists and their descendants”. Soon after its electoral victory of the Fine Gael, the Irish Prime Minister would Jack Lynch would officially state the Ireland had a “constitutional right” to Northern Ireland, and that a full withdrawal of UK Armed Forces needed to be the first step in any peace process. The fighters of the Provisional IRA would be determined by Eire to be eligible for “veteran” status in Ireland, Dublin also demanding they be treated as prisoners of war by the UK rather than common criminals (justified by the fact that the UK was using military forces to fight them, rather than police). The Irish community in the USA would be particularly vocal, housing some of the most anti-British elements of American society. The general anti-colonial attitude of the USA would also extend towards Ireland, demands on a British withdrawal from Ireland as a first step towards a “United Ireland” being issued by US Senators, including ones from the notable Kennedy clan, like Edward Kennedy. The Irish-Americans would organize numerous fundraisers for the Irish in the USA, celebrations of Irish holidays like St. Patrick’s Day being also demonstrations against the British – bumper stickers, poster and toys of a green-clothed Leprechaun and George Washington beating John Bull or some Redcoat being something of a popular motive, “united against British colonial imperialism”. The IRA would also gain sympathy from other powers of the world who were in conflict with the UK over territories – Argentina, Guatemala, the UAS, China etc. Through the 70’s the troubles would come to claim thousands of lives in total, military actions intensifying, relations with the Republic of Ireland worsening, eventually coming to a point where the UK would destroy bridges on the internal Irish border. The situation would try to settled peacefully by promises and small scale reforms, but to no avail - even a referendum in 1980 on the question of whether Northern Ireland was to unite with the Republic of Ireland giving no conclusion, as only 52% of those eligible to vote participated, 98% of whom opted against it, and for Ulster to remain part of the UK. This would be a sign of the Catholic community losing all faith in the possibility of using democratic means to solve the conflict, while also being used as proof the UK being right about its stance and having the support of the majority of the population.

George Washington would come to be perceived as a hero in Ireland as well as the USA due to his victorious fight against the British.

Escalation of the conflict took place in the late 70’s and early 80’s, when it started to spill over to England itself. Attacks took place in areas that were thought could seriously damage the UKs image as the centre of the Commonwealth and scare foreigners away. Bombs were detonated at tourist attractions, such as Tower Bridge or in the vicinity of Westminster, as well as hotels, restaurants, pubs and discos. Central offices of BCoN institutions were also targeted. This increased the anger of the English population and led to changes in the procedures of the UK forces in Ulster, who were with time being replaced with the veterans of the colonial wars in Africa and Asia – bringing with them skills, practices and training that was necessary in those much more brutal environments. Gun use started to become more commonplace with a “shoot first, ask questions later” attitude, previously “reserved” for “uncivilized peoples”, being on the increase. Casualties rose. The fighting in Ulster started to more and more resemble a colonial conflict with heavier equipment being brought to the streets, such as tanks. Abandoned buildings were bulldozed so as to prevent them from being used as hideouts. Soldiers became more trigger-happy, while the English population would for the first time in a very long time experience fear – England itself becoming bombed for the first time since the Great War. In 1979, the Republic of Ireland filed a case against the United Kingdom accusing it of torture of captured IRA fighters, the World Court determining the UK guilty of practicing torture in 1982, causing an avalanche of cases for compensation by arrested IRA fighters or their families.

A bombed restaurant in Bristol

The situation in Northern Ireland only began to improve in the 80’s, not because of any major military success of either side, but due to changes in the political situation. The introduction of direct London rule and the suspension (eventually an official dissolution) of the North Irish parliament has had a negative effect on the Unionist movement. The Unionist movement began to divide internally between the proponents of maintaining direct rule, and those who wanted autonomy restored. Also the attitude towards the Catholic minority began to change, with radicals proclaiming “not one step back” and “no bowing to the demands of terrorists” while moderates were willing to introduce guarantees for the Irish Catholics, even “personal autonomy” for the minority based on the fascist model (the latter being strongly opposed by London though, on moral grounds as well as little belief in the effectiveness of such a model without constant police control). The weakening of the protestant minority was coupled with the Irish Republic weakening as well: the decade of Fine Gael rule (1969 – 1981) and diplomatic conflict with the UK had led to its economy taking a turn for the worse, the country entering a depression in 1980. As the Irish nationalists ruled in Dublin, economic relations and trade with the UK began to stagnate, taking the entire economy with it. Emigration to the USA increased, where the Irish also were beginning to lose sympathy, a combined effect of UK diplomatic/propaganda/information campaigns, as well as the American public by itself being opposed to using force as a means of political fighting. Ireland did attempt to turn towards France for support, even applying to join in the creation of the West European Economic Community, but was rebuffed by the French. Paris remained loyal to London and its official stance was that Ireland was at least partly responsible for the conflict and terror, thus not being eligible to join or receive support. Thus Irish economic difficulties coupled with diplomatic isolation, Ireland being wise enough not to come closer to Germany or the USSR. After the elections of 1981, Fianna Fáil returned to power and offered to take steps to end the conflict, promising to end economic stagnation and international isolation. Among its first action was cracking down hard on both the Official IRA and the “regular” IRA, arms smuggle into Ireland and closing down their training camps on its soil. It also strongly pulled the leash on the Provisional IRA, demanding its command to self-declare itself as to what where its goals and what conditions would have to be met for it to end fighting. Those actions naturally created a re-action, the forceful disbarment and massive arrests causing 1983 to be the year with the largest number of bombings and assassinations in Eire since the beginning of the Troubles. Ireland had shown determination in its pursuit to ending the conflict, or at least re-routing it to a direction where it would not hurt Irish interests, primarily economic ones.

The simple possibility of achieving peace with the IRA fighters was a sign of improvement in the situation.

In 1984 the first hopes for a resolution had come with the British offer of creating a new local parliament and a new administration for northern Ireland. Ireland offered to support the idea, as did the USA, President Morris Udall promising to begin investments in Eire and Northern Ireland, primarily aimed at reconstruction. A Constitutional Commission was established with the purpose of finding a compromise and creating a new system of government for northern Ireland. A Anglo-Irish agreement was signed in December 1984, agreeing on the establishment of a senior administration for Northern Ireland which was also to have legislative powers. The effects of the Commission’s work was the formation of the North Irish National Assembly, to which representatives were elected in universal and proportional elections – the restriction on only taxpayers being able to vote being lifted, the proportional system being meant to allow for multiple parties of Northern Ireland to participate in its works. The formation of the Assembly coincided with Eire forcing the Provisional IRA into declaring a ceasefire, with which American offers of financial aid came. But those hopes were died down rather quickly, as the assembly did not function effectively. The Unionists objected towards the many privileges and other that were introduced to protect the Catholic minority (first elections to the Assembly leading to the victory of a coalition of various protestant groups), which was felt by the Protestant majority as being undemocratic (the “constitution” of Northern Ireland, known officially as the “Basic Law of Northern Ireland”, not being voted through in any referendum, but being octroyed by London), their majority not translating into an ability to establish new laws according to their vision. This had led to the assembly ceasing to function after just 8 months, and being officially suspended in 1986. This in turn had led the PIRA into breaking its ceasefire, as well as both the Prime Ministers of Ireland and Northern Ireland resigning. Violence came back, the Provos changing their tactics from targeting officials and governmental offices to causing massive property damages. Bombing attacks on skyscrapers, stock exchanges, banks, docked and cruising vessels and other such causing damages counted in billions of pounds in just a few years. It was this period that had ultimately led to the popular view of the IRA across the world to change radically, from being seen by some as “legitimate” freedom fighters to simple “villains” – this period also serving as inspiration for numerous action movies of the era, including the British popular film hero James Bond, who would fight the IRA on two occasions, preventing them from kidnapping the Queen of England ones, and from detonating a nuclear bomb meant to destroy British gold reserves.

Caricature from the period, on the ineffectiveness of the Stormont.

Thus the conflict came to no resolution and fighting continued. The failure of the North Irish National Assembly had however some golden lining. The work done to establish it, its short functioning and the PIRAs response to its suspension had allowed for the “guilty parties” of the conflict to finally be identified (in the publics views) – no longer was it seen as a religious or ethnic conflict, but as political one with extremists on both sides being guilty. Even though the damages caused by IRAs actions would grow, losses in life compared to the past fell, as more and more tight controls prevented illegal weapons from entering the UK. The PIRA had also come to announce its intentions of carrying out attacks so as to allow people to avoid presence around certain types of areas, decreasing human casualties. While the assembly was suspended, the political parties in Northern Ireland were not, allowing them to become and remain vocal. This had far-leading consequences for the UKs political system, where traditionally only two parties were present. While such a system had allowed the UK to be protected from what had plagued other democratic states – the presence of communist and fascist parties – it had also the downside of eliminating many voices in public debates, and many political factions, like the liberals or Christian democrats. For them, Northern Ireland became a way to vent their frustration, the North Irish National Assembly ending up with many political parties which otherwise had no chance of becoming present in mainstream politics. Among those were the National Front, the Liberal Party, the Communist Party, the Republican Party and many more, which were directly tied to North Irish issues, but used it as an opportunity to enter politics. As the “Basic Law of Northern Ireland” did guarantee state financing of all political parties to cross a certain threshold in elections for the purpose of their work, and the Assembly being suspended but not officially disbanded, this also allowed for those numerous parties to obtain funding to increase their presence. The work done by the Irish had also come to motivate the other nationalities of the UK to start requesting similar privileges, primarily in Scotland, but also in Wales and even (in a microscopic way) Cornwall.

The multitude of political parties that has arisen in Northern Ireland had also allowed many activist of various agendas to become more outspoken about their issues, be it environmentalism, immigration, anti-communism or anti-nazism.

 

[Kongzilla]

For much Europeans who for one reason or other ventured into the United States of America, life there seemed to be almost surreal compared to what went on in their own countries. The fear of constantly looming war and the propaganda associated with it there was ever present. Paranoia over who might be a threat or an enemy encompassed all parts of society – from school books teaching about survival in case of an air raid and the reasons for which other nations were enemies, through the construction of innumerous bunkers and shelters under buildings in cities to the names of dishes being changed due to them “sounding foreign”. Yet upon entering the USA, all that was gone. The USA did not feel threatened by war. It didn’t seem to be so interested in foreign affairs overall. Domestic matters completely dominated any public debate, foreign affairs being something that only enthusiasts were interested in. While the American society have come to accept ending its isolation and understood the necessity of being involved in conflicts and problems in other parts of the world, they certainly didn’t feel like that was anything near the top priority of the government. The American people felt safe and didn’t want for that sense of safety to go away. The country was peaceful, not expecting any war to come, not wanting to be part of any. To those coming from Europe, such an attitude was completely baffling, though easily understood – being protected by “Admirals Atlantic and Pacific”, the United States of America and its people could sleep peacefully, not having anything to fear.

The American Dream of a life of peace, security and prosperity was well and alive in America through the Cold War.
The American people had mostly a passive stance towards the foreign policy conducted by the government, hardly ever protesting against any governmental moves. This mostly thanks to the US carrying out its foreign policy in a way that the people either accepted – cautiously, prudently, in a non-aggressive manner – or in a way that was well-explained to them as to why certain steps had to be taken. The people of the USA also overwhelmingly supported any stated goal of the US foreign policy makers, as those were considered entirely natural to them. Opposition to totalitarian ideologies, maintaining free trade worldwide, upholding peace, bringing post-colonial states out of their misery, providing aid for those in need – those were things the American people sympathized with. The USA was consistent in its stance of “no nation being its enemy” and maintained correct and proper relations with all other of the great powers of the world, even those following an ideology it opposed. Such a stance was also what allowed to maintain a high-export economy, some American products being possible to find even in the deepest corners of Germany and the USSR. The USA remained among the world’s most technological advanced countries of the world, its innovative economy producing numerous of new technologies, those often being copied or bought by other states. Such a “neutral” attitude in terms of trade and friendly relation was kept together with a general pro-western sentiment, despite some remaining anti-British sentiment among parts of the public. The American people mostly understood that any potential new war on the Eurasian continent – whether a Second Great War in Europe or another Far-Eastern War in Asia – would somehow affect the USA, and the USA could not afford to maintain a completely pacifist, passive stance. Isolationism simply wasn’t viable in the long turn, as it was increasingly obvious that any modern country with an advanced industry needed access to global resources, not just domestic ones, or the ones found within “it’s bloc”. Whereas in terms of “national interests” the USA may have been better off by keeping away from such conflicts, selling anything to anyone, profiting from wars and not caring about who eventually wins (or survives), similarities in “ideology” was what eventually drew it closer to the western bloc. There was obviously some degree of “protecting national interest” in that as well, as trade with the western states was the most important ones for the USA, as well it having to be kept in mind that a “balkanized” European subcontinent was preferable to a “united one” – especially if it was to be united under an expansionist, protectionist regime like the USSR or Germany. Ensuring that peace would be maintained in Europe was thus serving the Americans “national interest” as much as it served them in keeping peace in their hearts.

The first McDonalds restaurant to open in Germany in Berlin, a symbol of what America had to offer to the world. As Burger King carried the burden of being associated with “western imperialism”, it’s main competitor benefited from the lack of competition in some of the fascist states.
This didn’t mean that all American’s approved of such a stance. Plenty of jingoists have appeared through the years pointing out that it’s sheer population, industry and resources was enough for the USA to be a global great power more powerful than any other; that should it want to, America could have an army greater than any other country could dream about; that its industry could outproduce and overwhelm any competition. Moving out of isolationism wasn’t enough for them – the USA was meant to take the top spot among countries of the world for itself. There were also plenty of those who thought of the end of isolationism as a “necessary evil”, one they didn’t like. Isolationism still remained as the general sentiment among the people when faced with problems and dilemmas that didn’t have easy answers. Falling back to it was common, especially when faced with active opposition – after all, America did not seek to make enemies, so if it didn’t have to act, it certainly could let some matters be, avoiding unnecessary confrontation. When faced with hostility towards its cause by others, America would be more vary about using force, hard or soft, to fulfill its agenda, not wanting to alienate others and destroy the social capital it had worked on accumulating. This was especially true when any debate on “foreign escapades” entered the part of “what it would cost domestically”, particularly in terms of taxpayers money. While spending billions on foreign aid, development programs, investments and other “soft power” moves was found acceptable, this was not the case when tax money was meant to be spent on “aggressive moves”. That universally involved all potential expanses on the military, but also on other matters. For example, on a number of occasions, plans were laid down in Washington about the possibility of the USA buying small islands on the Pacific and Atlantic from either the UK or France, buying the rights to their bases, even trading them for American hardware. Such ideas were not uncommonly thought of as beneficial even by the Europeans. But none of them ever finalized. German and Soviet foreign services had their part in preventing the USA from expanding territorially into the Atlantic and Pacific, at a number of occasions stating their disapproval for the USA expanding its territory (real reasons being to prevent the USA from increasing their naval territory and area where its shipping towards the west in case of war would benefit from protection by marine law – the experience of the Great War proving submarines to be successful at raiding commerce ships). Declaring that such treaties would be looked upon very negatively by both Moscow and Berlin, Washington backed out, not seeing it as prudent to provoke them. Fears that the USA’s actions aimed at increasing its defensive capabilities would be interpreted as hostile actions thus creating a self-fulfilling prophecy and potentially leading to an arms race (which the USA feared to be dragged into) was enough to discourage the USA from even such “peaceful” types of expansion. These type of instances of heeding the objections of foreign great powers were however just as common as the USA being very assertive about maintaining its interests and rights when threatened or infringed upon by others. Covert attempts at arming communist militias in the Philippines were dealt with harshly by the Americans causing an international scandal; demands on the USA giving up its privileges to the Panama Canal and military presence there by the European powers were also rejected. The Panama Canal got to the headlines of international press in 1977 when Panamanian irregulars attacked the US Army positions along the canal and were soundly beaten off, nearly bringing the USA and Panama into a state of war. While the USA no longer invoked the Monroe Doctrine, it went without saying that it still considered South and Latin America and area where it would not tolerate any hostile presence sponsored by European or Asian powers. Its diplomacy, both in Europe and the continent in question was successful enough to convince European leaders, even the Fascist and Communist ones, that attempts at subverting the USA there would not be tolerated.

