Kongzilla
Banned
Next part is up.
Although Portugal was one of the first countries in Europe to fall victim to the general post-Great War European trend of abandoning democracy in favour of authoritarian and fascist regimes, it has also been one of the more skeptical ones towards the confrontational attitude the cold war powers displayed. An integralist regime, it did not follow an expansionist, racist, militarist agenda, nor did it have a “leader figure” the type of Benito Mussolini or Adolf Hitler – or other such that were heads of the fascist states. It drew mostly from the principles of Catholic traditionalism and strong conservative, strongly opposed to communism, anarchism and liberalism, both in political and economic agendas. Like most fascist states it venerated the “traditional rural lifestyle” while simultaneously supporting modernization – though in its case, the fascist regime meant to control the modernization effort very strictly, to the point of near-regression. Regulations and state control were imposed on all branches of life and economy, the population heavily invigilated by the PIDE secret police. Censorship was introduced on all types of media, with civil liberties and freedoms being repressed in order to maintain power and curb communist/liberal influences. Political dissidents were imprisoned and exiled into prisons constructed on archipelagoes on Cape Verde. All political parties were sidelined, with only the União Nacional (National Union) remaining present – though technically they weren’t banned, and opposition members were legally allowed to run for office.
António de Oliveira Salazar, the fascist dictator of Portugal
Portugal had been the most fringe of the European fascist states, mostly uninterested in the great ideological confrontations of the world. Being located far from the USSR, it did not see Marxism as a direct threat; having historically close ties and friendly relations with Britain, it had no reason to change that. The Portuguese fascist system called “Estado Novo” based itself on the Italian model, though unlike it or most other fascist states, it did not call for expansion or glorified military to excess. While it did use the greatness of the past Portuguese colonial empire that spanned the globe as a tool of generating national pride (the Ultramar), it did not demand sacrifices for “restoring past glory” – but merely for bettering the situation at hand without constantly looking backwards. The motto of the regime was "Deus, Pátria e Familia" (meaning "God, Fatherland, and Family"), with national and catholic values being praised and imposed on the population. But overall Portugal did not develop the same degree of totalitarian rule as Germany or Italy did. While prison and exile were common punishment for opposition members, death penalties were seldom issued. State control was heavy in the cities, but the broad rural countryside did not feel its pressure on a day-to-day basis. Churches and religion were treated lightly even when directly opposed to the regime’s actions. While paramilitary organization such as the Legião Nacional or Mocidade Portuguesa were created, membership wasn’t obligatory and their “ideologicalness” was rather weak.
Mocidade Portuguesa rally in Lisbon, 1950.
Anti-communism was present in the ideology, and also one of the reasons Portugal moved closer to Germany – the threat of losing Macau or East Timor to communist China being too big to ignore and without western guarantees of support, the Reich was the only option, especially after the Taiwan Crisis when Germany had proven itself to be willing to stand up to its promises of protecting anyone from communist expansion. The loss of its possessions in India had shaken Portugal’s faith in “British-Portuguese friendship” but it has not terminated it, Portugal trying to keep a balance between Britain - with which it felt close politically and sentimentally - and Germany, to which it was attached militarily and economically. Portugal refused to join the anti-comintern pact in 1938 when it was first given the offer, but accepted it in 1950 when it also joined the OMEWZE with a “special status” to take into account its pluricontinental nature. Portugal never did impose the same type of chauvinistic racism most fascist systems were known for, allowing blacks to serve in its military and administration, though restricted to the non-metropolitan areas.
Blacks were allowed to serve in the Portuguese military and administration, many of their language and survival skills being deemed useful by the colonial regime.
Fascist policies of autarky and creation of a “secondary world market” built around “fascist principles” rather than capitalist ones had been a great aid for Portugal. The economic concepts of “fascist unity” mostly revolved around Germany forcing the states of central Europe into buying its products, selling it things cheaper than market rules would demand, restricting them in other ways, an all that being forced via the threat of military intervention, sanctions, clever diplomacy which pitted the various states against another, offers of benefits in some areas as return for support, appeals to some greater values such as “white unity” and others. The central European states were more less dependent on Germany as their greatest market and trade partner, as well as lacking in the ability of ridding themselves of that dependence – not having the infrastructure to independently trade with the non-fascist world or being to small to establish a truly diversified economy. Thus they were in a position where they could be “bullied” by Germany. Portugal, while small in both territory and population, wasn’t in such a position however. It was the only fascist state with access to significant deposits of rare natural wealth – oil, metals, bauxites, jewels, etc., making it too valuable even for Germany to push away; its marine heritage technically giving it the option of trading freely with the entire world. However, sticking with the fascist states and being part of the OMEWZE gave it a position of an almost monopolist in many areas, allowing it to sell resources from its colonies at prices higher than the global market set them on. This was initially seen as a good reason to stick with Germany, though it would also show certain flaws when the time came – the monopoly being based only on German/fascist principles of prioritizing trade with other fascist states rather than basing them on economic value, thus when the détente came and trade with the west was liberalized, Portugal’s position in the block declined. Monopolies also weren’t really good at modernizing and Portugal did fall behind technologically in those areas it prided and enriched itself on – again, when met with “fair” competition being unable to stand up to the challenge.
Portugal’s economy was based on extracting resources from Angola and Mozambique, shipping it to Portugal to be processes and sent further into central Europe/the Mediterranean, or sending them directly to those countries. It’s industrialization thus followed the same patterns as the central European states – industries being established with the aim of supplying more developed economies with pre-manufactured goods. Portugal had the benefit of being able to sell those same resources to other countries in the Atlantic (and even China, Portugal being the most “economically connected with a communist state” fascist country, Macau serving as gateway to trade with the PRC), mostly to obtain so called “hard currency”. But it failed at using that freedom at developing advanced domestic industries. Portuguese roads would be filled with Italian cars and Hungarian buses, its airlines using German aircraft, household appliances and chemicals originating from Czechia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, etc. It’s main point of pride was it’s marine industry and shipyards – Portugal owning one of the largest merchant fleets in the world, another boon of fascist allegiance as its rather liberal policies regarding the use of its flag made many people and businesses from fascist states register their fleets in Portugal.
