Next part is up by MSZ.
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With the withdrawal of the Portuguese forces from Angola and Mozambique, the war in south Africa has entered a new phase. For the first time since the Great War, Germany has acquired a colonial empire of its own, one it did not have to share with anyone else. And although the conquest of Africa was not the cornerstone of Nazi philosophy, this attitude has changed as the war progressed. With time, ambitions grew, and so did grand visions. In the eyes of Nazis, Portuguese withdrawal was to finally allow Germany to do things “their way” and grant victory. The very concept of “Victory!” has become something of a “spiritual” goal the Nazi party presented to the people, partly to the regular Nazi ideology being largely spent. Despite decades having past, Germany still did not achieve the status of the world’s greatest power, nor did it have a “satisfactory” place under the sun. Autarky has not been achieved, and in fact the German people where living poorer lives than their neighbours in the west. Even the difference between it and its eastern neighbors were getting narrower, to the point where countries like Czechia, Slovakia and western Poland actually managed to exceed German eastern provinces like Prussia or Pomerania in terms of wealth. With most of the Reich having become officially “Judenrein” in the 70’s, Germany lost its main “internal enemy” against which it could mobilize its population and fight. It was also mostly cleansed of Slaves (except a small minority in Silesia and the Sudetenland) over which Germans could rule. The Germans were thus left with only the satisfaction of being able to rule other countries - but not the satisfaction of ruling large swathes of other people who would obey them. Dark-skinned and curly-haired blacks in Africa thus made a good substitute in the eyes of Nazi philosophers for a people to become the designated “servant race” – a great numbers of “savages” that a handful of Germans would rule over, like the German Spartans over the Black helots. It would create a situation where even the lowest of the Germans would be better than the highest of the natives. That was supposed to give the Germans the sense of superiority they needed, and which they were gradually losing. Although the Reich was still scoring successes in many selected areas – conquest of space, nuclear technology, genetics, sports – it was losing the race with the west in down to earth matters, like providing housing, decent cars or a diverse, cheap diet. Protests against the worsening situation were taking place in German cities and brutally suppressed by the police. The number of “anti-fascist” organizations was on the rise, as was corruption in state institutions. German industry was growing increasingly obsolete, the troubles of the humongous state conglomerates being “solved” by mergers or nationalization of private enterprises. That in turn increased unemployment and only served to cover up the flaws of the entire fascist economic system. Lack of development in Germany had overall allowed the countries of central Europe to catch up to Germany in term of economics and motivated their populations to try and seek other trade partners. German culture popular except those of its products from the pre-Nazi eras. Despite the broad personal autonomy German abroad enjoyed, the number of Volksdeutche was shrinking. And that wasn’t due to them returning to Germany in large numbers, but due to them either assimilating with the locals or migrating to the west or to Scandinavia. Thus for the Germans, their main source of national pride was their powerful army that forced respect among foreigners and was claimed to be able to defeat any foe.
9/11 celebrations in Berlin, 1980
The war in Africa was thus not just a “landgrab”, but also an ideological matter – to show the invincibility of the German Army, stopping the “rising tide of colour” and “securing the safe and prosperous future of white children”. Because the conflict was seen as an existential one, and conducted against an “uncivilized” opponent, the regular rules on the conduct of warfare were quickly thrown aside. Africa has become a field testing place for new kinds of weaponry – herbicidal agents, thermobaric bombs, even chemical and biological weapons. It was an open secret that Germany had been spreading both tropical and European diseases amongst the African population against which it had vaccinated its own soldiers, along with denying access to medicine for the sick civilians. Rumors spread about the development of “ethnic bioweapon” that would target only people of a certain ethnic or racial background. It would also become a long lasting rumor that HIV virus that was destroying much of central Africa and later spread across the world started out as a German bioweapon. And it would be no secret that Germany had been using dum-dum bullets during the war. The war served as stimulus for the development of conventional weaponry as much as much as exotic ones, most commonly dealing with the lower durability of German equipment in the fields and its lower resistance to the elements, along with difficult and costly maintenance.
Spread of chemical-biological agents in northern Mozambique. The German colonial war would greatly raise concerns about chemical and biological warfare and whether the indirect use of such agents was legal. Much has been done in attempts to modify and amend the Geneve and Hague conventions on warfare to make them suited for modern warfare and technological conditions.
Germany was not alone in the war. Despite Portuguese withdrawal and the non-participation of the mittleeuropa countries, the Germans have had the State of South Africa as an ally. South Africa has been coming closer ideologically towards Germany for some time, though it never abandoned its democratic character. The apartheid system was becoming more harsh however. Blacks were banned from many sorts of economic activities and trades, denied the right to vote or assume political offices, not allowed at all in some areas of the country or cities. Different criminal and administrative laws were introduced for whites and blacks. Black districts in cities were liquidated, their inhabitants forced to move to squats outside towns or even to reservations. South Africa had thus become a de facto “Racial State” where ones race determined his position in society, even though officially apartheid was meant just separate the populations. And for a long time, it made the impression it was working. South Africa was the most developed African country. When on the rest of the continent colonial wars took place, South Africa enjoyed peace and development, growing rich from exports of its natural resources and machinery. Even though blacks were second or third class citizens, they still lived in better conditions than elsewhere on the continent. South Africa was even one of the main destinations of blacks escaping the war-torn countries of Africa, despite those immigrants well knowing what fate would befell them after entering.
The influx of blacks moving from the north was faced with resistance by the white population and the government. The idea of the “rising tide of colour” was deeply ingrained in the minds of south Africans. The fate that befell the French, British, Belgians and even the Portuguese and Italians was considered proof that the “anti-colonialists” were in fact “anti-white” and sought to purge “white civilization” from Africa. The borders were thus tightly controlled by the military, border guards units and even volunteers in the form of minutemen militias. Many acts of violence were reported, illegals being shot dead without warning, even pursued when fleeing back northwards by attack helicopters. Vigilantism within the country was on the rise, illegals being caught in roundups by both police and vigilante groups. Those caught were at best deported back. Others who were less lucky were subjected to special courts meant for “illegal aliens”, the punishment for illegally entering the country being prison, forced labour and sterilization. Over the decades, more than two millions Africans were subjected to this fate. Hundreds of thousands were even killed, as the law did not punish those who killed those “attempting escape”.