The battle of the Panama Canal. The attack on the canal was carried out by political oppositionists who sought the nationalization of the canal under Panamanian rule, thinking a quick victory over the American garrison as first step to overthrow the government. Their failure was what begun a brief civil war into which the USA was almost dragged into, but which was eventually won by government forces.
The USA was perfectly able to assert itself despite being among the least militarized of the developed states. In Europe countries with a population of a few million would maintain armies standing hundreds of thousands strong. The USA, despite having a population of over 200 million by 1980 would still only have an Army less than 200.000 strong (another 200.000 being part of the National Guard units). America had one of the lowest military budgets from the developed states (which was still considerable though in absolute terms though due to the sheer size of the US economy) and the largest part of it was spent on the US Navy – the pride of the US military and its most prestigious formation. Being ultimately (in geopolitical terms) an island located of the coast of a larger, more populous continent (albeit a disunited one), American security naturally had to be based on maintaining a powerful fleet; land forces being absolutely secondary. Thus the US Navy was no lacking in either ships or crew, nor in prestige or public support. The USA clearly had the potential to lay down a fleet more powerful than any other in the world; it’s merchant fleet was among the largest in the world, rivaled only by the British and Norwegian. Yet the USA remained remarkably constrained in terms of launching massive fleets of military vessels, partly for economic reasons, partly due to British diplomacy. With both Germany and Italy refusing to abide by previous Naval Treaties on the limits of naval armaments, the Royal Navy had to enter a de facto naval arms race with them. This in turn led to much concern in the USA, many demanding that the USA maintain a fleet capable of defending American shores from Europeans along with being able to protect naval trade routes at the same time. While the UK did not treat the USA as an enemy, nor a country to which it had to maintain a naval power parity, it still much rather preferred for the US Navy not to exceed the Royal Navy in tonnage. This led to a series of treaties, first unofficial, later made fully official in 1967 under the terms of the Second Washington Naval Treaty, by which the USA agreed to not to exceed the Royal Navy in tonnage or the number of ships; unofficially, the USA would also agree to keep the US Navy slightly smaller than the Royal Navy at all times, while the UK and later the rest of the countries of the BCoN made considerable purchases in American shipyards. The US Navy would thus be a constant no.2 in terms of navy size just after the Royal Navy, but that would also allow them to be much more modern than the Royal Navy – many American ships being sold off to the British or other countries of the BCoN, replaced by newer models. Because of that, many observers would actually come to the conclusion that despite British propaganda, it was in fact the US Navy that was the most powerful navy in the world – its numbers being only slightly lower than British, but ships being faster and better armed, as well as operating on only two oceans compared to all the oceans of the globe the Royal Navy had to be present on. The sign of US and British parity, or perhaps even superiority was that apart from the UK, it was only the USA that kept Supercarriers in service – both German and Italian aircraft carriers being considerably smaller.

The Whipple-class aircraft carrier of the US Navy, designated into the Atlantic Fleet.
The importance of the Navy in the USA went beyond defence – it was also a matter of prestige and culture, even economy and social development. American shipyards were serious employers, while American school of technologies and naval institutes were responsible for many technological advancements – materials such as metal foams and titanium alloys being developed and later brought into the global market as a result of research into making ships lighter and more durable. The US Navy was also a formation that was quite willing to accept candidates and offering them a chance at social advancement – few years long service allowing one to have their college education being covered for example. The US Navy was one of the formation that under Joseph Kennedy was strongly forced into abandoning any racial discrimination practices and introducing affirmative action, allowing for many African-American to escape the poverty of their homes. The formation was more prestigious than any other in the US Armed Forces, whether the Air Force or Marines – people of equivalent ranks in other formation saluting to their naval counterpart first, etc. Command of large warships was extremely prestigious in social circles all over America, even in the landlocked states, captains of ships being a very welcome addition to any cocktail party, fundraisers and such. Small towns would name their streets, parks, libraries and such after high-ranking navy officers coming from the said town, being a matter of pride for them – also aiding in political careers. The popular view of sailors being gentlemen-officers, who nonetheless knew how to fight was very common and that image was strongly protected by the Navy itself. This sentiment also in many ways radiated onto the civilian fleet, basically any service on any ships being seen as something honorable in the USA. Numerous speeches made to sailors during elections would refer to them as the “Ambassadors of America around the world” – which would carry some truth in it. Indeed, for many people in the fascist and communist worlds, the only contact with Americans was through sailors – their appearance, manners and attitude being what made people establish their opinions on the United States (their seemingly inexhaustible supply of many rare goods, whether chewing gum, exclusive liquor or vinyl discs also making them popular, their arrival anxiously awaited).

US sailors salute during a wreath laying ceremony in Vladivostok, USSR.
The Navy affected the very culture of the USA, though whether it was media reacting to an already common sentiment, or whether media created that sentiment was difficult to say. Both Hollywood and paperback books have had a lot of influence on people choosing a career on the sea. The trope of a “prodigal family member” escaping his home town and undergoing a personal change after a few years serving at a ship would be very popular, a would stories about “American adventurers” getting into all sorts of trouble in every port they visit. American culture would produce works of every type, from sad dramas about a mistress anxiously awaiting her sweetheart to return home while she had to deal with all the problems of everyday life, through comedies of American sailors getting into funny problems in alien cities, to full scale action-adventure stories on sailors fighting at sea against other ships, pirates or after being shipwrecked – having to deal with survival and combating savages. Matters such as long periods of separation between people in love, the non-presence of a parent during a child’s upbringing, duty and unity while in an isolated environment would be commonly brought up in such media works. This would come to a point where media consumers, when faced with stories regarding the life of a single person when asking the question “where is his/hers family if he/she is having these problems?” would casually answer to themselves “serving at sea”. This would be particularly common for many works by feminist activists and women right’s movement. Publishers who didn’t like the “independent women does everything by herself” finding the backstory of “husband at sea” convenient and acceptable.
This emphasis of the Navy in military literature or motion pictures had also affected those entire industries over time. Whereas in Europe war movies would overwhelmingly revolve around the Great War or the colonial wars, those would be almost completely absent in American media (despite the US involvement in the Great War). While European war movies would find appeal due to lots of scenes of intense battles, explosions and gore, American war movies would be considerably more introverted, trying to capture the inner struggle of soldiers, having to fight for some cause they didn’t understand far away from home. America’s lack of history in “modern warfare” thus led to many of its war movies being placed in the era of the Civil War – once again bringing up the questions of what was “a right war” and the internal conflict of fighting one owns countrymen, maybe even family. Ironically, when American movies weren’t “deep and psychological”, they were often extremely humorous, producing innumerable amounts of comedies popular worldwide. Statistics over the decades would show the American movie industry producing at least four time as many comedies (relative to total production) as the European movie industries. Hollywood would eventually come and “conquer” the European market much more than the European movies ever could conquer the USA – whereas “fun” and “laughter” were a good sought universally, European movies would on average be either to alien or non-understandable to be so appealing to the American audience – the language barrier being a problem too, as European comedies often relied on language humour that couldn’t be translated well into English.

Cadre from the academy award winning movie “A Sweetheart in Every Port”. The movie was one of the first to have US Navy financial support, which recognized the potential of cinema as a tool of gaining popularity. The navy would not be hesitant about allowing film crews to make use of their vessels circumstances allowing it.
This by no means meant that the USA would be denied action-packed movies with explosions and gunslingers. While Europe would have its war movies, America would have its “Westerns”. The original movie genre would not fall out of style at any point, remaining fresh and providing the global audiences with a fair share of macho-men shooting guns at villains. The genre would undergo a shift only in the 70’s and later 80’ continuing into the 90’s, where the “traditional western” would start being replaced by the “New Western” and “Urban Western”. The “modern” versions of the western would use similar conventions and tropes, only changing the setting into a modern one – cars replacing horses, trucks replacing stagecoaches, suits and sunglasses replacing leather jackets and hats. Action would take place in small towns in the Midwest, or in the case of “urban westerns” – in large metropolises. But overall, the same stories about tough life, crime, justice, revenge and honor would be told, only in a new version, never getting old. The “New Westerns” would not uncommonly be actual remakes of older cult classics, such as Clint Eastwood in both of his “Unforgiven” works from 1992 and 2002. Similarly, many noir crime stories would also be adopt much from westerns, the sentiments of “frontier justice” as applied to large cities, or finding the difference between vengeance and justice.
The USA, like Europe, wasn’t however free of various types of “counter-culture” movements appearing. While many things stayed the same, the “American Dream” being a constant, other things changed – the attitude to various phenomena, society and the world around. In the USA, the fast pace of life, the “rat race”, “social-darwinism” had left many people wandering if such a lifestyle did not mean leaving some things behind, society losing its ties to nature and empathy towards other people – thinking too much and feeling too little. Much of the American Left preyed upon such sentimentalism, using it instrumentally, and not a few turned to that only due to failing to keep up with the world or making wrong choices in life – but many also genuinely wanting for their world to be different than the world of their parents. The slogan of the people having “forgotten about their roots”, “forgotten about where they came from”, “lost their ties to world around them” would be the most common ones. The dislike for the American urban culture had led many to turn to traditionalism, re-researching who they were and where they came from. America had enjoyed a strong renaissance in sciences devoted to researching the world of the Native Americans, both social sciences and archeology; their spiritual beliefs and social doctrines. Numerous Federal Acts would be passed by Congress to better the situation of the remaining Native Americans, enlarging their reservations, providing protection for their landmarks and places of spiritual value, granting them privileges and exemptions on construction works, gambling, liquor production and sales, other such. This type of renaissance had led to many enthusiasts moving into such reservations wanting to “go native” or otherwise seeing it as a “spiritual journey”. While deemed “counter-progressive” and “stupidly sentimentalist” by many, it had also led to much being done in terms of saving Native American heritage, numerous museums being established to protect their arts or reminding people of those who were there before them.

While gambling and liquor would be what Indian Reservations would be most commonly associated with, plenty of Native Americans used the opportunities provided to them and the renewed interest in their culture for developing other enterprises – financial groups, “ecological agriculture”, survivalist camps and training, horseback riding schools, etc.
Apart from insight into the Native Americans, many people would also look into their own heritage, the traditions of “their ancestors of the Old World”. While the “Melting Pot” that US civilization was, had led to much of the traditions of old being forgotten, the “Salad bowl” it also was would allow for some of their parts to be taken out of it, preserved and polished. This would be an important sentimental conflict that the US society would face, critics claiming that the “Melting Pot” was destroying the “original culture” of the people who were in America, whereas the “Salad Bowl” allowing them to remain the same. On the other hand, proponents of the “Melting Pot” argued that it was the “Melting Pot” that allowed for differences and inequalities to be removed, a “Salad Bowl” being equivalent to segregation. People of European-American descent would “rediscover” their origins and start associating with their “European” heritage more than with their “American”. This would be in many ways just a matter of sports, or fun – homogenous communities establishing long-forgotten holidays as days of celebrations and decorating the streets of those towns or districts in some particular way, such as green, when it came to Irish Americans rediscovering their Irishness and celebrating St. Patrick’s Day with green beer. America was not immune to the general rise of national sentiment worldwide, and with policies of “minorities protection” being introduced, many people would also find it profitable to become a “member of the minority”, even if it was only declaratory and for purely instrumental reasons. This instrumentalism was also one of the reasons critics were opposed to “Salad Bowls”, seeing it only as a means of perpetuating the divisions of society. This conflict would largely align with party division in the USA, the Democratic Party siding with the “Melting Pot”, the Republicans with the “Salad Bowl”. It would also often come up in numerous conflicts between the Federal and the State authorities, as many of the individual states, or even cities, would actually have a rather common and singular national background and liking it, governmental demands on being “more American” being seen as “Big government overexceeding its powers and authority”. The irony of the American left being more about flag-waving and supporting the idea of a “single American nation”, rather than such national sentiment being associated with the right as it was in Europe, was also something that didn’t escape the attention of foreigners visiting America – another peculiarity of the USA.
Rising national sentiments among the American population would be a cause of concern, fear, celebration and pride all at once. Many “minorities organizations” would form in the USA and become very active in American politics, both local, state level and federal. Groups such as the German American Bund, the NAACP, the American Jewish Congress, the National Italian Foundation, the Polish American Congress would become powerful lobby and voter groups, their level of organization allowing them to reach far and wide. While often accused of having “fascist sympathies” or being simple fronts for the fascist states of Europe, reality would be much more complex. Indeed many of such minorities organizations would be directly funded by the fascist regimes and meant to be used as a means of pushing their agenda in the USA. Such was for example the purpose of the German American Bund, which almost completely copied the structure of the NSDAP at home and wanted to be the “state within a state” of the German-Americans, complete with their own “taxes” (accusations of the Bund running protection rackets being unfortunately common), schools, businesses and even youth camps, such as the infamous Bund Camp Nordland. On the other hand, plenty of such organization grouped genuine German-Americans who were very loyal to the USA, anti-fascist and devoted to their new home, only wanting for their heritage to be maintained and for bad stereotypes to be fought. Among them the most prominent was the German-American Heritage Foundation created in 1960, which had a very powerful anti-Nazi character and would work tirelessly to terminate the “all Germans are Nazis stereotype”. It did have some success at that, mostly thanks to its head, Marlene Dietrich, a popular German-American performer who devoted much of her career to anti-nazism. Those would be the two extremes of the spectrum, with the numerous organizations of virtually every Europe (and not only) nationality having their own “interest group”, “culture preservation foundation”, “anti-defamation organization” and such, some being the creations of other countries, some being the products of the US citizens of various nationality themselves, their agendas and influence greatly varying. Since it wasn’t unusual for such groups to cooperate with each other for common goals, or for them to be infiltrated by fascist or communist agents, they still would often be the target of suspicion, scandals regarding the uncovering of French intelligence officers in Franco-American Association being just one of many, proving also that it wasn’t only the totalitarian states that wanted to use their American diaspora for their interest. Other such scandals involved the exposing of the large degree of infiltration of US influence groups by communist agents (not only Soviet, but Chinese, Japanese and Vietnamese as well) complete with their “goals” – while the “Current Communist Goals” list from “The Naked Communist” by Cleon Skousen was never determined to be the product of any foreign power, or even if it was the general agenda of all “secretly communist groups” in the USA, the permanent declarations of those being just a single persons dreams just like “the protocols of the elders of zion” also did not sound very convincing, and many people who would declare their support of any of the goals from that list would end up branded as “communist”. Accusations of political candidates being supported by “Nazi/Soviet sponsored groups” or “groups cooperating with foreign-financed groups with a foreign interest agenda” would thus be rather common, the support of one minority often meaning the loss of support of another. The story of how President Harrison would win an election over Cleveland due to British support for Cleveland at the time would be commonly brought up, at certain point some of the most extreme groups – such as the “Aryan Brotherhood” or the “American Communist Party” being used instrumentally by their masters to support their enemies so as to discredit them.

The infamous Bund Camp Nordland in New York, for long treated as a “hatchery of American Nazism” and a symbol of national sentiments remaining strong within America despite decades having past and generations gone.
But while national sentiment was tricky tool to use in all-American elections, it was more straightforward in various local elections, be it state, city, district or neighborhood-wide. Since people of same nationality had for a long time the tendency of settling in towns of districts already populated by others like them, the development of national sentiment that had them associate more with the non-American part of the heritage was both a boon for their own organization, and an obstacle for cooperation with other groups at a higher level – ethnic tensions getting in the way of proper cooperation. Economic theories on how homogeneity of states increased the “social capital” of the population that originated mostly from the countries of central Europe (and remained popular, being an economic justification for assimilation/ethnic cleansings/discrimination) did make it across the ocean and gain some popularity in America, along with the economic theories of “economic blocs”. Used instrumentally by many radicals, but also studied genuinely by regular economists, some of their conclusions on how diversity of a community lowered the degree of “trust” and “social capital” between not only members of distinct groups, but also those within the same one led many to the conclusion that “separate but equal” was in fact a valid economic practice, provided “equality” was real, and not just covert discrimination – the “coloured” districts and their facilities getting same funding as the “non-coloured” ones for example. Same went for governmental aid and programs for “coloured” towns or districts. Many major city would have their own “ethnic districts” or “ghetto neighborhoods” populated in a huge majority be people of a single background, always electing their representatives to city, state or federal councils/bodies based more on their nationality than politics. Such was the case for example of the many Chinatowns in major American cities which not uncommonly managed to even get “their” parts of town separated from other neighborhoods and established as separate ones. On larger scale, even some entire cities fell to that such, as Buffalo in New York being dominated by the Polish American Congress. On the largest of scales, the state of North Dakota would commonly be referred to as “the German state” due to the number of German and Scandinavian Americans and the intensity of their cultural identity.