German equipment was used extensively in mining and other colonial industries.
For Portugal, it’s colonial empire was more than just a matter of maintaining profits generated from it, or the prestige being a colonial empire provided. It was a matter of ideology. Under Salazar, the Portuguese philosophy of “Estado Novo” had come to evolve, the colonial empire playing an important part in it. Education, propaganda, religion – all had aimed at ingraining in the minds of the Portuguese people that their colonies in Africa were a “national treasure” or “family heirloom”, thus being priceless. All sacrifices were acceptable to preserve it. Staying true to the fascist philosophy of “propaganda having to be dumbed down to the least intelligent listener”, these type of slogans were used and mixed together with other, more known ones – such as “White’s Man Burden” or “Aryan Superiority”. But the “least intelligent” were not the only ones targeted and indeed the Portuguese colonial policy had backing among economists and political scientists. Angola and Mozambique were resource rich and thus provided a “natural wealth deposit” which even if unprofitable gave Portugal “economic independence from the trends of the global market”. Keeping it made just as much sense as keeping a standing army despite there being no war, as it was “better to have it and not need it than need it and not have it”. “Estado Novo” aimed at creating a spiritual connection between the people of the metropolis and the colonial assets, even though it didn’t outright support settler-colonialism. While quite some of it was drawn from the German “Blut und Boden” philosophy, it wasn’t copied; in fact, it would be the German “New Agrarians” (as they were called in the political circles of the west) who would come to adopt the Portuguese colonial ideology – “Lebensraum” being meant as a steady pool of necessary resources, blacksoils in the past, rich veins presently; rural-colonial presence being unnecessary other than “mining towns”, established for the sole purpose of extracting whatever goods was hidden in the earth for the benefit of the volk – be it the food formerly, oil and metals now. All this was “sprinkled” with moral philosophy which was meant to justify sacrifices made in its name as well as provide an excuse for errors and problems, which only grew in size and number with time.
Lusotropicalism would be greatly romanticized in Portuguese propaganda, used as a justification for colonialism
The Portuguese Bush War began in the early 60’s along with the other decolonization movements in Africa, though it grew in intensity by the middle of the decade. Opposition to decolonization was an important part of Portugal’s general policy on the international stage for which it was criticized by the west – though that criticism had little effect as the great colonial empires of Europe were at the same time waging their own wars to keep their possessions. Many African anti-colonial movements called for total independence of the overseas African territories from Portugal, invoking the right of nations for self-determination, of them, most demanding a Marxist-based system; nationalisms and “liberal western” influences being very weak in those areas, the revolutionary ideology being more appealing to the people. The Portuguese leadership tried to answer those calls by introducing new policies of “civilizing missions” in the colonies and sharing more of the interest generated from selling colonial natural wealth with the colonies themselves; Salazar even going so far as to propose “assimilation and multiracialism” in the colonies rather than an “apartheid” system as it was, much to the displeasure of Germany. Those efforts were in vain however, as with revolutionary forces growing stronger all over in Africa, the local rebels were able to gather more supporters and power while the promises of the colonial regime remained on paper only. The ultimate withdrawal from Central Africa by Britain in 1968 was an important moment for the revolutionary forces in Angola and Mozambique, as they were finally given a permanent “sanctuary” to hide in as well as a supply base – Soviet and Chinese weaponry being unloaded and provided for the forces in both east and west “Portuguese Africa”, Central African also becoming the place where their political and military leaderships would meet to better coordinate their struggles, their soldiers to receive training with the help of Soviet experts.
Salazar inspecting his troops in Africa
Initially being a number of loose militias living of terror and looted weapons, following no particular ideology other than fighting the fascist colonial regime, the rebels in Portuguese Africa had gotten a new face with the official formation of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 1964. While not the only organization fighting against Portugal, nor the only one to have a communist background, it was the only one to have direct Soviet backing and thus being more successful in its action. Support came through Belgian Congo and East Africa; many of the veterans of the wars in East Africa, Central Africa and Congo and other African conflicts coming to join them, the southern parts of Congo being utterly lawless and a “sanctuary” for all the failed rebels of Africa who fled the repercussions of their failed struggles during the 60’s. The organized paramilitary force was led by Ilidio Machado, initially having 7000 soldiers, but those being well trained and experienced in fighting guerrilla wars, as well as armed with modern weaponry provided by the USSR and China. Against them Portugal fielded a colonial army commanded by Venâncio Deslandes, being almost 50000 soldiers strong.
Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique. Difficult terrain was a huge logistical problem for infantry.
First clashes occurred in the northern parts of Angola, where Portuguese targets were attacked by forces from bases located in southern Congo, the rebels receiving logistic support and cover from the local population. This allowed them to quickly spread into the Angolan central heartland where they operated in small groups, attacking Portuguese military installations and posts – mostly the small ones, so as to break the soldiers morale, force them into operating in larger groups, thus leaving other areas less defended – Portuguese war resources being limited from the start. The forces of the MPLA grew in membership, especially once it allowed women to join its ranks, growing into a 15 000 strong force by 1968, while the Portuguese colonial forces grew smaller, not being given sufficient reinforcements. By 1970, the MPLA was strong enough in Angola to be able to launch terror attacks in urban zones – thought of as being “safe”. Explosions in Luanda and other cities shook both the local and metropolitan population, as colonial administration personnel died in the attacks – being proof of the war not going in Portugal’s favour despite propaganda claiming the contrary. Mozambique was not in a better situation, where the Marxist FRELIMO waged its own war against the Portuguese, mimicking the tactics of the MPLA, loosely collaborating with each other, holding meetings in Central Africa. This collaboration would only grow stronger with time, and with those two being the most successful anti-colonial fighting groups in Portuguese Africa, they would grow in size, influence, membership – and effectively take over (or destroy) other anti-colonial resistance movements, particularly those of “tribal identity” or “black nationalist” ideology – the Marxists aiming at being the only possible political representatives of the Angolans and Mozambicans at the international stage. The USSR supported that goal, stylizing itself as the “advocate” of the “oppressed people of Africa”, also being the major power to pressure Central Africa into allowing anti-Portuguese rebels on its soil and for them to organize better – eventually leading to the formation of the “United African Front for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea” in 1972 as the alliance of anti-Portuguese forces in Africa (and anti-Belgian/anti-South African to a degree) supported by the USSR and Central Africa – and being increasingly successful.