African prisoners in Ingwavuma prison camp.
With time, the brutality aggressiveness and impunity of radicals grew. Paramilitary organizations formed out of militias and vigilantes as they began to cooperate more. Those almost always had a very racist mindset and were usually the most ardent supporters of close cooperation – political and military – with Nazi Germany. They benefited from the fact that police usually left a blind eye on their excesses, or even welcomed their participation in “crime fighting. Their members commonly took the role of “night watchmen” in white cities, looking out for blacks, and the organization was overall popular within law enforcement agencies, many members serving in them. Also the general apathy of the white population that didn’t care about what happened to the blacks, accepting the “they committed crimes and thus were properly punished” as good and proper. Eventually this gave rise to the Afrikaaner Resistance Movement, initially a Boer-separatist organization, that quickly turned into a general white supremacist political group. AWB effectively played on the populations sense of fear, fear from blacks, criminals, communists, liberals, “tribalists” – all those who opposed apartheid or who wanted “equal coexistence” with blacks, painting them as “race traitors” and “fifth columnists”. Initially elitist and meant solely for Afrikaaners, it changed its attitude when non-afrikaaner supporters began flowing to it. Its popularity came from its radicalism and anti-communism among the middle class combined with the “cool factor” of “uniformed armed people fighting bad guys” among the youth. AWB propaganda showed the European empires which withdrew from Africa as “weak and decadent”, alongside with the effects of their withdrawal – lynches of remaining whites, collapse of infrastructure, disorder, poverty, famine, disease. Thus from a small paramilitary group with a minimal political agenda concentrated around the issue of creating a separate Boer State in south Africa, it became a major political force, representing those supporting total resistance towards “black and communist aggression” and those who felt that the ruling National Party was “going soft”.
Entering parliament in 1977 with only 12% of the votes, it scored a great victory in 1981 when in gathered 29%, mostly at the expanse of the National Party with which in entered a coalition – thereby ensuring the preservation of the apartheid system and the impunity for anti-black violence. While commonly linked to the Nazis and described as “South African fascists”, that wasn’t really the case though, as AWB did not oppose the democratic system of South Africa. In fact it used it well, pushing through its desired reforms in the form of great “personal autonomy” for Boers and Afrikaaners in South Africa, along with the formation of an additional Province of South Africa – Volkstaat. The Volkstaat was the smallest of the provinces, as it was in fact composed of a few dozen villages scattered around the State of South Africa, being enclaves within other larger provinces. It also wasn’t opposed totally to the presence of blacks in South Africa, and was in fact supported keeping the “reservations” system that allowed certain African tribes to keep cultural autonomy within them. Some African tribes even supported the AWB directly due to its anti-communist character – since most of the militant “Black Marxist” movements in Africa were opposed to Africans having tribal identities, fighting to destroy it, replacing it with general “African” identity.
AWB soldier in uniform.
Apartheid did have opponents, both in parliament and in the streets. It was opposed by the blacks who suffered from being second class citizens, if even citizens at all – that privilege not being given out lightly and being possible to take away in court verdicts, in the later era even by administrative decision. It was also opposed by the socialist and liberal elements of the political opposition, the former due to ideology, the latter due to the economic and political isolation it pushed South Africa into, along with the negative economic effects it had domestically. Also “Black Nationalist” movements abroad were strongly against it, such groups forming in the USA, Botswana and East Africa. The two largest politico-military organizations fighting for the rights of the Blacks were the nationalist African Liberation Movement, centered in Botswana and led by Frantz Fanon, and the Marxist-populist African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo. Both those organizations took their most recognized form of “political formations with paramilitary wings” in the 60’s, after South Africa withdrew from the British Commonwealth and apartheid was getting worse. Initially they cooperated with each other officially, along with the many other anti-apartheid and anti-colonial groups that formed in that period. Over time they absorbed many of those smaller movements becoming the two completely dominant ones on the political scene – and thus also becoming competitors in the battle for the hearts and minds of the African blacks. Their politics, while remaining similar in the agenda of “liberating the continent” and the means by which to achieve it, was different in terms of social philosophy and domestic policy. Nevertheless both of them received great material support from the anti-fascist powers of the world, primarily the USSR. Their form of struggle was also slightly different. Whereas the ALM based its terrorism directly against the apartheid system and its enforcers, attacking “whites only” restaurants, public buildings, police stations, party offices, the vigilante/minutemen militias, the ANC held a campaign aimed against the entire socio-political system of South Africa, thus having a much more “total” character – attacking train stations, mines, planting explosives in grazing areas and general public places. This radicalism made it slightly more hated by the apartheidists, which also made it slightly more popular among the general population. Whereas the ALM was willing to achieve some of its goals through compromise and diplomacy, the ANC was more adamant about having its way with the use of force. The ALM had however actual support of Botswana unlike the ANC, which was only tolerated by the government. Thus whereas the ALM was seen as a “better” representative of the interests of South African Blacks outside South Africa, the ANC was more popular in it. The exception was Namibia tough, where it would be the ALM that was the more popular party, thanks to its adamant stance about Namibian independence.
Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo at ANC rally.