Entrance gate to the Chinatown of San Francisco. Most “ethnic districts” in American cities would have decorations of some kind on the streets along with an official “entrance gate”, cynics calling it a way of “marking their territory”.
The idea of “minorities rights” in Europe had led eventually to the creation of the “ghetto” – an isolated community populated by a homogenous group. While in Europe the ghettos were simply excuses for chauvinism and apartheid, they nevertheless have proven to be an ugly, but effective means of relieving areas of ethnic tensions. Ironically, in some cases they also served to improve the area by turning it into what many American scholars referred to as “the self-sustaining community”. While hardly autarkic, these “communities” were able to efficiently provide the specific services required by its inhabitants (such as kosher meat in Jewish ghettos) as well as provide goods or services desired by those outside it, trading them for other commodities – all the while keeping the populations separate. Such isolation ironically also stimulated the establishment of local businesses, corporations, services, even factories – providing opportunities for advancement for people who otherwise faced discrimination. While attitude towards any “success” such ghettos made in Europe was usually envy and sometimes led to violence, in the non-totalitarian world the equivalents of such ghettos were safe from mob violence and their success was more often a reason of pride. In the USA, the term “ghetto” had pejorative meaning, and was completely replaced by the neutral term “self-sufficient community” – which was used for everything from entire towns of a single ethnic origin in the Midwest, through a metropolises Chinatown or “Black district”, to small communes built by ideological fanatics or religious zealots.
Small town or ethnic districts “keeping to themselves” and becoming rather closed societies would not be a uncommon sight in the USA, even if only a fraction of the population brought their national sentiments to any extreme – the sheer diversity, americanization of society and mixing of families simply prevented such things to become a true mass movement. But where such sentiment did appear, it was quite noticeable. The city of New York would become a true mosaic of cultures, many districts getting a “unique” flavour – Jewish, African, Irish, Italian, etc. Many thought of this phenomena as being a “true” diversity, a person living in such a city being able to enjoy the uniqueness of every culture of the world simply by going down a few streets. And such folklore in no way affected entire cities, most of which still remained “generic American neighborhoods”. Such nationalism strengthened the social fabric of smaller communities, though at the expanse of the larger ones. The lighter side of the coin took the form of great advancement of many disadvantaged groups, particularly the African, Chinese, Japanese and Korean Americans. Establishing their own districts and developing their own “towns within towns” helped greatly for them developing a strong sense of community, diverse services and even industry. The benefits of this was not uncommonly recognized by authorities who used it when it came to exercising affirmative action legislation in the US – police or fire departments for entire cities having to employ a particular percentage of people of some race doing so by having the police or fire station responsible for the “ghetto” be manned in 100% with people of the race of the ghetto. Both public and private schools were made in a way to accommodate the needs of minorities, by making them de facto “minority only” schools. Similar policies went even for college and universities, organizations such as NAACP funding scholarships for them and lobbying for introducing minorities quotas there. While in some places such policies would end up being “no go zones” for people outside the community, these were rare – the “self-sufficient communities” being usually much less crime-prone than others, visitors being the cornerstone of their economies. But the dark side of the coin was also related to crime, both petty and organized. “Race gangs” would commonly use “racial solidarity” for the purpose of getting away with crime, robbing from neighbouring districts and hiding in their own. The “strong sense of community” extended to covering up for criminals, accusations of potential corruption being replied as being acts of racism. More importantly, the rise of nationalism in the USA also led to much greater and better organization of the many “ethnic” criminal organizations, such as the Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza, Chinese Triads or the Jewish Mob. The “Little Romes”, “Little Tokios”, “Chinatowns” would provide the ideal infrastructure for country-wide criminal organizations. Mob wars between these crime families would be the cause of much blood on the street, as well much dislike between the various communities – each blaming the other for the “start” of violence, sheltering their own, attacking the other. Among the developed countries, the USA would have the largest problem with organized crime, their influence going very far and deep, even into politics – and the fights of intelligence agencies of the old world. The power of the American crime organizations would be felt even outside it, such as in Cuba where a great deal of plantations, industries and businesses where at least partly involved in criminal activity, the country often being treated as a “summer resort” for mob bosses as well as one big money laundry. Irish American gangster were known for being strongly afflicted with the IRA in Ireland, involved in lots of arms smuggling. The influence of various criminal groups varied from state to state, the various Asian mobs being most active in the west coast; California being the stronghold of the Jewish mob in particular, after a brutal gang war against the united front of other groups in New York, the city and state falling to the Italians. German and Polish criminal gangs would be most common in the Midwest, particularly in Illinois, while Mexican and other Latin American gangs prowl the south. Fascist and Communist propaganda would often depict the USA as being a country ran by gangsters who openly shot people on the streets with Tommy Guns, crime being rampant. And there was some truth to that, the scale of crime compared to western Europe being much worse. That many states objected against Federal proposals at strengthening the FBI and other Federal agencies meant for combating crime didn’t help matters, as state police were often not properly equipped to deal with the problem and prone to corruption. The dark side of “civil rights” and “privacy” that many states invoked in their “states rights” rhetoric, was that the same rights also protected criminals from being pursued and investigated.

The city of Detroit. Tall skyscrapers contrasted with the poverty of shantytowns erected around the city, but such sights were increasingly uncommon as communal housing construction financed by the state allowed for many to be given at least “proper quality” flats. Unfortunately, such areas where communal housings were built would with time come to be dominated by people of a single ethnicity, becoming a “ghetto” of its own, just with better developed infrastructure.
But light sides of the growing national sentiments in America were also present. Unlike in Europe where those born and raised in ghettos had relatively little chance at getting out of it other than migrating out of the country and thus had to work at bettering the ghetto itself, the USA did offer many ways of escape such “ghettos”, the strong fabric of society in them preparing people well for using all the opportunities available. Those who would rather escape the ghetto at the first moment when opportunity appeared, would often choose to stay due to their sense of allegiance to the community, their skills not ending up benefiting the “WASPs” or “Big Corporate Business” – but the smaller local businesses. As no “ghetto” was ever restricted in regard to what those inside it could do, many companies would form there, able to count on the support of the local population. Black, Asian, Jewish people who would otherwise have to live at the outskirts of society could aim at reaching “the top” of their smaller society and move on from there to the bigger world, while not forgetting where they came from and on who they could count. While such things often sounded like truism, and many of those who “got out” would never come back, not a few did make it their point that a Black/Asian/Jewish men could score it big in America. For many races, it was in fact some of the “ghettos” that were the good places to live in – rather than “big cities” where they “dissolved” in a big pot, becoming “one of many” and outcompeted due to lack of local support. Such was for example the case of Flint in the state of Michigan. The city experienced a large increase of the African American population from the 50’s onwards, most of which ended up mostly in the North Side. The cheap labor they provided for the local automotive industry was what had allowed for many of them to advance into “middle class”, whereas political and administrational reform allowed for the North Side to be separated as a neighborhood, given with much of the obligatory infrastructure (schools, police stations, fire stations, etc.). In a time of rampant racism those were meant as means of separating them from the rest of the city, but ended up being used to the fullest by the locals who had a strong sense of solidarity and community spirit. Not being able to buy "foreign goods" (i.e. to frequent white stores), African Americans ceated their own economies and societies. With profits from local industry enriching the population and tax revenue increasing, the quality of “government/public services” increased. Private businesses such as barbers, drug stores, auto repair workshops and other types of private initiative exploded in the late 60’s and 70’s, with the locals strongly supporting each others businesses. African American churches, schools, kindergartens and various social organizations were formed, increasing their mutual self-reliance. The positive effects had not to be awaited long, as already in the 70’s did the North Side of Flint surpass the cities average wealth, and in the coming years, became the richest of them. The success story of the “North Side of Flint” would be only one of many and often be presented as a model for others, as well as heavily researched, as to what had allowed it to grow and prosper so well so fast. And the answer would often be claimed to be the fact that these communities did not allow for the income that came their way to flow out to others, as well as did not allow for their best to leave for the “greater world” – the “ghettoization” serving as means of mercantile economic practice that worked to the “ghettos” advantage.

The North Side of Flint, Michigan. The black-populated district would be undistinguishable from a typical “white suburbia”.
The issue of race was extremely complex subject in American society. Unlike most European states, it was a “multi-racial” country with a long history of separation or “apartheid”. Much of the American whites did not appreciate the changes the country was undergoing, the population growth of the blacks and Asians, their migrations all over the country and “stealing jobs”, the growth in crime that racial diversity introduced, and other such. And while among the democratic states of the world the USA had among the most rigorous racial legislations, it also was the country that wanted to do the most to end racial discrimination. Beginning with Jospeh Kennedy, “anti-discrimination” and “affirmative action” laws were passed meant to force public services and businesses into allowing the minorities into participating in the American society. Those were however strongly criticized by many as being de facto “reverse discrimination”, as providing privileges to people due to their race in a country where “every citizen had equal rights” meant some citizens were given rights others did not have. In order to counter the effects of federal legislation, the states would typically invoke the US constitution and its guarantees on “states rights” and “private property”, challenging Federal Acts in the supreme court. Private businesses would refuse to serve coloured peoples on the basis that it were “their private business and it being their choice whom they served or not”; governmental universities or agencies refusing to employ/accept minorities on the basis of the US constitution not obliging them to do so, the agencies themselves being products of state law rather than federal (even if their creation by the states were the result of federal legislation beforehand). Many problems were also about effectively implementing the said legislation, authorities in towns both big and small simply ignoring such new laws, local cliques of lawyers, judges, law enforcement and such de facto guaranteeing those who broke the law safety. The effectiveness of federal agencies to counter such problems (such as the FBI) varied greatly from state to state and from town to town, the fight between the federal authorities and the local states being a constant struggle for power.
Controversies regarding racial legislation would very often be resolved in the US supreme court, such cases drawing a lot of attention by the public as well as the various minorities organizations. The character and phrasing of the US constitution as well as the practical relation between the federal and state powers have ultimately created a situation where federal legislation was usually rather vague and unspecific, filled with declarations and general clauses. These act were more a thing of intent rather than specific solutions, giving the states a directive and goals rather than formulating an exact path that had to be taken to reach that goal or how to abide by the directive. The US states had to accept them, but also ended up having considerable leeway on how to implement them in practice, not uncommonly in ways that the acts original creators did not intend. These type of conflicts would most often end up being about giving legal definitions of various legally undefined words or whether a certain practice was deemed constitutional or not. And since the rulings of the supreme court were binding to the entire union, even “local” conflicts drew the attention of people or organizations from all over the country, just to check if their own practices were legally correct – or if they could change in a way the supreme court would rule as acceptable. Among the landmark cases was the “Brown vs. Board of Education” case that ruled against the constitutionality of segregated public schools. The case began a certain resistance movements against its implementation and was a subject of great controversy, specifically regarding the various techniques meant to bypass it – such as closing public schools and providing state-funded vouchers for students to attend private schools with their own rules of enrolment, or creating “segregated classes “ complete with “segregated floors” at schools, keeping the white and coloured students separate. These type of segregation legislations were gradually turned down by the supreme court, but much greater problems came out during attempts at implementing affirmative action legislation. The landmark case of “Regents of the University of California v. Bakke” in 1978 which ruled on the constitutionality of quota systems for minorities in public schools, guaranteeing minorities a number of places regardless of their performance compared to others. It was hailed as a great victory by black organizations such as NAACP, as the University of California specifically guaranteed a disproportionally large number of places to minorities compared to their population, and was expected to cause a great leap in the educational advancement of the racial minorities. But not long after it was ended up being a rotten egg in the legal system, following the “Williams v. University of Chicago” case in 1980. The University of Chicago had been one of the segregationist schools in the USA not using a quota system and resisting de-segregation by various means (such as introducing oral exams after the first semester that were purposely extremely difficult so as to expel the coloured, introducing bench ghettos, creating classes in a way to keep all coloured together and make their lessons take place at weird hours, etc.). Finding itself under massive pressure to end such practices, and already punished for them in the past, the University of Chicago eventually folded and in 1978, in response to the “California v. Bakke” case, introduced a quota system guaranteeing 20% of seats to people of racial minorities – together with officially recognizing the various national minorities of European Americans as racial minorities. Thus, the German-Americans, Italian-Americans, Polish-Americans and so on were counted in the same category as the African-Americans, the 20% of seats being guaranteed to them, based on test scores. The results of the entry exam in 1978 ended up with no African (or Latino or Asian) student making it before the European-Americans, causing outrage, resulting in one Martin Williams, a would-be student suing the University of Chicago for discriminatory practices.

NAACP demonstration before the US Supreme Court building.
The case was extremely complex as the University defended itself not only on the basis of the State of Illinois accepting to recognize numerous European-Americans of various nationalities as “racial minorities”, giving them the privileges of affirmative action. It also pointed out the lack of any actual legal definition of “race” in the legal system and invoked numerous works by biologists, genetecists, anthropologists, eugenicists and such so as to prove the peoples of Europe being of separate “race”, rather than being altogether the representatives of a single “Caucasian race”. That same question in scientific terms has been on the minds, and in the papers of scientists for decades, accelerating since the rise of the Third Reich, its racist legislation, the concept of “Rassenstaat” and the pursuit of finding a way to justify it scientifically. The discovery of the Deoxyribonucleic acid had beecome a milestone in not only biological sciences, but the development of humanity itself – „Eugenics”, which previously had been treated as a semi or pseudo-science (albeit treated seriously by more than a few) has suddenly gained a hard-science sister. While the claim of just how important DNA was for inheritance of traits would for some time be opposed by “anti-eugenists” who refused the idea of race being anything else than a social construct like nationality, it would gradually enter the mainstream sciences. Germany would naturally be pioneer in this new branch of science, its geneticists earning numerous Nobel prizes in biology. Many of those scientific discoveries would still be objected by both the west and east scientific communities, counter-studies proving faults in research and too many exceptions on the “laws” German geneticists laid down for them to be treated as “laws”. Yet the fact that genes did carry at least some responsibility for how people were and behaved could no longer be doubted – effectively the question becoming, just how much a human being was determined by his genes, and how much by his environment, as well as if the genetic differences between different peoples were sufficient to treat them as “different races”. The subject was extremely controversial, many western doctors refusing to dabble into it for fear of repercussions of just what their studies may turn out – on the other hand, the massive breakthroughs made by Germany thanks to almost unlimited funding also led to the discoveries of numerous genetic disorders, along with ways of treating them. And while the scientific community would for a long time stick to the axiom of “a person’s characteristics being determined in 50% percent by genes, 50% environment”, the same axiom would not be shared by the population in the same degree. Obvious facts such as different skin colour, that a person’s race could be determined solely by his bones or the fact that the genetic difference between people of different gender were smaller than those of different “race” while no one was questioning the existence of sexes made many people accept the existence of “races” as a simple biological fact – and saw no reason why the rights or obligations of people of different race should not be different as well (“If men and women have separate restrooms and schools, then shouldn’t black and white people have those separate too?). Such “middle class racism”, backed by superficial knowledge of genetics led to “racism-light” being quite widespread in the USA. While not being chauvinistic in the sense of claiming superiority of one race over another, it still was a reason why segregation and separation (in extreme cases even “race protection laws”) did find support among the common population.
Geneticists and anthropologists would commonly find themselves in the trap of answering the question of “what race were those born out of a mix-breed couple?”, or “how to explain the genetic differences between people of the same race?”. These question were meant to discredit the science in the first place. The answer to those questions usually revolved around treating “mix-breeds” as separate races, and by having a relatively narrow definition of race, defined not as very broad groups (White, Black, Yellow, etc.) but as rather narrow ones – Nordic, Germanic, West Slavic, East Slavic, Nipponese, Chinese, West African, East African, etc. These concepts and definitions were widespread in central Europe where “racial awareness” was usually more developed than in the east or the west. But in the west they did not become as popular, specific nations at best being treated as “sub-races”. The necessity of somewhat restricting the intermarriage and mix-breeding, as well as appeal to the general population by giving them a sense of “uniqueness” thanks to their genetic make-up was common in Germany, but not in Western Europe or the Americas, where all legislation on banning interracial couples was terminated a long time ago. Still, the fact that the USA was a multi-racial society with the number of people being “mix-breed” increasing created a necessity of addressing that change with changing the language – such as introducing terms such as “brown race” or “bronze race”. As science wasn’t exactly concrete on where the border between different races where and how to check them, determining ones race was more often than not a matter of self-identification. This in turn provoked instrumental use of certain types of legislation, such as crafty businessmen claiming being “native americans” so as to acquire liquor licenses more easily, refusing to provide any “proof of race” on the basis of there not possibly being any way to prove it. The “Williams v. University of Chicago” case was thus landmark as it required the supreme court to finally give a legal answer on whether race was a scientifically provable fact, or whether it was only declaratory. The burden of the decision had proven too great for the US supreme court to bear though, it’s ruling avoiding a straight answer, but determining the right of states to choose which races/minorities were entitled to benefit from minorities protection laws. Thus it also determined the right of universities to entitle Caucasians to affirmative action provided they were a member of a “minority”. The landmark decision caused a true shock across the country, giving a large loophole to counter affirmative action legislation to virtually any state. While many “anti-segregationist” state refused to make use of the loophole and maintained a policy of providing “recognized race status” to only non-Europeans, plenty of them did.

Scholarship programs for White American of “minority ethnicity” would become common in the American south.
Truly, the problem of racism, both on an institutional and social level, where not solved by increasing amounts of verdicts and legislation, but by much more powerful forces – economy and self-organization. While the USA economy experienced a steady growth from the 40’s onwards, development being slower or faster depending on the period, it did not manage to come very much ahead of the west European countries, despite a larger domestic resource base and lower military spendings. Having to compete for global market, often forcing itself through high tolls and tariffs, the US economy simply couldn’t afford racism to remain competitive. Employers previously employing “only whites” couldn’t afford not replacing their workforce for a coloured one that offered to do the same work for less. This was equally true for blue collar workers such as plumbers, repairing leaky popes in “white suburbs” for less than the local plumber wanted, and large corporations, who when faced with strikes of their workers, were able to quickly contact the organized “black workers unions” to replace the moaning whites. As the USA had consistently maintained a strict immigration policy since the 40’s, purposely to prevent the access of cheap labour into the country that would drive wages down in a time of recovery after the great depression, workers unions remained a very powerful force for a very long time, especially once its privileges were extended during and after Kennedy’s presidency when most US states introduced or reformed their own “Labour Code Books”. Many business owners who opposed this turned what was meant to be a tool against them into something that worked for them – preventing the formation of “multi-racial workers unions” that would encompass people of all races. Since it was politically often difficult to dissolve or act against any workers union due to it having a “ethnic character”, many professions ended up being represented not by one, all-country union, but by many smaller ones, either having their ethnicity or location in common. The communist dream of “workers of the world uniting” never came true in the USA just as it didn’t come true in Europe – whereas in the latter disunity came among national lines, in the USA, it came along ethnic ones.

