Kalter Krieg - a TL of a three way cold war

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With the tide of the Summer of Nations moving east, Italy was next in line. The situation there was however different than on the Iberian Peninsula. Italy managed to avoid strategic mistakes, like getting itself involved in prolonged colonial wars or struggles with national minorities. It’s political system was ultimately more stable, not being based solely on the persona of a single Leader figure. Libyan oil also provided it with a stable source of hard currency. But that did not mean the above issues were non-present. Indeed they were, just in a smaller degree. It was remarkable in some ways, as Italy certainly was in a situation where the things that brought the fall of fascism in Spain and Portugal could affect it too. It had a colonial empire in East Africa, one neighboring both France and the East African Federation – but it managed to prevent any massive uprising from happening, the costs of military presence there being high, but not as high in blood or money as what other European states paid. It had national minorities within its borders, both in Upper Adige in the north and across the Adriatic Sea in Albania and Montenegro, - but those too managed to be kept satisfied, thanks to a general consensus with Germany and Serbia, with “stick and carrot” tactics being used. Repressions against the Albanian and Montenegrin populations, initially weak in the 40’s, growing much worse in the 50’s and 60’s, went down again in the 70’s and 80’s. Its political system after Mussolini’s death generated much internal frictions and struggles for power, but did not threaten itself or bring onto a path of internal self-destruction. None of that seemed to jeopardize the fascist system, despite it going on much longer than anywhere else. Even those critics who prophesized the “imminent” collapse of the totalitarian system after the death of Il Duce had gone silent after a time. While the number of failures of the system was long, it was also successful at a number of things, other than greatly increasing Italy’s standing on the scene of European and global politics and creating a strong navy in the Mediterranean. It did manage to suppress and “evolve out of” the regionalisms that were still present in Italy in the early XXth century, creating a sense of “Italian Vaterland” in place of the former “Haimats” (like Sicily, Ferrara, Perugiac), etc.). Arguably, it created the first generation of people who universally identified themselves as “Italians” (even if not all of the liked “other Italians/Italians from other parts of the country”. It’s empire in North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea was the most stable of all, and while it was achieved by brutal means – Italy no longer worried about the safety of those areas like France or the UK had to.

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Celebrations of the Risorgimento anniversary in Rome, March 17 1961. Since 1961, it would be established as a annual holiday known as “National Unity Day”.

What made the situation get worse in Italy was not any singular thing or a lack of reforms, but wrong reforms and a “critical mass” of failures that alienated large parts of the various classes of the society. Farmers, workers, servicemen, the military, the intelligentsia – in any part of the society discontentment was on the rise. Ad hoc attempts to better the situation of some group usually came at the cost of others. This was for example one effect of the reforms that opened Italy more within the OMEWZE, allowing for much greater imports of grain and vegetables from central Europe – something Italian protectionism and autarkic tendencies long resisted. The effects were predictable, without state protection Italian farmers found their products uncompetitive. Protests against low buyout prices were replaced with protests against imports, including rail junction occupations and pouring out imports from train carts. Similar situations took place in industries where Italy was also lagging behind. Germany was one to try and benefit from the worsening Italian situation, attempting to buy out part of the Italian industrial companies like it did in much of central Europe, and managing to actually achieve larger successes in the late 70’s and early 80’s. As German management usually meant the termination of local deals and cliques, it also meant shutting down production and an increase in unemployment. Anti-German sentiment began to grow in Italy, despite Germany not faring well either – Italians losing much of their feeling of self-worth after the Duce’s death and feeling overshadowed by Germany, against which they tried to vent their frustration with their failures. Weirdly, part of that frustration also came from a noticeable lack of alternatives. Italy was almost completely free of any form of organized opposition, those that did exist being easily infiltrated and destroyed by state authorities before they could grow. Even within the workers groups no serious anti-fascist organizations arose, nor did they in conservative circles. The Catholic Church was extremely delicate in the subject of Italian fascism, having to balance the security of the Vatican with its social doctrine and teachings – one effect of that being the Catholic Church not providing any direct support for anti-fascists, in either word or deed. It was ironic, but within Italy what constituted the largest “organized” opposition groups were the non-Italian ones, in Montenegro and Albania (as opposed to the various informal coalitions of protest groups without any concrete program or structures and just having a common dislike for the government.

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Farmers dumping imported peaches on the roads. Italians would prove to be very creative in carrying out strikes and protests despite them being forbidden and heavily punished, coming up with things like “rule-book slowdown”, “white strikes”, many “accidents” occurring in storage or during transportation, etc.

The upheavals in Portugal and Spain was the gasoline that got poured onto Italy, where the situation was already heated and the country eagerly absorbing “revolutionary sentiment”. The spark that lighted the entire thing up was the death of parish Matteo Gubbio, a popular Catholic priest, former missionary in East Africa and later known for organizing many “spirit raising” events in Italian towns and cities, including public masses, fares, participating in theatre plays and stand-up satire/comedy shows. His humorous publications and stories, easy-going attitude combined with his wit, great intelligence and charisma made him a very popular person in Italy, a celebrity even among the vocal anti-catholic groups. In August 1985, after the annual Ferragosto celebrations in Rome, father Gubbio was kidnapped by a duo of blackshirts and beaten up, resulting in his death in a hospital, after being found brutalized on a public road. The exact background behind the events were shrouded in mystery – officially him being attacked by “unknown assailants”, but it being quickly determined by private investigators that the culprits were in fact the blackshirts. With that knowledge becoming public, authorities changed their story claiming these two acted independently from their superiors and “outside their organization” – though speculations that was not the case were rampant. That father Gubbio was subject to a directed attack was supported by the fact he was increasingly problematic for some of the Italian familias, who were irritated by his support among the growing number of unemployed people, but having no good way to remove him from the picture. His death was however a very ill move – in the eyes of the Italian people being a sacrilege that couldn’t go unpunished. Even among the higher-up fascists there was outrage about it, the move being seen as ridiculously stupid and aggressive (in fact, the involvement of such higher-ups was one of the reasons for the speculations it was not a random or self-initiative attack, but was ordered from somewhere on the top). The arrest, trial and execution of the two culprits did not ease the situation, the people still crying justice for the uncounted thousands of people who died in similar “incidents” throughout the decades – kidnapping and beating/killing/disappearing political opponents being an old tactic of the blackshirts, stories even being told of people being dropped out of helicopters over the Mediterranean – just one instance of the brutality of the fascist regime.

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Matteo Gubbio would become a martyr for Italian anti-fascists and strain the relations between Italy and the Catholic Church, the “untouchability” of the clergy being one of the conditions for the church’s silence about much of the fascist s criminal activity.

On September 17, one month after the death of Gubbio, a huge march took place in Rome, led by a number of priests, workers and students, demanding the removal of the Prime Minister and the leader of the blackshirts Alessandro Natta. This event would go down in history as the “Second March on Rome” – while only 50.000 strong, it was powerful enough to actually force the resignation of Natta and large changes in Italian politics. Upon entering Rome, the crowd managed to not only occupy much of the city centre, but even raid the headquarters of the Blackshirts before the arrival of the police. A number of attacks on the houses of known fascist politicians and fascist party offices also took place, provoking the government to request military backup. But that did not arrive, the military leaders of Italy refusing to enter the capital (expecting that doing so would be quickly followed by orders to shoot) before the decision could be made by the Grand Council of Fascism itself. The gathering of that body eventually took place on September the 19, at which time the capital was in uproar. That the fascists were so slow to react to the occurrences was mostly thanks to internal power plays within the fascist party and the familias, who had very different views of the situation. While some were desperately clinging to power and demanded immediate radical actions to prevent the situation from descending into what happened in Iberia, others realized the tide was against them and that fascism was existing on borrowed time – prolonging its agony only leading to it being more costly for them. The Grand Council of Fascism entered its most important session since the death of Mussolini, having to determine the fate of the Fascist system in the country that was its very cradle.

It was fortunate that much of the high ranking military figures were actually opposed to the blackshirts and did not display any fanaticism for the system – both the Navy and the Army holding a deep dislike for blackshirt “political officers” being present at various levels of command, as well as among the rank-and-file soldiers. This effectively managed to prevent a forceful resolution of the situation, the military simply refusing for force to become the first option, thus forcing the familias to contemplate further. General lines of division between the hardliners and “moderates” began to appear, with only the minority (including Prime Minister Natta) being among the former – the majority of the leaders thinking more in terms of their private interests and seeing it as safer to accept a “controlled but radical” change in the status quo. Many in fact wanted more to see their enemies and competitors weakened or destroyed more than they wanted for the fascist system to survive – private wealth proving more important than ideology. This took the form of Natta being dismissed by the GCF from his seat as head of government and more importantly, the dissolution of the Blackshirts organization. Unprecedentedly, there was no one else to take the seat of Prime Minister after Natta, the position remaining vacant for some time until a new suitable candidate could be found.

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Alessandro Natta announcing his resignation.

With Natta being forced to quit in disgrace (and fleeing the capital at night by helicopter), the crowd cheered and began to press for further concessions – this time, for their own candidate to be given the post of Prime Minister and breaking the fascists monopoly on power. To that end, they gained a vary unexpected ally – Vittorio Emanuele IV, the new King of Italy. Like his father Umberto II, Vittorio was detached from state matters and reduced to a figurehead. Unlike him however, he was more aware of the situation around the world, having been educated abroad and travelling a lot. This was also partly thanks to his father who tried to protect his son from becoming a “mascot” of the fascists and insisted on him spending more time away from them. When ascended to the throne in 1983, Vittorio Emanuele IV wasn’t even very recognizable among the people, despite being 46 years old. This was both a boon and a vice – without there being much popular sentiment towards him, he was not specifically seen as a “supporter of fascism” like any other crowned heads of central Europe, but neither was he seen as an opponent of it; he was mostly viewed as “the monarchy” which some people saw as part of “the fascist system”. Pro-monarchist sentiment was slowly fading throughout the decades, some fascists sometime even trying to finally abolish it (even in 1983, though failing even then). When the march on Rome started, the King initially remained silent and did not participate in the GCF, though he did hold (secretly, and unknowingly to the public) conversations with the military leaders urging them not to start bloodshed. Once Natta was removed from office and the question who would replace became open (much of the fascist heads wanting to place the King before a facti accompli), Vittorio opted to become the “voice of the people”. Leaving his palace, he went to join the protestors, promising them they would not be hurt and that their demands would be heard. As ultimately his decision was necessary to appoint a new Prime Minister, the King decided to use that one shot he had as an opportunity to get into the good graces of the people, correctly predicting that fascism was heading towards collapse and siding with the people bettering the chances for saving the monarchy.

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King Vittorio Emanuele IV in the streets of Rome.

In a move meant to appease the crowd and create grounds for negotiations, the Grand Council of Fascism agreed with the King’s strong suggestion of creating the position of “Prime Minister ad interim” and provide it to Marzio Ciano – a “black sheep” of the otherwise very powerful Ciano familia, known primarily as an intellectualist who supported the preservation of Italian regionalisms and opposed centralization. During the détente he also got known for some of his works on the politics of Italy, where he argued for Italian withdrawal from the Axis alliance and “declaring neutrality” in the Cold War – his reasons being a “perversion of fascism” that had occurred under National Socialist pressures and the belief that the cold war was ultimately a pointless burden that redirected the attention and energy of the nation from what really mattered. Disliked, even hated, among the fascists, he had however the protection of his family that gave him a position of ambassador in Uruguay (both for his own protection and as a place where his presence would not damage the Ciano family in Italy). Returning in 1980 to the country he was more humble and quiet – which awarded him the right to be the secretary of his brother and head of the Ciano familia, Fabrizio Ciano. As Fabrizio was himself too controversial to officially assume power his “semi-renegade” brother was deemed a suitable alternative – radical change enough for the people, too weak a persona and too hated to be a threat. While this move itself did not satisfy much of the Italian public, who saw him as a puppet to his brother, it had proven a successful stalling tactic before the real changes occurred.

The most controversial event during the fall of fascism in Italy was the Caelian Hill Gathering. The Caelian Hill became a villa district of Rome during the fascist era, though one not completely reserved for the cream of the society – more like a place that those of the middle class that aspired to high class aimed for. After Natta’s resignation and Marzio’s appointment, a number of meetings between numerous officials took place in over a dozen of the villas there over a period of a week and a half. These were completely unofficial, even secret, with various of those meetings having different participants – the ultimate number of those meetings (which would last from 30 minutes ones to those lasting for four days straight), the complete list of those who participated, to what extent, in what role never being definitely determined. Those who were confirmed as having taken part would contradict each other in their recollection of the event, not see the whole thing or have different interpretations – the exact truth about what exactly took place there being something that scholars would spend a lot of time trying to determine. What was known, was that there were plenty of members of the Grand Council of Fascism present, or their subordinates, high-ranking military members, many of the Blackshirts and intelligence operatives, members of the clergy and some representatives of the Vatican, the King even, and many members of the opposition and the Second March on Rome leaders. For those last ones, the Caelian Hill Gathering was said to be a way to bypass and overpower the “hardliners” of the fascist party and the military, an attempt to create a “common front” – but doing so in secret. The goal was to reach an agreement between the fascist “moderates” and the reforms-demanding public. As groups of officials and oppositionists, some even being specifically released from prisons just to participate, walked and drove the Caelian Hill meeting various others, the foundation of post-fascist Italy was being formed – separately from the protesting demonstrators and the top-ranking fascists.

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Overlook of the Caelian Hill. The Villas of the district would be the place where much of the covert talks between the fascist oligarchs and oppositionists would take place.

Secrecy had managed to pay off. On October 6th 1985 the “Rome Agreement” was achieved, presented by the Prime Minister ad interim and hastily accepted by the leaders of the Second March of Rome – its points being all agreed on the Caelian Hill in the previous week. The King supported it and so did parts of the military and the Grand Council of Fascism. The rest was placed before an ultimatum to either accept it and roll with it - or resist. Many chose the latter and quickly paid the price, which was their positions. The same day the agreement was officially accepted, nearly 40% percent of the members of the GCF were dismissed by the PM’s order. Next weeks were followed by a radical purge in administration and military and practical anarchy in Italy, as the state agencies just ceased to function. The “Rome Agreement” stipulated massive political reforms, including the formation of an Italian Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, with free elections taking place to the former, and partially free to the latter – the fascist party being guaranteed 70% of the mandates there. Guarantees on employment for state factories workers, rise of wages and increase of products supply in stores were promised. But overall, much of those promises were based on the good will of the fascists still remaining in power and the nomenclature – the opposition only being given the chance to do something after 28th December 1985, when election day was supposed to take place. Such a postponed date was officially meant to give everyone a chance to organize and freely work towards it. To that extent it was what happened – most political prisoners were freed from prisons and the organization of any groups, societies, parties, labour unions was also allowed.

But realistically, it was a period of time the fascists gave themselves to “close the shop” or adapt to the new situation. This was the main point of criticism of the Rome Agreement – that it allowed a large deal of fascist criminals to go unpunished. Many of the heads of the familias began the process of “privatizing” their “empires”, by either buying out industries and land, or downright taking it for no charge. Economic reforms that were promised were also written down in a manner that would allow those knowledgeable to take massive financial advantage of them. This would take many forms, from being issued certificates and licenses on economic activities expected to become beneficial (like liquor trade, gambling, natural resources extraction, etc.) to being able to prepare better for the upcoming revolution in enterprises. Those knowledgeable in the effects of freeing currencies began creating their own currency exchange booths, buying out hard currencies on the market with the purpose of re-selling it at a massive profits. These currency exchange units would become a massively profitable business, that was commonly used to launder a lot of money previously originating from shady sources. Procedures for the buyouts of state factories and other elements of national infrastructure began – power plants, railways, motorways, airports – many of those even being conducted under the cover of genuine “reprivatisation”, giving property that fascism previously nationalized back to the real owners descendants – and those descendants subsequently selling off what they got to post-fascist Italian businessmen for pennies, all being part of one business-political agreement. Over the years, such practices resulted in the creation of an oligarchy of Italian businessmen and politicians, most (but not all) of which hailed from fascist circles.

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The Agnellis would be one of the more symbolic and well known examples of Italian oligarchic families, who abandoned fascism and took ownership of the FIAT company during the transformation period, none of the family members ever even being prosecuted for their past sins despite their high position in fascist hierarchy.

Overall, this made it disputable whether the events of 1985 could be described as an actual „fall of fascism”, driven by popular demand and frustration, or whether it was more an internal political game within the fascists circles, driven by some groups using the popular sentiment against their internal political opponents. Changes in Italy were both significant and not significant. Many reforms took place on paper, but not in reality. The financial-industrial elite of the state remained in place as an oligarchy, and much of the fascists managed to keep their cozy positions and benefits for a long time, but their political power weakened. The country remained officially the “Italian Empire”, but decolonization occurred at an extremely rapid pace. Free elections took place, but the position of Prime Minster remained in the hands of the fascists and the Grand Council of Fascism remained the body of top power in the country – it was only that now the “opposition” was allowed to participate in its works and talks. On the other hand, social and economic liberalization did occur. While legislation easing restrictions on enterprises and freedom of expression took place, many remained in place, including the censorship bureaus – but were completely powerless and irrelevant, not bothering to enforce those restrictions. It went to a point where even a workers newspapers calling itself “The International” and using a sickle and hammer as its logo, its editors discussing and agreeing with Marx would receive seals of approval by fascist authorities. For such reasons, the period of “fascist” rule in Italy following the Rome Agreement was colloquially called “make-belief fascism” – where the people in power pretended it still was fascism, but no one taking that seriously. The country experienced a massive surge in the presence of western culture, so much demanded by the population that no longer was restricted access to it. Rock concerts, both of Italian and western bands would be performed. VHS rental places with western media would be started in just about every place larger that a small village. Radio frequencies of western radio channels would be unscrambled. Western products of all kinds, from cars to chewing gum would become available, many Italians (and French middle class people) becoming very rich in a span of few years by being able to buy something at wholesale prices in France and selling it across Italy, benefiting from the general popular demand for anything western. Ironically, these “make belief fascism” years when there was much less control and restrictions, when many Italians began to change their life around, becoming a middle class, the country “re-westernizing”, would eventually become most praised by the future liberals of both economic and social type – being presented as a time of “unrestricted” trade and freedom of expression, when crime was still low and the country still managed to fulfil its “night watch” function well (excluding corruption, which remained a problem).

What made the world believe that the changes in Italy where significant, permanent and going in the direction of democratization was the decolonization effort of Italy. This was one of the few things that the democratic opposition and the “still in power” fascists were able to agree upon was necessary – and possible to use as an argument in international negotiations. The new Italian government made numerous promises to begin decolonization already in 1986, and secretly conducted talks with France, the UK and the USA on being allowed some economic benefits in return for that – mostly in the form of debt forgiveness, loans and non-persecution of Italian officials previously involved in morally questionable actions. While the UK was hard to convince and more interested in using the opportunity to reach a deal over the size of the Italian Navy and the freedom of passage of British ships through Italian waters in central Mediterranean, France was enthusiastic, as was the USA, even if the latter did not trust the “new fascists” much and demanded concrete proof of goodwill. Concrete proof came quickly, as already in April 1986 was the complete withdrawal of Italy from East Africa announced. All military operations seized almost immediately and the non-military personnel and administration with Italian citizenship was ordered to return to Italy immediately (conveniently, Italian citizenship was not something those sentenced to exile to East Africa, like the Libyans, Albanians, criminals, etc. or their descendants were issued, forcing them to mostly stay behind). Suddenly, East Africa began to cease to have any central rule over it. The west was pleased by this development, creating an ironic situation where Marxist anti-colonial circles in the USA where cheering for a (still nominally) fascist state. As negotiations had progressed, so did the withdrawal, Italy even going ahead of the west, wanting to cut itself off the African burden quickly. Addis Abeba was vacated in February 1987, and the last of Italian presence in East Africa left Asmara left in January 1988. While such a tempo pleased the USA, the British government was much more troubled by it, realizing that such a hasty retreat would have to mean a lack of any replacement administration and de facto – anarchy. This was entirely true, and already in 1987 did fighting over power in the countryside begin between “warlords”, spreading into the cities as they were abandoned by the Italians. The end of the Italian occupation was thus the beginning of the Ethiopian Civil War – a non-unexpected turn of events.