The fight of the ANC and ALM against South Africa and of the MPLA and FRELIMO against the Germans would become tied to each other. It was easy for fascists, apartheidists and other radicals to combine the fight of the Marxists against the capitalists with the fight of the blacks against the whites. The propaganda effort in both Germany and South Africa presented the blacks as communists creating a “single front” against “white civilization”. Unity and fighting together was to fend off the attacker and bring victory. Together with South Africa’s isolation on the global political scene, an alliance with Germany was thus only a matter of time. Both countries cooperated in intelligence gathering and espionage, held joint maneuvers and exercises, trading African resources for German weaponry and machines. South Africa allowed for Germany to move troops through its territory between Angola and Mozambique, was place of R&R and Germany even used its military bases for training conscripts, making them more used to the African climate. This alliance went from a military and economic one to a political and ideological one. Visions were made of a future “lebensraum” being created in south Africa, spanning South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, possibly even Botswana and the Republic of Central Africa as a huge german protectorate. Even in South Africa such a vision of a “Greater South Africa” had followers who saw themselves as the governors of such an empire. Such grand ideas were not only made by the fascists. The communists had their own visions of “final victory” that was to bring the end of “white rule” and liberating the continent from colonialism. From the ashes, were supposed to arise new soviet republics bringing the dawn of a brighter future, to be combined into a Union of Social Soviet South African Republics, and later on to be the foundation of the African Union of Social Soviet Republics.
Propaganda piece from the era. The idea that the massive riches of Africa could guarantee prosperity to anyone in control over them stimulated the fantasies of many.
The total character of these visions translated into the total character of the war. With Portugal withdrawing and extremism on the rise in South Africa, the war was becoming less of a war of conquest and more a war of extermination. Though the ideologists wanted to have their “masses” of lower-race servants, the realism of others pointed out the impossibility of keeping in check such an excessive amount of “helots”. As Werner Jarowinsky, the Minister of Propaganda said during the NSDAP Parteitag rally in in 1986:
This was a rather dark prophecy, and the belief of the righteousness of this view created a dangerous mentality. Since the total population of Africans was to be “reduced” either way, reducing it during military actions was becoming acceptable. This was an euphemism used to excuse actions conducted specifically against civilians. German propaganda officially stood on the position where the local population should be “repatriated” to Botswana or the Republic of Central Africa. The desire to move them was described as a “security measure”. As “enemy combatants” were hiding among the civilian population that did not expose them, the logical move was to have the civilians move – otherwise they would risked “being in crossfire”. Germany offered both Botswana and the CAR the “temporarily relocate” the Angolan and Mozambiquan populations a number of times, only to be rebuffed. This in turn led to Germany shedding itself of the responsibility for civilians deaths. It further justified its action claiming the right of nations for self-determination, pointing out that both in Angola and Mozambique (and South Africa), the black populations came from tribes not native to that land, being “colonists just as much as the whites”. On the other hand, the Marxist forces also casually spoke of having to “decimate” or “kill every second” white person in Africa to liberate it, along with expelling the remains. This spiral of hostility preserved the notion that the conflict could only be ended with the total victory of one of the sides – which would also mean not the defeat, but the utter elimination and extermination of the other.
Germany engaged more and more soldiers as the fight went on. Whereas in 1980 there would be 150.000 German soldiers in Angola and Mozambique, by 1990 that number would grow to 250.000. Casualties rose as well, from a few hundred to a few thousand a year. The losses on the other side were significantly higher though, counted no longer in hundreds of thousands but over a million. The war was becoming significantly more “professional”, as the guerilla forces were made up of veterans of multiple anti-colonial African conflicts little by experienced and battle hardened commanders – some of which started their fight already in the 50’s, now being in the war business for the fourth decade. These were supported by specialists and equipment from the USSR and China, flying in larger and larger to Botswana and the CAR. And on top of that, the strong pro-African sentiment in the USA and UK led to much more high-tech weaponry going there too. Both of those countries served as sanctuaries for the partizans, holding training grounds, supply depots, hospitals and command. Escalating the conflict by attacking targets in those countries was not unusual. And the lack of concrete effects of that escalation crippled morale of both the soldiers and civilians. The war began to lose sense. The destruction of the infrastructure made the African colonies completely unprofitable, not exporting anything. Africa was not a desired destination for German colonists, and the entire colonial movement in Germany was failing. Most Germans were more interested in getting a flat in a large city or a house in a smaller one near it than a piece of land in either Bosnia or Africa. Draft dodging began to increase. Dissent with the war was expressed by women’s organizations and even some of the veterans. These were quickly dissolved and members arrested. Germany experienced a witch hunt for “cowards, defeatists and pacifists”. However, and underlying feeling that the population was not happy with the war and was not willing to sacrifice their lives and wealth for it grew. This was especially true in south Germany, where churches and monasteries often served as a way to escape service or the Gestapo. Anti-war sentiment was becoming one of the more important issues of german counter-culture and the “youth rebellion” which didn’t want to go to war – unlike their fathers and grandfathers who fought in Yugoslavia and the Great War.
FRELIMO guerillas. Anti-colonial warfare had gone a long way since its early years, largely due to some guerilla war taking place in some part of the world pretty much since the start of the cold war. This led to countries like the USSR devoting military R&D to “irregular warfare”, products of which were for example portable SAM launchers or “silent” car engines.