Portuguese commando infantrymen with a German assault rifle
The failings of the Portuguese colonial forces in keeping order led to a change in leadership, Venâncio Deslandes being replaced in 1971 with Francisco da Costa Gomes, his main mission on the new post being preparing and launching a major counter-offensive against the rebels. Starting in April 1971, the colonial army in Angola began a large, broad-front offensive with 35 thousand soldiers being used in the operation – many of them being commandos and special forces as well as mercenaries – the Portuguese Bush War becoming infamous as the first large-scale conflict where a state-power would use mercenaries in combat operations as well as heavily emphasize waging “irregular warfare” against its opponents. This tactic, while moderately successful at repelling rebels has also had big downsides – irregulars being left in the African jungles without direct command would often go rogue and act against orders, involve itself in criminal activity including war crimes (later blaming them on the rebels) or outright deserting, morale being not particularly high among the soldiers, especially the black ones. The nine-month offensive has been a short term success – while it managed to rid a large part of Angola of MPLA presence, it did not destroy it, its operatives either going into hiding and being sheltered by the locals or fleeing to Congo and Central Africa, Lisbon not allowing for the Army to pursue them there. The colonial army had been mostly ill-prepared for the situation at hand, still being locked in a conventional war mentality limiting its effectiveness – difficult terrain and logistics causing many fatalities from injuries, disease, poisonings, etc. Thus once the offensive was complete and the situation relaxed, the guerrillas would once again seep into the country to wreak havoc, bringing the situation back to square one. The entire operation had also been a great loss of face by Portugal due to a great deal of war crimes and other questionable conduct having taken place, including wholesale evacuation of tribes and village, forcing them deeper into Africa or even from Angola itself. Civilian casualties were high, as were desertions. While specifically denied to be that, the war in Portugal was becoming viewed as more and more as a “race war” between the whites and blacks by both the Portuguese people and the Africans - Portuguese denials to that being the case actually taken as a confirmation. German, Western and Soviet reports of the situation in Angola and Mozambique not making the situation better, as all of them kept the tune of the wars there being a conflict between “racist Portuguese whites” and “freedom fighting blacks”, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of that becoming just that – and helping the Africans in getting unity, fighting the war as a war of national, racial and class liberation at the same time, propaganda having something in store for anyone willing to fight.
MPLA child soldiers on a parade.
The “racial context” of the war was more complex though – Portugal not wanting it to descend into that territory and be viewed as such. The colonial regime had employed many blacks from the very start of the war and over time the ratio of black-to-white troops in the colonial army would actually rise. Whereas in 1963 the Portuguese forces in Mozambique would have about 10 000 whites and 5000 blacks, by 1971 it was 22 000 whites to 23 000 blacks. Portugal had little restrain toward promoting blacks as officers or creating mixed-race units, meant to both instill a sense of unity, tie the blacks closer with the state and dismiss claims of “racial segregation” in the army – the last one happening though, with plenty of units being “accidently” gathered in a way to make them mono-racial. The “anti-white war” card also wasn’t as effective among the rebels as a motivator as many had chosen to abandon their struggle when an opportunity arose – that mostly being offers of amnesty and financial gain in return for giving up arms and fighting. It was estimated that by 1971 about 8000 rebels had been “bought off” by the colonial administration or even turned against their former leaders. Nevertheless, the racial element of the war was among the more important reasons for Germany taking a rising interest in the war – next to the economic and ideological ones.
The colonial wars has had an extremely negative effect on the Portuguese economy, using up much of its resources – in 1971, the war effort’s cost took up 40% of Portugal’s budget and was expected to grow. Many young people were reluctant to participate in the war, choosing emigration instead – mostly to France and the UK, an estimated 1.5 million Portuguese leaving the country in the 60’s. Political parties were established “in exile” as well as at home in hiding – such as the “Communist Party of Portugal” - though it never truly dissolved, members keeping its individual cells going, waiting for an opportunity to re-emerge. Student groups were the ones taking the most active stance against both the war and repressive governmental policies, being the ones where both communist as well as democratic sentiments were the strongest. This would be the source of the Student Crisis which occurred in 1965, when in a “preventive move” the PIDE secret police arrested a number of students suspected of being tied with communist groups, a number of student associations also being declared closed. This had caused an outrage, leading to a boycott of school lessons by the Portuguese students in Lisbon, who demanded the release of their friends and re-opening the closed associations. The reaction to the boycott were further repressions and arrests coupled with expulsions from universities. The spiral of tensions went even further with a massive student demonstration taking place in November 1965 in Lisbon that was suppressed by riot police. The result had been over two dozen wounded, many being expelled from school or transferred – and many teachers resigning from the universities as a sign of protest and solidarity with the students. Tensions and anti-governmental sentiment grew, with the economy getting worse, war weariness growing and the repressions of the government becoming less tolerable for the general population which would become more outspoken about demanding reforms and change.