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Italian colonial propaganda.

In Europe however, the transformation in Italy was very unnerving for Germany. Having already lost Portugal and Spain, German mentality began to change. Until the 50’s, Germany was plagued by the horror of the possibility of a two-front war and a “surrounding coalition” of hostile states. The creation of the mitteleuropa alliance including Iberia changed that. Germany received some peace of mind by having a “secure” buffer zone against Russia in the east and becoming part of a coalition surrounding France instead – with Spain and Italy. While aerial bombardment and rockets, as well as nuclear weapons generated paranoia and the fear of an anti-fascist “coalition of opportunity” between the west and the USSR remained, the sense of security coming from being separated from the Russian bear and being clearly superior to France was helping. But that sense began to erode, as France grew significantly stronger in the 70’s and 80’s, its ties with the UK becoming stronger. The loss of Spain meant (in the minds of Germans) the loss of a “third front” in the case of an anti-French war. Now with Italy undergoing changes, Berlin was becoming paranoid about the possibility of losing a “second front” . This happened while France was showing to be very capable militarily, as despite withdrawing from west Africa, it simultaneously managed to keep the anti-colonial struggle in Algeria in check. Violence in Algeria was gradually dropping in the 70’s and 80’s, thanks to a combination of massive police/military presence and control along with development money and the natural gas Eldorado. In the same time, Germany was showing to be incapable to achieve a lasting victory in Angola and Mozambique. German paranoia was what led other countries of central Europe to be more outspoken against the Reich, creating a downwards spiral of German aggressiveness, the Third Danzig Crisis being proof of Germany being willing to go very far in “protecting its sphere of influence”. It again started to feel like it was surrounded by hostile states (or unreliable allies), now with the added danger of nuclear annihilation, as of all of the global great powers it was the one most vulnerable to it. Thus when Italy began changing – even if it didn’t nominally withdraw from the Berlin Pact, the OMEWZE or the anti-comintern pact – Germany felt like the west was encroaching onto its area of interest. It didn’t want Italy do “democratize” or even “liberalize” – not even for it to become neutral. German response to Italian reforms was thus hostile from the very start.

While Italy was promising that the changes going on would not interfere with German security and that “nothing was changing” as Italy was not stopping the sales of oil or cooperation within fascist international structures, Germany quickly began demanding additional guarantees and stopping “anti-German activities”. It wasn’t surprising that with freedom of expression returning, anti-fascists would become vocal and speak out their anti-German views. Some of that included verbal attacks against the Germans living in Upper Adige. Italy was savvy enough to ensure the safety of Germans there though and did take action against Italian nationalists and leftists that tried to spread violence in the German populated province, many being arrested – but there being no casualties of violence, anti-Germanism there restricted to marches, slogans and badmouthing. This was enough for Germany though to begin a campaign of demands, including territorial and personal autonomy, local police forces, arrests of provocateurs, etc. Italy was unwilling to comply with such requests, sticking to its “nothing is changing” policy – since such demands were not raised before, there being no reason for Germany to demand them now. Italo-German relations were growing cooler and in combination with Italy already having lost most of its influence in central Europe in face of German brutal tactics and strong-arming, more and more of the Italian fascists themselves questioned the reasonability of sticking with Germany in the fascist bloc. They themselves were more concerned about their personal power and wealth than ideology already. Suddenly agreeing with the anti-German crowd in Italy became a popular thing. German accusations of Italy being undermined by western influence and growing weak as evidenced by its withdrawal from East Africa and the chaos in the country were mostly ignored.

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German protests in Upper Adige, the swastika flag flown by the Germans, Italian flag by Italians.

The situation changed when in 1986 decolonization was announced to also be supposed to cover the Italian acquisitions on the eastern Adriatic – Albania and Montenegro. These two small countries were the only ones where there actually was an organized opposition of nation-wide character, rather than just an ideological one. Those were mostly led by the small elite of the intelligentsia, supported by a cadre of people of human sciences-types – teachers, journalists, clergymen, academia members. While organized and capable of effective cooperation, they still lacked numbers – the Albanians and Montenegrins being overall not that numerous. It was impossible for them to try and fight for their freedom with strength of arms, hence for a long time their demands were more about autonomy and cultural freedoms, independence being a taboo. After the Rome Agreement however, their “national liberation” movements were allowed to move out from the shadows and start acting in the open. Suddenly their numbers soared and it became obvious that should they actively turn against the Italian authorities, Italy would be in trouble. France was quick to use Montenegro and Albania in its own negotiations with Italy, becoming their spokesman and advocate. In effect, in 1986 it was announced that Albania and Montenegro were to be given autonomy with a Rome-appointed local government, and that Italy would withdraw from those countries in the near future. At the same time however, Italy wholly opposed any suggestion of withdrawing from either North Africa, the Aegean Islands or the various small islands of the Adriatic, including the small peninsulas on the Balkan coast it annexed after the Yugoslav War or even held beforehand. It’s argument was that those territories were already Italian populated and part of “Italy proper”, which was true in fact – both Albania and Montenegro having received a special administrative status within the Italian Empire in the past. Thus Italy was willing to decolonize by withdrawing from “colonies” – but not from “Italian land”. Lack of will to hold onto colonies, international pressure, internal demands and the offerings of foreign aid was enough to convince Rome to give in to decolonization trends and announce its withdrawal from Albania and Montenegro. This led to a cry of cheer in Tirana and Podgorica, both of which began preparations for independence.

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Montenegro national celebrations, Albanian flag flown as well in a sign of solidarity.

But Germany saw this as yet another threat. The tide of the summer of nations was getting dangerously close to areas under its direct control. Anti-fascist sentiments were growing, especially in Serbia, but also in Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary. The possibility that the wave of discontent would reach any of those countries was something that Germany would have to answer by force – having already done that previously, but with wars taking place in both Africa and Arabia, it not being so willing to do so. Preventing that was a priority, and so was preventing Albania and Montenegro from falling out from of the fascists bloc – which was what Italy was seemingly allowing and France and the UK seeking. Should the west acquire such a foothold in the Balkans north of Greece, its position to further encroach into fascist territory would get better, Serbia and Bulgaria already being the most fertile ground for that. Berlin’s response to Italian offers of withdrawal was declaring that being a breach of its international obligations and the treaties signed after the Yugoslav War – that being a diplomatic way of saying Germany would feel like having a carte blanche in all of the Balkans as well as Upper Adige, regardless of any Italian promises or treaties with the west.

In February 1987 Italy finally made good on its promise, forming the “Council of Albania” and the “Council of Montenegro” as executive-legislative bodies with moderate powers for those two respective provinces. Not being a product of any elections and not having any members from the organized opposition, they weren’t particularly popular or seen as much of a step in the direction towards independence, even though technically they did mean a de facto autonomy. Popular demand led to a flood of requests towards the two councils, mostly made by the opposition, along with demands for the appointment of non-fascists to them. This had quickly shown that these new bodies were inadequate for the situation, becoming overburdened and incapable of introducing reforms demanded by the local population. With the people’s expectations not being met, the people took action in their own hands. In July 1987, the National Legislature organization was formed, led by Mirko Kovac, a known oppositionist, journalist and writer. The National Legislature was a “think-tank” type of body meant to show a willingness and determination of the Montenegrins to achieve self-determination, starting with the creation of specific legislative projects, including a draft of the constitution of the “State of Montenegro”. Practically, the NL was in existence for a longer period of time as an unofficial “club” of right-wing intelligentsia members, a group that wrote down ideas, published them and spread them, the summer of nations being just an opportunity to do it more openly and eventually also legally. This initiative has proven to be a success, Rome being unwilling to disband it, as it became a popular forum for Montenegrins to express their views and demands. By September, the Council of Montenegro entered an official cooperation with the National Legislature, and by November the same year, Italy announced its intention to surrender power from the Council of Montenegro to the National Legislature, allowing the country to get independence. This was in a large part thanks to the pressures of the USA which was demanding faster decolonization and withdrawal from Albania and Montenegro. On November 15th 1987, after a meeting in Podgorica between Kovac and the Italian PM, and agreement was reached on the immediate withdrawal of Italian Army from Montenegro (and Albania) until December 14.

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Mirko Kovac, unofficial leader of the Montenegrin opposition.

Once announced, the Montenegrins cheered for their soon to be achieved independence. But very soon after, there was concern as to what the reaction of Germany would be. Officially Berlin remained silent on the issue, but concentration of German Army troops did begin along the Italian borders. Panic began to rise, as it became apparent that Germany was intent on invading Italy, both in the Balkans, as well as Upper Adige. Independence didn’t look so good for the Albanians and Montenegrins, as it was easy to imagine it causing a German intervention an occupation – Italy still being preferable to that. Rome too was uneasy about it, though the reactions of the people and the fascist leaders were different. The population overwhelmingly demanded resistance to any German pressures, not allowing for any concessions or any step back – not even giving official autonomy to the Germans, even though they de facto enjoyed it for decades. But the fascist clique still remaining in power was much less concerned, still thinking more about their ongoing trade, deals and businesses in central Europe (including Germany) which were sure to crumble in case of relations with Germany crashing. This was yet another example of the Italian oligarchs placing their private interests before national sentiments, sometimes hiding it, sometimes trying to justify it, sometimes however going along with it, believing it a necessary cost to keep the population calm. In effect, Italian response to German saber-rattling was practically nothing, other than calming the Italian population down, not introducing any privileges the Germans demanded, and trying to stay friendly towards the increasingly more hostile Germans at the same time.

This approach could not last long, and Italy was incapable of forming any actual strategy to deal with the growing threat. At some point, the Italians became convinced that Germany would not ignore the collapse of the Italian empire and do something, that only being a matter of time and place. The idea that the Germans could be directed elsewhere than Upper Adige was a popular idea, even if based more on wishful thinking and unofficial statements of the Germans. This was yet another reason why Italy was remarkably easy on Montenegro and Albania and willing to pull out from quickly. By doing so, it would leave it ti the Germans, who in turn would forget about Upper Adige and other “problems” that Italian reforms were making. The fact that such a reorganization of the fascist bloc should be possible to achieve officially, and German unwillingness to do that in such a way was somehow missed by the Italian establishment, only a few pointing out that should Germany occupy Montenegro and Albania, that still would leave North Italy vulnerable. Yet this was eventually what happened. When Italian withdrawal from Albania and Montenegro was announced in December 1987, a number of oppositionists from those two countries actually opposed it, pleading both Rome and the local military to stay longer, until they could get some form of guarantee of independence, from either the LoN, or the west – or even the USSR. It reached a point where the members of the National Legislature downright offered the Italian military commander the position of Commander in Chief of those countries “militaries” upon independence, along with service for the Italian grunts. The Italian commander, Benito Agostino, even considered the proposal until December 13 – when he declined and left Albania, the last Italian soldiers doing so the next day, along with Rome officially surrendering all power over the territory to the National Legislature, opening their way towards independence. Albania and Montenegro did not need much time to do so, independence of those two countries being declared at midnight of December 14th 1987, the last Italian soldiers being escorted out of the country by “Montenegrin and Albanian soldiers” – in fact, regular policemen and security guards dressed in old military uniforms from the 30’s picked from museums, this being meant as a symbolic gesture.

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Last Italian soldiers leaving Albania.

These events were preceded with a great deal of diplomatic work and talks, official and unofficial. Officially, nobody talked about independence for Albania and Montenegro. Unofficially everyone knew it was the direction towards which things headed. Officially Germany had no intention of invading those two countries in case of Italian withdrawal and made no plans against Italy whatsoever. Unofficially, the concentration of German forces on the Italian border was making things look abundantly clear as to what Germany wanted. The fact of the matter was that Italy was nominally still a fascist state that had no guarantees of its territorial integrity other than those provided by the fascist states, headed by Germany. Berlin still benefited from the western assumption of central Europe being in its sphere of influence where the west would do nothing, other than talk. An intervention in Italy seemed entirely safe. Even a war with Italy was not seen as some devastating scenario, Germany being in possession of nuclear devices whereas Italy wasn’t yet; a brief attack, occupation of desired territories followed by a demand of “border adjustments” was something the ideologically driven German leadership of the time saw as entirely possible – even necessary, as the case of Poland had shown indirect means of pressure wasn’t very effective. The Germans too seemed to me missing the possibility of Italians deciding to fight regardless of German advantage and the consequences of such a war escalating to such levels. Both Germany and Italy seemed to be blind to the problem – and so seemed the USA. It wasn’t until very late in 1987 that Washington came to the realization that the independence of Albania and Montenegro they so demanded would be brief in face of German aggression, and that German aggression against Italy would be devastating for Europe. The diplomatic machine was however too much in motion for it to be halted. Radical moves had to be taken if the opportunity that Italian decolonization presented was not to be missed. Neither France nor the UK were willing to offer anything to Albania or Montenegro, but where very concerned about a possible Italo-German conflict. Regardless how it would end, the west stood to lose. Should Germany emerge victorious and take what it wanted from Italy, it would grow stronger. Should it fail at that, the war proving costly, the west stood at a risk of a German first strike in a more global war – if Berlin was to realize continued fighting with Italy would bleed it out and leave vulnerable to the west, striking against the west when it still had strength making sense.

Paris and London preferred to solve the coming crisis by dealing with Berlin directly, dissuading it from taking action against Italy. For the Germans, this did look like the usual “all talk no walk”, like it happened so many times before when it came to central Europe. International calls from other places, such as the Albanian and Serbian diaspora or LoN institutions that wanted guarantees for Albania and Montenegro were ignored. It was only on December 5th 1987 that a major breakthrough took place that altered the situation. Going against the traditional stance of its foreign policy and without official approval from France and the UK, the United States of America had unilaterally guaranteed its protection of “Italian territorial integrity” should Italy call for support. The declaration left the Italians with the right to invoke the guarantee, though without specifying what territory was actually under the protection of the guarantee, as “colonial territories” were exempted from it. Technically, this did not further USA obligation any more than they already were, such guarantees being nominally part of the League of Nations treaties, here just repeated in a declaration. Practically, the consequences were immense, as the USA did not exclude (and in fact, strongly hinted at) the possibility of using naval force against Germany should it prove necessary. It left itself with a lot of legal gateways though, most specifically the “no colonial territories” clause that could mean anything, from those obvious like East Africa, through less obvious like the Aegean islands, to Upper Adige even (given its germanophone character and the circumstances it was acquired in). This left initiative within Italian and German hands. The former was still able to withdraw militarily from Albania and Montenegro while not recognizing their independence, meaning a German attack on them could be treated as an attack on Italy and consequently, allow them to invoke the guarantee. It could do the same regarding Upper Adige. The latter now had to face the game being raised to a new level, where it was unable to tell if the USA was bluffing or not, how far was Washington willing to go and how much could Italy still be pressured.

The Nazi regime wasn’t one that acted entirely based on calculation, but also had to take image into account. And in this particular situation, it felt like it couldn’t lose it. But war with the USA was something it couldn’t risk, not even if most of the top ranking regime members believed it bluff – the sheer number of options the USA realistically had to make Germany suffer even without a war was dangerous. Thus some action had to be taken, the question remaining how much. An answer came with the declaration of independence of Albania and Montenegro. Before Italy could even give any reply to it, Germany declared it to be a “threat to an allied country” and in accordance to the Berlin Pact, entered Montenegro and Albania, occupying the countries within a few hours. However, elsewhere no action took place, both Upper Adige and the Italian territories on the Adriatic remaining in Italian hands. This was the middle ground Germany was willing to risk, the intervention being a sufficient response to “satisfy domestic demand” – an excuse more like, as most of the German population was long past a point of having much interest in the situation of Germans outside Germany, more concerned with their own well-being. Italy’s response was one of acceptance. Rome did not officially recognize the independence of either Albania or Montenegro, nor did any other countries in the world except the People’s Republic of China and a handful of others in Africa and South America. Germany was still condemned for its actions, but did not experience any harsher response from the global community.

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German soldiers in Montenegro. While the Black-Red-Gold flag was not the country’s official flag, it’s display wasn’t banned and it was used on some occasions by savvy people who realized the negative symbolism the swastika or the Black-White-Red colors had.

The summer of nations ended at that point, no longer spreading further into central Europe and accelerating the collapse of Italian fascism. In 1990, Germany formally established the “State of Albania” and “State of Montenegro” as puppet countries, Italy and most of the world recognizing them. But by that point, Italy’s presence in the fascist bloc was just nominal and coming to an end, Italy withdrawing from the Berlin Pact and the OMEWZE in 1990, and the anti-comintern pact in 1991. The “make-believe fascism” period came to an end in 1995 with the first free elections since the 20’s, which were won the liberal National Democratic Union, beginning a new period of reforms and changes in Italy. Unlike Portugal and Spain, the fascist party of Italy was not dissolved though – in fact, it participated in the first free elections receiving 12% of the votes, and remaining present in the Italian parliament in the future as well. This was a sign for the new Italy, interpreted differently by people: for some, a sign of a lack of review and reckoning with the past, fascists crimes going unpunished or even being denied as having occurred, those responsible remaining in power as a present elite, often even of oligarchic status. To others, it was a sign of the immaturity of the Italian society that was still mostly apathetic and uninterested in politics, signalized also be very low turnout in election – with less than 50% of those eligible to vote participating in 1995, that percentage dropping in the future. That the National Fascist Party continued to exist was deemed an affront to democracy and the victims of the former system, its politicians being universally boycotted by the politicians from all of Europe. But it did not change the course that Italy was taking, towards the west, and that the broad majority of the population refused fascism or other totalitarian systems, seeing its future as part of “free Europe”.
 
New update from MSZ.

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Since the end of the Great War, there was a common sentiment among much of the European population generally referred to as “the decline of the west”. Usually considered to have started through the works of Oswald Spengler, it had existed before in different forms. The belief that “western civilization” had grown weak and corrupt was something that motivated many fascist movements to stop that decline by turning away from “western” values; it was in part from such a mentality that the term “central Europe” grew out from, a negation of the fascist powers being either “western” or “eastern”. But this kind of feeling wasn’t present only among the fascists as many western philosophers also agreed with the “declining civilization” theory. Most often the proof of it was simplified to “the west loses colonies and colonial wars”. Later on, this was supplemented by the fact that much of the post-colonial states experienced a period of very fast economic growth, while the west was developing only at a moderate pace at best. Economic realism was not something that social philosophers were familiar with and the fact that over the XXth century the west did not collapse made Spengler’s theories seen as somewhat obsolete; predictions that “the west would fall in 20 years” were not taken seriously when after 20 years the west would be stronger and richer than before, rather than broken and weaker. However, the predictions of “new power centres in the world” appearing did come true, as there were in fact a number of countries that grew in strength significantly through the decades – to the point that they could realistically resist the global great powers with their own strength, or even challenge them in their own region. A general expectation was that in the third millennium, the western civilization would no longer be the main point of reference for the countries of the world, whether treating it as a model or as something to oppose. And that did not mean some great rise of fascism or communism either, both totalitarian system already being seen as flawed and no longer as appealing to the general populations of the world to be attractive. That democratic and free-market capitalism did not require social or economic liberalism, anglo-saxon political structures, Christianity, roman law or other pillars on which “western civilization” stood was becoming a generally recognized fact. As such, the “decline of the west” was no longer considered to mean a downfall of western countries, but merely their relative power on the world stage weakening due to the non-western world developing and growing in strength. And for many in the west this wasn’t even seen as some tragedy. The fact that these “non-western powers” still general abided by the principles of democracy and other “western values” was enough for them to feel safe and satisfied, even proud, that their “mission to bring civilization” has “succeeded”.

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Oswald Spengler’s works would be controversial, used by the fascists to discredit western democratic systems, but not uncommonly being interpreted in an anti-fascist way, with the west considering fascism to be proof of “cultural decline”.