Western criticism of Germany sounded hypocritical when remembering how long the western empires fought their own wars in colonies. But there were considerable differences in how they conducted their wars and how Germany did it. Germany barely hid the fact that its war was aimed not just against enemy combatants, but the entire population of Angola and Mozambique. Scaring them away into fleering anywhere else was considered desirable. The Reich pretty much waived the Geneva convention on the conduct of warfare. What the west usually cynically referred to as “collateral damage” was planned operations for the Nazis. Global public opinion was increasingly believing that Germany was truly intending to keep the fighting going until the enemy was exterminated, not just beaten. What used to be thought of as “propaganda slogans” was now being read literally. The acts of Germany during its colonial period in Africa before the Great War were reminded in press and literature. The motivation to resist Germany by the west increased, especially in the USA were there was a strong sense of solidarity with the black population, and anti-colonial sentiment was still present – German excesses being seen as the logical conclusion of European imperialism. American support marked a turning point in the conflict, as it would provide the rebels with humongous amounts of hard currency needed for the war effort. Already in 1985 did American intelligence services begin the secret “Operation Pulse”. The operation was un umbrella endeavor for providing American support for the African rebels, ranging from weapons and cash supplies being sent to Africa to training camps being constructed in the USA mainland for American blacks, to be sent to Africa as “volunteers”. Much of this operation ended up being conduct together with the Soviet KGB. As archives would reveal in the future, soviet intelligence caught wind of the American operation early on and offered support. This translated into much of American equipment going to Africa doing so through Russia first. This combination of the experience held by African veterans, armed with modern western weaponry and frenzied with communist zeal gave a mixture that would prove lethal to both the Germans and the South Africans, who would be bleeding out in the unending war.
German diplomacy failed completely at the task of trying to justify the war in international eyes or getting any allies. Both Angola and Mozambique would acquire international recognition despite German attempts to the contrary. The African tribes that once supported the Portuguese turned against the Germans. Subtle works of diplomacy and intelligence to try and play “divide and conquer” failed spectacularly, leading to the formation of a true, trans-African resistance movement. Though to be fair, it wasn’t just the diplomats fault. The Reich Foreign Ministry was consistently obstructed in its efforts by the military which did not want “politicians messing with military matters”. The autonomy the military enjoyed, insulation from responsibility and lack of civilian oversight except for political NSDAP overwatch, was turning against its intent. Initially introduced for the purpose of increasing efficiency in military administration and thus strengthening the state, it turned against the state as it practically lost control over its militaries doings. Rather than being a tool of foreign policy and means of applying pressure, it started to carry out foreign policy in Africa itself without caring for the diplomats doings. War was no longer waged for the purpose of reaching some goal, but for the sake of waging it. Diplomats and intelligence officers would secretly negotiate treaties with tribes or some other authorities, inform the military about it – only to be answered with military attacks on those who were being negotiated with. Ambitious officers wanting to “prove themselves” would carry out attacks on non-hostile targets who were persuaded to lay down their arms in return for peace just to score a “successful operation” – only for the remnants from that attack to join up with the nearest resistance group. That soldiers were ordered into doing despicable things would be news that would make it to Europe despite censorship, lowering morale and respect for the uniform. The Wehrmacht became a universally despised force that created a general sentiment of resistance towards all whites. In this way, it contributed to what the USSR referred to as “the triumph of internationalism” – Angolans being just as eager to fight in Angola as well as South Africa, Congolese fighting the Belgians one month, changing to fight in Namibia the other, the fighters of ANC and ALM joining he fights in Katanga. This spread of the war was the main reason for which the war would start to be called the “south African war” as often as the “German Colonial War” – creating an appearance of Germany being solely responsible for all the violence there.
German propaganda. Germany commonly associated itself if “Europeanness”, its “mission” in Africa being carried out in the name of all of Europe or “white people”. This led to many Africans coming to despise all Europeans in the long run, as national consciousness wasn’t developed well in Africa. Most African used race or tribe as their prime group of “self-determination”, applying the same to “the whites”, assuming their war being fought against all of them, regardless of nationality.
The battles of the south Africa war was waged in offices and public media sphere just as much as on the battlefields. The general sentiment towards the war in the west was to a significant degree the result of an international disinformation campaign conducted by the USSR. The Soviet KGB infiltrated and sponsored many political parties, organization, even media corporations and individual journalists. Many “anti-war” NGO’s were formed in response to the war who criticized the war and gained influence in both national governments and international organizations. An example was the World Peace Council, formed by the Soviet Cominform, that was financed by the KGB and managed to even obtain permanent representation in the League of Nations offices in Geneva. In the post-colonial world, the USSR would even start their own news companies, be they newspapers, radios or even tv networks, using the natural anti-colonial sentiment there to create an anti-German sentiment, indirectly affecting the politics of the BCoN and the UK itself. Many of the rumors that surrounded the war had their sources in Soviet disinformation, such as the accusations of using biological and radiological weapons there. That Germany did in fact commit many “stone-age era atrocities” (as written many time in the Washington Post) made many of such claims believable and put German diplomacy and propaganda on the defensive - where it failed badly. Germany was incapable of even effectively stopping the spread of such information into the Reich itself, much of which would also arrive via the countries of Mitteleuropa, which were not very motivated in trying to whitewash the Germans. Western newspapers smuggled to central Europe through Greece and the USSR made it into secret circulation. In fact, the USSR would even create its own print works, making forged American newspapers with specifically prepared articles for the purpose of throwing them into the hands of the people of central Europe to further anti-German sentiment.
The USSR’s power would go far beyond its obvious military strength, its influence in foreign media, corporations, NGO’s and political parties often making a bigger impact than its state diplomacy.
The war in Africa had shaken the Germans confidence in themselves and their capabilities. With the war getting so prolonged, and “African syndrome” was born that reduced the Germans willingness to send the army to far away places for an undetermined period of time. This was one of the reason why Germany never got itself involved directly in the Arab-Iranian War, even after the Soviets joined in, and despite the fact that the German army was much better prepared for fighting a conventional war like the one in Persia than a guerilla war like in Africa. Germany had an increase in social conflicts as well, primarily between the lower and higher classes. As draft dodging increased (with over 15.000 being in hiding by 1980 and 3000 imprisoned for it), it became apparent that it was the poorer Germans that were sent to Africa more often, those of the middle class or higher allowed to stay in Germany. Similar sentiments were held against the “Nazi aristocracy”. While the Nazis still claimed to be a “volkish” movement, it was apparent for a long time that it was in fact elitists, with the “higher up” party members and their families being greatly privileged and immune from legal responsibility. During the war, this translated into being allowed not to serve, or be given officer positions before experienced veterans. The latter has proven especially damaging, as it created a sentiment among much of the grunts that competence no longer mattered in the military career. It also created a feeling of association, that “all Officers are Nazis”, leading to both being disliked. The Wehrmacht became entangled in political battles between the “political” and “non-political” factions, the latter gradually losing. And such battles sometimes even resulted in bloodshed, incidents of “friendly fire” against ones superior officer that gave his second in command a field promotion becoming not unheard of – an estimated 2 for every thousand promotion being the result of killing ones superior while “in the field” in some way that “didn’t leave fingerprints”.