Signs and labels forbidding certain people from spending money somewhere would gradually become a thing of the past, as businesses couldn’t afford not taking customers money in order to stay competitive.[/

 

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New update from MSZ.

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The war in Portugese Africa was the largest colonial engagement any of the fascist power experienced. Having started in the 60’s, it was also among the longest ones, and the most expensive ones, both in terms of materials and manpower. The war was a significant drain for Portugal, so much it eventually needed to look for aid abroad. Germany had proven to be a willing assistant, joining the fight in 1972 with a few thousand soldiers meant to secure certain strategic plants and transportation routes. But in the next years, its presence increased significantly, effectively taking over a larger part of the fight from the Portuguese. German aid came at a cost though. As military presence increased, so did German administration and pressure on being given more freedom and privileges within the Portuguese colonies. Those were both of military and economic character. Germany demanded for more and more local area control to be transferred to the Germans along with more of its troop presence being allowed. It also took over control of an increasing number of mines and plantations producing goods meant for export to Europe. The basis of the German-Portuguese economic relation was that Portugal extracted resources from its colonies, processed them in its European facilities and further transported these goods to the Reich. Such an organization of labor still left Berlin vulnerable to the fluctuations of the global market of which Portugal was part of in a much greater deal than Germany. As the war waged on, Portugal suffering damages and other areas of the post-colonial world tapped into their own resource pools, the price of Portuguese products rose. For Germany, an intervention in Portugal was meant as means of preventing this downwards spiral from going on and securing Portuguese Africa as a stable pool of cheap resources, keeping both Germany and much of the fascist world financially secure. Export of raw minerals was becoming the only source of hard currency for all fascist states. But as the costs of the intervention turned out to be also high, Germany wanted to compensate itself at Portugal’s expanse. Resources extracted in Angola and Mozambique had their prices artificially lowered for Germany, were transported to areas under stronger German control for processing, or even into Germany itself. Portugal was being cut out as the “middle man” between the colonies and Europe in an increasingly large manner. This translated into severe economic difficulties in Portugal itself. Factory workers, while officially employed, in practice having little no work and being paid less; wages dropping and food prices increasing; Portuguese exports on all levels of industry falling.

German “Delikatessen” store. Tropical fruits like pineapples, peaches, mangos or bananas were in short supply in the German Reich and a rarity – or a sign of good political connections and wealth. Similar problems with lack of supply were common in all of the fascist states, even those in the south like Portugal.

Overall, more and more people started to question the viability and necessity of continuing the war. Portugal seemed to have less and less of a reason to fight it, as its control over the colonies weakened. The war took over an increasingly large part of the country’s budget, reaching 65% by 1980. Second thoughts about the war did not take place even after the death of Salazar in 1970, who was replaced by his friend and co-worker Marcelo Caetano. Caetano was however just a figurehead for the true power in Portugal – the military. The Portuguese generals used the civilian government and administration solely as “experts” and managers for the issue of molding the state into a form where it would best serve the purpose of continuing the war. Portuguese budgets, laws, foreign relations were all rigged for the benefit of the war effort. The ideas of Lusotropicalism remained strong among the veterans and the officers corps, for whom victory in the war was everything. Many even came to believe that the war served a purpose of “battle-hardening” the Portuguese people and its youth, by sending them to combat. Fascist ideology in Portugal sometimes having a local twist according to which “entering into manhood” for teenagers required prior military service in “the defence of the country”. Such a sentiment was very unpopular among both the youth, and many of the veterans of the war who spoke about how pointless and brutal it was. This contrasted state propaganda presenting the war as a glorious matter, veterans as heroes, the deeds done there being done for a greater good. The fanatic Portuguese right-wingers in the military found common ground with the neo-agrarian regime of Germany in such political and ideological manners, even if they disagreed on the questions of race and the overall strategy to be introduced in the colonies. The war grew increasingly controversial in Portugal and the rest of the world, as the amount of atrocities committed there grew. Brutalization of civilians, trophies made from fallen enemies, construction of concentration camps, use of dum-dum ammunition and other types of controversial weaponry made the Portuguese war look more and more “dirty”. But the ruling military remained oblivious to it, as well as the effects the war had on the economic and social situation of the country – the politicians in offices (including Caetano himself) being given posts solely for the purpose of ensuring that the war would be possible to continue, regardless of costs.

German and Portuguese soldier in Angola. Gallows humour would be the most popular one among the military.

But Portugal could not continue the war indefinitely, regardless what measures were introduced. The war has become an enormous strain on public finances and completely dominated all affairs within the country, as well as its foreign policy. The decade of 1970-1980 was a decade of the military increasing its control over every aspect of life of the citizens and the states influence over all parts of the country’s functions. Police control was tightened. Military service for conscripts extended. Businesses were forced to participate in the war effort by either contributing their resources or income to “the cause”. Taxes grew. Even the church found itself under increasingly large pressure to officially support the war – something it has resisted in doing, preferring to stay neutral. The entire state was meant to become subordinated to the military, which began to openly speak about the necessity of waging a “total war” against the anti-colonial forces – called the “marxists” or “socialists” in propaganda, fight against which was a fight for “civilization”. The facade of a civilian government was completely dropped in 1980 when general Kaulza de Arriaga – a veteran of the Bush War – replaced Marcelo Caetano in the position of Prime Minister and introduced direct and official military rule. Military service was further extended, with many people being recalled into service. The rising problem of unemployment was also tackled with military means, the unemployed drafted or employed for various types of menial works in the Mozambique and Angola. The entire Portuguese force in Africa grew from 90 000 in 1970 to 250 000 in 1980 – meaning that almost 3% of Portugal’s population was at the time serving on the front lines.

General Kaulza de Arriaga. De Arriaga was a strong believer in the necessity of “politicizing” the colonial population and culturally assimilating them; participation in the war alongside European soldiers being seen as means to that end. Having Africans and Europeans working and fighting together was meant as a way of raising African national consciousness and directing towards Portugalism.

The influence of military rule in Portugal went beyond large scale mobilization for the war and the militarization of the society. For both Portugal and Germany the war was also an opportunity to test out new tactics and equipment. The generals in both Lisbon and Berlin were quite eager to allow new weaponry being “field tested” in Angola and Mozambique. These went from new and modernized personal rifles, such as the G3 and G4 series of battle rifles replacing the older Stg assault rifles series. The war in Africa had proven the well-known flaw of German military equipment being over-engineered, specialized and too delicate for battlefield conditions, especially in a situation where replacements and repairs were not easily available. Thus the conflict helped immensely in resolving these issues. Similar situations happened with German tanks, artillery and aircraft. When introduced to an environment where re-supplies were not as hasty as in Europe and demand for them was high, the engineering flaws were exposed. Without constant and proper maintenance, or when used by insufficiently trained personnel, German equipment would quickly suffer a drop in performance. Thus much of the German military in the 70’s and 80’s would undergo a large degree of “optimization”. This was noted by both the western powers and the USSR at that time, both of the blocs actually coming to the conclusion that German war-capabilities actually grew in the period when it was bogged down in Africa.

Angolan child-soldier with a captured G3 rifle. Many new technologies lost on the African battlefield would be used by the anti-colonial forces or shipped to either the communist or western states for research and reverse-engineering.

Also, completely new types of weapons were used. The Bush War saw the first field use of GNS technology (Globales Navigationssatellitensystem) by Germany for the purpose of precise navigation. The works on a satellite system for providing location and time information in all weather conditions over an area were pioneered in Germany already in the 50’s thanks to the works of Friedwardt Winterberg, and put to practice in the 70’s with the GNS satellite system beginning to be placed in orbit. Jungle warfare brought back the infamous German Chemical Corps into work for the purpose of producing chemical agents meant to “thin out” the jungle by killing vegetation. Overuse of such chemicals led to periods of famine in Africa, and was deemed the reason for a spike in birth defects among the African population. The war was responsible for new advances and tactics being developed in the field of helicopters, both light recon ones produced by Portugal and heave assault ones made by Germany and Poland. War correspondents, local peoples, veterans and “leaks” would also speak of incidental use of various other types of experimental weapons, such as white phosphorus and thermobaric explosives. Stories were even told of Germany using completely fantastic weapons like “brown noise”, panic-inducing gases, blindness-inducing lasers or chemically augmented “super soldiers”.

The sheer massiveness of the undertaking, the brutality of the means employed in Africa and German has however had a noticeable effect on the war’s conduct. The communist forces were being continuously supported by the USSR, China and Central Africa in their fight, and nominally their numbers grew. But in reality the way the war was conducted meant much less of actual fighting, and more of “remaining under arms awaiting further orders”. After a decade of combat, the fascists forces actually did manage to suppress most of the insurgent activities in most of Angola and Mozambique, most of the heavy-duty fighting taking place further to the interior of the continent. However, “suppressed” did not mean “defeated” or “out of the war”. Attacks and raids still took place at any moment the presence of governmental forces weakened or once they withdrew from an area. These type of attacks were more opportunistic than driven by ideology. Many guns were hidden away by villagers and tribes in hidden caches, to be dug up when at opportunity for using them came. What made the war so terrible was the situation these people found themselves, placed between a hammer and an anvil. Whereas the governmental forces would brutally punish even just the possession of firearms, the communists would punish the same peoples for a lack of them; communist propaganda operating on a “if not with us, then against us” principle. Those not fighting the Portuguese (and a lack of weaponry indicating that) being assumed collaborators. The fact that the anti-colonial guerillas reasonably expected the general population to have free access to vast quantities of weaponry also spoke volumes of the amount of foreign support that the communists were receiving from abroad. The USSR and China both sent in massive shipments of weapons to the Central African Republic, along with organizing training camps there, providing technical assistance, even going so far as “official” R&R facilities being built for the veterans of the anti-colonial war – these often being repurposed buildings, hotels, offices from the British era. The UK and the East African Federation were also semi-willing participants of the anti-colonial struggle. Whereas the UK’s approach was mostly of cautiousness and staying away from the war, not preventing the Communists and Fascists from fighting each other, East Africa has shown a larger degree of solidarity with their “African brothers” and constantly tried to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict, looking towards the UK as an aid.


The guerilla tactics employed by the Africans went down to large offensives being prepared in the safety of Central Africa and the fringes of the Portuguese colonial space, carried out every year or two. During these offensives, captured areas would have the inhabitants drafted into the communist forces as “reinforcements”, and a scorched earth strategy taking place. The idea was to avoid open battles, which the Africans usually lost due to superior European firepower, but to provoke the colonial forces into counter-offensives directed towards the African interior. There the anti-colonial forces could use the environment to their advantage and bleed the advancing Europeans out. The war has thus reached a situation where it was in a “dynamic equilibrium” – both sides having their own offensives both of which were “successful”, and neither of which were able to achieve a decisive victory. But these large scale offensives by the anti-colonial forces, while military failures, were still propaganda successes. They proved that not only was Portugal not in control over its own territory (even though actual combat operations took place on just a fraction of the colonial territory), but that the strength of the rebels was great enough for such large operations to take place. The military effort of Portugal and Germany managed to stabilize the situation in Angola and Mozambique and suppress the anti-colonial forces, but not destroy them. It was a delicate balance maintaining which required constant military action and led to casualties. With time, it was Germany doing an large part of the action required, Portugal being reduced to cannon fodder and doing damaged control. German reckless use of firepower and brutality as well as its racist ideology permanently destroying many of the alliances with local tribes the Portuguese worked hard to cultivate and maintain.

Portuguese children in Angola. Education was seen as one way of gaining allies among the native population. The Portuguese much more relaxed attitude towards racial issues made them much more successful in this than the Germans.

The intensification of the conflict since 1980, with the declaration of “total war”, brought the Portuguese people to a breaking point. War was waged for almost two decades already with no sign of an end. Portuguese casualties alone numbered in thousands, more perishing every year. The war claimed the lives of tens of thousands Africans as well. Morale in the army was low, and the popularity of the war also fell to rock bottom levels. But the sacrifices made in the name of winning the conflict also seemed to somewhat pay off. Though soldiers were dying, most of the coastal areas of the colonies were deemed safe to live; checkpoints, patrols, invigilation, expulsion and all types of other measures being rewarded with peace. Raids on convoys and plants in the interior were the main problem, though a manageable one provided sufficient manpower. The costs in life of the indigenous population were massive though; as estimated 75.000 being killed by 1980. So when in 1980 the military demanded additional contribution, it was in order to both preserve the status quo which wasn’t (militarily speaking) terrible, and to potentially better it by moving the “safe areas” further into the interior, rooting out all possible insurgents in a stable, gradual manner. But much of the low and mid-ranking military personnel still resented the changes, which went down to longer period of staying in colonies, more time spent in the field, more danger of losing lives and more casualties. The war was no longer seen as glorious, or worth fighting for, especially since there was no longer anything more to fight over. With decolonization hitting Europe, it was in Portugal too that ideas of ending the war by some compromise were born. But there was little tolerance for thoughts like that being expressed openly. The frustration over the war not getting nearer to victory would also increase the number of radicals who advocated full-scale ethnic cleansing of Mozambique and Angola, shipping off the population to the border of the Central African Republic. Calls like that were especially popular among the Germans, who saw the indigenous population as an obstacle to “securing” the “resource pool” Africa was. Such radical statements were however toned down by most of the Portuguese who did not follow extremely racist philosophies, and knew that the rebellion was being fought by the minority, sponsored from the outside – most of the local Africans being perfectly acceptable for the Portuguese, even intended for assimilation and co-participation in state affairs. In fact, for the general idea of the war being an “anti-communist war” waged in the name of protecting the “Angolan and Mozambiquean people” was quite popular among the black soldiers. The Bush War was also a very powerful catalyst for the development of local nationalisms in Angola and Mozambique, as well as the larger “Black Nationalism” movement.

But the people were not willing to go through with it. The war was already deemed completely pointless despite all the state propaganda about it. By the mid 80’s the damages caused by the war were too great to make the colonies profitable. Total production in them in 1985 amounted to only 40% of the production in 1960. What little was being made and exported was mostly taken by Germany as a form of “compensation” or used to pay off debts and costs of the war. No profits were made from them. Portugal had to resort to buying the products it usually gathered from Africa on the global market, proving a point about the unviability of colonial empires in a globalized world that was emerging. Oil, titanium, rubber, bauxites, gems, tropical fruits were all by that time available in countries outside any “blocs”, and the industrialization of much of the colonial world ensured a stability in production and lower prices. On the other hands, the territories still under fascist colonial rule fared much worse. Both Angola and Mozambique suffered from a massive exodus of the population, mostly to Central Africa and South Africa, as well as Brazil, which at the time was undergoing an economic boom. Metropolitan Portugal experienced a new social phenomena known as “non-employment” – a situation where nominally employed people would de facto not work at all due to lack of anything to work in factories. This would often take the form of work contracts being a quarter-time or a fifth-time, with wages being proportionally lowered. Students would purposely fail exams to extend their stay at universities to avoid military service. Unemployed people would not register themselves fearing the same. The black market in Portugal would grow immensely, as would crime and also prices. In 1984 the complete failure of the Portuguese economy was marked when rationing of dairy products was introduced, the first time regular food products would fall under such limitations. Rationing of petroleum products was introduced already earlier, and many governmental projects were put on hold due to war necessities – like communal housing construction or automobiles, for which people in the millions would save their money on in state-owned banks promised to receive them in a few years – that time being constantly postponed.

Grand Hotel in Mozambique, at the beginning of the war and later. The collapse of infrastructure was very visible, bringing these countries decades back in development.

1985 was the turning point. War weariness, low wages, unpopularity of the regime – those were all cases that led to the anti-fascist movement gaining momentum. After a harsh winter of 1984-1985, food prices once again were announced to go up. Apart from winter, the reason was also state mismanagement, as the military junta would routinely replace specialists in governmental administration with soldiers who had no knowledge on the functioning of civilian administration and the agencies they were working for. And to cope with the expected problem of people being without work or food to buy, yet another round of conscription was announced, this time also aiming towards the students still studying in universities and workers employed on contracts. This caused a huge backlash as the angered population went to the streets of Lisbon demanding a to revoke this new plan. Anti-governmental student organization, workers organizations, “unemployed associations” and veterans of the Bush War had already had their own structures operating for years, and though state crackdowns led to many being broken, many would also survive. On March 15th 1985 a great demonstration was announced to take place in Lisbon, information about spreading through fliers, illegal posters, gossip and other means. The anti-governmental sentiment was present not only among the civilian population, but the military as well, especially the young officers, many of whom were veterans of the Bush War. When information about the expected demonstration reached the military, and were confirmed by intelligence that it would in fact take place, the junta took preventive measures. The COPCON formation, a special unit created in the 1976 by the military for the purpose of securing the Portuguese metropolis in case of domestic instability, was ordered to arrive in the capital to disperse the expected crowd before gathering. Commanded by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, it grew significantly in autonomy since it’s foundation from the Lisbon Military Command, of which it was originally a part of. The necessity of having a formation more detached from the General Staff and more prepared for the task of seizing control over the country in case of emergency (such as taking railroad junctions, water distribution, power plants, etc. and being able to operate them) while loyal to the government itself, dawned on the junta in 1980 when together with claiming official full power, it also became increasingly paranoid. And that paranoia was not baseless, as in fact the Portuguese junta had many who were opposed to it– including Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho himself.

General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, the commander of COPCON and the initiator of the March 15 coup.