Brazil was often cited as becoming a great power, expected to reach that status in the XXIst century, thanks to its growing population, industry, resource pool, landmass and geographic location – a simple look at a world map making it look like a natural hegemon of South America at least. Thanks to the Fulbright Plan and, liberal economic reforms, good relations with the USA, UK and France, Brazil was gradually overcoming the structural problems that previously held it back, such as the presence of a large “perpetual poverty” underclass. Anti-Communist sentiment that started during the authoritarian era, and which continued throughout the time when the national democrats ruled the country, also meant a rather strong anti-socialist stance. The general sentiment among the upper and middle class was that Brazil was still simply too poor to afford the luxuries of a developed welfare state like the USA and Scandinavia offered. To avoid them, Brazil maintained a “income must be invested, not consumed” stance, which was the “official policy” present in schools and media – much of the latter being owned or under the control of National Democrats supporters. Brazil was often accused of being insufficiently democratic because of its low voting turnout and many infringements of the secrecy of ballots – much of the poor underclass that the socialists appealed to simply not voting or voting not on the ones “they were supposed to”. But such practices could not continue forever and social pressures, general education, free media and political awareness eventually did its part. In 1985, the National Democrats lost the elections to the Socialist Party, which formed a coalition with the agrarians. The new government was led by Andre Franco Montoro, a renown law professor who was highly popular among both the Brazilian intelligentsia and much of the worker class – a “People’s intellectualist” who had a remarkable ability to explain complex legal issues in simple words, thus being able to bring the two groups together.

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Andre Franco Montoro, Prime Minister of Brazil, also considered the “great reformer” after a long reign of the right wing in Brazil.

Montoro’s socialist government had proven to be well prepared for taking office and the “burden of leadership”. That the socialists were “ill prepared” for governing was something the right wing would commonly accuse them of for years prior. The Socialist Party however had many political plans together with ready-to-launch legislative projects. Unlike many other south American countries where the first move for the new governments was clearing out the administration of those people who were brought there by the previous rulers, Brazil was able to go past that. Montoro was a strong believer in the French administrational doctrine of administration workers being “civil servants” that were meant to be apolitical specialists working equally well regardless who was in charge and their work judged by their effectiveness. Administrational reform was one of the four major reforms that Montoro’s government passed during his first four year term, by which promise he won the elections of 1985, and subsequent ones after that. While Brazil had officially become a federation, the “United States of Brazil”, in 1965, federal reforms weren’t perfect and the central government still had unusually much power for a federal state. The administration reform of Montoro greatly strengthened the states of Brazil, introducing greater authority and responsibility for their governors, along with direct elections of them; direct elections being one of his most prized children, as he also introduced them for the post of President of Brazil. Greater guarantees for administration workers were also introduced, but at the cost of greater responsibility of public officials. The administrative court system was separated from the general court system, together with a Supreme Administrative Court being created. New administration law and administrative procedure laws were introduced to create a more clear division between the authority of the states and the union, as well as guaranteeing the rights of the people in relation with them. Over the next two decades, the administrative reform of Montoro would universally be agreed to have been the one to complete the process of Brazilian federalization, as well as having had an effect on lowering corruption.

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The Supreme Administrative Court of Brazil. Brazilian civil procedure codes would undergo reforms in a manner that would create a larger variety of procedure types, special paths for labour law, economic law, land law cases, etc.

Apart of administration reforms, Montoro also introduced the Brazilian Elections Code, one of the few national code books for electoral law. In practice, the Brazilian Elections Code also covered a lot of legislation on the internal regulations and operations of the political parties, the Parliament, Senate, office of President and the Governors of states. This was an answer to the common accusation unfair practices being done in Brazil, ranging from media bias to the financing of parties, or even the often undemocratic practices within parties. Electoral courts were introduced to quickly punish instances of slander or combat other means at harming political opponents. The Elections Code was however only a marginal success – while over time it did prove its ability to rid Brazil of many perversions that took place during and before elections, it did not manage to fulfil its main goal – increase voters turnout. Brazil was still one of the countries to have among the lowest ones in the democratic world, barely ever exceeding 50%.

The Public Utility Bill was another piece of legislation that Monotoro’s government had passed, this one being very controversial and highly criticized among the right, more so than others. Overpopulation of urban areas was a great problem for Brazil which was experiencing a population boom, many of its cities being unable to handle it. The general policy of the National Democrats throughout the previous decades was encouraging westwards migrations into small towns, at the same time limiting the expansion of the city sprawl in the eastern urban areas. Migrations were meant to be stimulated by creating employment opportunities there, either on “reclaimed land”, in the mining sectors or factories. While this policy had success, it was not sufficient for Brazilian needs. Cities still were the main destination of both immigrants and the local poor. Brazilian cities were slowly surrounded by shantytowns filled with people working illegally in the cities themselves. As these people were mostly squatters, utilities like water or electricity was either unavailable for them, expensive or had to be stolen. The National Democrats usual stance towards these squatters was usually repressive, periodical “clean up actions” taking place during which those shantytowns would be demolished. Many cases of the land owners evicting those actually living on it took place, much to public outrage. The socialists had for a long time called for a different approach to the problem, demanding for the legislation of the squatters quarters and allowing for urban development. The Public Utility Bill was means for squatters to legalise their stay on unowned land and their houses (mostly built against construction law, without permissions), provided guarantees for those living in “vacancies” against evictions, as well as obliged the cities to develop proper public utility infrastructure in the shantytowns. Criticism against those projects were plenty, ranging from property owners who were now unable to use their estates, the cities which were burdened with the costs of massive infrastructure development without getting proper funds and many businesses, from the construction companies (as construction standards for new buildings were greatly reduced) to flat renters, who had to raise prices to compensate for the risk of the tenants being much more difficult to remove from rented apartments. The Public Utility Bill also reduced the price of utilities for the poorest and some social groups, like single mothers. All these massive expanses were meant to be covered from taxes, which were also raised, new rates being introduced. Overall, while the legislation did manage to better the situation in the outskirts of many large cities (and proven to be a success when compared with the cities that obstructed the legislation, where the shantytowns have grown completely out of control and became hatcheries of crime), but the cost of increased taxes and a large increase in estate prices – the constructions and property development sectors of the Brazilian economy being greatly reduced, as did the flat rental business, the cranes that once covered the panorama of Brazilian cities going away.

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Typical sight of Brazilian cities – developed metropolises separated from a shantytown sprawl.

The fourth of the “Four Reforms” was the Brazilian healthcare plan, something much demanded by the Socialists and much resisted by the National Democrats and the conservatives. Reasons were both fiscal and political, the United States of Brazil being deemed unable to fund a vast healthcare system and much of the right wing political scene still seeing healthcare as an area of business that should remain in private hands rather than a different type of utility that the state had an obligation to provide to citizens like running water. It was a controversial subject as much of the Brazilian poverty was unable to afford any form of healthcare – in fact, Brazil had a rather high percentage of infant mortality and premature deaths caused by illnesses. The establishment of a large healthcare infrastructure was a massive undertaking, starting with a demand on constructing large, multi-speciality hospitals in all cities above a 100.000 population along with a network of clinics in smaller ones. Machinery was mostly imported from abroad, as were many specialists. Montoro also greatly increased funding for medical and pharmacy schools, vastly increasing enrolment, the number of schools and scholarships and overall the popularity and prestige of medical professions. Over time, “a doctor in the family” would become something prestigious in Brazil, and the overall number of trained physicians in the country would be very high (though their quality would often leave much to be desired). Medical professions – doctors, dentists, nurses, pharmacists, etc. – would be given almost guaranteed employment in the public sector, and though for many this meant “being sentenced” to work somewhere outside large cities and without much chance for personal development or career, it also meant much easier access to first contact medical aid. While not planned, medicine would come to be one of the strongest of Brazil’s ‘”soft power” assets in South America and the post-colonial world. Brazil would come to provide a great deal of medical care, personnel, equipment and training to much of the developing world, its doctors being known worldwide. Its medical universities would also increase recruitment allowing for students from abroad to attend, mostly from the developing world, many of who would ultimately choose to stay. While the effects of these reforms would ultimately be a success, it would come at a cost. Financing such a great “investment” was a large burden for the Brazilian budget. There was also a lot of criticism over the “quality over quantity” approach that the Brazilian medical community had, many of the average students finishing Brazilian schools displaying a level of skill much lower than what present in the west, the fascist states or even the communist world. Learning foreign languages was not obligatory for doctors, this keeping much of them away from new knowledge and developments. And despite promises, the system would eventually grow to become more centralized as most of the Brazilian states were unable to finance them, thus being forced to come to the capital for aid. Hospitals built in the 90’s would not uncommonly face bankruptcy only ten years later. Long waiting periods and many treatments not being covered plagued Brazilian healthcare, leading to corruption – bribes in return for life saving treatment being given on time, or at all. It also had the a very high ratio of “professional mistakes” among doctors.

Montoro’s “Four Reforms” would allow him to win the next elections in 1989, and the Socialist Party won yet again in 1993. The reforms were kept going with only minor changes and alteration through further years as well, consolidating and gaining universal acceptance among the population so that even after the Socialists eventual loss in elections in 1997 they were not reversed – something that was a great problem in many South American countries where the victory of one party usually meant the annulment of the reforms made by the precious administration, something that generated much chaos and practically meant a growth in the power of the bureaucracy, that in turn negatively affected the entire country. Brazil overcame that structural flaw many young (and not so young) democracies had. Its internal stability and growth, responsibility and prudence on the international stage earned it respect – and envy of other South American countries who began to fear the strength of the Brazilian juggernaut much like they previously feared (and envied, and hated) the USA. Brazil was not only the number one economic power of South America and number two in all of the Americas, it held those titles also in terms of military strength. That this growth was stable progress and not some form of bubble, and that the world was recognizing Brazil as an important player became most apparent in 1995, when it was finally given seat at the LoN security council as semi-permanent member – something that was a goal of Brazilian foreign policy since the 20’s. It was achieved with some help from the USA, which had promised to support Brazil when the USA joined the LoN itself, and by 1995 made good on that promise. Brazil was thus the second American, second non-European and arguably the first “non-western” country to get such a privilege in the League of Nations.

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Brazilian soldier on a humanitarian mission in the Caribbean. Brazil’s soft power would be most prominently used among the countries of the western hemisphere, though it rarely entered into conflicts with either the USA or the BCoN, preferring to work with them in partnership, the western hemisphere being an area where it felt it could be treated as such even by the global great powers.
 
New update from MSZ.

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India was another „expected great power” in the assumptions of many, a country that by virtue of its sheer population, area, resources and geographical location was a natural regional power with aspirations going further. Independence, fast growth, importance in both BCoN and global affairs, crucial role in dealing with crises in South East Asia and the victory in the brief Sino-Indian War had given the people a sense of pride and filled the government and elites with ambition. It was strongly believed that in the early XXIst century India would overtake the UK in terms of nominal GDP, becoming the second former colony to do so after the USA. Even in face of being surrounded by totalitarian powers, its democratic system stood strong, the country resisting foreign pressured and managing to apply pressure of its own when necessary – it’s stance and actions during the Thai-Cambodian War being paramount to the conflicts resolution. It was also Indian diplomacy (along with UK’s) that had managed to keep the Red Army out of Afghanistan after the communist coup there, preventing it from becoming another SSR, and leaving it just as a Soviet-aligned buffer state.

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India’s status as a great power was well represented by its military capacity, having the third largest military in Asia after China and the USSR, as well as being the second country in Asia (after the USSR) to acquire nuclear weapons.


What kept India from becoming a Great Power for such a long time was its many structural problems which it continuously tried to solve, but having significant problems in doing so. The structure of India had kept it as a rather decentralized state, the provinces and princely states jealously protecting their autonomy and powers. Various magnate families also weren’t supportive of many of the “progressive” policies the central government demanded. Westernization was considered suspicious by much of the conservatives, who preferred traditional institutions. This created an environment where social change required a lot more effort than just passing legislation, but would also require active government participation in their execution and enforcement. When determination to do weakened, be it due to elections, some new matter coming up, straw enthusiasm or popular resistance – reforms would become dead laws again, whatever reforms having been done even being undone, the situation reverting back to what it used to. These type of relapses to past flaws led to many radicals getting support in local elections and provinces, often among ethnic or religious lines, that hampered democratic process. The electoral procedures of majority voting usually prevented the problem of no majority in legislatures being found, but created the problem of that majority in legislatures changing every elections, making it easy for reforms made by one group to be canceled in a few years – even on the constitutional level. Changes in the Indian constitution occurred at an average of more than once a year. This lack of legislative stability was more a problem in social affairs than in economic ones, India being bound by BCoN regulations and being less vigorous in constantly altering commerce codes – but even there, instability and often changing administrational requirements did hamper economic freedoms.

Structural poverty of the majority of the population, overpopulation, remains of the caste system and its later incarnations, conflicts between the central government and provinces, wealth inequality, religious and ethnic tensions – all where serious issues Delhi had a hard time tackling. While most of them were usually blamed on the colonial past, in reality much of them appeared or grew worse only after India’s independence. Blame for problems was just as commonly assigned on the English as was on various ethnic groups within India that didn’t go together so well. This was just as true for Indian initiatives, that were criticized by opposition as “the government sucking up to the Englishmen” as well as for UK’s initiatives that were accused of “benefiting a select few in India” – those “few” being some ethnic group or a class. Overcoming these prejudices was a constant challenge in UK-Indian relations and a commonly brought up reason by the supporters of India’s withdrawal from the BCoN. The belief that India could do better on its own by severing ties with the commonwealth and throwing off its constraints, doing away with “British meddling” wasn’t uncommon. But while such sentiments gathered votes among some voters groups it did not become a mass movement or achieve support among the highest authorities. Anyone who found themselves in the seat of India’s Prime Minister was quick to realize just how important and tied up with the UK India was – and to India’s benefit. Interestingly, where anti-British sentiment was strongest was among the nouveau riche and the recently advanced lower middle class, who grew thanks to UK’s (and European overall) deindustrialization. The elites and the established middle class held much less of it, being more aware of the benefits India drew from the BCoN. Also, the sentiment wasn’t strong among the most impoverished class, though mostly due its apathy.

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India’s development gave rise to a growing middle class that adopted much of a typical western consumerist mannerism, while also coming to enjoy the benefits of a free market democratic system. Regular corner stores and supermarkets were thus replacing the more common bazaars and flea markets.

Poverty and overpopulation where the two most troublesome issues, and connected to each other. The central government simply couldn’t gather enough funds to “stimulate wealth creation” or “provide investments” all around that would allow for a significant part of the population to experience a betterment. Even the largest factories and investments programs that would employ thousands of people would still be just a drop in the ocean when the perpetually poor and unemployed went in tens, if not hundreds of millions. Overpopulation also worked against the people in the private sector, the sheer supply of available workforce meaning so much competition it brought wages down to a minimum level at all times. India managed to resist the urge of raising minimum wage and introduce other socialist policies – these being long standing demands of the left wing parties – opting for the long term solution of simply allowing for these “drops in the ocean” to pile up, allowing at least a part of the population to experience a betterment in their living conditions. At the same time it remained lenient towards the workers unions which were seen as the prime power in fighting for better working conditions, rather than the government. Still, lack of work and apathy generated numerous social ills, from lack of education (though India did succeed in combating illiteracy) through crime to poor health and spread of diseases. These were concentrated not only in favelas or “poverty districts” of cities, but covered entire regions, even provinces of India. And it would be images from these areas that would often get reported by the western media as a way to disprove the obvious growth in strength and power India had, the implication being that a country so poor could not possibly be competition for the “developed west” – regardless of the fact that that the total number of middle-class Indians exceeded that of the UK’s middle class, its land forces being much larger in size than the UK’s, the growth of its industry also encompassing military production.

Overpopulation was another issue. It greatly strained public infrastructure, as Indian cities were rarely built in a manner that they were intended to hold a multi-million population. Public transportation, roads, water treatment and sewage, waste disposal – all these things simply couldn’t handle the pressure the growing Indian population brought. India was among the world’s second largest importer of food after China, and even with the benefits of the green revolution it couldn’t reach self-sufficiency in any of the basic foodstuffs. The growing population brought a constant demand for more workplaces that neither the Indian government nor the business sector could satisfy in full. India attempted to relieve itself of the stress through emigration which it downright encouraged. These policies found support among economic theoreticians who came to dub it “export of workforce” – allowing for Indian to emigrate en masse to other countries of the BCoN bringing the state tangible benefits in the form of less welfare recipients, less people to make use of public institutions, and money that the emigrants sent back home to their families from abroad. This was a figleaf measure though that was popular in the 70’s and 80’s, but which had expended itself by the 90’s as other countries of the BCoN also could no longer handle the growth in immigrant populations, BCoN rulings and legislation de facto limiting “looking for work” migrations. India’s plans of leasing unused land in Australia, Canada and East Africa for the purpose of moving agricultural workers there and produce food for India’s needs had ended up as spectacular failures, on one hand due to governmental and local population resistance in both Australia and East Africa, the costs of launching such projects in Canada being economically costly on the other. Suggestions of population control by arbitrarily denying the right of families to have more than one child were made, but never went anywhere (though on the other hand, birth control measures were given state sponsorship, and the “abortion underground” was also left without state persecution). The effect was an overburden of India’s infrastructure on many levels – power grids, telecommunications, waterways, etc. – as well as pollution in urban areas and around, along with environmental damages (the river Ganges being among the most polluted in the world). Infrastructure newly built quickly degraded or rendered near obsolete. India had found itself in the trap of constant public and opposition criticism for engaging in costly development projects that aimed at establishing a fully modern and new infrastructure, counter demands being that the same funds ought to be used for cheaper and older units, that would however benefit more people in some way at least – the philosophy being that it was better to provide power for 12 hours a day to a whole population that previously didn’t have it, than to provide it 24 hours a day for half the population while leaving the other half with nothing. Same philosophy applied to attempts at modernizing existing facilities, replacing trains or buses or other situations like that. Negative side effects of such a trail of thought were known, such as when it came to running water – degrading water treatment plants leading to the water eventually turning brown and polluted, while there being little effort at bettering it while other parts of the population still did not enjoy having running water at all. Sanitation was thus in a poor situation and India suffered badly from diseases of various types, which spread quickly in a densely populated environment, outbursts of deadly diseases often causing many fatalities. But despite that, this policy was kept around and led to India being a huge buyer of everything “second hand”, ranging from buses and locomotives to textile clothes. And it also wasn’t uncommon that many such “second hand” goods that were imported to India were originally manufactured there.

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Crowded train in India. Sights like these weren’t uncommon and made railway transportation something of “commoners way to move”, the rising middle class preferring automobile transportation.

The “success” here meant a rise in the statistical availability of water, power, food, public transportation and the like – but with little improvement in their quality. This led to the most impoverished being somewhat helped and better off in the 90’s than they were in the 60’s by giving them access to such utilities, but it still led to problems in getting people advance further than that. The advancement from lower to lower-middle class was just as difficult as going from lower-middle to middle class, those who “managed to escape” from slums still finding it hard to advance further up in their careers or making savings – their poverty “being hidden behind the curtains” of their rented apartments where inside things seemed to in order, but where in reality there were common problems with making due to the next payout. It also had a very bad effect on the esthetics of Indian cities, which, while functional, appeared to be more in decay than in prosperity. Same problem of “low quality but available, or high quality but at exceedingly high price” was present in education. While India boasted about its successes in conquering illiteracy and its universities producing impressive numbers of engineers and specialists, the quality of their education was lacking significantly. Literate people after school often ended up with functional illiteracy, the level of education Indian universities gave being equivalent to a good western high school. Much of India’s middle class was aware of that, hence foreign studies and scholarships to western countries remained in high esteem.