But despite it all, anti-war sentiment was still practically illegal in Germany, not tolerated even among the highest ranking politicians. Those who held such views had to hide them, or disguise them under the veil of wanting a “change in strategy” or “trying a different approach”. And they were few, being either those who had to deal with the crumbling finances of the war and the economic toll it took on the country, and the military minds who saw the war from a Eurocentric perspective – the effects it had on German capability of fighting a war in Europe. Not surprisingly those few that “secretly” did not follow the official party line were those who hailed from the same circles as the strongest anti-nazis in the country – the catholic south and the poorer industrial workers. Their ideas of Africa usually revolved around loosening the racial character of the war and trying to recruit more of the locals, finding a compromise with the rebels by dividing Angola and Mozambique with them, trying to exchange Mozambique for Namibia with South Africa, trying to broker a peace treaty directly with the USSR, and other proposals. None of them were implemented, as the neo-agrarian faction was determined in maintaining a hardcore stance and achieve victory through German strength alone and through hard power. Even at the costs of lives that this would mean and with support for the entire Nazi regime in Germany falling to historical lows.
Flag burning in Gottingen. “University cities” would often be the ones were anti-regime “incidents” took place.
The turning point in the war was the so called Ganguela Offensive of 1989. “Ganguela” was term used in reference to both the territory and the people of east Angola, where the MPLA had its strongholds and where German presence was significantly weaker. For years, Germany mostly just undertook raids in that area to terminate bases, strongholds and supply routes, also bombarding the area heavily. This was thought to be sufficient to contain the guerilla forces in what was called a “strategic suppressive fire” - keeping the opposition under constant bombing runs to deny them initiative. Yet despite overwhelming amounts of ordnance being used, the MPLA still managed to scramble a large offensive that reached all the way into the Bie Plateau. While halted and pushed back after a few weeks of fighting, the offensive had proven that the war was far from over, that the Africans could yet take the initiative and do large scale offensives. This was a huge boon for the anti-German crowd, the entire offensive often depicted as a military failure of the German military. And while it wasn’t the case and the offensive had cost the MPLA a great deal of men, it was certainly a huge propaganda success and shook the German leadership greatly. Even more important than the entire seven week offensive was just one particular event that took place during this campaign – the liberation of the Luando Camp.
That Germany and Portugal had organized a system of prisoner camps in both Angola and Mozambique was not a secret. These camps hailed from the times of the very beginning of the war, when Portugal had attempted to “reeducate” captured POWs, or try and find potential allies for themselves among them, such as those who were drafted into Marxist service by force. With time, that role was gradually reduced and the camps took a more traditional role of “prison camps”, later expanded into “labor camps” and eventually also coming to be the place of sentence for political and regular criminals. The grand majority of these camps were constructed in the west of Angola, near the coast, and under heavy security. But as the war went on and the rules of engagement changed, so did the goals and operation of camps. They started to become “concentration camps” to which entire villages or tribes were deported due, often for little reason, in what amounted to an ethnic cleansing campaign – by 1989, around a 600.000 people were estimated to be kept in camps of various sorts. The conditions in them were terrible, their quality dropping, more being constructed hastily in the centre of the country away from prying eyes. These practices were pointed out as yet another example of German barbarity in Africa, and justifications that generally revolved around he claim of the UK doing the same thing during the Boer War amounted to little. The Luando Camp was one of such camps, designated as a concentration camp for “suspected insurgents and their collaborators”, constructed 150 kilometers east of Andulo in an isolated part of the country and according to gathered intelligence being one of the larger ones, keeping over 50.000 people. One part of the Ganguela offensive was an attack on the camp system with the intent of liberating them and gaining recruits, as well as to use them as living proof of the crimes that Germany was committing in Angola on a regular basis.
Satellite image of Luando Camp Prison Complex, or Konzentrationslager Luando
The attack on the camp took place on June 16 1989, with a force of 1200 MPLA soldiers managing to come close to the camp without detection. With one group attacking the barracks of the nearby German “guard battalion” and another striking directly against the camp simultaneously and with the element of surprise, the camp was quickly taken as the defenders were outnumbered, poorly trained and did not obtain reinforcements. The barracks attack was also successful, the Guard Batallion being defeated and routed, many fleeing. This victory allowed the MPLA to not only take over the camps, but also its entire documentation and archives, thus revealing the horrible truth behind it – the concentration camp being in fact a “death camp”, inmates being expected to die or were executed, by firing squad or used as guinea pigs in medical experiments. Bodies of the deceased were burned and buried in mass graves. Additionally, information was gathered that Luando wasn’t the only one of the “concentration camps” where such pactices took place. This revelation had led to the captured Germans being summarily executed by the attackers, the inmates fleeing and releasing the truth to the entire world. In this, war correspondent Peter Arnett participated in covering the story of the entire attack (officially having gone to Botswana as a member of the International Red Cross and illegally joining in with a MPLA band – a common practice encouraged by the Marxist leadership who knew of the benefits of the war being reported for their side) also covering it on video tape. With the camp documentation being gathered, the MPLA leaders surrendered it entirely to Arnett who quickly made his way back to Botswana and to the USA, where they would be released, to the shock of the entire world.