Student demonstration in Lisbon, 1965
Under these circumstances, Lisbon was forced to look for relief, and Berlin was an obvious destination. Germany had itself good reasons to participate in the war in Africa, initially economical and “prestigious”, but the ideological ones grew in importance – especially among the internal opposition towards chancellor Hanke. The war had disrupted many of the key facilities extracting resources meant for Germany and has also led to a general increase in prices of goods sold by Portugal despite OMEWZE regulations – the possibility of ending, or at least calming the situation being understood as a way of restoring balance and lowering the cost of imports (Germany having troubles affording substitutes to Portuguese resources on the free market). Military presence in Angola and Mozambique would also grant Germany enormous leverage in future relations with Portugal as it would give them significant control over those colonies – the German Kriegsmarine being significantly more powerful than the Portuguese navy, should a conflict arise. That the rebels in Africa had been “open communists” also did help, as despite the détente being in operation, Germany never abandoned its goal of “containing communism” in every part of the globe – that being realistically a great boon to Germany in foreign affairs as it almost universally considered as a “more certain ally” when it came to fighting communists. Many South American or post-colonial states would turn to it specifically for that reason, fear of communism and revolution being the central point of their political views (or their propaganda which they used to keep the population scared). Upholding the image of a stalwart “bulwark against communism” opened many doors in terms of military alliances, followed by military equipment sales and trade, and later into outright mutually-beneficial politico-economic cooperation.
Antonio Salazar in Berlin, greeted with the traditional salute.
Initially German involvement in Angola and Mozambique was limited to stationing guard troops in many facilities and areas deemed “strategically important” by the Germans, relieving the Portuguese there from duty and allowing them to participate in actual fighting. Germans had been present in Africa even before that, as Portugal used a great deal of German weapons and equipment, German instructors and trainers educating the Portuguese, as well as gathering information of their weapons performance in combat situation and difficult climate/terrain. The first batch of German troops was only 3000 strong – less than what was sent to Thailand – who arrived in Angola and Mozambique in early 1972. This development barely made it to the world press, as it was only reported in the sixth and eight page of the “Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung” and “Völkischer Beobachter” respectively, “The Guardian” placing a mention of it on the fifth, while “The Daily Telegraph” failed to report it at all. Despite that, it would be a turning point in the Portuguese Bush War – for the first time, Germans would be the ones to shoot African anti-colonial militias, as well as being shot at by them, suffering first loses.
Just as Portugal had been greatly unprepared to wage an irregular war in the Angolan jungle and deserts, only getting the hang of it in the later years, neither was Germany despite observing the war for some time; in both cases, “conventional warfare” training received at home before dispatch was inadequate for the situation the soldiers would be placed in. Traditional German tactics of emphasizing squad automatic weapons as the main firepower of a team, supported by a marksmen and riflemen were effective in open terrain, but not in areas densely covered by vegetation. German air support was also limited, as it was still the Portuguese air force that was present in Angola and Mozambique, not the Luftwaffe. German soldiers would often act against orders when engaged by rebels, pursuing them into the wilderness despite their objective being protecting sites, not taking action – which was to be done by the Portuguese. But low morale, slow reaction time, linguistic barriers and racial prejudice had all come to affect the entire “cooperation”, Portuguese soldiers not reacting to German calls for reinforcements or demands for taking action against fleeing opponents, failures of capturing/killing them being blamed by the Germans on the lack of Portuguese professionalism. Low-tier officers and NCOs would demand from their superiors to be allowed to be given a more free hand in dealing with threats. Racial issues would also arise, Germans not wanting to be ordered around by African-Portuguese military personnel, who were also most often blamed for all failures – the entire Portuguese policy of allowing blacks into the administration and military being reported as the reason for continued failings of the Portuguese to suppress the rebellions. The German command would allow for greater involvement of the German military in combat situation, also dispatching the SS to Angola, mimicking the Portuguese use of commandos and counter-irregulars; special training grounds would also be erected in Angola meant for arriving Germans to receive special training in the new environment; the main German boot-camp being “Camp Lettow-Vorbeck” outside Lobito. The first Commander in Chief of the German Forces in West Africa, who would also be responsible for setting up much of the German military doctrine in irregular African warfare would be Genaralmajor Siegfried Muller – who would also be one of the most controversial personas in the Portuguese Civil War, both due to the unquestionable effectiveness of his policies and actions – as well as their costs, in human lives and material loses.
Genaralmajor Siegfried Muller, Commander in Chief of the German Forces in West Africa
Portuguese commanders would be quite welcoming to German “demands”, as for them greater German involvement meant lower casualties and less engagement. This of course wasn’t what the Germans expected, as their goal was for them to be an addition to the war, not a replacement. Yet increasing freedom of action on Angola and Mozambique went hand in hand with more troops and equipment being sent there – in 1974 already 12 000 Germans would be present in Angola alone, another 8000 in Mozambique. The German Luftwaffe would also mark their presence, acting not only as scouts but also close air support and strategic bombardment. Germany would have much less reservations against taking action in Central Africa in Congo leading to numerous bombing runs taking place there against rebel encampments there. Germany would take a much more active approach against fighting the insurgents and initially, it would show to be effective – German organization and material superiority managing to effectively protect supply lines across the colonies, untold checkpoints being established helping in controlling population movements (and rebel maneuvers, hampering their preparations). German tactics would encourage sending large units for long patrols so as to allow them to get a better grasp of the situation and come up with innovations and take up initiatives – Portuguese tactics of re-acting to rebel activity and protecting urban areas/strategically important sites being deemed as “too defensive”. Those were couple with extreme brutality however – German commands had for example established quotas on how many rebels ought to have been captured/killed in every operation, leading to the soldier capturing o killing civilians when not faced with resistance (the rebels having escaped). German soldiers were outright exempted from any liability for war crimes, Berlin openly stating the MPLA and FRELIMO were not protected by the Geneva Conventions, justifying harsh repressions. Looting had also been de facto allowed by the Germans, gathering “African souvenirs” becoming something popular among the German soldiers. On the other hand, the German command did not introduce rotations in service in Africa – those sent were meant to stay there for as long as necessary, leading to those who have managed to survive becoming battle-hardened veterans – while also leading many who sought to escape service into self-mutilation. The war in Angola and Mozambique would be called the “African adventure” by many Germans, expectations being a quick victory in a manner of months, two years at worst – expectations which would not be met.