But even with statistics being deceiving, it wasn’t possible to deny the fact that even with just a fraction of India’s total population, industry, education and military having western standards, in nominal numbers that still placed India as a match to any of the western powers, even exceeding most of them. It was widely believed that once India was done with its extensive, “horizontal” development and began and intensive, “vertical” growth, it would rise beyond any western (and non-western) power. Speculation about an “Indian Superpower” – a power greater than even the global great powers – was ripe in British fiction. The “Indification” of the Anglo-Saxon world was another common trope. The Indian diaspora was numerous in every country of the BCoN, including the most poor African ones. With the signing of the BAFTA treaty even the USA with its strict immigration policies started to loosen them, increasing annual quotas allowed for immigrants from India. The Indian diaspora displayed a varied level of nationalism and willingness to assimilate mostly depended on the host country. In African and Arab states Indians were mostly menial workers of the lowest class, heavily discriminated against and envied, which made them cluster in their own small communities and stick to their own traditions, not being eager to cultivate Muslim or African culture. Such enclaves did grow in western countries as well as in South America. But in their cases, the immigrants were more commonly of middle class background for whom emigration was a desire of career choice, rather than a total necessity. Western immigration policies also played a part here, the axiom of immigration only being tolerated if it was sustainable not being challenged except for the most far-left elements – and when practiced leading to dubious benefits, the ethnic conflict between the Indian immigrants and the Blacks in East Africa being a model example. As the western states mostly acquired “brain drain” specialists, skilled workers, people of middle class income and such, it was much easier for them to be accepted into a western culture and assimilate themselves into the Anglo-Saxon world. And Indian immigration was not restricted to the countries of the BCoN – Indians moving also to South America, the Arab states, East Indies, even South Africa – this overall trend being sometimes called “peak colonization”, as the total number of Indians emigrating over the decades exceeded that of the most intensive periods of European emigrations during the colonialist era. Among the enthusiasts this was seen as a viable way of increasing the population of recipient countries, full assimilation into English or Canadian culture (those two being more common) deemed desirable and possible. The sceptics on the other hand referred to this as “former empires being colonized by their former colonies” and considered it a sign of cultural decline – Germany in particular considering it repulsive, including elements of “race treason” in the practice. That Indian culture had negative traits that got sometime transmitted to other countries was not questioned though, as India itself was struggling with them – most noticeably the caste system.

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The UK remained the prime destination for Indian students seeking higher education, though countries like Canada or Australia weren’t far behind; as many such students would decide to stay where they studied and sought to bring their families there, an increase of on Indian immigration was noticeable in most of the countries of the BCoN.

The general rise in nationalisms worldwide meant not only a surge in the development of modern state institutions and reorganization of countries governments, administrations and judiciaries, but also a revival of culture and customs – sometimes also unfortunately also the “bad ones”. The caste system of India was one of them, an old plague that nationalism had given a new form, against which both the English have struggled against in the past, but which much of the Indians opposed as well – Mahatma Gandhi being a well-remembered example. The massively multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-national character of India made it extremely diverse, yet the idea of “castes” was quite widespread among many of them. The idea got assimilated into nationalist chauvinism during the Indian national revival period, and has as such become a tool for many to discriminate against others, while covering their practices as under the guise of “local culture”. It was commonly an instrumental tool used for the benefit of a small group at the expense of others. It contributed greatly to the vast inequalities in the benefits received by the people from economic boom – those of “lower caste” being straightforwardly denied them by the “higher caste”, who would also obstruct various “wealth redistribution efforts” on both central and local levels of government. Elected leaders in a majority voting system naturally preferred to keep that majority by giving preference to those of their own caste or those who weren’t “untouchable” in some way – the caste system being a convenient tool when combined with elections in either keeping a majority in local legislatives or at the very least preventing some political parties from collaborating with each other. Economic policies would be similarly used for political benefits. Investments and development aid were directed towards specific recipients, those of “better” caste getting the benefit of more opportunities along with more direct help and lack of silent discrimination. Using national prejudice combined with ethnic dislikes led to situation where peoples of different ethnic background would label each other as being of “lower caste” – despite this having nothing to do with the original meaning. Such practices would quickly get combined with economic prejudice – those better off financially opposing any efforts to benefit those worse off at their own expanse, citing “culture and tradition” as reasons for that. This took many forms. Socialist parties that most strongly opposed the caste system were shunned in most local elections, though the contrary happened in general elections where they performed much better. Acts of domestic violence and vigilante justice happened, like bombing of clinics built in “untouchable” areas or lynches on doctors who refused aid to those of a different caste leading them to die. Such things were a huge structural problem for India as it excluded large segments of the population from the state and its institutions (despite the State’s efforts) as well as denied it the opportunity to use their full potential. It was common knowledge that for many, the castes were just excuses for bigotry, something straw lawyers would bring up in defence of their clients, but for many it was a honest belief and local community tradition – a way to preserve “purity” and culture. Fighting it had proven difficult, as the caste system had seemed to have many benefactors, starting with politicians who liked the permanent voting base of the supporters, the elites who saw it as a way to avoid redistribution and high taxes, the various “higher castes” who like the prestige and such. But overall, the system did not have any full legal backing and was officially banned in the Indian constitution under the “no discrimination regardless of caste” clause. Other countries of the BCoN were also highly disproving of the practice and in turn shunned those who actively supported it – Indian politicians of such views being uninvited to BCoN meeting and badly written statements about castes ending many careers.

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Graphic representation of the “caste system”. During the Cold War, it was often compared with the Nuremberg Laws and other types of racial legislation in fascist states.


The conflict between the Indian central government and the local governments had been going on for a long time, since the very beginning of Indian statehood. Calls that the unitary structure of India ought to be abolished in favor of a federal system were strong from the very start, and though never materialized, the liberalization of the 70’s did lead to a lot of deregulation and much authority being transferred to lower levels of administration. It was disputed though whether it was an result of the central powers finally agreeing with the voice of the people, or whether it was a sign of capitulation of the state that simply couldn’t continue to keep the image of still being in control of all state affairs when it was being obstructed in many ways and lacked means to fight that obstruction. Decentralization went together with economic liberalization and led to massive economic benefits, though at the cost of social policies reforms becoming harder to introduce and implement. The majority “first past the poll” system in Indian elections combined with it having a “soft” constitution that only required a 2/3 majority of the Indian parliament to be changed had allowed for the constitution to be amended in some way annually – on average, there being more than one each year since India’s independence. Changing bills and acts was even easier and it wasn’t uncommon that pieces of legislation passed at the end of the parliaments term would be annulled just a few months later, after new elections. The Indian justice system was clogged with cases leading to many laws being simply ignored by the people as there was little trust in any conflict being possible to be resolved in court in any reasonable time. The same went for administration and many local governments simply ignored national legislation, knowing the central government did not have it easy to punish them for it. To make matters worse, the decentralization often meant that power was de facto transferred to “permanent majorities”, some local areas overwhelmingly supporting political parties that were entirely financed by one clan, or even one magnate – democratic procedures becoming twisted to a point where they could be used to make private latifundas out of provinces.
Such magnates would often enjoy popular support despite their massive wealth and obvious disregard for any spirit of the law for many reasons, ranging from racist bigotry covered up as “caste solidarity” to genuine support for the idea of federalism or independence, establishment of a “nation –state” for their particular ethnic group, present autonomy being seen as step in the right direction and the magnates being seen as supporters of those desires – an alignment of interests where people would want independence and freedom for independence and freedom sake, and side with magnates with whom they may disagree on some things, but still were willing to go along with them to protect the freedom they guaranteed while in power. Autonomy gave many people a strong sense of statehood that satisfied the desires stirred by rising national sentiments, even if it sometimes did cause identity conflicts between being “Indian” and “Local”. Such a disconnect between the local and central government authorities created a situation where implementing reforms would often require active governmental task forces to literally force them through using police, and also be used by foreign powers for their own agenda. Many of those having interests in India preferred to deal with the “locals” rather than the Indian central authority – the best example of this being Pakistan. With its ethnic, national and religious distinction, further supplemented by the Pakistanis being mostly labeled as a “lower caste” by most Hindu and the province being overall among the poorest, all that contributed to a strong sense of bitterness, anger and desire to secede.

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India was the easy scapegoat for much of the Pakistani population for all their ills and accused of all sorts of crimes, from torture of oppositionists to practicing “water monopoly” tactics.

Pakistan had been a place of constant conflicts, martial laws, terror attacks and even border skirmishes on the Afghan border, which made it an area where Delhi’s attention was towards keeping order and peace rather than organizing relief in cases of natural or social disasters that plagued Pakistan. Just how selective the decentralization effort from the 70’s was also seen in Pakistan, as while nominally the provinces there were to benefit in the same degree as those in the rest of India, realistically their autonomy was significantly smaller. Indirect discrimination of muslims was practiced, both de iure via national legislation, as well as de facto, by having much of the local administration and police forces there coming from heartland India rather than being recruited locally. Effectively, the little hope that Pakistanis had in the 70’s over reforms had soon proven to be futile, the elections in Pakistan bringing radicals to power there, to which Delhi responded often with banning their parties or even dissolving local offices and institutions, denying the Pakistanis right to be employed in public administration. It thus became apparent that the situation there could not change through democratic process and that self-determination could not be achieved by any other means than secession or confederalism. Things went from bad to worse in Pakistan in the 90’s after the Arab – Iranian War (during which things got somewhat calmer there, thanks to many radicals moving to Persia and the economic boom of the era) when India was actually thought of as being on the verge of Civil War. The decision to allow India to have a personal nuclear arsenal independent from UK’s was also made at the time, a very risky move by the UK that was intended to scare away the USSR and China from trying to expand Communism further into Asia, as well as being a response to India’s own demands for greater security guarantees. India would also get less restrained in using police and military forces to keep calmness and order than the west was, the situation in the 80’s being thought of as “the calm before the storm”, and the 90’s being thought as the moment the storm would come, any event being a possible spark for the powder keg. But even though the 90’s did get bloody, riots, fights, terror attacks and such claiming the lives of thousands, (in one particular case, the Indian police resorting to use dum-dum bullets to quell protestors) numerous political scandals of the time exposing the mutual hatred of various groups towards each other within India. This reminded the world of the instability of India and was often presented as a reason for which India would not achieve true great power status anytime soon. But civil war never came and India managed to pull through that hardship as well. This was the real thing that prevented India from being seen as a great power – image. Most people in the west simply couldn’t stop thinking of India as anything else than a British Colony despite all numbers showing the contrary, and India had a problem in building itself a brand that would make the people of the world accept India as the new centre of power in Asia – and in the future, maybe the world.

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Violence in India was much more commonly reported in western media than its various spectacular successes, further undermining India’s work in bettering it’s image.
 
Next part is up by MSZ.

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East Asia was considered to be the „hottest” theatre of the cold war, not only due to the number of conflicts taking place there throughout the cold war, but also due to those conflicts clear ideological flavor. In Europe, the conflict between the three power blocs had a very strong ideological undertone, but overall was very calm, with only minor incidents occurring on seas and over airspaces. In Africa, the number of conflicts was large, but a great deal of them were anti-colonial wars rather than purely ideological wars – even though the opposing sides were supported by different power blocs on almost every occasion. Even in South America the “proxy conflicts” were more “politics using different means” than they were “ideological crusades” against different beliefs. In most cases ideology served only as a background, or a tool, for people of different agendas who were looking for any backers they could find, changing their politics and rhetoric when deemed necessary and convenient. This did not mean that the leaders of the various proxy wars were non-ideological, or that their followers were. Rather, their motivations seemed much more often to be simply power for the sake of power rather than for the sake of spreading ideology. Situations where after any victory the victors would start their “social revolution” by eliminating the “believers” from their own side were common. Even more common would be situations where after just a few years of being “civic leaders” rather than “revolutionary/war leaders” those in command would change their politics to suit the changing political environment. Trying to play the various sides of the cold war for their own benefit was a tactic attempted by many countries, though only a few could say that they succeeded at that. More often, those “aligned” with a certain bloc would support them in situations where their own interests were not harmed, but were much less willing to stick their neck out in the name of “solidarity” when their own interests were in jeopardy. Loyalty to ideology only went to some length before having to make way for realpolitik. It wasn’t unusual for post-colonial states leaders to change their minds over individual matters when presented with a lucrative offer by an ideological enemy – or threatened by them in some way.

This was much less the case in East Asia where ideologies seemed to affect both the leaders and the populations to a greater degree. Since the Far Eastern War, East Asia was mostly viewed as the place of communist expansion against which both the fascist and the west needed to protect itself. The lines where quite clear, with mainland Asia being firmly in the communists grasp. Japan remained a communist “aligned” state, though mostly unwillingly. Taiwan was the main stronghold of the fascists, with Thailand serving as a secondary base, though one significantly less “politically certain”. Former Indonesia remained a mosaic of various countries, being more or less democratic, but a number of them descending into various types of local “socialisms”, “fascisms” and other “-isms”. Australia remained a solid ally of the UK and the west overall, same going for the Philippines, which remained an ally of the USA. These allegiances remained unchanged for most of the cold war, the countries there showing a larger degree of solidarity with their “ideological allies” in Europe than those from other places on the globe. This was often explained by the fact that the risk of some war occurring there between countries of different blocs was larger than elsewhere. Those countries that feared a localized war seeing escalation as a deterrent. Thus remaining loyal to others was seen as the best guarantee of protecting themselves. But this did not fully explain the reasons why even in times when change was possible, be it during the détente or on other occasions, they did not try and alter the status quo to a more accommodating one. Taiwan had been subject to quite some British and American influences, both of which tried to push out fascist interests from it and offered considerable support in Germany’s place – yet to no success. Similarly the USSR had on numerous occasions tried to start a bilateral relation with the Philippines without the USA present, offering friendship and guarantees – to which offers the Manila responded by inviting the Americas to the table. When Cambodia was occupied by Thailand and given the opportunity by the LoN to hold elections, those still brought the socialists to power, despite previous atrocities caused by the Red Khmers.

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Pro-German march in Taipei. National Socialism was the most successful fascist ideology in the far east, ideas of racial purity, “racial state” and strong sense of community being popular in societies where individualism was not as praised as in western states.

The Philippines were one of the few cases when a “colony” (though the USA refused to admit the Philippines were that) would willingly choose to stay close and allied with its metropolis after obtaining independence. Among the Americans, this was often shown as proof of the superiority of the American method of “bringing development” to “uncivilized parts of the world”. More realistically though, it had to do with the Filipino elites simply seeing it as safer to stay tied with the US, both for them personally, and for their country. The Filipino were hardly pro-American en masse and there were significant elements that sought to fight against American influence or severe ties with America altogether. The great political split in the Philippines was in fact between the wealthy, conservative, land-owning elite, also supported by the businessmen and middle class, and the impoverished rural population. Whereas the first sought to preserve the ties with the USA that ensured a flow of money and goods between the two countries, the second were opposed to continuing American presence. Not a few of them looked towards communism, or even fascism as an alternative to the democratic system introduced by the USA. But overall, non-democratic opposition in the Philippines was small and weak, as even those opposed to the “liberalist American system” preferred to operate within the democratic institutions than outside them, the republican political system being overall preferred over communism or fascism. American and Filipino armed forces were able to eliminate most potential radicals during the years prior to Filipino independence, and then stood on the guard of keeping democracy. Attempts to overthrow it did happen though. Parts of the Filipino army did rebel in 1961 and tried to take Manila, the coup however not going far. After entering the capital and taking the President hostage, the USA responded by declaring it would not recognize the military junta and would use force to restore president Carlos Garcia to power (the coup taking place in response to his electoral election by a very narrow margin, and claims the election was forged). This threat was enough for the coupists to back down.

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Rebel forces holding a checkpoint to Manila centre during the coup. Most of the common soldiers would be pardoned for their participation.

Another attempt at forcefully wrestling power from the legitimate government took place in 1968 led by the socialists, this one being a response to yet another “Land Reform Act” that left most of the peasant population unsatisfied. Land reform was a very controversial issue in the Philippines, with demands of land reform that would reduce the landholdings of the elite and foreign corporations and distribute the land among the farmers and peasants that actually worked on it. Obviously that small elite was unwilling to go along with it and tried to prevent reforms. Democratic process thus led to a decades long process with “new, revolutionary reforms that would change everything” being announced every few years, after the previous ones made little progress. In 1968 frustration reached its peak, leading to countrywide unrest and attacks on the palaces of the landowners as well as demonstrations in major cities. This “uprising” was put down by the Filipino police and Army, the US forces not having to interfere, but being ready to do so. The uprising did allow for further reforms in the land sector though. The process, while long, did bring progress. It’s main flaw however was that its graduality only allowed a minority of the farmers to benefit – each new reform forcing the landowners to give up only a part of their land, allowing each time only the richest “kulaks” to buy them out. Effectively, after a few decades, this translated into the landowning elite simply having grown larger by those “newly enriched”. It also didn’t help that with the coming of the green revolution, the Philippines found themselves almost burrowed under imported American food products, much of which was actually cheaper than domestically produced. This forced the Filipino farmers to turn from subsistence agriculture to specialized production meant for the US market. And this in turn meant that the farmers found themselves at the mercy of the global market and its shifting prices, specialization meaning a great risk of bankruptcy for those who would be unable to predict what would consumer demand be the next year.

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City of Manila. The Philippine capital city avoided the fate of many post-colonial urban agglomerations where they ended up flooded with poor people from he countryside squatting in slums that surrounded enclave districts of the elite. It did so thanks to rather high prices of estates there which made it a city of the middle class.

Filipino democracy remained flawed and corrupt, but it did remain a democracy. Many would try to contest that by pointing out a certain noticeable “tradition” among Filipino political circles for children to take over the political careers and empires of their parents. Entire dynasties of politicians would form – though rather than a sign of oligarchy or there being an “unelected aristocracy”, this was more of a cultural import from the USA, where powerful clans of politicians would also form – like the Roosevelts or the Kennedys. It was more common in the Philippines than in the USA though for children or grandchildren of one politician to take over the post their father or grandfather used to hold. Such was for example the case of Gerardo Roxas, the son of Manuel Roxas, who became President in 1965, or Jose Romero II, who became ambassador to the UK as his father, and whose children would follow in his footsteps. This type of concentration of power in the hands of families bugged many of those who viewed it as a sign of “American cliqueism”. But realistically, elections in the Philippines were free and plenty of people without family connections made it to power or advanced their careers within state administration. Much of this was thanks to the Filipino police, which was modelled after the USA police and was considered a very effective formation, often deemed even better at their work than even its American counterpart. It was remarkably resistant to corruption and from very early years, bribery and any sort of “bending the law in return for profit” was strongly fought against within its ranks. Unusually for most countries, it was in fact the Police that remained the institution that was held in high esteem and respect by the population rather than the army. That rule of law be followed was an important part of the Filipino culture and became part of the national psyche during its formative years. It was established so often just to severe cultural ties with Spain, Spanish culture being deemed inferior and a corrupting influence – “bribery being how Spaniards do things”. Such an attitude of not repeating “what Spaniards do” was in part helped by American propaganda, which tried to paint Spanish colonialists as villains and the war of 1898 as a “liberation”. Anti-Spanish propaganda and attitudes were not uncommon in the Philippines and in Filipino popular culture, especially in the context of the cold war – Spaniards in historical fiction being almost universally depicted as fascists in some way, Dutch, Englishmen and Americans as heroes.

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Inauguration of new policemen and women. The police formation was a prestigious one with very high standards of quality and general morality, as well as very little tolerance for corruption an uncouth behavior. Interestingly, this made many of the Hollywood “cop movies” not as popular in the Philippines as they were in the US, there being less acceptance for policemen “going rouge”.

The Philippines benefited immensely from American soft power efforts at containing the spread of communism and fascism, especially since the administration of Joseph Kennedy. A lot of private investment went to their during the 60’s and 70’s. This had to do with US immigration still being very strict when it came to migrant workers, but customs and tolls for American – Filipino trade being low, and labour in the Philippines being cheap. As such, any American businesses moved production overseas and produced their goods there, later exporting it back to the USA. Liberal reforms in the Philippines even allowed for US citizens to easily start new companies in the Philippines and pay low taxes there, further contributing to the country’s development. And this was further supplemented by American direct aid. Along with Australia and the countries of former Indonesia, the Philippines became a major exporter of natural resources to the countries of the Indian Ocean rim. Filipino culture had also gained a foothold in the USA during the 60’s and 70’s era, being a mix of western and eastern culture, exotic for many of the American consumers and thus appealing, but also “not too foreign”. Its niche was found mostly among the upper management class who aspired to be part of the “elite”, but weren’t quite there yet – Filipino dances, theatres, concerts and other such performances becoming fashionable and a sign of “good taste”. The import of American culture to the Philippines and its transformation there through injecting local oriental elements had also produced many interesting products, particularly in the animations sectors. Filipino studios like Fil-Cartoons, Kennedy Cartoons or Toon City would produce countless cartoons for kids since the 70’s, and American Hollywood would commonly come to use the Philippines as the place for shooting “exotic” scenes, the country being known for its biodiversity. The Philippines would thus be commonly seen as one of the best examples of successful “westernization”, the country being universally thrown together with Australia and the USA when it came to painting “western countries” in a single color on a map of the pacific.