Peter Arnett during the Ganguela offensive. Germany did not allow war correspondents in Angola and Mozambique and did not have policies in place to protect those who entered illegally, making those who dared to cover the war highly praised.
While Germany denied the authenticity of the “Luando papers”, their authenticity was proven very quickly. In fact, it were the newspaper publishers that demanded their authenticity to be confirmed, along with the American government. The Luando papers, going back 15 years, detailed the entire operation of the camp, from the first transports of prisoners, the labor they were forced to do, orders to deny the inmates medical assistance, orders of executions in order to “make room” for more, the conditions in the camps that led to massive death tolls, the medical experiments conducted there, even accounting books that detailed the costs of the camp. It also had many names of German soldiers, doctors, officers and politicians that knew of the camps operation, means and goals. And it had detailed information about its victims, including many of their names, tribes, origin and time of demise. As counted, the Luando camp claimed the lives of over 250.000 people, 200.000 of which took place in the last 5 years when it was entirely German run with no other oversight (an element strongly emphasized by the Portuguese, who defended themselves from accusations of participation by claiming the camp was a “regular” camp for as long as they knew of it). The story of the Luando camp, along with the video footage of the Ganguela offensive earned Peter Arnett the Pulitzer prize and worldwide fame, along with serious questions about how many other “Luandos” there were in Africa, and what was the total toll off the war.
Human remains collected from one of the mass graves discovered around Luando. After the Luando papers were leaked, much of the documentation in other such camps were destroyed, making an exact count on how many have perished in them impossible, and one of the dirty secrets of the war hidden away in German State Archives.
That Germany was under universally condemned was an understatement. Numerous countries severed relations with Germany in answer to the Luando scandal and German reaction (or rather, lack of thereof) to it. This included the most important ones, the USSR, China and India. Also, the Holy See had annulled the concordat in answer to the scandal. Unilateral sanctions against Germany were introduced by numerous countries, including France and the UK, and the notion of universal sanctions was filed in the League of Nations. With Italy outside the fascist bloc at the time and the notion being filed against Germany directly, the Reich protested and refused to participate in the voting. To the surprise of many, the only remaining fascist power in the LoN security council, Poland, abstained rather than voting against. This was the result of catholic demands to refuse cooperation with Germans and Polish spite over the Danzig crisis a few years back. Thus the German Reich once again found itself under global trade sanction, this time more severe and better enforced than ever. German assets abroad where frozen and borders closed, only the immediate threat of war preventing a naval blockade against Germany and traditional Swiss neutrality stopping Switzerland from being as severe in executing sanctions as most of the world.
Boycott of German goods leaflet from the USA.
The political fallout of the Luando scandal was significant enough to remove the heavily entrenched neoagrarians from power and break the traditional “neutrality” of the army regarding political affairs. Internal criticism struck von Thadden deeply. While boasting to the population and the rest of the world how Germany was “impervious” to global pressures and self-reliant, “the spirit of the German people being unbreakable” – reality ensued and sanctions did in fact hurt the German economy badly. Von Thadden’s rule had overall been a long trail of failures. Until Luando, the greatest of them was losing the south European states from the fascist bloc. His brinksmanship tactics in dealing with crises brought him the ire of much of the nazi elite, who saw it as foolish – a repetition of the events leading to the Great War, where numerous crises took place before the death of Franz Ferdinand. Many feared that with the situation getting worse (both because of the war, international stance towards Germany and civil discontent) the neoagrarians could “overdo it” and cause a second great war when circumstances would not favor Germany. This sense of “needless risk” being taken was prevalent among the older/retired officer corps, as well as those parts of the military that were not ideologically driven and had a different sense of priorities. To them, the war in Africa was a distraction to the “real thing” that was a war in Europe, and for which Germany was gradually getting less ready for, being bled out across the seas, fighting for territory it would lose regardless should a clash with the west come.
The decline of German economic strength, rise in unemployment and fictional employment was universally blamed on the Nazis in general, and on the neoagrarians in the nazi circles. The small success that Germany had, such as the third Danzig crisis or the occupation of Albania and Montenegro , could not cover up their numerous mistakes. Even the fact that Germany had to rely on brute strength alone in order to keep other countries in its “sphere of influence” to keep them in line was noted, and seen as a sign of weakness – that Germany lacked greatly in economic and diplomatic power. And with German failures in Africa as well as being unable to properly support its allies in Asia during their wars – the UAS and Thailand – Luando was the final straw. The various factions within the NSDAP were ultimately brought together to oppose von Thadden, including some turncoats from the neoagrarian camp. Their plot was crude. During the annual Parteitage in Nuremberg in August 1990 a number of high ranking officials shocked the gathered members by openly condemning von Thadden, accusing him of numerous crimes and damaging the Reich “more than the Jews have”. Von Thadden’s furious reply was not met with traditional applause – a historic event captured on tape, where his confusion upon noticing the fact he was suddenly alone was clearly seen on his face. His immediate decision to flee to Berlin did not materialize. It was halted by the Heer forces that entered the Nuremberg Party Rally grounds locking it down. This was possible due to Nuremberg not having a loyalist “internal security” division like Berlin had, that role being played by the 1st Waffen SS LSSAH unit. Not having been given any orders, not having the strength to carry out an attack on the Heer and refusing to take initiative, Nuremberg was the first city to “fall” to the coup. With that signal, another “office coup” took place in the OKW and OKH where the coupist colonels arrested their superiors – for this reason the coup going down in history as the “colonels coup”, even though it wasn’t masterminded by anyone in the military. With the Party delegates in Nuremberg under the coupists control, they were flown to Berlin and to the Reichstag under guard. In the meantime, others were gathered from across the country and transported to Berlin as well. In an emergency session of the Reichstag, von Thadden was “legally” deposed and placed under arrest expecting trial, alongside his closest palatines.
Nuremberg Party Rally of 1990.