German soldiers on a raft in Africa.
Although Portugal was one of the first countries in Europe to fall victim to the general post-Great War European trend of abandoning democracy in favour of authoritarian and fascist regimes, it has also been one of the more skeptical ones towards the confrontational attitude the cold war powers displayed. An integralist regime, it did not follow an expansionist, racist, militarist agenda, nor did it have a “leader figure” the type of Benito Mussolini or Adolf Hitler – or other such that were heads of the fascist states. It drew mostly from the principles of Catholic traditionalism and strong conservative, strongly opposed to communism, anarchism and liberalism, both in political and economic agendas. Like most fascist states it venerated the “traditional rural lifestyle” while simultaneously supporting modernization – though in its case, the fascist regime meant to control the modernization effort very strictly, to the point of near-regression. Regulations and state control were imposed on all branches of life and economy, the population heavily invigilated by the PIDE secret police. Censorship was introduced on all types of media, with civil liberties and freedoms being repressed in order to maintain power and curb communist/liberal influences. Political dissidents were imprisoned and exiled into prisons constructed on archipelagoes on Cape Verde. All political parties were sidelined, with only the União Nacional (National Union) remaining present – though technically they weren’t banned, and opposition members were legally allowed to run for office.
António de Oliveira Salazar, the fascist dictator of Portugal
Portugal had been the most fringe of the European fascist states, mostly uninterested in the great ideological confrontations of the world. Being located far from the USSR, it did not see Marxism as a direct threat; having historically close ties and friendly relations with Britain, it had no reason to change that. The Portuguese fascist system called “Estado Novo” based itself on the Italian model, though unlike it or most other fascist states, it did not call for expansion or glorified military to excess. While it did use the greatness of the past Portuguese colonial empire that spanned the globe as a tool of generating national pride (the Ultramar), it did not demand sacrifices for “restoring past glory” – but merely for bettering the situation at hand without constantly looking backwards. The motto of the regime was "Deus, Pátria e Familia" (meaning "God, Fatherland, and Family"), with national and catholic values being praised and imposed on the population. But overall Portugal did not develop the same degree of totalitarian rule as Germany or Italy did. While prison and exile were common punishment for opposition members, death penalties were seldom issued. State control was heavy in the cities, but the broad rural countryside did not feel its pressure on a day-to-day basis. Churches and religion were treated lightly even when directly opposed to the regime’s actions. While paramilitary organization such as the Legião Nacional or Mocidade Portuguesa were created, membership wasn’t obligatory and their “ideologicalness” was rather weak.
Mocidade Portuguesa rally in Lisbon, 1950.
Anti-communism was present in the ideology, and also one of the reasons Portugal moved closer to Germany – the threat of losing Macau or East Timor to communist China being too big to ignore and without western guarantees of support, the Reich was the only option, especially after the Taiwan Crisis when Germany had proven itself to be willing to stand up to its promises of protecting anyone from communist expansion. The loss of its possessions in India had shaken Portugal’s faith in “British-Portuguese friendship” but it has not terminated it, Portugal trying to keep a balance between Britain - with which it felt close politically and sentimentally - and Germany, to which it was attached militarily and economically. Portugal refused to join the anti-comintern pact in 1938 when it was first given the offer, but accepted it in 1950 when it also joined the OMEWZE with a “special status” to take into account its pluricontinental nature. Portugal never did impose the same type of chauvinistic racism most fascist systems were known for, allowing blacks to serve in its military and administration, though restricted to the non-metropolitan areas.
Blacks were allowed to serve in the Portuguese military and administration, many of their language and survival skills being deemed useful by the colonial regime.
Fascist policies of autarky and creation of a “secondary world market” built around “fascist principles” rather than capitalist ones had been a great aid for Portugal. The economic concepts of “fascist unity” mostly revolved around Germany forcing the states of central Europe into buying its products, selling it things cheaper than market rules would demand, restricting them in other ways, an all that being forced via the threat of military intervention, sanctions, clever diplomacy which pitted the various states against another, offers of benefits in some areas as return for support, appeals to some greater values such as “white unity” and others. The central European states were more less dependent on Germany as their greatest market and trade partner, as well as lacking in the ability of ridding themselves of that dependence – not having the infrastructure to independently trade with the non-fascist world or being to small to establish a truly diversified economy. Thus they were in a position where they could be “bullied” by Germany. Portugal, while small in both territory and population, wasn’t in such a position however. It was the only fascist state with access to significant deposits of rare natural wealth – oil, metals, bauxites, jewels, etc., making it too valuable even for Germany to push away; its marine heritage technically giving it the option of trading freely with the entire world. However, sticking with the fascist states and being part of the OMEWZE gave it a position of an almost monopolist in many areas, allowing it to sell resources from its colonies at prices higher than the global market set them on. This was initially seen as a good reason to stick with Germany, though it would also show certain flaws when the time came – the monopoly being based only on German/fascist principles of prioritizing trade with other fascist states rather than basing them on economic value, thus when the détente came and trade with the west was liberalized, Portugal’s position in the block declined. Monopolies also weren’t really good at modernizing and Portugal did fall behind technologically in those areas it prided and enriched itself on – again, when met with “fair” competition being unable to stand up to the challenge.
Portugal’s economy was based on extracting resources from Angola and Mozambique, shipping it to Portugal to be processes and sent further into central Europe/the Mediterranean, or sending them directly to those countries. It’s industrialization thus followed the same patterns as the central European states – industries being established with the aim of supplying more developed economies with pre-manufactured goods. Portugal had the benefit of being able to sell those same resources to other countries in the Atlantic (and even China, Portugal being the most “economically connected with a communist state” fascist country, Macau serving as gateway to trade with the PRC), mostly to obtain so called “hard currency”. But it failed at using that freedom at developing advanced domestic industries. Portuguese roads would be filled with Italian cars and Hungarian buses, its airlines using German aircraft, household appliances and chemicals originating from Czechia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, etc. It’s main point of pride was it’s marine industry and shipyards – Portugal owning one of the largest merchant fleets in the world, another boon of fascist allegiance as its rather liberal policies regarding the use of its flag made many people and businesses from fascist states register their fleets in Portugal.