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Filipino folk dance troupe. Such “oriental” spectacles were popular among the American upper middle class that aspired to becoming the high class, being seen as “above” popular American culture or “classical” works like operas.

The westernization and development of the Philippines contrasted with the situation in Japan. Nippon had fallen on bad times since the end of the Far Eastern War, it’s times as a flawed democracy being divided by periods of dictatorship. After the brief “Stalinist dictatorship” immediately after the war and the heavily communist-influenced autocratic period until 1959, Japan finally managed to start developing functional democratic institutions and gain broader internal autonomy from the USSR. It didn’t last though. The decade after 1959 saw the attempts at restoring democracy be obstructed by numerous forces, including the communists, the remnants of the Taisei Yokusankai, even “regular” democratic opponents. Thus those years had seen significant political instability, numerous governments and Prime Ministers, passed reforms being ineffective. A common trend in this period was vilifying the Taisei Yokusankai , presenting it as the main enemy of Japanese freedom, by extension also blaming it for the “crime of war” it has committed by starting the Far Eastern War. TY has become a pariah on the political scene, losing influence, offices and eventually getting banned in 1969 – all as part of a general “anti-imperial” campaign that democratic forces held, as they saw the imperial, militaristic past as a burden that prevented Japan from truly reforming and changing for the better.

But such campaigns had proven to be a double-edged sword. While the TY certainly wasn’t popular in itself, many of the slogans and ideas it used did come close to hearts of the Japanese people. For most of them, it was Soviet communism that was the main enemy of Japan, and the fact that anti-TY campaigns did not go parallel to anti-CPJ campaigns was an obvious double standard – if not outright treason. The idea that the “democratic” government was somehow still in league with the communists (even though the CPJ was also losing power) was a popular theory. The democratic reforms forced through also did not go along with the spirit of the Japanese people, many of whom did not welcome them. The Japanese people, whose upbringing was usually based on the ideals of obedience and order, were unused to the concepts of democratic rule and procedure. The memory of the Far Eastern War remained fresh in their psyche, and their interpretation of it was much different than Soviet, or even domestic-democratic propaganda. For the average Japanese, the far eastern war was a war of liberation of Asia, from communism as well as western imperialism. Thus the soldiers who fought in it were heroes, not traitors or criminals. It was the world that betrayed Japan by not aiding it. Stories of atrocities committed on the Chinese were not believed, described as “lies and false propaganda”. In the minds of the Japanese, the Japanese people were still a “warrior nation” who were turned into slaves. This brought bitterness to their hearts and resentment. Not many were willing to accept the fact that Japan simply lost the war it started and was soundly beaten, preferring to look for the “real reason of failure” elsewhere – such as communists, pacifists and even democrats who “did not display sufficient fighting spirit” – along of course with the rest of the world that did not help Japan in its fight. This kind of sentiment and historiography was passed down to the next generation of Japanese people, from the parents who actively fought in the war onto their children. And it were those children that once having grown up, had no respect for the “democratic authorities and elites”, ” who only got to where they were because of treason and sucking up to the communists”.

Thus while the TY was not supported in name, it was still supported in spirit. Nationalism, even chauvinism, remained strong in Japan, as was the sense of discipline in society and obedience towards “true” role models. Japanese national sentiment was filled with a sense of “lost glory days”, apologism for its militarist past and hate for both the Russians and the Chinese. The latter were even openly not considered to be “victors” in the war, only having ended up on the victorious side thanks to Russian intervention. That Japan was still forced to pay reparations onto them was thus deemed humiliating and unfair. War reparations were overall the main issue of Japanese politics, their humongous size meaning they were only expected to be paid off in the XXIst century – and the USSR constantly threatening to force Japan into paying directly if it would not comply. This war debt combined with international isolation and being at the mercy of the Red Army was what frustrated the Japanese people the most – and led them to support anyone who would offer them a solution to the problem.

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Japanese dreams of greatness did not perish after the war, the common national sentiment being part “doomed moral victor” part “lost glory days” – but with an honest belief of greatness coming back one day.

That solution came in 1972. The party to claim most of the hearts of the conservative Japanese people was the Liberal Party. In 1966, the conservative elements split from the Liberal Party forming the Patriotic Party led by Yukio Mishima. The Patriotic Party had achieved an electoral success in 1971 when it came second after the Liberal Party, with 25% of the popular vote, making it a coalition member of the Liberal Party. Yukio Mishima was given the position of deputy Prime Minister and his party’s members took the cabinets of the ministries of finances and interior. Soon after that, these ministries and other subordinate institutions began to be purged, much to the dismay of the Liberal Party. The coalition was expected to break down. In a radical move, Mishima had usurped Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka accusing him of corruption and bribery, orchestrating his public arrest. Speaking before the Japanese diet one day later, he was given a vote of confidence and given the position of Prime Minister thanks to the votes of all parties – the left wing and centrist opposition accepting him, hoping his promotion would break down the right wing coalition completely. Yet events took a turn for the dramatic as a wave of arrests of other political opponents took place under bogus charges. In the next few months, Mishima usurped more power for himself and his followers, effectively abolishing democracy and establishing himself as dictator.

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Yukio Mishima, dictator of Japan. Noticeably, Mishima did not wear a uniform, nor was his dictatorship a military one.
Dictatorship was not resisted by the population. The Japanese people, brought up on the ideals of obedience, were not very willing to go against any government, even one that obviously refused to follow democratic procedures. Mishima’s strong rule, nationalism, brutal treatment of opposition and condemnation of past governments gave him certain support. So did his non-compromising stance towards greater Japanese autonomy and freedom from Soviet and Chinese pressures. Under Mishima, another round of obstruction towards reparations began. The military was being enlarged. Democratic and socialist elements of everyday life were being removed, replaced in favor of traditional Japanese symbols. The cult of the Emperor was renewed. This “re-japanization” was brought to extreme levels, with a lot of legislation introduced since 1945 being changed. Agriculture and farms were re-privatized. Relations with religious organizations were bettered, including the Catholic Church. Press, radio and theatre plays were “liberalized” – meaning they were freed from previous, pro-socialist censorship and a new one was introduced, with pro-traditionalist tunes. Show trials against certain communists took place, leading to them being either executed or exiled to the USSR. Bans on the possession of foreign currencies, precious metals and jewels were lifted. Many university professors were allowed to go back to educational work. Amnesty and rehabilitation was given to numerous “war and political criminals”, with over 40.000 people being released. Russian models for youth and sports organizations were abandoned and Japan re-entered the Olympic Games. Socialist realism was abandoned in arts, replaced with traditional Japanese forms.

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Japanese art from the era. Military elements were incorporated into traditional type of works.

These changes were largely possible thanks to Mishima’s diplomacy with the Soviet Union, which was initially less than impressed with a „nationalist clique” returning to power in Japan. But Mishima was able to cleverly play on Soviet insecurities regarding China, being quick to offer collaboration against it in return for being allowed to remain in power and accepting Soviet demands regarding security policies. He was able to convince Suslov that his reign was the only thing that could prevent a total revolution and anti-Soviet uprising in Japan – which was something Suslov would rather avoid. While it was certainly possible for the USSR to invade and occupy Japan, having to suppress a nation of nearly 100 million which was known for its fighting spirit would be a costly endeavor. Even more so given Soviet experiences with attrition warfare. Having come to power in part thanks to his views of Russia having to keep a dominant position in Asia, losing Japan, or even being seen as the one who “lost Japan” by having to invade it, was something he couldn’t afford. His competition and dislike for Mao was another factor. As China was attempting to usurp the title of the “first power of anti-imperialism in Asia”, the possibility of Sino-Japanese rapprochement was a concern. Allowing for a “nationalist” dictator to take over Japan and letting him be a guarantor of Soviet strategic interests in the country being untouched was seen as acceptable.

Thus Japan remained part of the Comecon, the general trading strategy of Japan importing Soviet raw minerals for the use in its own industry staying in place – as well as Japan supplying the USSR with manufactured goods. War debt was largely reduced by the USSR and Japan also stopped paying to China altogether – much to the fury of the Chinese, as the USSR was unwilling to “lend a hand” in forcing Japan to pay without prior Chinese concessions. The Japanese army and navy was kept at low numbers and Japan was not allowed to join any anti-soviet alliances, but hold a soviet-friendly neutrality stance at all times – which in reality actually led to an even more tight cooperation with Soviet officers present in Japanese staffs and Japanese ships, as well as almost totally infiltrating Japanese intelligence agencies. Many Japanese prisoners of war were allowed to finally return to Japan after almost three decades in captivity, exchanged for Japanese communists and other “criminals”. The “forced friendship” with Korea was also kept in place, as was the ban of any direct or indirect anti-soviet propaganda and on non-revisionism of post-war borders. Japan was given an almost total internal freedom in ruling itself, trading with the world and carrying out its own foreign policy – but severely limited in defense and security. It still being in the COMECON was sometimes a drag, but also had certain benefits – Japan being able to use its new found freedom to become the first country in the communist bloc (if it could be called that it was still part of it, since it remained aligned with it in political institutions, but not in spirit, ideology or internal policies) to both have the benefit of importing cheap Russian resources, processing them and selling them further across the world with a profit.

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Commemorative stamp of Japanese-Soviet friendship. While the Japanese held no love for the Russians, state propaganda did not allow for much Russia bashing, though did not require praising or whitewashing it either.

By 1980, the USA began its own campaign at opening the doors of the countries of the west Pacific, Japan being the obvious gateway for trade with China and the countries of south-east Asia. It was mostly alone in this endeavour, as Germany stuck to its strong anti-PRC stance, France was unwilling to involve itself in far eastern affairs in any way that might upset the Soviet Union and the UK had to show solidarity with India and Hong Kong. That the USA was willing and able to have a foreign policy that was not anti-soviet nor anti-chinese and deal with both of them in a friendly manner was a unique opportunity for it. Japan saw the obvious benefits in coming closer to the USA as well, mostly in terms of markets. Both the Philippines and the countries of former Indonesia were able to profit from trade with America, and there was no reason to believe Japan could not replicate their results. Non-democratic government, while a concern, was not a great obstacle. The USA was incapable of convincing Japan to break off from the communist bloc altogether though, mostly due to Japanese fears. The USA simply could not provide sufficient guarantees for Japan should it try to break its deals with Russia, nor was Washington willing to risk Soviet wrath over trying to push the issue too far. Still, the 80’s saw a start in greater mobility between the USA on one hand, Japan on the second – and China on the third. Beijing was not willing to miss out on the opportunity to spite the USSR simply by coming closer to the USA, trying to create the image of being the one that was “leading the countries of Asia” in their negotiations and talks with America.

The economic and political reforms in Japan led to similar results as in most “newly independent” states. Freedom of business and opening borders for imports allowed for a general rise in the wealth of the average Japanese, but also allowed led to a great increase in inequality, as those associated with the regime were able to hoard most of the profits. Corruption remained a problem, as was the presence of intelligence operatives in deals between state-owned enterprises and foreign businesses. Japan found itself to be somewhat “late for the party” – being locked out of the global economy for three decades, it had an obsolete industry by modern global standards. Deindustrialization of the developed world and the industrialization of the rest of the globe in turn – this was something that avoided Japan, most of such factories transfers going to former colonies or other countries the western states had previous bilateral or multilateral deals. Japan was thus in a non-favourable position, as it was also outside the League of Nations and the numerous organizations and agreements on trade and tariffs the LoN regulated. Accession to the LoN was in turn blocked by the USSR, on the basis it would constitute a “breach of Japanese neutrality”.

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Typical Japanese urban area. Large concrete panel buildings and shanty backyards.

Economic growth was measly in the 70’s and 80’s, but noticeable in the average Japanese household. This, combined with isolationism and censorship was what allowed the dictatorship to keep popularity. Resistance against it was broken down and Mishima stayed in power until his death in 1990. His autocracy was not continued though, his designated successor, Shintaro Ishihara committing suicide just three months after taking the office of Prime Minister. Suicide was deemed to be the result of his grief over the suicidal death of his wife Noriko, which in turn was due to her psychological problems, but conspiracy theories over Soviet involvement arose quickly. According to them, Ishihara was inconvenient for the Soviets due to his anti-soviet stance and fears that he would be willing to break off from the communist bloc even under the threat of Soviet intervention. Without a clear heir apparent, it was Emperor Aikhito that took action, officially requesting elections to take place, which they did. The elections of 1990 were a surprise for both the Japanese and the global community, the Japanese dictatorship appearing “stable” until that point. Those led to a fragmented parliament from which a broad centrist coalition of various conservative, liberal, populist and minorities/haimat parties. Unstable and weak, it was nevertheless able to take over the administration of the country and give democracy another try, starting with the freeing of political prisoners and media – but not the economy, nor with severing the connection and allegiance with the USSR.

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Emperor Akihito speaking to the newly elected delegates to the Japanese diet, 1990.

The USSR’s problems with keeping Japan under control and China down were not the only ones it had in the far east. With the annexation of Mongolia, Manchuria, Tuva and Uighuria, the USSR inherited their ethnic and national issues. Stalinization and Sovietization of national culture could only go so far, and while many of the minorities were peaceful, some were able to voice their demands for greater respect of their interests and domestic culture. Of those, Manchuria was the most loud, sometimes referred to as “the Ukraine of the East”, due to the Machu and Han Chinese attitude towards sovietisation, russification, attempts and clinging to their domestic culture.

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Collectivisation in Manchuria led to similar effects as in Ukraine, with a collapse of agricultural production and destruction of much of national cultural treasures.

The dynamic between the Manchu and Han population, and the Russians, was a complex one. The Manchurian SSR, despite its name, was not a soviet republic of the Manchu people, who were actually a minority there. The fact that it was created rather than incorporated into the RFSSR or Communist China was in itself something of a coincidence than a previously thought out plan. While the Manchu language was allowed and the Manchu were recognized as a national minority, they did not initially receive any special treatment from Russian authorities. It was only later as Soviet-Chinese relation deteriorated that things changed. The coincidental naming of the country and the presence of the Manchu minority led to a gradual increase of the privileges the Manchurians were granted, at the expanse of the Han majority. This created an initial sense of gratitude of the Manchus towards Moscow. The actual population of the Manchus in Manchuria was also increasing, partly the result of more Han starting to identify as Manchu, the education/manuchrification efforts of propaganda and education, as well as Soviet population transfers, the Han people being forcefully “repatriated” to the People’s Republic of China in the 50’s and 60’s.
Thus Manchuria had become a social experiment on a grand scale, one trying to establish a national identity almost from scratch. It wasn’t much unlike what took place in the Belarusian SSR. In Belarus, as in Manchuria, most of the population lacked a concrete national consciousness, what little of it was present revolving around certain cultural concepts, like religion or customs. In Belarus, the “cultural experimentation” took the form of erasing traces of Polish culture, establishing an almost artificial Belarusian identity and converting it into a “Soviet-Belarusian” one. Similarly in Manchuria, it was Han culture that was phased out and replaced with revived Manchu culture, properly altered into “Soviet Manchu” identity. But unlike Belarus, where the lowest of the classes had almost no identity to start with and were a complete “carte blanche”, Chinese culture had been already present within the Han population of Manchuria, even among the lowest, illiterate peasantry. Imposing Manchu culture on them was thus met with not as much success.

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Manchu language class in school in Harbin. While Manchu culture managed to make a revival in cities, most of the rural areas were much harder to “convert”.

These “cultural campaigns” in Manchuria had far reaching consequences. Under Malenkov, Manchuria was purged of a large deal of its intellectuals and “social elites” who had Han origin. They were mostly “repatriated” to Mao’s China. The idea of Kremlin’s sociologists was that it was the educated classes representing a “high culture” that were the main obstacle in Manchurian sovietisation. Their removal was thus deemed necessary, and they were quickly replaced with ethnic Russians and Manchus. The Manchu national revival and sovietisation could not erase Han identity – but it could alter it considerably. This would be the ultimate effect of Soviet cultural experimentation – the creation of a “Han Chinese” nationality in Manchuria which was culturally very different from the “Han Chinese” nationality in China, even though both of them called themselves the same name.

By the 70’s, general education, presence of press and media, state propaganda, almost universal literacy, books becoming commonplace – all these things were enough for pseudo-nationalisms in Manchuria to actually become a threatening force. It wasn’t unlike what ultimately happened in Belarus, where the population was capable of adopting the “national” part of the identity intended for them, but was incapable of adopting the “Soviet” part fully. The answer to that was the incorporation of Belarus into the Russian FSSR. Calls for doing the same with Ukraine were present as well, though not implemented – Ukraine being too big and too culturally different to effectively assimilate. And for those same reasons, neither was Manchuria. Both the growing Manchu minority and the Han majority were able to set their differences aside within the Manchurian Communist Party and assert itself before the Kremlin more. While this killed the idea of incorporating Kaliningrad (still called Dalian among many Chinese) into the Manchurian SSR, it was sufficient to bring more attention to its needs.

Under Suslov, the USSR took a renewed interest in Asian matters which in turn cooled relations with China – the issue of Manchuria still being a hot topic between Moscow and Beijing. Suslov had been working towards limiting Chinese influence in Mongolia and Manchuria even before his rise to power, and after doing that, took action to further curb Chinese power in the Far East. And he did not restrain himself in using force in doing so. This led to the so called “border pole wars” between the USSR and China – though “wars” were an overstatement as they were just skirmishes. The Chinese had attempted to increase their territory through a campaign of moving border poles at night – Chinese soldiers digging up a such a pole, moving it a kilometre or two northwards into soviet territory and replanting it overnight, all this being done in remote, unpopulated areas where there was no permanent Soviet presence. At their greatest, those campaigns led to the border being “moved” as much as a hundred kilometres, at which point the USSR responded with force – once in Mongolia in 1972 and in Manchuria in 1976. In both situations, the Red Army soundly beat the People’s Liberation Army, putting a stop to this Chinese practice. These skirmishes, the unpopularity of Mao’s rule, his actions in China among the Han population in Manchuria, and a general “path of divergence” Han cultural in Manchuria took – all these things culminated in general “Han solidarity” on both sides of the border clearly breaking. Support for any kind of “reunification” with China waned, being already dead among the party elites for a long time. The population of Manchuria were becoming visibly more attached to their Manchuria than to China – or to the USSR as a whole even.

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Coat of Arms of the Manchurian SSR.

The 60’s and 70’s were the golden decades for Manchuria, mostly thanks to the massive far eastern development programs. As the USSR reoriented itself from Europe to Asia and the rest of the world via the Pacific, new factories sprung up in the far east, many ending up located in Manchuria. Natural resources extraction allowed for the coastal cities of the RFSRR to grow in population, but passively Manchuria benefited from that as well. Manchuria was called the “Ukraine of the East” not only because of its strong national sentiment, but also because of its food production. Manchurian grain, rice and vegetables fed much of the far east and where exported abroad, to China, Indochina and further. With Japanese industry being set for using Soviet resources, much of what it bought or was forced into buying from the USSR came from Manchuria. This boom in the 60’s and 70’s led to the republic enjoying massive electrification, running water being introduced, many schools and railways being built. The Harbin Institute of Technology experienced a huge development in cadre and facilities in the 50’s, the city becoming home to over a dozen universities and colleges. While collectivization and agriculture had overall kept the rural population in poverty, the cities were reconstructed along Stalinist models, their architecture changing greatly, especially when compared to traditional Chinese one.
It was only in the 80’s that this “idylla” came to an end. The new generation of people, born either after or not long before the end of the far eastern war, were much less content with Soviet domination than their ancestors, or than other nations of the USSR. As the Soviet economy was collapsing, the situation in Manchuria worsened. Shortages of everything became even worse than usual – though Manchurian farms and factories were still producing a lot. Demands to put a stop on the policy of exporting goods that are in deficit increased. Also, Soviet participation in the Arab-Iranian War was very unpopular in Manchuria, where the culture was one of pacifism. Like in Ukraine, both the Manchus and the Han began to venerate their “national” heroes more than Soviet heroes, and their national culture more than soviet culture. The Soviet answer to that was as usual repressions and police action. After Suslov’s death and the purge of his last days, the Manchurian Communist Party was among the larger opponents of Fedorchuk, along with the Mongolian and Ukrainian Communist Parties. The Manchurian SSR became a battlefield of influence between the pro-Fedorchuk crowd, centred around the KGB and some elements of the Red Army, and the Party bureaucracy along with other elements of the Red Army. Things did get bloody, with a number of assaults and even executions taking place, with Fedorchuk eventually winning – though the price was considerable alienation of the Manchurian population and unpopularity of the Kremlin. And more importantly, a significant fall in the popularity of the Communist Party overall, an increasingly common demand among the academia being Manchuria’s withdrawal from the USSR and establishment of a separate People’s Republic, like Korea.
 