Carvalho managed to splendidly manipulate the events that brought the downfall of the Portuguese military junta. Surrounding the city early in the morning of March 15th 1985, he only brought token forces into the city with a few tanks, placing them near the governmental buildings. As expected, the anti-governmental manifestations started before noon and gathered a remarkably large crowd, while at the same time staying very peaceful. When the nervous military demanded for Carvalho to give the order to disperse the crowd, he did the opposite. General Prime Minister de Arriaga and his entire cabinet was arrested on the same day, forced into officially surrendering power to Carvalho, who was immediately declared Prime Minister. Opting for cooperation with the anti-fascists forces, he himself being secretly a member of left-wing organizations within the military, his new cabinet encompassed the leaders of the various anti-fascist groups, and proclaimed the organization of a new cabinet, later promising free parliamentary and presidential elections.

The popular demonstration in Lisbon that provoked the March 15 coup. The speed of the events completely surprised the democratic opposition that was unprepared for what happened, but which managed to rise to the challenge when the opportunity for introducing democratic reforms presented itself.

This event would go down as the March 15 Coup, and would not only be the first step in the democratization of Portugal, but remarkably also start the entire “Summer of Nations” of 1985. That Carvalho was not a true democrat at heart hardly mattered in the long term. In fact, what exactly were Carvalho’s motivations in the coup would be a matter of intense debates. Though eventually he would claim that his intentions were always to abolish the dictatorship and restore democracy, his actual action in the first months of his rule spoke differently. Most of those close to him at the time considered his actions as attempts to seize power in the state for himself while using the anti-war sentiment to gain popularity. At the time he obstructed the works of the democratic opposition and worked towards maintaining military administration and military rule. He would also allow for many of the high-ranking junta members and military officers to escape the country, something he would be very criticized for. Many of these escapees carried with them personal wealth or would be pursued for crimes against the Portuguese people, as well as war crimes in Angola and Mozambique. Carvalho’s personal rule lasted briefly, first weakened by the parliamentary elections that led to a massive victory of the Socialist Union – a coalition of the Socialists and Social Democrats, also allied with the young officers movements with which Carvalho was associated with. But the newly elected officials had no wish to collaborate with him and worked towards removing him from the position of Prime Minister. Carvalho attempted to save himself by running in the presidential elections the same year. With Americo Tomas stepping down, who held the position since 1958, Carvalho entered the elections, but lost significantly to Antonio de Almeida Santos, a known anti-colonial activist and a lawyer opposed to the junta who protected many political dissidents in court. Portugal would remain in turmoil through the next months, as the new powers pushed for a hasty withdrawal from Africa and from the various fascist international organization (including the Anti-Comintern Pact) as well as purging the military administration. The latter has proven remarkably easy, as it mostly required only the restoration of the order of affairs from pre-junta times, while the soldiers carrying out administration duties being sacked, or even dismissed from military service. This rough way of ending the rule of the junta using decisive moves were possible thanks to the loyalties of some parts of the military (particularly the left-wingers) and a great deal of popular support for the radical changes. It culminated in a attempted coup by the remnants of the pro-junta establishments on December 24th – an event known as the “Christmas coup” when Portuguese Army units of the radical right assaulted the city, joined by veterans and the recently removed military personnel. This was an attempt at holding a kind of “march on Lisbon”, but failed as the regular army units opened fire on the coupists, killing twelve of them.

Members of the march on Lisbon during the Christmas Coup. The military counter-coup was ill-prepared and carried out by mostly desperate people who hoped the elements of the military would back them. As it turned out, most of the military preferred to stay loyal to the new management.

Thus fascism would end in Portugal, the military regime being toppled by the dissatisfied elements of the army, who in turn were incapable of rallying the people behind themselves and had to give up power to the popular pro-democratic, reformist sentiments. The aftershocks of Portugal hit southern Europe hard, but Angola and Mozambique even harder. Unlike the western colonial empires which when withdrawing from colonies did so in a gradual, controlled manner, Portuguese withdrawal was hasty and with little preparation. It did help that at the time morale was so low most soldiers were more than eager to sell their guns just for the opportunity to take a ship back home. The withdrawal also meant leaving Angola and Mozambique completely in the hands of Germany which did not want to withdraw, even when faced with straightforward demands by the new government in Lisbon. The Portuguese-German crisis led eventually to a ridiculous situation where Portugal recognized the independence of Angola and Mozambique in November 1975 (when the last of the Portuguese administration was were leaving Angola) but Germany did not. Berlin would try and muddle the issue arguing that Portuguese withdrawal meant a transfer of territory to Germany which was now in legal possession of these territories. But such argumentation was completely ignored, as both Angola and Mozambique gained international recognition, being treated as “countries under occupation”. The Bush War would thus enter its next phase, one where Germany was in full possession and control of its “new” colonies, and had to increase its involvement even further to make up for the withdrawing Portuguese soldiers.

General Siegfried Muller in Angola. Without the Portuguese to act as a moderating presence, the German Nazis became free in carrying out its plans for Africa.

The Guerra Colonial would thus not be lost by Portugal on the battlefield, but due to war weariness and a governmental coup. Even in the few months after the March 15 coup and the final withdrawal of Portuguese soldiers from Angola and Mozambique Portuguese soldiers were still capable of fighting, albeit with visibly reduced morale. Their withdrawal was also perfectly organized and ordered, if hasty. It also did not mean an end to the Portuguese colonial empire altogether. Portugal still held onto Macau, Guinea and East Timor, where the anti-colonial guerillas were defeated without the need of German assistance, and where Portugal was able to preserve control. Such an outcome created a fertile ground for apologists who spoke about a “stab in the back” myth, according to which Portugal was perfectly able to win the war if it was given “just a few more years”. Blame was also placed on the Germans who undermined Portuguese strategy of “divide and conquer”, using tribal tensions to bring locals against each other. The members of the junta would be universally stripped of power and banned from participating in politics, many facing trials for their actions (and many choosing escape and exile). But at the same time, Portugal refused to give up any people to stand trials for alleged war crimes. Crimes which were undeniably committed, but for which Portugal denied responsibility. This would be a somewhat sour point in the relations between Portugal and the “independent” states of Angola and Mozambique, and by extension – the other countries of black Africa. But it was also important that ultimately Portugal did not shed all responsibility for its conduct. As soldiers withdrew, many civilians and local Africans were given the opportunity to leave for Portugal with them, Lisbon knowing well there being no future in Africa for them without the Portuguese. Portugal was open to giving these people Portuguese citizenship, as well as accepting more people coming from there in future years. Portugal was also active in the League of Nations in the issue of recognizing Angola and Mozambique – as their recognition was still limited. Their governments in exile were both located in the Central African Republic and were both unrecognized by Germany, which also claimed that with Portuguese withdrawal, these colonial areas became “terra nulla” and as such, were legally annexed by Germany. Portugal contested that claim and was an important player in giving legitimacy to the Marxists governments of these two countries, producing a situation where most of the world saw Germany as an occupational power, occupying countries that even their former owner recognized as independent. Germany was thus fast becoming the main ideological and political enemy of African anti-colonial forces, attracting the attention of the veterans of other anti-colonial coflicts.

 

[Historyman 14]

This is one of the best timelines i seen.

 

[machine3589]

New update from MSZ.

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Spain was among the first countries to undergo a fascist revolution. In its case, it was both a result and a cause of the clash between the socialists and the broadly understood “left wing” on one side, and the nationalists and the broadly understood “right-wing”. The Spanish Civil War was one of the worst conflicts in Europe after the Great War. The victory of the nationalists brought the Spanish fascists to power under the leadership of Francisco Franco. Franco introduced Spain’s own variation of fascism and followed a strong anti-communist and anti-liberal agenda. This naturally caused it to gravitate towards the fascist bloc and Germany in the 40’s, joining the anti-Comintern pact, Berlin Pact and OMEWZE. The 40’s were overall a period of a strong pro-German sentiment rising in Spain. The country enjoyed a large economic boom in between 39-45, a result of post-war reconstruction. Even after that it experienced moderate growth, thanks both to an increase in trade with Germany, and carefully playing with France and the UK to get the most possible from them – his offers to London and Paris being simply not going along with some German plans, even if he wouldn’t do it otherwise. Franco initially pursued a policy of autarky, later amended by joining together with the central European states, opting for the “German” variation of autarky – to be achieved by the fascist states as a bloc rather than by individual nation-states. This policy had saved Spain from what many predicted would otherwise be a stagnation after the initial reconstruction effort. Spain was still a mostly rural state with an agrarian-industrial economy and devastated infrastructure at the time, but still fared relatively in well. More surprisingly, the reconstruction effort had actually made the impression of people’s situation getting better than the country’s. Spain imported a great deal of goods and materials from the fascist states of central Europe, receiving much on credit or even for free. This went from basic foodstuffs for feeding the population – rationing being revoked already in 1945 as Spain’s agricultural output rose to a level it no longer needed such means – through textiles, chemicals, home appliances, military products to industrial heavy machinery. For these, Spain paid in favors such as free transit of ships along the Spanish Moroccan coast, bonds, agreeing to stronger integration with Axis political institutions or bartering back whatever things it currently had. While this led to the country ending up in heavy debts towards Germany, it also led to the regime getting substantial popular support. Spanish families would find a large number of things with German brands in their houses, being either payment for their work in state-owned industries or being bought for affordable price from full store shelves. German cars and buses would appear more frequently on Spanish streets. The Spanish army would be re-armed and re-supplied with German weaponry. For Germany, this was mostly a way to rescue itself from the tough economic situation it was in due to reckless spending in the 30’s, but incidentally, it also became a great PR boon, making the Spanish population genuinely grateful for the Germans aid and support during the war. But it also had a downside, as this pro-German sentiment had also made the west very suspicious of Spain and Franco, and what he was planning.

The 1948 Mercedes-Benz OP 3750 bus would be the standard model on which Spanish public transportation in cities and between cities would be reconstructed.

This PR effect was more powerful than either Madrid or Berlin intended. In fact, Spain was perceived as being far more in league with the Axis Powers than it really was, or wanted to be. Franco did not see Spain’s future as a German lapdog or as a blind follower, but as a powerful independent state that would make its own path. Problem was, France and Britain were highly distrustful of Spain after this surge of Germanophilia. When Spain was willing to make friendly moves towards the west, the west saw them as insufficient; when Spain did not go along with Germany with some of its plans or even acted against it, London and Paris treated it as incidents rather than a change in policy. And since Franco made it a point of honor not to fold to socialist or western demands, when the western powers went into disagreement with Spain, it rarely gave in. The conflict with the UK over Gibraltar did not help matters, nor the conflict with Paris over the Basque and Morocco issue. Gibraltar was a hotspot for the entire duration of the Cold War, before it and after it. It was also an extremely important geostrategic point for both Germany and Italy, both of which were supportive of Spanish demands to “decolonize the Rock”. Expelling the British from there and leaving Spain in control of the Gibraltar Strait would mean closing the gate to the Mediterranean for the UK, allowing Italy to dominate it and forcing the west to have to go all the way around Africa to make use of its colonial holdings, including Middle Eastern oil. The strategic advantage of that was obvious for the axis, who often rekindled the British-Spanish conflict to prevent any form of agreement. Additionally, strong moves were made to make use of Spanish soil to prevent the free flow of goods through the strait even if Spain would stay out of a anti-British war. This included straightforward Italian offers to purchase Spanish Morocco in the 50’s and 60’s, which Spain refused along with all others made by Germany and Italy on selling other parts of its colonial empire. On other occasions, talks were made regarding the right to station German troops in Spain along the Spanish-French border, and the possibility of offensive operations made by Spain against not only the UK, but France as well, in case of a second great war. Spanish participation in the Berlin pact also meant taking part in some of the joint maneuvers, some even taking place in Spain itself – such as in 1950 when the axis states mountain infantry training took place in the Pyrenees soon after the signing of the Berlin Pact treaty. France objected to this type of “diplomacy”, but even after Franco refused to allow Germany to permanently station its troops in Spain, Paris remained scared of the possibility. Especially since Spain did not ever excluded the option of allowing for “deeper military cooperation” in case war actually broke out. This was Franco’s diplomacy in a nutshell – keeping close to the fascist states, but not too close and not engaging in activity that would directly threaten the west, though not hesitating in making potentially threatening moves for the show.

The Spanish-Gibraltar border. Franco would order it closed soon after the end of the Civil War, and it would remain so for decades.

The Francoist system in Spain was characterized by a very weak position of the Cortes Espanolas, the Spanish Parliament, the National Movement and the state bureaucracy compared to the power of generalissimo Franco. In most fascist states the Party would come to play a dominant role in state affairs, usually by having a very strong control over state administration and enterprises, and would eventually grow to be powerful enough to influence the “Leader”. Spain was an aversion of that. Franco had envisioned that in no way would the “opportunists and bureaucrats” be able to meddle with the policies he wanted to introduce. But at the same time he lacked the will to introduce a full totalitarian system and tolerated low-level decision making in areas where he hadn’t imposed his own will, often even accepting certain facti accompli presented to him. Franco’s greatest fear was a repeat of the civil war, whether during his times or after them. And he saw a weak administration, one incapable of making moves that would be divisive or capable of having the influence necessary to start a war as the best guarantee. All hard and controversial decisions were meant to be made by him or his closest associates. As he was the one with power, that was meant to ensure order with there never being any doubt in anyone about where real power lied.

Francesco Franco and Benito Mussolini. Franco eagerly portrayed himself with other fascist leaders such as Mussolini or Goring to increase his prestige and present himself and his country as “equals” to other fascist powers.

In practice, this translated into Spain being an extremely centralized state even by fascist standards. The Cortes Espanolas was mostly an institution of mere prestige without power, at best an advisory body. Franco preferred to trust the councel of his advisors and specilaists and ruled by decree. Thus even the legislation created by the Spanish parliament and presented to Franco just sign had no guarantee of coming to force. Franco played a “divide and conquer” political game on a massive scale, his rule being one that kept everyone down while he tried to balance the onf;uence of the numerous faction that did form. Whis usually took the form of constant personal changes and relocations of officials, both by post and territory. He would instrumentally threw his Francist opportunists at “ideological deviants” to reduce any power they had, and subsequently removed them from power giving up this “freed” area of influence to others. All this while ruthlessly eliminating any opposition. Franco avoided giving full power to any one faction – including his own, the so called “Francists”, so as to prevent any coalition against it from forming and thus keeping the state together. He was well aware of the divisions plaguing Spain, both political and ethnical – and avoiding the backlash that the domination of one of them would bring his motivation had become.

Spain faced significant economic difficulties at the start of its fascist period though it managed o overcome them. The country was wrecked in the aftermath of the civil war, which also served as the reason for its extremely fat growth after it. Reconstruction motivated the masses to work, and a great deal of aid went to Spain from other fascist states. Through the years of 1945-1965 economic growth wasn’t as rapid, but still fair, estimated at around 4% annually. This would be significant enough for Spain to be presented as a role model for fascist development and proof of the viability and success of the system. Largely this was thanks to intense trade and collaboration with central Europe, as apart from that Spain’s trade relation with the rest of the world were largely severed. Spain had undergone a civilizational great step forward, transforming from an agricultural-industrial economy to a fully industrial one in just two decades. The period had been a time when Spain developed a serious middle class coming much closer to the European average in wealth. The abundance of consumer goods made the effects of this development realistically felt by the population. Spain’s urbanization degree grew in this time up to 65% by 1965. Whereas in in 1939 less than 10% of the population had access to appliances such as TVs and refrigerators, by 1965 the percentage grew to over 70%. Spain was completely electrified. Analphabetism was ended. Industry employed more than 75% of the working population and great industrial facilities were constructed in this time, such as the steel mills in Asturia, making Spain one of the largest steel producers in Europe. This prosperity was also what had allowed for the Francoists to rule safely, economic development being accepted by the population as a reward for centralization, bureaucratization and lack of political freedoms.

Asturian steel mills. Like all fascist states, Spain would use public works programs to build large industrial facilities meant to employ the population and generate the materials needed for further infrastructural and industrial development.

But prosperity did not mean unity and singlemindedness. Not all those who sided with the nationalists in the civil war liked the course the country was taking. The Francoist movement attracted plenty of opportunists, who contrasted with the many ideologically driven “veterans”. Numerous factions within the regime appeared with different agendas. Apart from the generic Francoists, there were also the Integralists, Clericofascists, even Spanish National Socialists and others. On the non-radical end of the spectrum were the more common monarchists and conservatives, though these mostly sided with the Francoists. These various groups fought for power within the state structures as well as locally on certain territories. Thus for example the Integralists, with their strong emphasis on agricultural-industrial cooperatives, have come to take over control over the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, overwatched over the reconstruction of agriculture in the post-war period and was behind the Spanish land reform. It also initiated the “land reclamation” projects in Spain, typical of the fascist states, aimed at settling the unused land in the Spanish interior via infrastructural works and forced relocations. Since after the war over a million Spaniards were left without homes, the idea of using them for farm work on previously unused land in order to increase production and eventually achieve autarky made sense to the fascists. Like Italy, this also included North Africa. In Spanish Morocco, Italian expertise was widely used for desert irrigation projects, employing both the native population and Spaniards brought from the metropolis. Spain managed even to avoid the Italian mistake of concentrating on the production of domestically consumed and easily produced foodstuffs like rye and potatoes, and actually made the effort for its production to be coordinated with central European demand. Vegetables and fruits requiring a warmer climate were made instead, adding a variety to the diets of the people in central Europe, as well as satisfying Spanish demand. Since farmers in Spain actually felt the improvement coming from the export of their products and various protectionist practices, the rural population (also being quite conservative and catholic at heart) had come to be one of the larger groups supporting the regime, on which Franco could rely.