That the coup had worked was a true miracle, as it wasn’t well prepared, lacked failsafes and didn’t have massive support even among von Thadden’s opponent within the NSDAP. The German military did not have a tradition of coups or knowledge how to prepare them. Despite attempts, the instigators of the coup had not managed to convince a single general to support it. The Abwehr, Gestapo and the SD all had signals about something that was to occur and even informed the Reich chancellery about it a few times, including just a few days before the Nuremberg rally. But these signals were all somehow ignored. The coupists themselves were motivated mostly by paranoia and rushed their work, thinking that a major purge was to occur after the rally, their strike being a “preemptive” one. Their success was dependent solely on the fact that the German military did not take action. Which miraculously it didn’t. This was attributed partly due to the fact that the generals did not want to “take sides” in any confrontation; while not willing to support it, they want to oppose it either. Some indeed desired a change in government, but also wanted plausible deniability of any knowledge of the coup. Thus while they would report their suspicions, they would do so vaguely and only in generalities. Also, the most fanatical elements of the military concentrated in the OKW and OKH were not even approached. The highest ranking member who knew of the coup was general Wolfgang Odendahl, chief of the Berlin Pact Vereinte Oberkommando – those in that structure having for some time developed a certain animosity against the OKW due to their “European bias”, many of the colonels directly or indirectly involved in the coup hailing from there.
The coup was instigated by a clique of Nazi officials usually associated with the old “Wilhelmine Imperialist” faction or the remnants of them; but once events started taking place, they got support from the mass of opportunists who previously supported the neoagrarians. The next chancellor to be appointed was Erich Eisenblatter, until then the minister of labour and an insignificant figure with no real backing – other than being considered a good administrator and specialist and having no ambition, making him useful. The coupists in fact saw him as a tool that would be both easily controlled and be the one to take the inevitable blame for everything that was expected to go wrong in the time just after the coup – especially the winter of 1990/1991 when it was already known Germany would have troubles with supplying its population with food beyond the bare essentials that Germany itself produced. Eisenblatter would stay in his post just for a few months, ending up mostly remembered for the “Poor Christmas” of 1990 when many German families ended up without having anything to buy for Christmas, the shelves of German stores being emptied weeks before. He would be replaced by Horst Ehmke, the Gaueleiter of Danzig in March 1991. Both of them represented the “left wing” of the NSDAP called the “neo-strasserists” abroad – tough that term was strictly forbidden in Germany. Like Eisenblatter, he too would become a tool of party games and plays for power, staying in office for just half a year and being dismissed in July 1991. Overall, the period between the colonels coup and summer of 1991 was very chaotic; a time of “reorganization” during which many in the west, east and Germany itself speculated about who would come out on top. The colonels coup broke the typical German situation where the new contender for power would be more or less known before taking top office, or where the number of people who had a chance to take it was small. This rough battle for influence was eventually “won” by Norbert Steger of the “Christian liberals” – the Nazis hailing from south Germany, catholics, who sought to reform the Nazi movement into a more “gentle and universalist” and less “militaristic and chauvinistic” one; being much more liberal in terms of racial and economic policies, their stance towards the church and workers rights, and the war in Africa.
Norbert Steger (centre) assuming the chancellorship from the head of the National Socialist German Workers Party Heinz Hitler (left).
The colonels coup was not met with enthusiasm by most of the high ranking “Afrika Korps” officers, who feared that it would lead to less support for “their” conflict. For many of them, the war had become a personal issue. In the months after the coup, many were recalled back to Germany and replaced. Of those, more than a few migrated to South Africa and joined the South African Army. The coup had a powerful emotional effect on those people, their state of mind being a common trope in future works of fiction; the “battle hardened veteran” who after years of service was recalled back home and left with no appreciation for his work, no commendation, no respect, would become a common “hero” (or anti-hero, or villain) of German movies, series, literature. How to treat these people who saw the fight in Africa as genuinely a “good fight”, or who “were just following orders” was a real problem for many Germans and the German psyche, which could not combine the “un whitewashable” performance of the military in Africa with the veneration of the uniform. Whether they should be condemned for what they did, or accepted back in society as if nothing happened was something Germans had to answer themselves on a personal level. This was even harder for those returning grunts who never wanted to go to war, and who met the coup with relief. Justifying themselves as having been “just following orders” while being personally disgusted with them, they were still met with hostility by some part of the society – hostility they found unfair, as all they wanted was for the war to come to a quick end. Hopes for that would not fulfilled for some time though. After the coup, military engagements in Africa were reduced and the number of soldiers serving there stopped increasing, but didn’t decrease. The new ruling powers were willing to seek accommodation with the Africans and the west, but still didn’t want to give up wholesale. For the Germans, a desirable outcome was a partition of Angola and Mozambique between Germany and the Marxists, even between the Republic of Central Africa. This was the subject of numerous talks from 1990 onwards. The years between 1991 and 1993 was a time of noticeable respite on the frontlines. Even the sanctions placed on Germany loosened, though some countries (like the entire communist bloc) maintained a full embargo, while most of the fascist countries did not respect (a noticeable exception being Poland and Bulgaria). Still, neither the Africans, nor the USSR or the west were willing to accept any plan that would leave Germans in control of any part of Africa. The respite in Angola and Mozambique went in pair with a spike in violence in South Africa. Germany was also failing at keeping discipline in the ranks. Morale fell, largely due to the swaps in officers – the newly introduced ones from Europe having no interest in keeping the war going, endangering themselves or their men. Orders were routinely ignored, reports forged or being straightforward lies. In 1993 the talks between Germany and the African Marxists (along with their western and communist backers) collapsed. Attacks occurred again, this time with the areas closer to the continents interior being left almost free for the MPLA and FRELIMO to use, and their infiltrators managing to begin bombing campaigns even in the coastal cities, previously thought of as “safeish”.