Great update as always. The level of detail really shows the research that must've went into this.

Similarly in Manchuria, it was Han culture that was phased out and replaced with revived Manchu culture, properly altered into “Soviet Manchu” identity. But unlike Belarus, where the lowest of the classes had almost no identity to start with and were a complete “carte blanche”, Chinese culture had been already present within the Han population of Manchuria, even among the lowest, illiterate peasantry. Imposing Manchu culture on them was thus met with not as much success.
Rather than Manchu (the language) making a "comeback" in cities but not in villages, I'd expect it to flourish in rural parts of Heilongjiang, where a lot of the population is ethnically Manchu and where the last Manchu-speaking communities IOTL existed. Also, if we're talking about any time after WW2 or so, the Han Chinese outnumber the ethnic Manchus (most of whom were sinicized to a ridiculous degree) like 10 to 1. While programs and projects to revive Manchu language and culture could be implemented, it could only happen in a limited sense. Terming the entire SSR a "Manchurian" one and trying to pretend that 90% of the (50+ million) population are a nationality they aren't is nonsensical even for the Soviets. The way to do it would be to set the SSR up as a "Chinese" republic and play the ideology card, with all attention being focused on how Maoism is a betrayal of true socialist ideals. This seems to have been the effect of the update anyway, so it's a minor oversight.
 
I actually really like this timeline. It's insanely detailed and reads well. Don't know what he was banned for but send MSV my regards for this work.
 
Next part is up by MSZ.

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With the withdrawal of the Portuguese forces from Angola and Mozambique, the war in south Africa has entered a new phase. For the first time since the Great War, Germany has acquired a colonial empire of its own, one it did not have to share with anyone else. And although the conquest of Africa was not the cornerstone of Nazi philosophy, this attitude has changed as the war progressed. With time, ambitions grew, and so did grand visions. In the eyes of Nazis, Portuguese withdrawal was to finally allow Germany to do things “their way” and grant victory. The very concept of “Victory!” has become something of a “spiritual” goal the Nazi party presented to the people, partly to the regular Nazi ideology being largely spent. Despite decades having past, Germany still did not achieve the status of the world’s greatest power, nor did it have a “satisfactory” place under the sun. Autarky has not been achieved, and in fact the German people where living poorer lives than their neighbours in the west. Even the difference between it and its eastern neighbors were getting narrower, to the point where countries like Czechia, Slovakia and western Poland actually managed to exceed German eastern provinces like Prussia or Pomerania in terms of wealth. With most of the Reich having become officially “Judenrein” in the 70’s, Germany lost its main “internal enemy” against which it could mobilize its population and fight. It was also mostly cleansed of Slaves (except a small minority in Silesia and the Sudetenland) over which Germans could rule. The Germans were thus left with only the satisfaction of being able to rule other countries - but not the satisfaction of ruling large swathes of other people who would obey them. Dark-skinned and curly-haired blacks in Africa thus made a good substitute in the eyes of Nazi philosophers for a people to become the designated “servant race” – a great numbers of “savages” that a handful of Germans would rule over, like the German Spartans over the Black helots. It would create a situation where even the lowest of the Germans would be better than the highest of the natives. That was supposed to give the Germans the sense of superiority they needed, and which they were gradually losing. Although the Reich was still scoring successes in many selected areas – conquest of space, nuclear technology, genetics, sports – it was losing the race with the west in down to earth matters, like providing housing, decent cars or a diverse, cheap diet. Protests against the worsening situation were taking place in German cities and brutally suppressed by the police. The number of “anti-fascist” organizations was on the rise, as was corruption in state institutions. German industry was growing increasingly obsolete, the troubles of the humongous state conglomerates being “solved” by mergers or nationalization of private enterprises. That in turn increased unemployment and only served to cover up the flaws of the entire fascist economic system. Lack of development in Germany had overall allowed the countries of central Europe to catch up to Germany in term of economics and motivated their populations to try and seek other trade partners. German culture popular except those of its products from the pre-Nazi eras. Despite the broad personal autonomy German abroad enjoyed, the number of Volksdeutche was shrinking. And that wasn’t due to them returning to Germany in large numbers, but due to them either assimilating with the locals or migrating to the west or to Scandinavia. Thus for the Germans, their main source of national pride was their powerful army that forced respect among foreigners and was claimed to be able to defeat any foe.

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9/11 celebrations in Berlin, 1980

The war in Africa was thus not just a “landgrab”, but also an ideological matter – to show the invincibility of the German Army, stopping the “rising tide of colour” and “securing the safe and prosperous future of white children”. Because the conflict was seen as an existential one, and conducted against an “uncivilized” opponent, the regular rules on the conduct of warfare were quickly thrown aside. Africa has become a field testing place for new kinds of weaponry – herbicidal agents, thermobaric bombs, even chemical and biological weapons. It was an open secret that Germany had been spreading both tropical and European diseases amongst the African population against which it had vaccinated its own soldiers, along with denying access to medicine for the sick civilians. Rumors spread about the development of “ethnic bioweapon” that would target only people of a certain ethnic or racial background. It would also become a long lasting rumor that HIV virus that was destroying much of central Africa and later spread across the world started out as a German bioweapon. And it would be no secret that Germany had been using dum-dum bullets during the war. The war served as stimulus for the development of conventional weaponry as much as much as exotic ones, most commonly dealing with the lower durability of German equipment in the fields and its lower resistance to the elements, along with difficult and costly maintenance.

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Spread of chemical-biological agents in northern Mozambique. The German colonial war would greatly raise concerns about chemical and biological warfare and whether the indirect use of such agents was legal. Much has been done in attempts to modify and amend the Geneve and Hague conventions on warfare to make them suited for modern warfare and technological conditions.

Germany was not alone in the war. Despite Portuguese withdrawal and the non-participation of the mittleeuropa countries, the Germans have had the State of South Africa as an ally. South Africa has been coming closer ideologically towards Germany for some time, though it never abandoned its democratic character. The apartheid system was becoming more harsh however. Blacks were banned from many sorts of economic activities and trades, denied the right to vote or assume political offices, not allowed at all in some areas of the country or cities. Different criminal and administrative laws were introduced for whites and blacks. Black districts in cities were liquidated, their inhabitants forced to move to squats outside towns or even to reservations. South Africa had thus become a de facto “Racial State” where ones race determined his position in society, even though officially apartheid was meant just separate the populations. And for a long time, it made the impression it was working. South Africa was the most developed African country. When on the rest of the continent colonial wars took place, South Africa enjoyed peace and development, growing rich from exports of its natural resources and machinery. Even though blacks were second or third class citizens, they still lived in better conditions than elsewhere on the continent. South Africa was even one of the main destinations of blacks escaping the war-torn countries of Africa, despite those immigrants well knowing what fate would befell them after entering.


The influx of blacks moving from the north was faced with resistance by the white population and the government. The idea of the “rising tide of colour” was deeply ingrained in the minds of south Africans. The fate that befell the French, British, Belgians and even the Portuguese and Italians was considered proof that the “anti-colonialists” were in fact “anti-white” and sought to purge “white civilization” from Africa. The borders were thus tightly controlled by the military, border guards units and even volunteers in the form of minutemen militias. Many acts of violence were reported, illegals being shot dead without warning, even pursued when fleeing back northwards by attack helicopters. Vigilantism within the country was on the rise, illegals being caught in roundups by both police and vigilante groups. Those caught were at best deported back. Others who were less lucky were subjected to special courts meant for “illegal aliens”, the punishment for illegally entering the country being prison, forced labour and sterilization. Over the decades, more than two millions Africans were subjected to this fate. Hundreds of thousands were even killed, as the law did not punish those who killed those “attempting escape”.

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African prisoners in Ingwavuma prison camp.

With time, the brutality aggressiveness and impunity of radicals grew. Paramilitary organizations formed out of militias and vigilantes as they began to cooperate more. Those almost always had a very racist mindset and were usually the most ardent supporters of close cooperation – political and military – with Nazi Germany. They benefited from the fact that police usually left a blind eye on their excesses, or even welcomed their participation in “crime fighting. Their members commonly took the role of “night watchmen” in white cities, looking out for blacks, and the organization was overall popular within law enforcement agencies, many members serving in them. Also the general apathy of the white population that didn’t care about what happened to the blacks, accepting the “they committed crimes and thus were properly punished” as good and proper. Eventually this gave rise to the Afrikaaner Resistance Movement, initially a Boer-separatist organization, that quickly turned into a general white supremacist political group. AWB effectively played on the populations sense of fear, fear from blacks, criminals, communists, liberals, “tribalists” – all those who opposed apartheid or who wanted “equal coexistence” with blacks, painting them as “race traitors” and “fifth columnists”. Initially elitist and meant solely for Afrikaaners, it changed its attitude when non-afrikaaner supporters began flowing to it. Its popularity came from its radicalism and anti-communism among the middle class combined with the “cool factor” of “uniformed armed people fighting bad guys” among the youth. AWB propaganda showed the European empires which withdrew from Africa as “weak and decadent”, alongside with the effects of their withdrawal – lynches of remaining whites, collapse of infrastructure, disorder, poverty, famine, disease. Thus from a small paramilitary group with a minimal political agenda concentrated around the issue of creating a separate Boer State in south Africa, it became a major political force, representing those supporting total resistance towards “black and communist aggression” and those who felt that the ruling National Party was “going soft”.


Entering parliament in 1977 with only 12% of the votes, it scored a great victory in 1981 when in gathered 29%, mostly at the expanse of the National Party with which in entered a coalition – thereby ensuring the preservation of the apartheid system and the impunity for anti-black violence. While commonly linked to the Nazis and described as “South African fascists”, that wasn’t really the case though, as AWB did not oppose the democratic system of South Africa. In fact it used it well, pushing through its desired reforms in the form of great “personal autonomy” for Boers and Afrikaaners in South Africa, along with the formation of an additional Province of South Africa – Volkstaat. The Volkstaat was the smallest of the provinces, as it was in fact composed of a few dozen villages scattered around the State of South Africa, being enclaves within other larger provinces. It also wasn’t opposed totally to the presence of blacks in South Africa, and was in fact supported keeping the “reservations” system that allowed certain African tribes to keep cultural autonomy within them. Some African tribes even supported the AWB directly due to its anti-communist character – since most of the militant “Black Marxist” movements in Africa were opposed to Africans having tribal identities, fighting to destroy it, replacing it with general “African” identity.

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AWB soldier in uniform.

Apartheid did have opponents, both in parliament and in the streets. It was opposed by the blacks who suffered from being second class citizens, if even citizens at all – that privilege not being given out lightly and being possible to take away in court verdicts, in the later era even by administrative decision. It was also opposed by the socialist and liberal elements of the political opposition, the former due to ideology, the latter due to the economic and political isolation it pushed South Africa into, along with the negative economic effects it had domestically. Also “Black Nationalist” movements abroad were strongly against it, such groups forming in the USA, Botswana and East Africa. The two largest politico-military organizations fighting for the rights of the Blacks were the nationalist African Liberation Movement, centered in Botswana and led by Frantz Fanon, and the Marxist-populist African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo. Both those organizations took their most recognized form of “political formations with paramilitary wings” in the 60’s, after South Africa withdrew from the British Commonwealth and apartheid was getting worse. Initially they cooperated with each other officially, along with the many other anti-apartheid and anti-colonial groups that formed in that period. Over time they absorbed many of those smaller movements becoming the two completely dominant ones on the political scene – and thus also becoming competitors in the battle for the hearts and minds of the African blacks. Their politics, while remaining similar in the agenda of “liberating the continent” and the means by which to achieve it, was different in terms of social philosophy and domestic policy. Nevertheless both of them received great material support from the anti-fascist powers of the world, primarily the USSR. Their form of struggle was also slightly different. Whereas the ALM based its terrorism directly against the apartheid system and its enforcers, attacking “whites only” restaurants, public buildings, police stations, party offices, the vigilante/minutemen militias, the ANC held a campaign aimed against the entire socio-political system of South Africa, thus having a much more “total” character – attacking train stations, mines, planting explosives in grazing areas and general public places. This radicalism made it slightly more hated by the apartheidists, which also made it slightly more popular among the general population. Whereas the ALM was willing to achieve some of its goals through compromise and diplomacy, the ANC was more adamant about having its way with the use of force. The ALM had however actual support of Botswana unlike the ANC, which was only tolerated by the government. Thus whereas the ALM was seen as a “better” representative of the interests of South African Blacks outside South Africa, the ANC was more popular in it. The exception was Namibia tough, where it would be the ALM that was the more popular party, thanks to its adamant stance about Namibian independence.

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Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo at ANC rally.

The fight of the ANC and ALM against South Africa and of the MPLA and FRELIMO against the Germans would become tied to each other. It was easy for fascists, apartheidists and other radicals to combine the fight of the Marxists against the capitalists with the fight of the blacks against the whites. The propaganda effort in both Germany and South Africa presented the blacks as communists creating a “single front” against “white civilization”. Unity and fighting together was to fend off the attacker and bring victory. Together with South Africa’s isolation on the global political scene, an alliance with Germany was thus only a matter of time. Both countries cooperated in intelligence gathering and espionage, held joint maneuvers and exercises, trading African resources for German weaponry and machines. South Africa allowed for Germany to move troops through its territory between Angola and Mozambique, was place of R&R and Germany even used its military bases for training conscripts, making them more used to the African climate. This alliance went from a military and economic one to a political and ideological one. Visions were made of a future “lebensraum” being created in south Africa, spanning South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, possibly even Botswana and the Republic of Central Africa as a huge german protectorate. Even in South Africa such a vision of a “Greater South Africa” had followers who saw themselves as the governors of such an empire. Such grand ideas were not only made by the fascists. The communists had their own visions of “final victory” that was to bring the end of “white rule” and liberating the continent from colonialism. From the ashes, were supposed to arise new soviet republics bringing the dawn of a brighter future, to be combined into a Union of Social Soviet South African Republics, and later on to be the foundation of the African Union of Social Soviet Republics.

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Propaganda piece from the era. The idea that the massive riches of Africa could guarantee prosperity to anyone in control over them stimulated the fantasies of many.

The total character of these visions translated into the total character of the war. With Portugal withdrawing and extremism on the rise in South Africa, the war was becoming less of a war of conquest and more a war of extermination. Though the ideologists wanted to have their “masses” of lower-race servants, the realism of others pointed out the impossibility of keeping in check such an excessive amount of “helots”. As Werner Jarowinsky, the Minister of Propaganda said during the NSDAP Parteitag rally in in 1986:



This was a rather dark prophecy, and the belief of the righteousness of this view created a dangerous mentality. Since the total population of Africans was to be “reduced” either way, reducing it during military actions was becoming acceptable. This was an euphemism used to excuse actions conducted specifically against civilians. German propaganda officially stood on the position where the local population should be “repatriated” to Botswana or the Republic of Central Africa. The desire to move them was described as a “security measure”. As “enemy combatants” were hiding among the civilian population that did not expose them, the logical move was to have the civilians move – otherwise they would risked “being in crossfire”. Germany offered both Botswana and the CAR the “temporarily relocate” the Angolan and Mozambiquan populations a number of times, only to be rebuffed. This in turn led to Germany shedding itself of the responsibility for civilians deaths. It further justified its action claiming the right of nations for self-determination, pointing out that both in Angola and Mozambique (and South Africa), the black populations came from tribes not native to that land, being “colonists just as much as the whites”. On the other hand, the Marxist forces also casually spoke of having to “decimate” or “kill every second” white person in Africa to liberate it, along with expelling the remains. This spiral of hostility preserved the notion that the conflict could only be ended with the total victory of one of the sides – which would also mean not the defeat, but the utter elimination and extermination of the other.


Germany engaged more and more soldiers as the fight went on. Whereas in 1980 there would be 150.000 German soldiers in Angola and Mozambique, by 1990 that number would grow to 250.000. Casualties rose as well, from a few hundred to a few thousand a year. The losses on the other side were significantly higher though, counted no longer in hundreds of thousands but over a million. The war was becoming significantly more “professional”, as the guerilla forces were made up of veterans of multiple anti-colonial African conflicts little by experienced and battle hardened commanders – some of which started their fight already in the 50’s, now being in the war business for the fourth decade. These were supported by specialists and equipment from the USSR and China, flying in larger and larger to Botswana and the CAR. And on top of that, the strong pro-African sentiment in the USA and UK led to much more high-tech weaponry going there too. Both of those countries served as sanctuaries for the partizans, holding training grounds, supply depots, hospitals and command. Escalating the conflict by attacking targets in those countries was not unusual. And the lack of concrete effects of that escalation crippled morale of both the soldiers and civilians. The war began to lose sense. The destruction of the infrastructure made the African colonies completely unprofitable, not exporting anything. Africa was not a desired destination for German colonists, and the entire colonial movement in Germany was failing. Most Germans were more interested in getting a flat in a large city or a house in a smaller one near it than a piece of land in either Bosnia or Africa. Draft dodging began to increase. Dissent with the war was expressed by women’s organizations and even some of the veterans. These were quickly dissolved and members arrested. Germany experienced a witch hunt for “cowards, defeatists and pacifists”. However, and underlying feeling that the population was not happy with the war and was not willing to sacrifice their lives and wealth for it grew. This was especially true in south Germany, where churches and monasteries often served as a way to escape service or the Gestapo. Anti-war sentiment was becoming one of the more important issues of german counter-culture and the “youth rebellion” which didn’t want to go to war – unlike their fathers and grandfathers who fought in Yugoslavia and the Great War.

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FRELIMO guerillas. Anti-colonial warfare had gone a long way since its early years, largely due to some guerilla war taking place in some part of the world pretty much since the start of the cold war. This led to countries like the USSR devoting military R&D to “irregular warfare”, products of which were for example portable SAM launchers or “silent” car engines.

Western criticism of Germany sounded hypocritical when remembering how long the western empires fought their own wars in colonies. But there were considerable differences in how they conducted their wars and how Germany did it. Germany barely hid the fact that its war was aimed not just against enemy combatants, but the entire population of Angola and Mozambique. Scaring them away into fleering anywhere else was considered desirable. The Reich pretty much waived the Geneva convention on the conduct of warfare. What the west usually cynically referred to as “collateral damage” was planned operations for the Nazis. Global public opinion was increasingly believing that Germany was truly intending to keep the fighting going until the enemy was exterminated, not just beaten. What used to be thought of as “propaganda slogans” was now being read literally. The acts of Germany during its colonial period in Africa before the Great War were reminded in press and literature. The motivation to resist Germany by the west increased, especially in the USA were there was a strong sense of solidarity with the black population, and anti-colonial sentiment was still present – German excesses being seen as the logical conclusion of European imperialism. American support marked a turning point in the conflict, as it would provide the rebels with humongous amounts of hard currency needed for the war effort. Already in 1985 did American intelligence services begin the secret “Operation Pulse”. The operation was un umbrella endeavor for providing American support for the African rebels, ranging from weapons and cash supplies being sent to Africa to training camps being constructed in the USA mainland for American blacks, to be sent to Africa as “volunteers”. Much of this operation ended up being conduct together with the Soviet KGB. As archives would reveal in the future, soviet intelligence caught wind of the American operation early on and offered support. This translated into much of American equipment going to Africa doing so through Russia first. This combination of the experience held by African veterans, armed with modern western weaponry and frenzied with communist zeal gave a mixture that would prove lethal to both the Germans and the South Africans, who would be bleeding out in the unending war.