Spanish oranges would be a great hit in Germany where for quite some time they were considered luxurious things; Spanish production making them much more common

But the most powerful formation, second only to the Francoists, were the Spanish National Socialists. Their power was derived mostly from their strong presence in the military, making their removal often difficult without having to resort to purges – something Franco was hesitant to do. Their radical nationalist chauvinism was found attractive among many Castilian Spaniards, those who eagerly supported the assimilation of all Spaniards into a single identity, those who opposed any minorities and the strongest anti-communists. They became a major presence in the Basque country, which had also become a bastion of their power, despite the Spaniards being a minority there. These National Socialists were involved in suppressing any Basque political activity and culture. Resorting to vigilantism or downright terror tactics took place. While officially the authorities forbade such actions, in reality little punishment came. More often the National Socialists had a blind eye put on their actions, much of the police and administration appreciating the effort of the NS in “keeping peace” – an euphemism for beating up Basque intelligentsia or shooting down members of ETA. The military would help in covering up such attacks, providing alibis to soldiers attacking Basques, and it not being unusual for these soldiers to even act under orders, their targets chosen by intelligence officers who wanted to avoid long and tedious investigations. The radicalism of the NS paid off for Spain though in some ways, as ETA was forces to move much of its activities north to France. There in turn it ended up allying itself with Marxist domestic terrorist groups. This in turn had been used by Spain to further justfy its doings – the Basque “fight for freedom” being presented as a communist revolution that Spain had to prevent.

Militarism would be as strong in Spain as in other countries, strengthened by the factor of the Spanish fascist having taken power thanks to a war.

It went without saying that the Spanish NS were also the most pro-German faction as well as the most pro-expansionist ones. Their influence in the military partly translated into Spanish foreign policy towards the west. Ambitions such as annexing all of Morocco and more of western Africa in case of war with France, annexing Gibraltar and various islands in the Atlantic in case of war with the UK and even annexing Cuba and the Philippines in case of war with the USA were al ideas not uncommonly thrown around in that environment. Franco paid them little attention, not being interested in territorial acquisitions. He was more concerned about keeping the Spanish colonial empire together when faced with the tide of anti-colonial tendencies. At this Spain was remarkably successful. Western Sahara was very sparsely populated and did not allow for any migration to it, keeping it as mostly empty (and useless) space. Morocco was more problematic though. Spain fought hard to prevent it from descending into an Algeria-like situation and succeeded only thanks to ruthless brute force. Cooperation with France was tough though, as both were mostly interested in pushing the problem of rebelling Muslims onto the other rather than trying to solve it together. Spain recognized the futility of trying to fully assimilate Morocco into Spain early on (apart from the National Socialists who casually spoke of the possibility of ethnic cleansing, moving the non-Spanish population of Spanish Morocco to either French Morocco or western Sahara) and engaged only in small-scale settler colonization in a few exclaves on the coast. Settlement there was restricted, as was entering and leaving it. Those settlement were also the ones placed under the regular Spanish legal regime. The rest of Morocco was placed under military administration until 1968, when it was officially incorporated into Spain as an “autonomous” province. Realistically though little changed. Morocco was still used as a prison-area to which criminals were sent. This included political criminals who were sent to Morocco into “internal exile”. This was yet another example of a “middle ground” having to be found between the NS radicals and the regular Spanish conservatives, as the first were quite willing to execute them, the latter being fine with regular prison. Similarly, the Francoist regime introduced the punishment of “exile” for common criminals in Morocco, those being forced out to either French Morocco and Algeria – much to France’s frustration” – or to Western Sahara. Such policies had certain unforced consequences, among them Morocco becoming another bastion of Spanish NS thanks to the military presence there and the uncomfortable position of the Spaniards there, surrounded by the Muslims and the French – but at the same time being the place of residence of a large number of the Spanish political dissidents and free-thinkers. Spanish Morocco would be the source of much anti-regime work, help in that coming also from the Catholic Church which played a double game there. At one hand, it insisted on being allowed strong presence there for the purpose of “spreading the faith” in Maghreb (something the Vatican would often be condemned for, along with its general friendly relation with Franco), but at the same time served to protect the political oppositionists there, smuggling information in out from them, their works, writings and such. Most of the anti-fascists in Spain would able to say that they spent at least some time in Morocco in one of the closed exclave cities – where the people would be both of the kind to hate them, and honestly support them, hating the NS administration instead.

Casa de los Dragones in Ceuta. The building would be used as the central office of the falangist movement in Spain and the National Socialists in particular. Eclecticism would be a common style of Francoist-era architecture.

Spain perceived itself as a natural “bridge” between fascist central Europe and South America. On the other side of the Atlantic it was a strong advocate of fascism and Catholicism. But it’s lack of real strength, hard and soft power alike, reduced its effectiveness and influence to mostly symbolic matters . Spain could not compare to Germany or even Italy when it came to offering actual aid and support. Thus its presence there gave it little benefit, but many enemies. Many in South and Latin America still disliked Spain, seeing it as the former “colonial oppressor”. Its fascist system multiplied that sentiment among the communists and anti-fascists. But the USA was not happy about it either and Spain took up a disproportionately large role in the USA public mind as a “villain state”. It’s historic presence in South and Latin America was often vilified and blackwashed , while the Spanish-American War of 1898 glorified. This was part of America’s larger self-imposed role as the “protector” of the Americas from all foreign presence, which included the fascists of Europe. The Spanish Empire was often being depicted as a “proto-fascist” state, much like the Kingdom Of Prussia and the German Empire were depicted as “proto-Nazi” countries. Eventually even Germany stopped bothering itlsef with and began dealing with South America independently without much concern about what Madrid thought. Spain and Germany never developed the same “gentlemen agreement” towards South America as Germany and Italy towards the Mediterranean. With time , time, this soured German-Spanish relations. It was also due to what Berlin saw as an insufficiently supportive position of Madrid during clashes with the west, as well as the time having come for Spain to repay its debts and receiving less aid and preferential treatment. The German-Spanish honeymoon ended not due to any particular event, but because of a general change in relations within the Axis bloc. As Germany became more willing to resort to force in the late Goring-era, those who weren’t threatened by it directly readjusted their policies. And Spain was among them. During the détente era Spain had shifted its allegiance much towards Italy and Poland as part of the bloc wanting to stem German influence within the Axis bloc. Cooperation with Italy also went in the direction of establishing a common foreign policy in the Mediterranean . But this change in approach in no way made Spain “anti-German” – something countries like Poland were sometimes accused of. In fact it was since the 60’s that a new area of German-Spanish relations opened – tourism. Spain had become a much favored destination for German tourists, overcoming Italy in that regard. People from all over Europe would flock to Spanish beaches which offered warm water and climate at reasonable prices. This made Spain a precursor in establishing a “tourism industry”, money from which served to preserve the cultural Germanophilia in Spain, even when the Spanish and German governments did not get along as well as before.

Monumento Nacional de Santa Cruz del Valle de los Caídos in Cuelgamuros valley. Established as a national monument of the victory over communism, it would become an obligatory point for tourist trips from fascist states. Still, it would more often be the beaches of the Mediterranean that would be the most popular destinations.

Increase in tourism was however still just a lousy fig leaf that couldn’t fully cover the growing difficulties Spanish economy experienced. The impressive growth of the 40’s and 50’s slowed down in the 60’s and remained at a rate of 0,5 – 1 %, and even that wasn’t certain as Spanish statistics weren’t very truthful. The reasons for Spanish slowdown were numerous. One was the saturation of the Spanish market with domestic use goods. Growth and wealth was generated in Spain thanks to industrialization and the manufacturing of large quantities of machinery and appliances that quickly found their way to regular households. But after two decades demand for those machines dropped as they became commonplace. Like most fascist states, Spain had a problem with modernizing its industries. This meant that once their manufactured goods became obsolete, the country was left without things it could sell. The black and white televisions that made Spaniards feel that they were getting richer in the 50’s no longer fulfilled that role in the 60’s when color television began appearing in the west – and was mostly unavailable to the Spanish people. What was produced no longer found demand domestically, nor could it be exported. Without preferential treatment from Germany, Spain had to pay to others more for imports. It also found its debt having amounted to such a high level, it stifled further growth. Competition also played a role here. Decolonization and the transfer of manufacturing to post-colonial states, the rise of power centres such as India and Brazil, the introduction of greater economic freedoms in the western world – it all made Spain lose the competition on the free market. And even on the “closed” fascist market, it found itself in a difficult position when having to compete with countries like Poland or Slovakia, where the fascist system was more liberal economically and their industries better at keeping up with technological advances. Once the détente came, between 1965 and 1975 Spain experienced the worst of both worlds, German, France and the UK dealing completely above Spain’s head, global trade and investments avoiding it, Germany looking for more favourable opportunities elsewhere. When most of the fascist states used the opportunity to liberalize and reform to a degree, the stasis Franco created left Spain behind, the prosperity having ended, and the opportunity was missed.

Spain tried to counter the ill effects of Spanish market saturation and outside economic liberalization with Keynesian means. Once the détente began, Franco spearheaded a new economic policy through what was called a “technocratic government”. In his zeal, he reshuffled much of the government and ministries, strongly reducing the power of the integralists and other factions in favor of “rule of specialists” whom Franco backed. Reforms and initiatives proposed by them have not succeeded though. Their calls for massive public spendings into infrastructure generated large debts that the income from the projects could not cover. Opening up even more on food imports had an ill effect on domestic production and the livelihood of Spanish farmers. Offers of employment in the various projects attracted a large part of the rural population, creating an “exodus” of sorts. But the wages from working on those projects ended as soon as they were completed, leaving a lot of people with either the option of return to their farms or staying in cities. This in turn generated a rising unemployment. The “automotive revolution” that was attempted (a campaign meant to provide Spanish families with affordable cars) would also end in a spectacular failure. Investments in auto factories were co-financed by Italy, which already had experience in the establishment of car industries in central-east Europe. But in Spain, Italy was more interested in increasing the sales of its own cars than upping Spanish production. Thus production in Spain was intentionally left at low levels, instead Italian cars being imported, the Spanish factories serving mostly as providers of parts. The few attempts at creating a true automotive industry with its own brand turned out to be too small in scale to satisfy Spanish need and too costly to become massive and growing. Spain’s “automotive revolution” had thus left it with a network of high-speed roads and an increase in Italian cars, but not with an industry to produce them on its own, and the same workers that built those roads were now creating a growing problem of unemployment.

The FIAT 500 K model. Advertised as the “family car” in both Italy and Spain, for many Spanish families it would be the first car ever owned and for decades associated with “Spanish motorization”.

The other significant problem Spain faced was the issue of minorities. While Spain was often perceived as a homogenous nation-state, reality was different. Various minorities inhabited the country, though their actual status as a minority was a subject of dispute. For some very radical Spanish nationalists, “Castilian Spanish” was the only “true” Spanish nationality, other ethnic or language groups expected to be assimilated into it. Other’s considered the various kinds of “Spanishness” as a type of “Haimat”-sentiment, possible to go along with “Great Spanish Vaterland” sentiment. Yet others believed in that all these groups were all “objectively Spanish” yet subjectively they were at different levels of development towards reaching that imagined “All-Spanish” national consciousness.
Those different views were the reason behind the different types of approaches towards the minorities at a time of very strong nationalist feelings growing all over Europe. Assimilation of all Spaniards into a single ethnicity and culture with strongly catholic and conservative culture and values was, in general, the goal. Franco held a strong belief that if Spain was to be treated as a developed and powerful state, it had to act like it both in terms of foreign and domestic affairs. Thus its internal policies had to be like the developed states of the western and central Europe who had already gone past the point of having “non-conscious” nationals of minorities and not like the developing states of the east like Poland or Hungary, whose problems were established in a way to “combat” the issue. Spain pretended that the problem of minorities didn’t concern it – and like Germany and Italy concentrated on creating a centralized homogenous nation-state. This would prove to be a mistake relatively quickly. Not only the Basques but also Catalans, Galicians, Asturians and others resented being treated like Castilians, the assimilation practices and trampling over their own culture and language. The central government was thus seen as oppressive and “imperial” rather than “their own”. Assimilation attempts caused backlash in the form of motivating the minorities into thinking more about themselves. Cultivation of domestic language strengthened, included being used during masses or secretly at schools – headmasters organizing classes along language lines, bishops moving priests to parishes where the gatherings spoke their language. Illegal books detailing the history of the people were printed in re-action to state propaganda at schools. Altogether, the hard assimilation campaign started by Franco failed, and once economic troubles grew, caused backlash. Peoples that considered themselves as just ethnic groups now believed themselves full-fledged nationalities and as such, deserving a right to self-determination. Spain that was meant to become a homogeneous nation-state, became more multi-national before. And with the country entering economic crisis, these people also saw the government in charge as their main enemy, as the one who had “leeched off” their wealth and which no longer had legitimacy.

Nationalisms of the various ethnic groups inhabiting Spain would grow, and those nationalists would be among the first to create common organizations for mutual aid.

In an attempt to maintain the unity of the country and further develop national unity, Franco took steps going beyond the usual propaganda and school/military indoctrination. After the end of the civil war, both in Spain and abroad the country would be called by the fascist fashion as the “State of Spain” – although whether the country was a “state”, a “republic” or something else was ambiguous. Franco himself sometimes went by the title “Regent of Spain”, but sometimes would refrain from the title and be unspecific about his intentions towards the throne, especially in the early years of his rule. Neither was it certain if the present organizational model was meant as a permanent one. Franco would often respond to the accusation of a lack of constitution or other “basic law” with the claim that the country was “in transition” and that a “supreme law” that would determine how it works would come with time – and until then, the “fundamental laws of the realm” having to suffice. But that time didn’t come for a long time, and different powers tried to influence the outcome. Among the fascists and national socialists, “republican” sentiments were strong, and they wanted the official establishment of a “State of Spain” like in other non-monarchist fascist countries. On the other hand, there were plenty of monarchists left in Spain who wanted a restoration of the monarchy in the “Kingdom of Spain”. Franco recognized the symbolic value of the throne around which all people of Spain could rally. He also held a belief that a monarchical system added prestige to the country. His first plot to restore the monarchy took place already in 1947, when Spanish diplomacy suggested the introduction of Wilhelm, the Prince of Prussia, as the new Spanish King. The idea was quickly shot down by the German Nazi government though, which still held a deep suspicion of the former German crown heads and their families and did not want any neo-monarchist sentiment to take any root in the Reich. The French also exclaimed their objections towards it. Another suggestion was made in 1960 to Otto von Habsburg, who previously resided in Spain and was often suggested as a candidate to the throne. But this failed again. Officially, Otto stayed silent on the matter, not making comments until the offer was made official. Unofficially, he did not want fearing, fearing it would hurt his position and that of his family in Hungary (his ascension to the throne coming at the price of renouncing other claims, and him being aware the Hungarians would not appreciate having to “share” a King). Thus both he, and his family members declined the offer. German pressures, and the pressures of the Arrow Cross Party played a role here as well. Yet another claimant to the throne was Juan de Borbon, the son of the late king Alfonso XIII, and the legitimate heir to the throne. He had genuine support among many of the monarchist conservatives, as well as numerous fascists who held the view that Fascist State would not grant any power to any royal figure, thus Juan’s apparent liberalism not being a problem. But Franco still didn’t trust him and opposed the notion of his instatement to the throne.

Eventually, in 1961, Spain officially established itself as a monarchy and the “Kingdom of Spain”, though at the time, still without a specific monarch. That would change in 1969 when Juan Carlos de Bourbon was designated as the new monarch as the “Prince of Spain”, after swearing an oath to the fascist “Movimiento Nacional”. What exactly were Franco’s intentions towards the young monarch was uncertain. The fact that it was Juan Carlos rather than his still living father that got the throne supported the theory that Franco did intend for the prince to take actual power in state affairs as a monarchist dictator, and that he wanted to groom him to that role. On the other hand, most people at the time believed that Franco considered Luis Carrero Blanco as his true successor. Blanco rose to the position of Prime Minister in 1967 and worked towards amassing a lot power for that position. His relation with Juan Carlos was a difficult one – while a monarchist at heart, other than that he was also a radical fascist close to the National Socialists. That the two figures rose to such power at almost the same time created a theory that Franco intended it to be yet another means of maintaining his own personal control over state affairs, or that he actually wanted for the two to fight and see who would come on top, thus proving themselves as leaders. Which it was, would never be found out first hand. Francisco Franco Bahamonde would die in 1975 before any clear division of power between the monarch and the Prime Minister was established. His funeral would be a great event at which all of the fascist leaders of the world gather, paying their respects to one of the few remaining heads of states who had a personal history of fighting communism not in a cold, but a hot war.

The tomb of Francisco Franco Bahamonde. His death was followed by a three-month period of national mourning, and his tomb a common destination of nationalist “pilgrimages”, even from outside Europe.