German equipment was used extensively in mining and other colonial industries.
For Portugal, it’s colonial empire was more than just a matter of maintaining profits generated from it, or the prestige being a colonial empire provided. It was a matter of ideology. Under Salazar, the Portuguese philosophy of “Estado Novo” had come to evolve, the colonial empire playing an important part in it. Education, propaganda, religion – all had aimed at ingraining in the minds of the Portuguese people that their colonies in Africa were a “national treasure” or “family heirloom”, thus being priceless. All sacrifices were acceptable to preserve it. Staying true to the fascist philosophy of “propaganda having to be dumbed down to the least intelligent listener”, these type of slogans were used and mixed together with other, more known ones – such as “White’s Man Burden” or “Aryan Superiority”. But the “least intelligent” were not the only ones targeted and indeed the Portuguese colonial policy had backing among economists and political scientists. Angola and Mozambique were resource rich and thus provided a “natural wealth deposit” which even if unprofitable gave Portugal “economic independence from the trends of the global market”. Keeping it made just as much sense as keeping a standing army despite there being no war, as it was “better to have it and not need it than need it and not have it”. “Estado Novo” aimed at creating a spiritual connection between the people of the metropolis and the colonial assets, even though it didn’t outright support settler-colonialism. While quite some of it was drawn from the German “Blut und Boden” philosophy, it wasn’t copied; in fact, it would be the German “New Agrarians” (as they were called in the political circles of the west) who would come to adopt the Portuguese colonial ideology – “Lebensraum” being meant as a steady pool of necessary resources, blacksoils in the past, rich veins presently; rural-colonial presence being unnecessary other than “mining towns”, established for the sole purpose of extracting whatever goods was hidden in the earth for the benefit of the volk – be it the food formerly, oil and metals now. All this was “sprinkled” with moral philosophy which was meant to justify sacrifices made in its name as well as provide an excuse for errors and problems, which only grew in size and number with time.
Lusotropicalism would be greatly romanticized in Portuguese propaganda, used as a justification for colonialism
The Portuguese Bush War began in the early 60’s along with the other decolonization movements in Africa, though it grew in intensity by the middle of the decade. Opposition to decolonization was an important part of Portugal’s general policy on the international stage for which it was criticized by the west – though that criticism had little effect as the great colonial empires of Europe were at the same time waging their own wars to keep their possessions. Many African anti-colonial movements called for total independence of the overseas African territories from Portugal, invoking the right of nations for self-determination, of them, most demanding a Marxist-based system; nationalisms and “liberal western” influences being very weak in those areas, the revolutionary ideology being more appealing to the people. The Portuguese leadership tried to answer those calls by introducing new policies of “civilizing missions” in the colonies and sharing more of the interest generated from selling colonial natural wealth with the colonies themselves; Salazar even going so far as to propose “assimilation and multiracialism” in the colonies rather than an “apartheid” system as it was, much to the displeasure of Germany. Those efforts were in vain however, as with revolutionary forces growing stronger all over in Africa, the local rebels were able to gather more supporters and power while the promises of the colonial regime remained on paper only. The ultimate withdrawal from Central Africa by Britain in 1968 was an important moment for the revolutionary forces in Angola and Mozambique, as they were finally given a permanent “sanctuary” to hide in as well as a supply base – Soviet and Chinese weaponry being unloaded and provided for the forces in both east and west “Portuguese Africa”, Central African also becoming the place where their political and military leaderships would meet to better coordinate their struggles, their soldiers to receive training with the help of Soviet experts.
Salazar inspecting his troops in Africa
Initially being a number of loose militias living of terror and looted weapons, following no particular ideology other than fighting the fascist colonial regime, the rebels in Portuguese Africa had gotten a new face with the official formation of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 1964. While not the only organization fighting against Portugal, nor the only one to have a communist background, it was the only one to have direct Soviet backing and thus being more successful in its action. Support came through Belgian Congo and East Africa; many of the veterans of the wars in East Africa, Central Africa and Congo and other African conflicts coming to join them, the southern parts of Congo being utterly lawless and a “sanctuary” for all the failed rebels of Africa who fled the repercussions of their failed struggles during the 60’s. The organized paramilitary force was led by Ilidio Machado, initially having 7000 soldiers, but those being well trained and experienced in fighting guerrilla wars, as well as armed with modern weaponry provided by the USSR and China. Against them Portugal fielded a colonial army commanded by Venâncio Deslandes, being almost 50000 soldiers strong.
Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique. Difficult terrain was a huge logistical problem for infantry.
First clashes occurred in the northern parts of Angola, where Portuguese targets were attacked by forces from bases located in southern Congo, the rebels receiving logistic support and cover from the local population. This allowed them to quickly spread into the Angolan central heartland where they operated in small groups, attacking Portuguese military installations and posts – mostly the small ones, so as to break the soldiers morale, force them into operating in larger groups, thus leaving other areas less defended – Portuguese war resources being limited from the start. The forces of the MPLA grew in membership, especially once it allowed women to join its ranks, growing into a 15 000 strong force by 1968, while the Portuguese colonial forces grew smaller, not being given sufficient reinforcements. By 1970, the MPLA was strong enough in Angola to be able to launch terror attacks in urban zones – thought of as being “safe”. Explosions in Luanda and other cities shook both the local and metropolitan population, as colonial administration personnel died in the attacks – being proof of the war not going in Portugal’s favour despite propaganda claiming the contrary. Mozambique was not in a better situation, where the Marxist FRELIMO waged its own war against the Portuguese, mimicking the tactics of the MPLA, loosely collaborating with each other, holding meetings in Central Africa. This collaboration would only grow stronger with time, and with those two being the most successful anti-colonial fighting groups in Portuguese Africa, they would grow in size, influence, membership – and effectively take over (or destroy) other anti-colonial resistance movements, particularly those of “tribal identity” or “black nationalist” ideology – the Marxists aiming at being the only possible political representatives of the Angolans and Mozambicans at the international stage. The USSR supported that goal, stylizing itself as the “advocate” of the “oppressed people of Africa”, also being the major power to pressure Central Africa into allowing anti-Portuguese rebels on its soil and for them to organize better – eventually leading to the formation of the “United African Front for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea” in 1972 as the alliance of anti-Portuguese forces in Africa (and anti-Belgian/anti-South African to a degree) supported by the USSR and Central Africa – and being increasingly successful.