German diplomacy failed completely at the task of trying to justify the war in international eyes or getting any allies. Both Angola and Mozambique would acquire international recognition despite German attempts to the contrary. The African tribes that once supported the Portuguese turned against the Germans. Subtle works of diplomacy and intelligence to try and play “divide and conquer” failed spectacularly, leading to the formation of a true, trans-African resistance movement. Though to be fair, it wasn’t just the diplomats fault. The Reich Foreign Ministry was consistently obstructed in its efforts by the military which did not want “politicians messing with military matters”. The autonomy the military enjoyed, insulation from responsibility and lack of civilian oversight except for political NSDAP overwatch, was turning against its intent. Initially introduced for the purpose of increasing efficiency in military administration and thus strengthening the state, it turned against the state as it practically lost control over its militaries doings. Rather than being a tool of foreign policy and means of applying pressure, it started to carry out foreign policy in Africa itself without caring for the diplomats doings. War was no longer waged for the purpose of reaching some goal, but for the sake of waging it. Diplomats and intelligence officers would secretly negotiate treaties with tribes or some other authorities, inform the military about it – only to be answered with military attacks on those who were being negotiated with. Ambitious officers wanting to “prove themselves” would carry out attacks on non-hostile targets who were persuaded to lay down their arms in return for peace just to score a “successful operation” – only for the remnants from that attack to join up with the nearest resistance group. That soldiers were ordered into doing despicable things would be news that would make it to Europe despite censorship, lowering morale and respect for the uniform. The Wehrmacht became a universally despised force that created a general sentiment of resistance towards all whites. In this way, it contributed to what the USSR referred to as “the triumph of internationalism” – Angolans being just as eager to fight in Angola as well as South Africa, Congolese fighting the Belgians one month, changing to fight in Namibia the other, the fighters of ANC and ALM joining he fights in Katanga. This spread of the war was the main reason for which the war would start to be called the “south African war” as often as the “German Colonial War” – creating an appearance of Germany being solely responsible for all the violence there.

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German propaganda. Germany commonly associated itself if “Europeanness”, its “mission” in Africa being carried out in the name of all of Europe or “white people”. This led to many Africans coming to despise all Europeans in the long run, as national consciousness wasn’t developed well in Africa. Most African used race or tribe as their prime group of “self-determination”, applying the same to “the whites”, assuming their war being fought against all of them, regardless of nationality.

The battles of the south Africa war was waged in offices and public media sphere just as much as on the battlefields. The general sentiment towards the war in the west was to a significant degree the result of an international disinformation campaign conducted by the USSR. The Soviet KGB infiltrated and sponsored many political parties, organization, even media corporations and individual journalists. Many “anti-war” NGO’s were formed in response to the war who criticized the war and gained influence in both national governments and international organizations. An example was the World Peace Council, formed by the Soviet Cominform, that was financed by the KGB and managed to even obtain permanent representation in the League of Nations offices in Geneva. In the post-colonial world, the USSR would even start their own news companies, be they newspapers, radios or even tv networks, using the natural anti-colonial sentiment there to create an anti-German sentiment, indirectly affecting the politics of the BCoN and the UK itself. Many of the rumors that surrounded the war had their sources in Soviet disinformation, such as the accusations of using biological and radiological weapons there. That Germany did in fact commit many “stone-age era atrocities” (as written many time in the Washington Post) made many of such claims believable and put German diplomacy and propaganda on the defensive - where it failed badly. Germany was incapable of even effectively stopping the spread of such information into the Reich itself, much of which would also arrive via the countries of Mitteleuropa, which were not very motivated in trying to whitewash the Germans. Western newspapers smuggled to central Europe through Greece and the USSR made it into secret circulation. In fact, the USSR would even create its own print works, making forged American newspapers with specifically prepared articles for the purpose of throwing them into the hands of the people of central Europe to further anti-German sentiment.

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The USSR’s power would go far beyond its obvious military strength, its influence in foreign media, corporations, NGO’s and political parties often making a bigger impact than its state diplomacy.

The war in Africa had shaken the Germans confidence in themselves and their capabilities. With the war getting so prolonged, and “African syndrome” was born that reduced the Germans willingness to send the army to far away places for an undetermined period of time. This was one of the reason why Germany never got itself involved directly in the Arab-Iranian War, even after the Soviets joined in, and despite the fact that the German army was much better prepared for fighting a conventional war like the one in Persia than a guerilla war like in Africa. Germany had an increase in social conflicts as well, primarily between the lower and higher classes. As draft dodging increased (with over 15.000 being in hiding by 1980 and 3000 imprisoned for it), it became apparent that it was the poorer Germans that were sent to Africa more often, those of the middle class or higher allowed to stay in Germany. Similar sentiments were held against the “Nazi aristocracy”. While the Nazis still claimed to be a “volkish” movement, it was apparent for a long time that it was in fact elitists, with the “higher up” party members and their families being greatly privileged and immune from legal responsibility. During the war, this translated into being allowed not to serve, or be given officer positions before experienced veterans. The latter has proven especially damaging, as it created a sentiment among much of the grunts that competence no longer mattered in the military career. It also created a feeling of association, that “all Officers are Nazis”, leading to both being disliked. The Wehrmacht became entangled in political battles between the “political” and “non-political” factions, the latter gradually losing. And such battles sometimes even resulted in bloodshed, incidents of “friendly fire” against ones superior officer that gave his second in command a field promotion becoming not unheard of – an estimated 2 for every thousand promotion being the result of killing ones superior while “in the field” in some way that “didn’t leave fingerprints”.


But despite it all, anti-war sentiment was still practically illegal in Germany, not tolerated even among the highest ranking politicians. Those who held such views had to hide them, or disguise them under the veil of wanting a “change in strategy” or “trying a different approach”. And they were few, being either those who had to deal with the crumbling finances of the war and the economic toll it took on the country, and the military minds who saw the war from a Eurocentric perspective – the effects it had on German capability of fighting a war in Europe. Not surprisingly those few that “secretly” did not follow the official party line were those who hailed from the same circles as the strongest anti-nazis in the country – the catholic south and the poorer industrial workers. Their ideas of Africa usually revolved around loosening the racial character of the war and trying to recruit more of the locals, finding a compromise with the rebels by dividing Angola and Mozambique with them, trying to exchange Mozambique for Namibia with South Africa, trying to broker a peace treaty directly with the USSR, and other proposals. None of them were implemented, as the neo-agrarian faction was determined in maintaining a hardcore stance and achieve victory through German strength alone and through hard power. Even at the costs of lives that this would mean and with support for the entire Nazi regime in Germany falling to historical lows.

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Flag burning in Gottingen. “University cities” would often be the ones were anti-regime “incidents” took place.

The turning point in the war was the so called Ganguela Offensive of 1989. “Ganguela” was term used in reference to both the territory and the people of east Angola, where the MPLA had its strongholds and where German presence was significantly weaker. For years, Germany mostly just undertook raids in that area to terminate bases, strongholds and supply routes, also bombarding the area heavily. This was thought to be sufficient to contain the guerilla forces in what was called a “strategic suppressive fire” - keeping the opposition under constant bombing runs to deny them initiative. Yet despite overwhelming amounts of ordnance being used, the MPLA still managed to scramble a large offensive that reached all the way into the Bie Plateau. While halted and pushed back after a few weeks of fighting, the offensive had proven that the war was far from over, that the Africans could yet take the initiative and do large scale offensives. This was a huge boon for the anti-German crowd, the entire offensive often depicted as a military failure of the German military. And while it wasn’t the case and the offensive had cost the MPLA a great deal of men, it was certainly a huge propaganda success and shook the German leadership greatly. Even more important than the entire seven week offensive was just one particular event that took place during this campaign – the liberation of the Luando Camp.


That Germany and Portugal had organized a system of prisoner camps in both Angola and Mozambique was not a secret. These camps hailed from the times of the very beginning of the war, when Portugal had attempted to “reeducate” captured POWs, or try and find potential allies for themselves among them, such as those who were drafted into Marxist service by force. With time, that role was gradually reduced and the camps took a more traditional role of “prison camps”, later expanded into “labor camps” and eventually also coming to be the place of sentence for political and regular criminals. The grand majority of these camps were constructed in the west of Angola, near the coast, and under heavy security. But as the war went on and the rules of engagement changed, so did the goals and operation of camps. They started to become “concentration camps” to which entire villages or tribes were deported due, often for little reason, in what amounted to an ethnic cleansing campaign – by 1989, around a 600.000 people were estimated to be kept in camps of various sorts. The conditions in them were terrible, their quality dropping, more being constructed hastily in the centre of the country away from prying eyes. These practices were pointed out as yet another example of German barbarity in Africa, and justifications that generally revolved around he claim of the UK doing the same thing during the Boer War amounted to little. The Luando Camp was one of such camps, designated as a concentration camp for “suspected insurgents and their collaborators”, constructed 150 kilometers east of Andulo in an isolated part of the country and according to gathered intelligence being one of the larger ones, keeping over 50.000 people. One part of the Ganguela offensive was an attack on the camp system with the intent of liberating them and gaining recruits, as well as to use them as living proof of the crimes that Germany was committing in Angola on a regular basis.

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Satellite image of Luando Camp Prison Complex, or Konzentrationslager Luando

The attack on the camp took place on June 16 1989, with a force of 1200 MPLA soldiers managing to come close to the camp without detection. With one group attacking the barracks of the nearby German “guard battalion” and another striking directly against the camp simultaneously and with the element of surprise, the camp was quickly taken as the defenders were outnumbered, poorly trained and did not obtain reinforcements. The barracks attack was also successful, the Guard Batallion being defeated and routed, many fleeing. This victory allowed the MPLA to not only take over the camps, but also its entire documentation and archives, thus revealing the horrible truth behind it – the concentration camp being in fact a “death camp”, inmates being expected to die or were executed, by firing squad or used as guinea pigs in medical experiments. Bodies of the deceased were burned and buried in mass graves. Additionally, information was gathered that Luando wasn’t the only one of the “concentration camps” where such pactices took place. This revelation had led to the captured Germans being summarily executed by the attackers, the inmates fleeing and releasing the truth to the entire world. In this, war correspondent Peter Arnett participated in covering the story of the entire attack (officially having gone to Botswana as a member of the International Red Cross and illegally joining in with a MPLA band – a common practice encouraged by the Marxist leadership who knew of the benefits of the war being reported for their side) also covering it on video tape. With the camp documentation being gathered, the MPLA leaders surrendered it entirely to Arnett who quickly made his way back to Botswana and to the USA, where they would be released, to the shock of the entire world.

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Peter Arnett during the Ganguela offensive. Germany did not allow war correspondents in Angola and Mozambique and did not have policies in place to protect those who entered illegally, making those who dared to cover the war highly praised.

While Germany denied the authenticity of the “Luando papers”, their authenticity was proven very quickly. In fact, it were the newspaper publishers that demanded their authenticity to be confirmed, along with the American government. The Luando papers, going back 15 years, detailed the entire operation of the camp, from the first transports of prisoners, the labor they were forced to do, orders to deny the inmates medical assistance, orders of executions in order to “make room” for more, the conditions in the camps that led to massive death tolls, the medical experiments conducted there, even accounting books that detailed the costs of the camp. It also had many names of German soldiers, doctors, officers and politicians that knew of the camps operation, means and goals. And it had detailed information about its victims, including many of their names, tribes, origin and time of demise. As counted, the Luando camp claimed the lives of over 250.000 people, 200.000 of which took place in the last 5 years when it was entirely German run with no other oversight (an element strongly emphasized by the Portuguese, who defended themselves from accusations of participation by claiming the camp was a “regular” camp for as long as they knew of it). The story of the Luando camp, along with the video footage of the Ganguela offensive earned Peter Arnett the Pulitzer prize and worldwide fame, along with serious questions about how many other “Luandos” there were in Africa, and what was the total toll off the war.

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Human remains collected from one of the mass graves discovered around Luando. After the Luando papers were leaked, much of the documentation in other such camps were destroyed, making an exact count on how many have perished in them impossible, and one of the dirty secrets of the war hidden away in German State Archives.

That Germany was under universally condemned was an understatement. Numerous countries severed relations with Germany in answer to the Luando scandal and German reaction (or rather, lack of thereof) to it. This included the most important ones, the USSR, China and India. Also, the Holy See had annulled the concordat in answer to the scandal. Unilateral sanctions against Germany were introduced by numerous countries, including France and the UK, and the notion of universal sanctions was filed in the League of Nations. With Italy outside the fascist bloc at the time and the notion being filed against Germany directly, the Reich protested and refused to participate in the voting. To the surprise of many, the only remaining fascist power in the LoN security council, Poland, abstained rather than voting against. This was the result of catholic demands to refuse cooperation with Germans and Polish spite over the Danzig crisis a few years back. Thus the German Reich once again found itself under global trade sanction, this time more severe and better enforced than ever. German assets abroad where frozen and borders closed, only the immediate threat of war preventing a naval blockade against Germany and traditional Swiss neutrality stopping Switzerland from being as severe in executing sanctions as most of the world.

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Boycott of German goods leaflet from the USA.

The political fallout of the Luando scandal was significant enough to remove the heavily entrenched neoagrarians from power and break the traditional “neutrality” of the army regarding political affairs. Internal criticism struck von Thadden deeply. While boasting to the population and the rest of the world how Germany was “impervious” to global pressures and self-reliant, “the spirit of the German people being unbreakable” – reality ensued and sanctions did in fact hurt the German economy badly. Von Thadden’s rule had overall been a long trail of failures. Until Luando, the greatest of them was losing the south European states from the fascist bloc. His brinksmanship tactics in dealing with crises brought him the ire of much of the nazi elite, who saw it as foolish – a repetition of the events leading to the Great War, where numerous crises took place before the death of Franz Ferdinand. Many feared that with the situation getting worse (both because of the war, international stance towards Germany and civil discontent) the neoagrarians could “overdo it” and cause a second great war when circumstances would not favor Germany. This sense of “needless risk” being taken was prevalent among the older/retired officer corps, as well as those parts of the military that were not ideologically driven and had a different sense of priorities. To them, the war in Africa was a distraction to the “real thing” that was a war in Europe, and for which Germany was gradually getting less ready for, being bled out across the seas, fighting for territory it would lose regardless should a clash with the west come.


The decline of German economic strength, rise in unemployment and fictional employment was universally blamed on the Nazis in general, and on the neoagrarians in the nazi circles. The small success that Germany had, such as the third Danzig crisis or the occupation of Albania and Montenegro , could not cover up their numerous mistakes. Even the fact that Germany had to rely on brute strength alone in order to keep other countries in its “sphere of influence” to keep them in line was noted, and seen as a sign of weakness – that Germany lacked greatly in economic and diplomatic power. And with German failures in Africa as well as being unable to properly support its allies in Asia during their wars – the UAS and Thailand – Luando was the final straw. The various factions within the NSDAP were ultimately brought together to oppose von Thadden, including some turncoats from the neoagrarian camp. Their plot was crude. During the annual Parteitage in Nuremberg in August 1990 a number of high ranking officials shocked the gathered members by openly condemning von Thadden, accusing him of numerous crimes and damaging the Reich “more than the Jews have”. Von Thadden’s furious reply was not met with traditional applause – a historic event captured on tape, where his confusion upon noticing the fact he was suddenly alone was clearly seen on his face. His immediate decision to flee to Berlin did not materialize. It was halted by the Heer forces that entered the Nuremberg Party Rally grounds locking it down. This was possible due to Nuremberg not having a loyalist “internal security” division like Berlin had, that role being played by the 1st Waffen SS LSSAH unit. Not having been given any orders, not having the strength to carry out an attack on the Heer and refusing to take initiative, Nuremberg was the first city to “fall” to the coup. With that signal, another “office coup” took place in the OKW and OKH where the coupist colonels arrested their superiors – for this reason the coup going down in history as the “colonels coup”, even though it wasn’t masterminded by anyone in the military. With the Party delegates in Nuremberg under the coupists control, they were flown to Berlin and to the Reichstag under guard. In the meantime, others were gathered from across the country and transported to Berlin as well. In an emergency session of the Reichstag, von Thadden was “legally” deposed and placed under arrest expecting trial, alongside his closest palatines.

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Nuremberg Party Rally of 1990.

That the coup had worked was a true miracle, as it wasn’t well prepared, lacked failsafes and didn’t have massive support even among von Thadden’s opponent within the NSDAP. The German military did not have a tradition of coups or knowledge how to prepare them. Despite attempts, the instigators of the coup had not managed to convince a single general to support it. The Abwehr, Gestapo and the SD all had signals about something that was to occur and even informed the Reich chancellery about it a few times, including just a few days before the Nuremberg rally. But these signals were all somehow ignored. The coupists themselves were motivated mostly by paranoia and rushed their work, thinking that a major purge was to occur after the rally, their strike being a “preemptive” one. Their success was dependent solely on the fact that the German military did not take action. Which miraculously it didn’t. This was attributed partly due to the fact that the generals did not want to “take sides” in any confrontation; while not willing to support it, they want to oppose it either. Some indeed desired a change in government, but also wanted plausible deniability of any knowledge of the coup. Thus while they would report their suspicions, they would do so vaguely and only in generalities. Also, the most fanatical elements of the military concentrated in the OKW and OKH were not even approached. The highest ranking member who knew of the coup was general Wolfgang Odendahl, chief of the Berlin Pact Vereinte Oberkommando – those in that structure having for some time developed a certain animosity against the OKW due to their “European bias”, many of the colonels directly or indirectly involved in the coup hailing from there.


The coup was instigated by a clique of Nazi officials usually associated with the old “Wilhelmine Imperialist” faction or the remnants of them; but once events started taking place, they got support from the mass of opportunists who previously supported the neoagrarians. The next chancellor to be appointed was Erich Eisenblatter, until then the minister of labour and an insignificant figure with no real backing – other than being considered a good administrator and specialist and having no ambition, making him useful. The coupists in fact saw him as a tool that would be both easily controlled and be the one to take the inevitable blame for everything that was expected to go wrong in the time just after the coup – especially the winter of 1990/1991 when it was already known Germany would have troubles with supplying its population with food beyond the bare essentials that Germany itself produced. Eisenblatter would stay in his post just for a few months, ending up mostly remembered for the “Poor Christmas” of 1990 when many German families ended up without having anything to buy for Christmas, the shelves of German stores being emptied weeks before. He would be replaced by Horst Ehmke, the Gaueleiter of Danzig in March 1991. Both of them represented the “left wing” of the NSDAP called the “neo-strasserists” abroad – tough that term was strictly forbidden in Germany. Like Eisenblatter, he too would become a tool of party games and plays for power, staying in office for just half a year and being dismissed in July 1991. Overall, the period between the colonels coup and summer of 1991 was very chaotic; a time of “reorganization” during which many in the west, east and Germany itself speculated about who would come out on top. The colonels coup broke the typical German situation where the new contender for power would be more or less known before taking top office, or where the number of people who had a chance to take it was small. This rough battle for influence was eventually “won” by Norbert Steger of the “Christian liberals” – the Nazis hailing from south Germany, catholics, who sought to reform the Nazi movement into a more “gentle and universalist” and less “militaristic and chauvinistic” one; being much more liberal in terms of racial and economic policies, their stance towards the church and workers rights, and the war in Africa.

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Norbert Steger (centre) assuming the chancellorship from the head of the National Socialist German Workers Party Heinz Hitler (left).