This failure brought chancellor Steger to offer to resign before the Reichstag – a resignation that was not accepted. No one in the nazi regime wanted to take the “hot potato” that “withdrawal from Africa” was; no one wanted to go down in history as being the one who “lost the war”. Steger resignation was turned down – and that turned out to be a brilliant move on his part, as he managed to use it as a demonstration of power and “confidence in him” – as long as he was willing to take the blame for the failure of the war, he would also be free to introduce groundbreaking reforms at home. Initially, after his inauguration, he was still met with resistance, particularly from the hard-head Nazis who still were living as if it were the 60’s. Even among those who agreed with the necessity of leaving Africa were not happy about the various liberal changes that Steger was introducing – their desire being to “go back to how things were before the war”. Steger realised the impossibility of that. With resistance against him growing thicker, his resignation was a form of calling the oppositions bluff, who tried to threaten him in different ways. For him, withdrawal from Africa was a matter of time which he tried to prolong for the sake of making sure he would stay in power longer – something he would also use in diplomatic talks with the west as an argument for loosening sanctions and restrictions placed on Germany. Like most of the more “liberal-minded” Nazis since the time Hitler, Steger wanted to cosy up to the west at a time when Germany was weak by playing on the common antagonism against the USSR, and in his particular case, the fear of nazi hawks coming to power.
Militarism, chauvinism and racism and statism that represented the NSDAP and much of German society were under increased attacks from the liberals within the country, who realized that Germany had fallen behind the west in every aspect and that Nazi policies were failing overall.
This tactic worked and sanctions against Germany were steadily reduced, one by one – though officially, the west still maintained an antagonistic attitude towards Germany as a whole. Sensing German weakness, the west felt powerful enough to not only demand concessions from Germany, but also to encroach into its zone of influence. The USA, UK and France all opened up on the fascist regime of mitteleuropa offering sanctions to be lifted for them in return for those countries asserting themselves more before Germany. Trade deals were offered, along with other forms of help. This had proven a successful tactic, especially in regard to Poland, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia, all of which were fed up with German domination and the “lackeyhood” of their governments which were perceived as German puppets. Those governments in turn tried to prove themselves as “independent” by assertiveness towards Germany – and western aid was what helped in making that possible. Whereas just a few years earlier Germany was willing to shell ships entering Polish ports, this time it had no such confidence. The presence of American trade vessels in the Baltic was something that it just had to accept, along with Poland and other countries of central Europe switching trade partners. The fear that trying to stop the operation of German-owned facilities in the Baltic States could lead those countries to revolt and force Germany into another “guerrilla war”, once negligible, was getting worse and prevented Berlin from trying to overplay its hand this way.
The decision to withdraw from Africa was finally given in 1995. Peace negotiations, re-started unofficially in 1994 with the MPLA, FRELIMO and the Republic of Central Africa, were made official in 1995. This began a slow demobilization effort by the Germans along with a great drop of casualties as military operations were almost completely dropped. Much of this “withdrawal” took place through South African ports, with lots of equipment being in fact left to the South African government. That this endeavour had an effect was proven quickly, as in spring 1997 when German withdrawal was almost complete, South Africa managed to stop a mayor African attack by a united front of FRELIMO, MPLA, ANC and ALM carried out along the entire northern SA border. This was also meant as a form of “compensation and apology” – many South African feeling betrayed by the Germans who were abandoning the war and leaving them alone against the struggle which was expected to get worse, especially since South Africa was still under crippling global sanctions. German withdrawal was carried out in an Italian fashion, leaving no administration behind, neither any trained personnel to keep maintenance of remaining infrastructure; in fact, much of what remained was dismantled and shipped to South Africa or Germany. South Africa itself encouraged for Germans to remain in South Africa, offering land and employment – something quite a few of them accepted and the German military made no problem about this. But as it turned out, their new South African passports were mostly used to flee the country to the west and bring their German families with them.
The last German soldiers left Luanda on September 1st 1997. This was after a final “peace treaty” was signed in April 1997 in Geneva, by which German recognized Angola and Mozambique as independent states and promised to withdrew entirely from the countries. The Germans did not even bother trying to establish any “local forces” to resist the Marxist advance, preferring to give whatever remaining resources they had to the South Africans – with whom, despite the withdrawal they maintained friendly relations with. The MPLA entered the city on the next day, proclaiming the establishment of the “Free People’s Republic of Angola”. On September the 8th, the last Germans crossed the Mozambiquan-South African border, leaving the country to the FRELIMO who proclaimed the “People’s Democratic Republic of Mozambique”. Both those days would become independence days in the respective countries. Thus the German Colonial War came to an end, as did the “German period” of the “south African wars” – the conflict still going on in South Africa. The entire conflict led to the death of 150.000 african soldiers – an insignificant amount compared to the 1.1 million civilian casualties suffered. Over 1.5 million were also displaced, and uncounted numbers were wounded. Leftover from the war, in the form of duds, unexploded ordnance, chemical and biological agents, would plague these countries for decades to come. The economies of those countries did not exist beyond sustenance farming; both lied in ruins. The war would leave a permanent emotional scar on the African psyche, not only in Angola and Mozambique, but much of sub-saharan Africa as a whole, as it led to the “whites versus blacks” mindset to engrain itself deeper, ignoring the national differences between “white devils”. In what was one of the greatest ironies of the war, it would be the Africans of south Africa that would come out with a powerful sense of “racial consciousness” rather than the Germans, the Marxists themselves coming to use it as a form of “internationalism” – “African Marxism” coming close to replacing the slogan of “all workers uniting” with “all blacks uniting”. The war would also permanently scar the Germans emotionally, the once proud nation being defeated by and enemy long described as “subhuman” and “inferior in every way”. With the army defeated and routed, no second “stab in the back” legend working to explain the failure and the entire fascist bloc bursting at the seams, the German people had to look for a new road into the future.
The German flag being removed from Luanda’s Fort of Sao Miguel.