Portuguese commando infantrymen with a German assault rifle
The failings of the Portuguese colonial forces in keeping order led to a change in leadership, Venâncio Deslandes being replaced in 1971 with Francisco da Costa Gomes, his main mission on the new post being preparing and launching a major counter-offensive against the rebels. Starting in April 1971, the colonial army in Angola began a large, broad-front offensive with 35 thousand soldiers being used in the operation – many of them being commandos and special forces as well as mercenaries – the Portuguese Bush War becoming infamous as the first large-scale conflict where a state-power would use mercenaries in combat operations as well as heavily emphasize waging “irregular warfare” against its opponents. This tactic, while moderately successful at repelling rebels has also had big downsides – irregulars being left in the African jungles without direct command would often go rogue and act against orders, involve itself in criminal activity including war crimes (later blaming them on the rebels) or outright deserting, morale being not particularly high among the soldiers, especially the black ones. The nine-month offensive has been a short term success – while it managed to rid a large part of Angola of MPLA presence, it did not destroy it, its operatives either going into hiding and being sheltered by the locals or fleeing to Congo and Central Africa, Lisbon not allowing for the Army to pursue them there. The colonial army had been mostly ill-prepared for the situation at hand, still being locked in a conventional war mentality limiting its effectiveness – difficult terrain and logistics causing many fatalities from injuries, disease, poisonings, etc. Thus once the offensive was complete and the situation relaxed, the guerrillas would once again seep into the country to wreak havoc, bringing the situation back to square one. The entire operation had also been a great loss of face by Portugal due to a great deal of war crimes and other questionable conduct having taken place, including wholesale evacuation of tribes and village, forcing them deeper into Africa or even from Angola itself. Civilian casualties were high, as were desertions. While specifically denied to be that, the war in Portugal was becoming viewed as more and more as a “race war” between the whites and blacks by both the Portuguese people and the Africans - Portuguese denials to that being the case actually taken as a confirmation. German, Western and Soviet reports of the situation in Angola and Mozambique not making the situation better, as all of them kept the tune of the wars there being a conflict between “racist Portuguese whites” and “freedom fighting blacks”, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of that becoming just that – and helping the Africans in getting unity, fighting the war as a war of national, racial and class liberation at the same time, propaganda having something in store for anyone willing to fight.
MPLA child soldiers on a parade.
The “racial context” of the war was more complex though – Portugal not wanting it to descend into that territory and be viewed as such. The colonial regime had employed many blacks from the very start of the war and over time the ratio of black-to-white troops in the colonial army would actually rise. Whereas in 1963 the Portuguese forces in Mozambique would have about 10 000 whites and 5000 blacks, by 1971 it was 22 000 whites to 23 000 blacks. Portugal had little restrain toward promoting blacks as officers or creating mixed-race units, meant to both instill a sense of unity, tie the blacks closer with the state and dismiss claims of “racial segregation” in the army – the last one happening though, with plenty of units being “accidently” gathered in a way to make them mono-racial. The “anti-white war” card also wasn’t as effective among the rebels as a motivator as many had chosen to abandon their struggle when an opportunity arose – that mostly being offers of amnesty and financial gain in return for giving up arms and fighting. It was estimated that by 1971 about 8000 rebels had been “bought off” by the colonial administration or even turned against their former leaders. Nevertheless, the racial element of the war was among the more important reasons for Germany taking a rising interest in the war – next to the economic and ideological ones.
The colonial wars has had an extremely negative effect on the Portuguese economy, using up much of its resources – in 1971, the war effort’s cost took up 40% of Portugal’s budget and was expected to grow. Many young people were reluctant to participate in the war, choosing emigration instead – mostly to France and the UK, an estimated 1.5 million Portuguese leaving the country in the 60’s. Political parties were established “in exile” as well as at home in hiding – such as the “Communist Party of Portugal” - though it never truly dissolved, members keeping its individual cells going, waiting for an opportunity to re-emerge. Student groups were the ones taking the most active stance against both the war and repressive governmental policies, being the ones where both communist as well as democratic sentiments were the strongest. This would be the source of the Student Crisis which occurred in 1965, when in a “preventive move” the PIDE secret police arrested a number of students suspected of being tied with communist groups, a number of student associations also being declared closed. This had caused an outrage, leading to a boycott of school lessons by the Portuguese students in Lisbon, who demanded the release of their friends and re-opening the closed associations. The reaction to the boycott were further repressions and arrests coupled with expulsions from universities. The spiral of tensions went even further with a massive student demonstration taking place in November 1965 in Lisbon that was suppressed by riot police. The result had been over two dozen wounded, many being expelled from school or transferred – and many teachers resigning from the universities as a sign of protest and solidarity with the students. Tensions and anti-governmental sentiment grew, with the economy getting worse, war weariness growing and the repressions of the government becoming less tolerable for the general population which would become more outspoken about demanding reforms and change.