Franco’s death came at a bad time for Spain. The Cold War was rekindling from 1975. The Spanish economy was experiencing already a decade of miserable growth. The situation in Morocco and other minority-populated areas was getting restless. Unemployment was becoming an increasingly large problem. Illegal workers organizations were covertly start to cooperate with minorities groups and other anti-fascist opposition. This was starting to become an actual “united front” against the Madrid regime. And Franco died without providing a clear successor to his power. This left Spain without a clear leadership facing turmoil. Spain was having a hard time keeping its image on the global stage. Like Italy, a lot of this power was derived from the strength of character and prestige of its “founding father”, and like Italy after Il Duce’s death had to cope with a significant drop in its importance. At the same time, the regime was too having a hard time keeping stability.

Luis Carrero Blanco and Juan Carlos, the two most important characters of the post-Franco period of fascist Spain.

It was hard, as internal opposition in Spain grew. Unemployment brought the rise of illegal workers unions, who resorted to strikes in face of planned employment reduction. Farmers protested against the low buyout prices of their products, as well as the new governmental policies that created a compulsion of at least part of the produced goods being dictated by the government. These “food production” plans were highly unpopular, especially given the few bad years of harvest between 1978 and 1982. Not willing to part with what they made or sell it below price, farmers hoarded food and sold it to city-dwellers at the price they demanded. Alternately, they secured individual deals on exporting their products to bypass state legislation and selling production to the state. This brought Spain to experience higher food prices in general, even shortages of some products at times. This situation reached its worst in 1981 when the “farmers strike” had led to food riots in Barcelona, both being put down by the military. After that apologies were issued and the accused of illegally opening fire brought before a show trial. In 1983 the situation had become so bad that the country fell to martial law lasting 7 months. During that, the opposition was cracked down upon, and sent to Morocco, but later released/ Brutality against Moroccans and Basques increased on one hand, some liberalization in the other parts of the country taking place on the other.

Military police in the streets of Malaga during the 1983 martial law.

This duality and lack of consistence was the direct effect of the duality of the power structure, divided between the King Juan Carlos and the Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco. Blanco was hardliner who supported traditional fascist methods and came closer to the militarists and the National Socialists. The King on the other hand was more conciliatory and found support among the “liberals” – the conservatives, rural population, Christian-democrat Catholics and such. Where the PM would be responsible for the brutal policies and continue the autonomy and lack of responsibility of the army, the King would act as a moderate, being supportive of liberalization and reforms. Problem was, that the King’s liberalism in no way meant support for the oppositions calls and demands. Juan Carlos remained an opponent to any socialist elements and many of the demands of the minorities, raising concern about the requests that jeopardized state unity. Additionally, many older Spaniards weren’t exactly fond of liberalization. The time of 1965 -1975 when it supposedly occurred being the “worse years” compared to the previous two decades and “liberalization” after Franco’s death also not bringing much good. Still, the King had support among the majority of the conservative population and was treated as a “lesser evil” by the socialists and other anti-regime elements. The King’s actions were the ones that protected farmers from persecution during the “farmers strike”, before and after it. He supported the free-market liberalization and the “technocratic government” of the late Franco era. He was an opponent of the martial law in 1983 and instrumental in its ending as well as its relative laxness – imprisonment and exile to Morocco instead of executions and torture. The army itself was divided about who to support, most preferring not to take sides and hide behind “army autonomy”.

In 1980 a French Hispanist named Pierre Michelin published a book on Spain in which he accurately described the political situation in Spain. He identified the 3 power groups in Spain – the PM’s radical fascists, the King’s “liberals” and the disunited but broad workers-minorities opposition. He predicted that the situation could not continue indefinitely and that an alliance of two out of the three would crush the third eventually – either the two sides of the regime coming together and destroying the opposition, the “liberals” and the opposition finding common ground in wanting to overpower the hardliners, introducing some more reforms and gain some more popularity in doing so, or the hardliners joining with the socialist, anti-monarchist elements of the opposition to dethrone the King. Following that, the two remaining group would inevitably start fighting against each other, whoever ending up victorious in that fight taking control of the state. Michelin’s work did not gain popularity, particularly final prediction – that the “liberals” would be try and appeal to at least part of the opposition to get the edge needed in defeating the hardliners, especially in their bastions, hoping to divide the opposition and introducing a small part of it to power. But those hopes being in vain as any significant defeat of the regime and subsequent reforms would mobilize the population to demand even more, leading the regime to collapse. That those predictions were made in 1980 when the cold war was in full swing, made them unbelievable.

But more quickly than expected they began coming true. In 1981 after the farmers strike, the Ceuta Meeting took place, where selected members of the opposition and pro-royal elements of the regime discussed the possibility of reforms and the formers possible participation in the power structure. The meeting had not produced any results, as the non-invited part of the opposition disliked it and refused to allow “divide and conquer” tactics to work, and radicals of the NS also refusing any dialogue with the “reds”. But one thing that did come out of the meeting was that finally the opposition became part of the political calculations of the regime and gained contact with those actually in power. The martial law introduced in 1983 was in a way meant to severe that connection and push the opposition back to isolation. But it failed and once ended, anti-fascists returned even stronger . In response to that rising sentiment, the King invited some of the opposition members to participate in the works of the Cortes – a gesture both symbolic, as the Cortes were a powerless entity and those invited not representing the entire opposition, and significant, as the huge wall that divided “the people” with “the power” was crumbling down in the eyes of the population thanks it. The first session of the Cortes (the Cortes working in sessions rather than permanently) with non-fascists took place in late 1984. The second took place in 1985, but neither was able to achieve anything.

One of the few photos of the secret Ceuta Meeting - Felipe González of the Socialist opposition and Manuel Fraga from the regime side.

A large problem was that Juan Carlos wasn’t a “crystal clear” democrat as some pictured him. While in general he recognized the necessity and importance of a legislature coming from popular vote before which the executive would be responsible, he still disliked the idea of democracy as a means of “bad influence” getting to power. Hence he was against dialogue with the socialists or quasi-socialist elements of the opposition, while being tolerant of the conservative Christian democrats and catholic groups. He understood how important autonomy for minorities was, but feared secessionism and didn’t want to start anything that could lead to it. Hence he also refused to speak with many of the minorities groups, especially those associated with domestic violence. His belief was that liberalistation and democratization of Spain could be achieved by joint work with the right-wing democrats against the regimes far-right factions and opposition leftist. Thinking so, he saw his actions as doing the opposition a favor. But it was a disservice in fact, as it made both him and those he liked to be perceived as part of the regime, the opposition members who accepted cooperation with him as sellouts. The King was ultimately quite naïve in his beliefs, envisioning a Spain ruled democratically, but still by catholic conservatives and traditionalists without “reds”. That this ultimately meant a country without ideological opposition where its lack was the result of general sentiment among the people rather that oppression made it utopian and not that appealing to the true democrats.

The failure of the first two sessions of the “King’s Cortes” (as it would get called) strengthened the belief that just as the regime was uncompromising, so should the people. Still, the call made by the opposition leaders to the population to remain patient and calm was heeded. The calmness of the first two months of 1985 contrasted with the surge of anti-regime sentiment later. The next session of the Cortes, which was planned for April, took place completely in the shadow of the March 15 revolution in Portugal. Popular demands and activity grew massively. Revolutionary sentiment increased, especially among the students who copied their Portuguese counterparts. Occupation of university buildings and facilities took place, with the forbidden red-yellow-indigo flag being flown. Demands were simple – governmental responsibility before the people, dismissing the Prime Minister, free election to appoint a new government. Not unexpectedly, demands to abolish the monarchy or curbing the power of the King were not present at that time. But they were voiced by the socialists, who took to the streets once seeing the opportunity to remove the fascists from power. The unity of the opposition had proven strong and once the April session of the Cortes took place, the invited non-fascists would use the opportunity to speak out the demands of the people present outside the buildings, repeating their slogans. Unfazed with the hatred towards him, Blanco did not give in in the slightest. But he was surprised when without warning he would be dismissed from his post by the King – his resignation being handed to him on April 28 1985. The Cortes would simultaneously appoint Vicente Enrique y Tarancon as the new Prime Minister. Blanco’s response was initially to call in the Army to enter the capital and reinstate him. But in what became probably the most decisive phone conversation for Spain’s transformation and fall of fascism, when talking with the commanders of the Spanish Legion stationed outside Madrid, he was talked out of it. Not being arrested or pursued by the royal authorities, he accepted his fate – to the extreme surprise of everyone, as it was almost common knowledge that this move would cause the militarist to intervene, and even the King had made preparations for what was expected to become a city-wide civil war. Instead, Blanco took his bodyguards and car and left the city together with his family to his mansion in a most unimpressive manner, going on “retirement”.

Vicente Enrique y Tarancon, considered the first democratic Prime Minister of Spain.

This unexpected peaceful change in power left Vicente Enrique y Tarancon – formerly the Archbishop of Madrid, who was given the position both to dissuade the radical fascists from shooting at clergy and being considered a compromise choice between the King and the opposition – as Prime Minister. The changes going on in Portugal inspired Spain to copy them – though it didn’t mean, nor was intended as a fall of fascism just yet. The first moves of the new government having the backing of the King was the elimination of the strongholds of the radical fascists and the national socialists. Purges took place in the army and the state administration. The NS organizations were dissolved. The falangist “militia” was also stripped of its rights to use force. Organized labour was starting to be allowed on factory-scale. These sweeping reforms took place in just 9 months, but even then, division between the King and the government was showing. The legalization of country-wide labour unions and the extent of their rights, the minorities organizations and their participation in state and province administration – these were all things the King had a hard time accepting. The royal regime envisioned a “more free” country being created by the reforms and not a liberal-socialist democracy, one that would allow for more economic and political freedoms, but still strictly forbidding all “deviations” such as Marxism, socialism, anti-catholic “moral relativism”, etc. This was the core of the conflict between the “royal dictatorship” and the “democrats”. Solidarity within the latter was stronger than the temptation of power. And so the proposals to limit the King’s power, introducing a new constitution, elimination of the remains of fascist institution and authority were being raised more loudly, Portugal serving as an example of change being necessary.

May Day demonstration of Republicans and Socialists in Valencia. Republican and Socialist flags visible.

On January 1986, after a turbulent 9 months Spain’s first “free government” has fallen and the democrats boycotted the Cortes in protest against the King’s obstruction of progressing democratic transformation. This act broke the right-wing democrat movement between those who went back to the streets to unite with the rest of the opposition, and those who chose to stay in power, claiming to want “gradual progress”. This move strongly discredited the softer elements of the opposition as a whole, giving credibility to the more radical ones of the left wing. Accusations of reforms being stopped and the King wanting preservation of fascism were baseless though. Conflict and anger derived mostly from a different approach to reforms and treatment of still existing fascist legislation which was still enforced by the police and courts, even if they were objectively unjust. This included things like fines being issued for participating in “illegal gatherings”, farmers being punished for occupation and blockade strikes, or freedom of expression being limited by the still existing Censorship Bureau. While changes were issued, both in the form of royal decrees and general legislation, too many individual cases of “fascist laws” being instrumentally used to hurt people took place for peoples comfort. But ideas of simply abolishing old legislation or replacing it with something made “ad hoc” were strongly opposed by the King who feared the anarchy that could be bought by it. Given the choice of either appointing someone else from the “loyal opposition” or allowing for free elections, the King initially went for the former, appointing Carlos Lopez to the seat of prime minister. But that lasted only 3 months as the government was proving ineffective and having to resort to using police force just to keep control over some of the provinces, where the minority organizations were beginning establishing their own authority centres. Faced with the rising threat of civil war or state disintegration, the King allowed for new elections to take place – bringing back democracy to Spain.

King Juan Carlos on television, announcing the calling of new elections.

The elections in 1986 resulted in an overwhelming victory of the Socialist Alliance, which immediately formed a coalition with the Minorities Bloc, giving it a stable majority. The Falangist Movement was proven to be dead, receiving less than 5% of the popular vote. The right wing opposition was shattered by the actions of the previous years, entering the Cortes divided with no clear, dominative Christian-democrat or Conservative party. And even amongst them were right-wing minorities parties that did not join the Minorities Bloc, who supported the independence of their respective peoples. The defeat of the great idea Juan Carlos had was total. With the victors of the elections congratulating themselves, a new crisis loomed already. The King refused to give power to them due to their association with “communist elements” that were present in the Socialist Alliance. After some political maneuvering his demands were accepted and the Communist Party of Spain was separated from the Socialist Alliance. But that was in fact yet another victory of the Socialists as it meant the legalization of the communist party – something otherwise unthinkable – and did not threaten the left-wing majority. The communists were still made present in the new government and active in the freshly established Constitutional Convention that worked on the new Spanish constitution. In the meantime the “Fundamental Laws of the State” were abolished altogether with a new “constitutional trinity” being introduced to act as the new supreme law. This supreme law maintained the monarchy, albeit greatly reducing royal executive powers and prerogatives. The King accepted that in return for the promise of keeping the future country a constitutional monarchy and maintaining state unity. But without power, he was in no way capable of ensuring those promises would be kept. The new Spanish constitution, the product of a few years of work, ten different governments, scandals and uproar that came as the effect of defascisation, opening the archives of the Spanish secret police and revealing snitches, clashes between the central government and local ones, was completed in 1991, being completely different from what was initially expected in 1986. Anti-monarchist sentiment left no other option than abolishing the monarchy and restoring the monarchy. The strength of the minorities movement was such that even autonomy was not sufficient for them, and instead a federation had to be made. Thus in April 1991, the constitutional referendum was passed with a 60% in favor outcome, giving birth to the Federal Republic of Spain – a federation of 16 countries (Andalusia, Aragon, Asturia, Balearic Islands, Basque, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile-Leon, Catalonia, Extremadura, Galicia, La Rioja, Murcia, Navarre and Valencia) and the Federal City of Madrid. The colonial territories of Morocco, Western Sahara and Spanish Guinea were officially not part of the Federation, but still under its rule – promised a road to eventual independence (or merging with Morocco).

Map of the Federal Republic of Spain

 

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Next part by MSZ.

In Italy, the death of Mussolini had become the turning point in the evolution of the fascist system. The country had entered a crisis of leadership. After the death of Il Duce, subsequent Prime Ministers, while nominally dictators, were much more restrained in their power and less independent players. That had to do with authority drifting from the Prime Minister to the Grand Council of Fascism, that held the power to elect and dismiss Prime Ministers at any time. While obviously never used against Mussolini, it would be used against his successors, or they would be threatened by it. The Grand Council of Fascism had grown in strength in the late years of Il Duce’s reign, having expanded in membership by more government ministers and Fascist Party leaders, both central and local. Mussolini in his late years was no longer able to effectively run the country and thus was giving up power to the bureaucrats and the institutions they ran, the GCF being the most prominent benefactor. While nominally it was still led by the Prime Minister who could remove anyone from it, realistically those already on it and having some sort of power base (like the Chief of Staff and the Army, Chief of the Navy or the Secretary) were untouchable and exercising “collective leadership” over the country. In fact, for many members the powerful position of Prime Minister was a problem and not a boon. Thus they appointed the PM’s they deemed controllable and meant to be weak. While Arturo Michelini was still deemed as powerful figure and capable of keeping a firm grasp over the GCF and the state, his reign was short. Michelini died after suddenly falling sick while on a trip to Sicily, failing to be brought to hospital in time, in 1969, without leaving any clear successor, his deputy prime minister and secretary of the GCF Giorgio Almirante. This began a process of a more visible rift growing between the GCF and the Fascist Party structures, as it created the impression of a “glass ceiling” being present, the top party leadership being a “black aristocracy” composed of old men crazed for power. For a movement that held a strong “cult of action” and valued “youth strength and temper”, such hoarding of power, the PM’s being seen as spineless and the country clearly losing importance on the global stage was deemed insulting. That the country’s economic situation was not getting better, also generated contempt.

The chamber of the Grand Council of Fascism in the Palazzo Venezia in Rome, the centre of power of the Italian Empire.

The process of transferring real power from the PM to the GCF was gradual and began even during Mussolini’s reign. In many ways in mimicked the process the USSR underwent, where the Politburo acquired more power after the death of Stalin. But whereas in the USSR that process was curbed by Malenkov who placed the government firmly in charge of the country, the direct connection between the government and the GCF made the latter dominant over the former. The fact that over the decades Italy copied the German practice of directly connecting State and Party administration helped in ensuring the GDF helped, as the two were eventually fused. Custom had made it that the position of Party leader and Secretary of the Grand Council of Fascism were combined, leaving position of the Prime Minister outside this fusion. This made the Italian PM more of an administrator, but also one through whom decisions had to go. Thus the position remained important and one the various groups within the Italian National Fascist Party strived to take. Mussolini was able to hold onto power indisputably, but without him, the GCF was able to ensure an erosion of the PM’s power. With Michelini gone in 1969, subsequent PM’s were not even half the man that Michelini or Mussolini were and considerably less important in national and international politics. The Grand Council of Fascism was not a uniform body of single-minded people either, and many fascist veterans of different kinds were members. That membership was tied to holding another office created a situation where all members were powerful people, the “pater familias” of huge fascist clans and families, more often representing their own, rather than the country’s interests. This also made the Italian system distinctively different from other fascist countries, where the Fascist Parties would be internally divided into many factions. In Italy, there were too many “factions” to name, as they were more tied to some specific person/clan rather than an internal ideology, who would make alliances of convenience, permanent alliances and “wars” as the situation demanded. Even the armed forces weren’t free of this, as the heads of the four branches of the military (Land Forces, Navy, Air Force, Special Forces – Italy copying the German model) and the Chief of Staff were all by office members of the GCF, and their posts were in particularly high demand.