Student demonstration in Lisbon, 1965
Under these circumstances, Lisbon was forced to look for relief, and Berlin was an obvious destination. Germany had itself good reasons to participate in the war in Africa, initially economical and “prestigious”, but the ideological ones grew in importance – especially among the internal opposition towards chancellor Hanke. The war had disrupted many of the key facilities extracting resources meant for Germany and has also led to a general increase in prices of goods sold by Portugal despite OMEWZE regulations – the possibility of ending, or at least calming the situation being understood as a way of restoring balance and lowering the cost of imports (Germany having troubles affording substitutes to Portuguese resources on the free market). Military presence in Angola and Mozambique would also grant Germany enormous leverage in future relations with Portugal as it would give them significant control over those colonies – the German Kriegsmarine being significantly more powerful than the Portuguese navy, should a conflict arise. That the rebels in Africa had been “open communists” also did help, as despite the détente being in operation, Germany never abandoned its goal of “containing communism” in every part of the globe – that being realistically a great boon to Germany in foreign affairs as it almost universally considered as a “more certain ally” when it came to fighting communists. Many South American or post-colonial states would turn to it specifically for that reason, fear of communism and revolution being the central point of their political views (or their propaganda which they used to keep the population scared). Upholding the image of a stalwart “bulwark against communism” opened many doors in terms of military alliances, followed by military equipment sales and trade, and later into outright mutually-beneficial politico-economic cooperation.
Antonio Salazar in Berlin, greeted with the traditional salute.
Initially German involvement in Angola and Mozambique was limited to stationing guard troops in many facilities and areas deemed “strategically important” by the Germans, relieving the Portuguese there from duty and allowing them to participate in actual fighting. Germans had been present in Africa even before that, as Portugal used a great deal of German weapons and equipment, German instructors and trainers educating the Portuguese, as well as gathering information of their weapons performance in combat situation and difficult climate/terrain. The first batch of German troops was only 3000 strong – less than what was sent to Thailand – who arrived in Angola and Mozambique in early 1972. This development barely made it to the world press, as it was only reported in the sixth and eight page of the “Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung” and “Völkischer Beobachter” respectively, “The Guardian” placing a mention of it on the fifth, while “The Daily Telegraph” failed to report it at all. Despite that, it would be a turning point in the Portuguese Bush War – for the first time, Germans would be the ones to shoot African anti-colonial militias, as well as being shot at by them, suffering first loses.
Just as Portugal had been greatly unprepared to wage an irregular war in the Angolan jungle and deserts, only getting the hang of it in the later years, neither was Germany despite observing the war for some time; in both cases, “conventional warfare” training received at home before dispatch was inadequate for the situation the soldiers would be placed in. Traditional German tactics of emphasizing squad automatic weapons as the main firepower of a team, supported by a marksmen and riflemen were effective in open terrain, but not in areas densely covered by vegetation. German air support was also limited, as it was still the Portuguese air force that was present in Angola and Mozambique, not the Luftwaffe. German soldiers would often act against orders when engaged by rebels, pursuing them into the wilderness despite their objective being protecting sites, not taking action – which was to be done by the Portuguese. But low morale, slow reaction time, linguistic barriers and racial prejudice had all come to affect the entire “cooperation”, Portuguese soldiers not reacting to German calls for reinforcements or demands for taking action against fleeing opponents, failures of capturing/killing them being blamed by the Germans on the lack of Portuguese professionalism. Low-tier officers and NCOs would demand from their superiors to be allowed to be given a more free hand in dealing with threats. Racial issues would also arise, Germans not wanting to be ordered around by African-Portuguese military personnel, who were also most often blamed for all failures – the entire Portuguese policy of allowing blacks into the administration and military being reported as the reason for continued failings of the Portuguese to suppress the rebellions. The German command would allow for greater involvement of the German military in combat situation, also dispatching the SS to Angola, mimicking the Portuguese use of commandos and counter-irregulars; special training grounds would also be erected in Angola meant for arriving Germans to receive special training in the new environment; the main German boot-camp being “Camp Lettow-Vorbeck” outside Lobito. The first Commander in Chief of the German Forces in West Africa, who would also be responsible for setting up much of the German military doctrine in irregular African warfare would be Genaralmajor Siegfried Muller – who would also be one of the most controversial personas in the Portuguese Civil War, both due to the unquestionable effectiveness of his policies and actions – as well as their costs, in human lives and material loses.
Genaralmajor Siegfried Muller, Commander in Chief of the German Forces in West Africa
Portuguese commanders would be quite welcoming to German “demands”, as for them greater German involvement meant lower casualties and less engagement. This of course wasn’t what the Germans expected, as their goal was for them to be an addition to the war, not a replacement. Yet increasing freedom of action on Angola and Mozambique went hand in hand with more troops and equipment being sent there – in 1974 already 12 000 Germans would be present in Angola alone, another 8000 in Mozambique. The German Luftwaffe would also mark their presence, acting not only as scouts but also close air support and strategic bombardment. Germany would have much less reservations against taking action in Central Africa in Congo leading to numerous bombing runs taking place there against rebel encampments there. Germany would take a much more active approach against fighting the insurgents and initially, it would show to be effective – German organization and material superiority managing to effectively protect supply lines across the colonies, untold checkpoints being established helping in controlling population movements (and rebel maneuvers, hampering their preparations). German tactics would encourage sending large units for long patrols so as to allow them to get a better grasp of the situation and come up with innovations and take up initiatives – Portuguese tactics of re-acting to rebel activity and protecting urban areas/strategically important sites being deemed as “too defensive”. Those were couple with extreme brutality however – German commands had for example established quotas on how many rebels ought to have been captured/killed in every operation, leading to the soldier capturing o killing civilians when not faced with resistance (the rebels having escaped). German soldiers were outright exempted from any liability for war crimes, Berlin openly stating the MPLA and FRELIMO were not protected by the Geneva Conventions, justifying harsh repressions. Looting had also been de facto allowed by the Germans, gathering “African souvenirs” becoming something popular among the German soldiers. On the other hand, the German command did not introduce rotations in service in Africa – those sent were meant to stay there for as long as necessary, leading to those who have managed to survive becoming battle-hardened veterans – while also leading many who sought to escape service into self-mutilation. The war in Angola and Mozambique would be called the “African adventure” by many Germans, expectations being a quick victory in a manner of months, two years at worst – expectations which would not be met.
German soldiers on a raft in Africa.