Michelini died after only 3 years in office and his successors rarely lasted much longer – the average length of term an Italian PM served being less than 3 years. Not a few tried to establish a stronger authority of the PM over the state at the GCF’s expanse, only to be met with an angry coalition of fear which would dismiss him once things went too far for their taste. This crisis of leadership affected Italy’s image abroad, but also the effectiveness of the policies that were attempted to be introduced. So unlike other fascists states that either failed to reform or reformed insufficiently, Italy suffered from too many reforms, which were changed too rapidly and often contradicted each other. Italy mostly failed to make use of the period of the détente like some other states did and experienced economic slowdown with social dissent in the next decade in effect. Like many fascist states, Italy had large problems with modernization of existing industries. It preferred to create new factories at much greater cost or consolidate existing ones into huge conglomerates instead – these conglomerates often being the “property” of the Italian fascist “clans” (being managed by them, but still nominally state owned). This was successful in masking the symptoms of failing industries but not as a cure. Italy was losing competitiveness, both in the “free world” and the “fascist world”. Without the political influence of Mussolini, and with the central-east European states industrializing themselves (Italy often being the founder of their industrialization and mechanization programs, especially in Hungary and Poland), Italian exports were dropping. This was equally true for industrial goods of Northern Italy, agricultural products of Southern Italy and the raw materials of the African colonies.

FIAT would be one of the more recognizable Italian brand abroad, the company owing its success to the Agnelli family, who guaranteed it a near-monopolist status in the Italian automotive sector in return for constant support of the Italian military.

Italy was the founder of the fascist economic principle of territorial specialization and the first victim of it. In the general concept, north Italy was intended to be the “industrial” part of the country, south Italy the “agricultural” one, and the African colonies providing raw minerals (most importantly Libyan oil) to fuel the economy – all while Rome acted as the centre, overwatching redistribution of production and ensuring everyone got a “fair share” of the generated national wealth. But such redistribution efforts could hardly cover up the vast disproportion in wealth between these three parts. Even with the statistical income of the average Italian family in north and south coming closer, it wasn’t enough as infrastructural development in the south lagged behind (apart from grand projects like the Medina bridge) and currency playing less of a role in a central planned economy – where it was actual access to products that mattered. Redistribution also badly affected the social ties in Italy, both the North and South (and the colonial population) considering the others “leechers”, taking away “their” wealth, with what they got back being insufficient. The North criticized the “bland” diet that the southern agriculture provided and its high prices; fascist economics having led to a situation where certain things that were common in pre-fascist times became rare in the second half of the XXth century. The southerners in turn disliked the high prices of credits, low prices of state buyouts, insufficient investments, expensive mechanical parts and chemicals that they were forced to buy – either because of state obligation or lack of competition. Dislike for each other also increased the dislike for the state institutions that were assumed to always side with “not us”, being corrupt and bloated, taking away much of the fruits of peoples work. This was true to large extent, as the Italian administration, contrary to propaganda, was highly inefficient and unprofessional. Centralization in the country was immense, with even the simplest of matters requiring decisions, permits and licences issued by the highest authorities – even such basics like starting small businesses requiring state permission and registry in the National Court of Registry. Nepotism was also a curse, it being not uncommon in Italy that entire branches of administration of state institutions being manned solely by one family and their associates – led by a “pater familias” residing on a high position in Rome. The Italian political culture would over time come to revolve around such “families” and “clans” that dominated state affairs and public offices, any advancement in politics, business, art, education requiring the good graces of at least one of them.

Gianni Agnelli, the head of the Agnelli family since the 60’s. He would become the Prime Minister of Italy in 1971, but serve only 13 months, being forced to resign in 1972. That people as powerful as him were still not able to assume full and stable power had shown how dysfunctional Fascist Italy had grown over the years.

Territorial specialization caused huge inequalities in Italy, with southern Italy being reduced to a level below even that of the Balkans or the former parts of the Russian Empire. North Italy fared better though, and remained among the richer areas of the fascist world. This affected internal migrations, with more people moving north to take advantage of the better opportunities there. As most of the Italian industry was either state owned or owned by the “business families” tied with the state, those weren’t always attractive, employment in them being hard to get for people without connections. Fascism did allow a degree of free enterprise though. Italians moving north often took advantage of that, using their savings to open small businesses, becoming electricians, plumbers, blue-collar workers, opening their own workshops, restaurants and such. Italy did not impose restrictions on internal movement of people and the “liberal” land, construction and estate laws actually allowed cities to grow – even if the quality of this “new housing” from the 60’s was behind global standards of the time. Large concrete blockhouses were erected on the outskirts of Italian cities, meant to serve as “sleeprooms” of the urban areas, connected with the “work areas” downtown by public transportation – buses, trams and trains. While effective at providing housing with utilities and employment, it wasn’t good for aesthetics. Many disliked this new environment thinking it plain ugly compared to the old Italian architecture. Dislike was mutual, with the newly arrived people often bringing their contempt for “northerners” with them and upon being met with coldness, these prejudices grew. When the Italian economy started to fall on bad times and the “expensive” local workforce was getting replaced with cheaper “imported” labour, strikes occurred, as did riots and attacks on the districts populated by southerners. These were quickly broken by the police and the Blackshirts, but it still left a bitter aftertaste in the relations of people from different parts of the country. This was especially true once the newcomers began to actually catch up in wealth with the locals – the small businesses offering just as good or even better money than state enterprises and administration did. Another factor was migration to the west. Many Italians, mostly from the south, took up “temporary employment” in France and Switzerland, agreements between those countries and Italy allowing Italians easy “work visas” that permitted them to work and stay abroad for a time, after which they were to return to Italy. Rome thought of this as a good way of lowering unemployment and getting hard currency – these “guest workers” often sending the money they earned back home, or returned to Italy with their savings after the visas were up. The social effects of allowing so many people – overall being counted in hundreds of thousands – over the years to see and experience the west would not come up much later, when those same people demanded the same life they were able to enjoy in the west, and which fascism denied them.

The fascist architectural style that favoured symmetry and uniformity would become perverted and a parody of itself with large concrete-plate blockhouses.

Italy was also the precursor of the fascist principle of „nation-wide autarky” also, as well as the victim of it. Full autarky nominally continued to remain its goal. But when faced with a popular demand for new types of goods (usually coming from the west) the regime was usually undecided whether it should try and establish a domestic supply, look for an equivalent/substitute, or try and suppress demand through propaganda and cut down on supply by tighter border controls. This was equally true for things like cheap electronics – vinyl players, VCR’s, cassette recorders – and more basic stuff like chocolate or fruits. The autarchic fascist system demanded that people be satisfied with what the country can produce itself. What had to be imported was treated as a luxury. This also made a situation where goods that were supermarket-level available right across the border of France or Switzerland were very expensive on the Italian side. It encouraged smuggle. Trafficking took place both across the Italian western and eastern border, the people of those fascist states that were more liberal in trade being able to secure a profit as middlemen.

The Italian system of agricultural financing was revolutionary when implemented in the 50’s and 60’s, but rarely copied in any significant degree. It was motivated more by ideology that science or economic viability. Italy had lifted a great deal of legislation restricting the trade and division of land (even if doing so required a lot of formalities being done). According to fascist ideological thought, t was another step in the progress of the fascist revolution. A “return to the roots” of sorts, as the original Roman Law also treated land as a good like any other and allowed for it to be traded freely. This contrasted with German Common Law that treated land as a “supreme good” and for that reason heavily regulated it. Thus for example while in Germany dividing land acres below a certain area was forbidden, in Italy doing so was allowed; when in Germany homesteads had to become the property of the eldest son after owners death, in Italy last wills could determine its division in any way, and in the absence of one divide it equally among descendants. The Italian land reforms included also freeing construction law from rigid bounds, restricting it only by generalities. This translated into just about anything being allowed to be built by owners, though also making them responsible for negative side effects experienced by neighbors and third parties. That “third party” included the state, leading often to ridiculous situation where construction works which were initially not forbidden or even given local office permission, would later on fall under the supervision of the state and accusations of breaking some obscure, general clause of a law, penalizing owners. Thus “fascist freedom” went hand in hand with complete uncertainty over what was allowed and what not; it also generated a humongous amounts of civil conflicts between neighbors to be resolved by a corrupt judiciary. Bribery was a plague of Italian justice and bureaucracy. The weakening of the importance of land also translated doctrinally into weakening the protection of estate properties – forceful buyouts and seizure being easier, usucaption periods being shorter in Italy than in other countries of the world. As bureaucracy was also slow to work and unpopular to deal with, lots of conflicts over the land of deceased ancestors arose, divisions and trade of land being unregistered, creating overall chaos in the circulation of estates on the market.

Fragmentation and overdivision of land as seen from the sky; the individual stripes of land being insufficient to feed even one family becoming abandoned, later put to use by neighbors, who would divide it between themselves, only to end up locked in judicial conflicts with the rightful owners.

Additionally, Italy introduced new functions in state agricultural buyout agencies in the form of progressive supplemental payments for land. Farmers were paid money progressively the size of their holdings regardless of their actual production. This gave a great advantage to the large landowners over small family farms. In fact, such legislation was pushed through thanks to the influence of a some of the Italian “clans” already having much land across the country, including land in Libya – desert land marked as “agricultural land”, that was extremely cheap at some points. Italy influenced production both directly and indirectly by demanding individual farmers to fulfil specific quotas on the production of specific goods, and maintaining buyouts for others, as well as fixing their market prices. These means were commonly used instrumentally, prices and quotas being changed from year to year, often even after sowing season. The quotas also rose over time to the point where smaller owners were either incapable to fulfil them or only did so barely, leaving them with little more for themselves or sales. As the personal and political connections between state officials, landowners and farmers grew closer, so did corruption. Many smallowners resorted to playing the system by purposely abandoning production in favor of living of their supplemental payments, renting their land to neighbors. Bribes to fake production were common. Overall Italian agriculture suffered greatly throughout the fascist period, and while nominally production grew, it did so at a pace much lower than anywhere else in Europe, despite the green revolution taking place.

While Italian industry and agriculture suffered, culture and education did not. Italian universities still ranked among the best in Europe with a high quality staff and were popular with foreign students who enrolled in them – most commonly from central east Europe. Italy saw such scholarship programs and such an open attitude as a great way of increasing its prestige and spreading its culture, a tactic which to some extent was successful. Italy, despite being fascist and a firm ally of Germany, never developed the same negative image as the Reich did and was successful at keeping the leadership of the small group of countries opposed to total domination of Berlin over the fascist world. Italian influence was also what kept Latin as an obligatory subject on “Maturità”-equivalent exams in central Europe (or at least being obligatory unless replaced by German as a “foreign language” exam). Italian research institutes, laboratories, and engineers were responsible many technological advances and while not as “flashy” as some others, still were important – high speed tilting trains, high-density concretes and construction materials, legal concepts in marine and aviation law – these were the “more recognizable” Italian contributions in sciences, not counting those in geology, geography, medicine, etc. The pinnacle of Italian “hard” science was the “Diamante” Space Centre in Italian East Africa, near Chisimaio - though built with much German aid, still being a point of pride for Italians.

“Diamante” Space Centre, envisioned by some to once become the place for humanities first space ladder, thanks to its position on the equator.


Rome remained the “capital of style” rivaling Paris, Italian art being highly admired – both old forms, like operas, theatre, painting, sculpture – and new forms, like Radio Dramas and Cinematography. While not free of propaganda, it was often very enjoyable, Italian TV shows being popular and their licenses bought throughout central Europe. Less constrained by ideology, Italy was able to better “sell” its culture and its products abroad. In fact, what would be considered one of the greatest products of fascism, and certainly of fascist Italy, would be the new film style of “spaghetti westerns”, popularized by the Italian director Sergio Leone. Westerns and crime movies/series were among those types of cinematographic work that were “untainted” by fascist ideology, the stories there being apolitical, without the need or ability to send aesops. Hence many ambitious film directors in Italy used that “freedom” for creating entertainment they wanted and liked. The “spaghetti westerns”, usually directed in north Africa, with its “manly” main characters, powerful and climatic music, entertaining plots and jokes would become a great hit in Italy in the 60’s, and from there would take over the entire world. Although the “grandmaster” Leone himself would make only half a dozen such movies, tens of others would be made in Italy alone, and other European states would “follow the leader” as well – the popularity of the genre there also being a side effect of political restrictions and censorship in other genres. The massive popularity of the Italian western would spread from Europe to the USA as well, where it would stimulate the eventual rise of the “urban westerns” in the 70’s and 80’s. Ironically, what both the people and the world in general enjoyed, did not receive much praise from the fascist authorities. Many considered in “degenerate art”, Leone himself being once threatened with arrest after he refused to direct a war movie after his rise to fame. Germany would miss out on this craze almost entirely, its movie industry being driven much more by the demands of the Ministry of Propaganda than the demands of the people – which also showed in its complete failure at creating movie adaptations of the works of Karl May.

Italian westerns would develop a large fanbase all across the world, including the USSR where such movies would often be transmitted on Sundays noon, to deter people from going to mass.

The 80’s were troublesome times for Italy, when the spiral of corruption, “familias” interests taking precedent over state ones, ad hoc “reforms” chaos and general bad management had reached a critical mass level. For years Italy had been practicing raising wages in the public sector simultaneously with fixing prices in an attempt to stop rising inflation. This has the opposite effect and more and more Italian families found their savings becoming worthless as inflation reached to digit levels. With money becoming useless, barter trading returned and production fell, as people preferred to keep the products of their work and trade them rather than sell. Italy began a campaign against “hoarding”, to which many farmers, factory workers and smiths resorted. They tried to circumvent the low prices on the official market by not declaring production, lowering overall supply and allowing for the black market to grow. The situation had become so bad insufficient production forced the government to start introducing rationing of some goods already in the late 70’s – like pork and beef. Italian exports, both to the fascist world and the west fell to rock bottom. Protests against allowing the export of things being in short supply on shop shelves began. Even the oil industry, which de facto financed the Italian state for the previous three decades fell on tough times, not being modernized since the 50’s and having to compete with new oil and gas powers like Nigeria, the USSR and the UAS. East Africa, which was intended to be a “resource pool” of cheap materials never developed to a level to become that – becoming one of the most backwards areas of Africa, being “ruled but not managed”. In truth, Italy had no plan or idea what to do with East Africa other than keep it and use it instrumentally for some projects. This resulted in the military becoming the de facto authority there, regular administration being barely present, the military non-responsible for their conduct. Rome accepted that as a facti acompli, the military “keeping the peace” in Africa being automatically assumed to be worth the military expenditure on keeping soldiers there present. The “peace” Italy brought was however a “peace of the grave” as it had little restraints in keeping the population pacified using overwhelmingly brutal methods. Italy was internationally condemned for using poison gas already in 1935 when in began the conquest of Ethiopia, and it would be an open secret that it continued to use it to suppress partisans, even against civilians – using helicopters or even crop dusters, the latter due to their “stealth factor” and plausible deniability. While such means did keep the population down and Italy avoided an full-blown colonial war like Portugal fought, the costs of that were still high. Italy’s brutal performance made it increasingly unpopular in across the world in the later decolonization period when post-colonial states were gaining independence, and the metropolises began to “loosen the leash” elsewhere. Along with Portugal, it was the “boogeyman of Africa” and a target for all anti-colonial factions all across Africa.

Italy was remarkably successful at preventing the flow of any illegal weaponry into East Africa, making any insurgency a lost cause in face of overwhelming firepower; Italian non-insistence on forcing any way of life on the inhabitants and their general apathy helping just as much.

The negative image Italy created itself also had a symbolic side-effect in the form of less favorable views of the Roman Empire entering historiography. Italy stylized itself after the ancient empire, but for many the similarities lied mostly in its militarism and brutality rather than refined culture. Nationalism in Europe helped that, especially in France where the Roman Empire was almost entirely treated as an “evil empire” that oppressed the Gauls, rarely being placed in positive light. This was true in pop culture as well, where it was common for Romans to be depicted as “fascists”, or even Nazis, using similar speech constructs and displaying similar ideology. In contradiction to that, the Roman Republic was however viewed much more favorably. Even Mussolini himself was given a lighter treatment, being depicted as a “new Octavian August”, the first and the last of “good emperors” who ended “the good (if corrupt) Republic”. The parallels between the Roman Empire and Fascist Italy went further. Just as Augustus was followed by increasingly incompetent successors, so it was expected to happen after Mussolini; just as the Praetorian Guard took power in Rome to rule over the Emperors, so did the Grand Council of Fascism come to dominate over the Prime Minister. And just as the Roman Empire had fallen after running out of “bread and circuses” and its military strength waning, so it was expected to happen of fascist Italy – the Summer of Nations to bring about major changes.

 

[TheBerlinguer]

The last image is repeated. Perhaps you should inform MSZ of an error in the original post, if that's the problem.

 

[machine3589]

The last image is repeated. Perhaps you should inform MSZ of an error in the original post, if that's the problem.

We already did that over on CF.net. I`ll see if he changes it.