The colonels coup was not met with enthusiasm by most of the high ranking “Afrika Korps” officers, who feared that it would lead to less support for “their” conflict. For many of them, the war had become a personal issue. In the months after the coup, many were recalled back to Germany and replaced. Of those, more than a few migrated to South Africa and joined the South African Army. The coup had a powerful emotional effect on those people, their state of mind being a common trope in future works of fiction; the “battle hardened veteran” who after years of service was recalled back home and left with no appreciation for his work, no commendation, no respect, would become a common “hero” (or anti-hero, or villain) of German movies, series, literature. How to treat these people who saw the fight in Africa as genuinely a “good fight”, or who “were just following orders” was a real problem for many Germans and the German psyche, which could not combine the “un whitewashable” performance of the military in Africa with the veneration of the uniform. Whether they should be condemned for what they did, or accepted back in society as if nothing happened was something Germans had to answer themselves on a personal level. This was even harder for those returning grunts who never wanted to go to war, and who met the coup with relief. Justifying themselves as having been “just following orders” while being personally disgusted with them, they were still met with hostility by some part of the society – hostility they found unfair, as all they wanted was for the war to come to a quick end. Hopes for that would not fulfilled for some time though. After the coup, military engagements in Africa were reduced and the number of soldiers serving there stopped increasing, but didn’t decrease. The new ruling powers were willing to seek accommodation with the Africans and the west, but still didn’t want to give up wholesale. For the Germans, a desirable outcome was a partition of Angola and Mozambique between Germany and the Marxists, even between the Republic of Central Africa. This was the subject of numerous talks from 1990 onwards. The years between 1991 and 1993 was a time of noticeable respite on the frontlines. Even the sanctions placed on Germany loosened, though some countries (like the entire communist bloc) maintained a full embargo, while most of the fascist countries did not respect (a noticeable exception being Poland and Bulgaria). Still, neither the Africans, nor the USSR or the west were willing to accept any plan that would leave Germans in control of any part of Africa. The respite in Angola and Mozambique went in pair with a spike in violence in South Africa. Germany was also failing at keeping discipline in the ranks. Morale fell, largely due to the swaps in officers – the newly introduced ones from Europe having no interest in keeping the war going, endangering themselves or their men. Orders were routinely ignored, reports forged or being straightforward lies. In 1993 the talks between Germany and the African Marxists (along with their western and communist backers) collapsed. Attacks occurred again, this time with the areas closer to the continents interior being left almost free for the MPLA and FRELIMO to use, and their infiltrators managing to begin bombing campaigns even in the coastal cities, previously thought of as “safeish”.


This failure brought chancellor Steger to offer to resign before the Reichstag – a resignation that was not accepted. No one in the nazi regime wanted to take the “hot potato” that “withdrawal from Africa” was; no one wanted to go down in history as being the one who “lost the war”. Steger resignation was turned down – and that turned out to be a brilliant move on his part, as he managed to use it as a demonstration of power and “confidence in him” – as long as he was willing to take the blame for the failure of the war, he would also be free to introduce groundbreaking reforms at home. Initially, after his inauguration, he was still met with resistance, particularly from the hard-head Nazis who still were living as if it were the 60’s. Even among those who agreed with the necessity of leaving Africa were not happy about the various liberal changes that Steger was introducing – their desire being to “go back to how things were before the war”. Steger realised the impossibility of that. With resistance against him growing thicker, his resignation was a form of calling the oppositions bluff, who tried to threaten him in different ways. For him, withdrawal from Africa was a matter of time which he tried to prolong for the sake of making sure he would stay in power longer – something he would also use in diplomatic talks with the west as an argument for loosening sanctions and restrictions placed on Germany. Like most of the more “liberal-minded” Nazis since the time Hitler, Steger wanted to cosy up to the west at a time when Germany was weak by playing on the common antagonism against the USSR, and in his particular case, the fear of nazi hawks coming to power.

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Militarism, chauvinism and racism and statism that represented the NSDAP and much of German society were under increased attacks from the liberals within the country, who realized that Germany had fallen behind the west in every aspect and that Nazi policies were failing overall.

This tactic worked and sanctions against Germany were steadily reduced, one by one – though officially, the west still maintained an antagonistic attitude towards Germany as a whole. Sensing German weakness, the west felt powerful enough to not only demand concessions from Germany, but also to encroach into its zone of influence. The USA, UK and France all opened up on the fascist regime of mitteleuropa offering sanctions to be lifted for them in return for those countries asserting themselves more before Germany. Trade deals were offered, along with other forms of help. This had proven a successful tactic, especially in regard to Poland, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia and Slovakia, all of which were fed up with German domination and the “lackeyhood” of their governments which were perceived as German puppets. Those governments in turn tried to prove themselves as “independent” by assertiveness towards Germany – and western aid was what helped in making that possible. Whereas just a few years earlier Germany was willing to shell ships entering Polish ports, this time it had no such confidence. The presence of American trade vessels in the Baltic was something that it just had to accept, along with Poland and other countries of central Europe switching trade partners. The fear that trying to stop the operation of German-owned facilities in the Baltic States could lead those countries to revolt and force Germany into another “guerrilla war”, once negligible, was getting worse and prevented Berlin from trying to overplay its hand this way.


The decision to withdraw from Africa was finally given in 1995. Peace negotiations, re-started unofficially in 1994 with the MPLA, FRELIMO and the Republic of Central Africa, were made official in 1995. This began a slow demobilization effort by the Germans along with a great drop of casualties as military operations were almost completely dropped. Much of this “withdrawal” took place through South African ports, with lots of equipment being in fact left to the South African government. That this endeavour had an effect was proven quickly, as in spring 1997 when German withdrawal was almost complete, South Africa managed to stop a mayor African attack by a united front of FRELIMO, MPLA, ANC and ALM carried out along the entire northern SA border. This was also meant as a form of “compensation and apology” – many South African feeling betrayed by the Germans who were abandoning the war and leaving them alone against the struggle which was expected to get worse, especially since South Africa was still under crippling global sanctions. German withdrawal was carried out in an Italian fashion, leaving no administration behind, neither any trained personnel to keep maintenance of remaining infrastructure; in fact, much of what remained was dismantled and shipped to South Africa or Germany. South Africa itself encouraged for Germans to remain in South Africa, offering land and employment – something quite a few of them accepted and the German military made no problem about this. But as it turned out, their new South African passports were mostly used to flee the country to the west and bring their German families with them.


The last German soldiers left Luanda on September 1st 1997. This was after a final “peace treaty” was signed in April 1997 in Geneva, by which German recognized Angola and Mozambique as independent states and promised to withdrew entirely from the countries. The Germans did not even bother trying to establish any “local forces” to resist the Marxist advance, preferring to give whatever remaining resources they had to the South Africans – with whom, despite the withdrawal they maintained friendly relations with. The MPLA entered the city on the next day, proclaiming the establishment of the “Free People’s Republic of Angola”. On September the 8th, the last Germans crossed the Mozambiquan-South African border, leaving the country to the FRELIMO who proclaimed the “People’s Democratic Republic of Mozambique”. Both those days would become independence days in the respective countries. Thus the German Colonial War came to an end, as did the “German period” of the “south African wars” – the conflict still going on in South Africa. The entire conflict led to the death of 150.000 african soldiers – an insignificant amount compared to the 1.1 million civilian casualties suffered. Over 1.5 million were also displaced, and uncounted numbers were wounded. Leftover from the war, in the form of duds, unexploded ordnance, chemical and biological agents, would plague these countries for decades to come. The economies of those countries did not exist beyond sustenance farming; both lied in ruins. The war would leave a permanent emotional scar on the African psyche, not only in Angola and Mozambique, but much of sub-saharan Africa as a whole, as it led to the “whites versus blacks” mindset to engrain itself deeper, ignoring the national differences between “white devils”. In what was one of the greatest ironies of the war, it would be the Africans of south Africa that would come out with a powerful sense of “racial consciousness” rather than the Germans, the Marxists themselves coming to use it as a form of “internationalism” – “African Marxism” coming close to replacing the slogan of “all workers uniting” with “all blacks uniting”. The war would also permanently scar the Germans emotionally, the once proud nation being defeated by and enemy long described as “subhuman” and “inferior in every way”. With the army defeated and routed, no second “stab in the back” legend working to explain the failure and the entire fascist bloc bursting at the seams, the German people had to look for a new road into the future.

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The German flag being removed from Luanda’s Fort of Sao Miguel.
 
Next part is up by MSZ. Just a filler chapter though.


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The Ethiopian Civil War was one of those events of the cold war that would long be considered very controversial, even though at the time it was occurring, it wouldn’t generate such strong emotions as it would later. With Italy announcing and carrying out its hasty withdrawal from East Africa, it was expected that the result would be a war. The experiences of the previous decades of decolonization taught so much, that whenever the imperial power would withdraw without leaving behind a basic infrastructure and administration, the result would be strongman rule at best, war at worst. Even the most recent “great event”, France’s withdrawal from Equatorial and Western Africa proved that much, both those countries ending up quickly taken over by military dictatorships, fighting their own internal inter-tribal fights. On the other hand, the effort that was put in place by the USA and the west European powers in making a “road map” for the Dutch East Indies and working towards setting up functional countries there mostly paid off. While “Indonesia” did not survive, the smaller countries that formed in its place were overall successful, even if poor and the level of their success uneven. Still, it served as proof, along with other examples like the Philippines, Algeria or East Africa, that decolonization could be carried out in a planned manner that would prevent a collapse or dictatorial takeover – like what happened in most of the African countries and the countries of south east Asia.
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Map of Italian East Africa.
Yet when Italy was decolonizing, very little attention was put to its East African possessions. Normally, the west would be expected that it would support some form of nation-building, try and cooperate with Italian authorities on what to do there, or even force Italy into pursuing a specific policy there. That a hasty withdrawal without anything left behind would cause a vacuum of power to be filled by tribal warlords using violence to achieve their ends was expected. It was also speculated that as it usually happened, the main benefactor of this would be the USSR, which typically supplied those “warlords” most friendly to its cause. All those things were known and understood, talked about and debated. And yet, little was actually done to prevent such a chain of events. It was one of the few times that it was correctly predicted that war would come, rather than coming as a surprise.
The reasons for why that happened varied. There was no single one. An important one was that the perception of the events in east Africa was from the position of how it would affect Italy. Italy had overall dominated any agendas on East African decolonization and most leaders of the free world were more interested in what would happen in Italy after decolonization, rather than in its colonies. Effectively, plans for some “road map” for east Africa of the kind that was given to the Dutch East Indies were all presented along with plans for Italian reconstruction – and the latter usually took precedence. The United States of America pushed strongly for a fast withdrawal of Italy from East Africa, staying true to its proclaimed policy of fighting colonialism. The belief was that colonialism, especially in the fascist edition, had to be terminated as fast as possible for the colonial state to flourish. Experiences from the past, such as Indonesia, were interpreted differently in the USA than they were in Europe. Many Americans had eventually come to believe that the relative success of the countries of the East Indies was achieved despite the pull out of the Dutch being prolonged, rather than being achieved thanks to it. The experience of the Philippines supposedly confirmed that. The USA did have a somewhat ‘naïve’ (as the Europeans would characterize it) faith in their own exceptionalism, and their belief that they could change entire countries, or the entire world, if only the world would follow their way. Also, the USA was on something akin to a ‘power trip’. Having for the first time directly joined European politics and managed to prevent a German attack thanks to its guarantees to Italy, it now felt both somewhat ‘responsible’ for Italy, and full of strength, that it could move things around in Europe according to its desires. This translated into offering financial aid to Italy in return for fast decolonization. Which was something Italy was more than willing to take, as East Africa was profitless regardless and Rome no longer wanted to take any responsibility for – if it could shed that responsibility in return for American dollars and use that to get closer to the west, then it was a perfect deal.
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Visit of the Italian delegation to the USA. Italy played a remarkable diplomatic game, managing to perfectly feel the spirit of the times, American good spirits and willingness to get involved in Italy, to which Italy gracefully answered in cheerful spirit.
The United Kingdom was much less idealistic about the ordeal. It was aware that a quick pullout would leave behind a power vacuum that would be filled by those with the strongest military, that such fast Italian withdrawal would inevitably lead to the remnant militias fighting the Italians to take up arms and try and take power. But for the UK itself, it was much more important to keep the USA in the European game now that it joined it, rather than argue with it over African colonies. The UK thus tactically decided to go along with the USA on the Italian manner, that also meaning leaving East Africa to fend for itself. There were other reasons as well. Having shouldered the burden of the cold war for decades now, the UK was simply tired. It was unwilling to take upon itself the reconstruction of an entire country like East Africa. The costs of keeping the African possessions it still had were large, as were the costs of keeping its position within the BCoN, and its military in a functioning state. The UK simply did not have the luxury of unlimited wealth like the USA did, and did not want to use up what it had for another dangerous investment.
For the UK, there was also the manner of the stance of the other countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The East African Federation had shown great solidarity with East Africa and supported the hasty decolonization effort. This was something of a projection. The EAF, while among the richest countries of Africa, was still behind the European countries or even the South American countries in terms of wealth. Many blamed that on the decolonization process being done too slow, the remnants of colonial past being removed to late, the EAF not asserting itself before the rest of the world early enough. Thus the elites of the EAF would support the stance of the Italians having to withdraw as fast as possible. This also served the EAF’s geopolitical interest – without the fascists in East Africa, it had one front less to fear, the country otherwise being faced with both a communist and a nazi opponent in the south. Even more importantly than that, it was India that strongly urged for decolonization to take a faster route, not only in Italian Africa, but Africa overall. India would even suggest plans for a future “Ethiopian Federation” that would include British Somaliland and French Djibouti, believing its own multi-cultural structure could serve as a basis for a future Ethiopian democracy. Also Brazil supported such concepts, being also one of the main contributors of relief to Italian Africa, in the form of medical aid and political consultants, serving often as a ‘bridge’ between the local Africans and the wealthy countries of Europe and America.
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The 11th extraordinary EAF summit that took place in 1993 was one devoted to the issue of Ethiopia. Delegates of not only the member states of the EAF were present, but also of the various tribes of east Africa, the representatives of the member states of the BCoN and other countries like Brazil, making it the largest conference devoted to the question of decolonization at its time.
France had its own stakes in the affair, though its own were more Eurocentric than any others. For France, it was most important to drag Italy into its own bloc as a counter to German power. Colonial issues were thus mostly irrelevant to it. It strongly stood at a “Italy first” position, believing that now that the fascist bloc was crumbling, it was more important to convince the people of the post-fascist states to embrace democracy so that other countries of the fascist bloc would follow. This meant that relief was to be provided to Italy, so that the Italians don’t themselves decide to fall back to authoritarianism. Thus whatever resources the west could scramble for Africa were considered by the French to be more useful it granted to the Italians. This attitude led to a good working relation between the French and the Americans on the Italian matter, French diplomacy being later considered an important influence in leaving Ethiopia as a “matter of second importance” in European cabinets.
And there were other, more cynical reasons for such an attitude among the French. After French withdrawal from Equatorial and West Africa, both those multi-national, multi-tribal countries descended into civil unrest. The democratic institutions created by the French there did not last long, collapsing after just a few years, replaced by de facto military rule and left-wing dictatorships. The cities that were once the pride of “French Africa”, like Dakar, were crumbling due to those coastal cities being the direction of migrants from the countries interior who had no work, those countries post-colonial economies being unfit to work properly on a globalised market. The general failure of those countries served as a warning to those who demanded “rapid decolonization” without prior preparation. But it also served as a justification for retaining ‘imperial’ control over overseas territories by France. The French had managed to calm the situation in Algeria and other areas of “Overseas France” in past decades, largely thanks to the economic prosperity that France enjoyed, and which did translate into real betterment for the Algerians – by 1990, the average wealth of Algeria being comparable to Greece. This was convincing to many Algerian politicians who convinced their people that remaining with France would allow for further prosperity – seceding from France meaning a “beggars fate”. Thus, France cynically believed that allowing Ethiopia to fail would stabilize the situation in Algeria even further, convince more people that the status quo without independence will just be more beneficial – not only for Algerians, but all the French people from overseas France. That included Djibouti, where a similar selfish sentiments were held – if France was to “give help to east africa”, then the people of Djibouti ought to come first. Similar attitudes were held among some circles in the UK as well, who believed that the UK ought to spend what it could on keeping its own African possessions, rather than using them on others, along with the belief that a potential success of Ethiopia would motivate the Somalis in British Somaliland to pursue independence with more fervour. A failure of Ethiopia, similar to those West and Equatorial Africa experienced, discouraging such attempts.
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French “underground” postal card from Algeria, discouraging decolonization. That countries like Algeria were better off as part of France rather than independent was a thought held not only by French imperialists, but a substantial number of people in “overseas France”, who would rather fight for equal status with “metropolitan French” than fight to severe ties with France.
Thus overall, Italian East Africa was left forgotten, even though so many realized the potential risks of that. With Italy withdrawing in 1987, the country was nominally left under the rule of the “Council of State” of the newly founded “State of East Africa”. It spanned not only the former Empire of Abyssinia, but also Italian Somalia and Eritrea. But the territory it owned was not the same as the territory in controlled. From the very start, the central ‘government’ in Addis Abeba struggled to get control over the country it was supposed to rule. The Italians gave token support at the very best, but in reality, the government did not have the funds to support even a basic administration or armed force. It wasn’t able to collect taxes and was reliant on foreign financial aid, which was small. Corruption took its toll as well, much of what was intended to help the country, ending up in private pockets. Even before the final Italian withdrawal, various tribes and groups took up arms to resist the central government, declaring independence, or carving out their own little warlord realms. The “State of East Africa” lasted for only 10 months after which it was abolished following a military coup led by colonel Hayelom Araya. Araya renamed the country into the “State of Ethiopia” beginning his own rule – and falling to the same troubles as his predecessors. This moment is usually considered to mark the beginning of the Ethiopian Civil War, even though fighting took place all over the country beforehand.
What made the Ethiopian Civil War a very grey and grey morality war was the lack of any side having a true moral high ground. Ethiopia was often seen as a successor of sort to the Empire of Abyssinia that existed before 1936. But Abyssinia never owned either Eritrea or Somalia, which Ethiopia inherited. When people in these two started rebelling, declaring their desire for independence, they technically had a right to that just as much as the Ethiopians. But they ended up being forgotten about, their claims ignored. Victims of a western attitude that opposed “tribal secessionism” from larger multi-national states. Effectively what for one group was a “secessionist war” was a “freedom struggle” for the other. And while that itself wasn’t anything new in Africa where the colonial empires specifically established such multi-tribal entities, the morality of letting the Ethiopians rule over the Somalis and Eritreans would quickly be put into question. That the warlords of Ethiopia would end up using similar tactics to those used by the Italians before them would also not avoid the attention of the world – when that attention eventually came. The sympathies of global opinion varied between the central government in Addis Abeba, the “freedom fighters” of Somalia and Eritrea, as well as the various other tribes inhabiting the country. The war overall had caused the entire concept of “no tribal secessionism” to be put into question – strongly. Similar kind of fights between various groups, religions or tribes took place in other parts of Africa, not only in south Africa – but places like Nigeria, Equatorial Africa, West Africa, Egypt, even Algeria (where clashes took place not only between the white Frenchmen and local Arabs and Berbers, but also between the locals and the newly arriving sub-Saharan Africans, though France had been successful in keeping these ethnic fights at a low level). And to many, it seemed like allowing for “tribal secessionism” to happen, for the multi-national states of Africa to be broken up into smaller nation-states of the European kind, was an answer to these conflicts. And of course, such suggestions were immediately opposed by the political leaders of those countries who did not want limit their power. The ‘viability’ of such hypothetical “tribal-states” in Africa was also questioned by many foreign scholars, who pointed out things like lack of access to sea as obstacles towards any such state being able to merely survive. Still it remained a popular answer among the people outside Africa interested in African affairs, and among the Africans themselves – especially those who wanted to secure their independence.
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East Africa was the clearest possible example of what the “third world” was; in fact, the overwhelming poverty of the country led some to use the term “fourth world”, to differentiate between those post-colonial countries that were ‘failed states’, and those who which were ‘developing states’.
Araya’s rule of Ethiopia lasted only two years, after which he was killed in yet another coup. This situation would repeat itself a number of times, no central power in Ethiopia being able to obtain security and stability. Ethiopia became something of a “second Congo”, where foreign businesses would ally with local warlords, one providing cash and equipment for the warlord in return for mining rights or such. Much of the country remained permanently outside the capital’s control, the country being divided into a number of “warlord states” who fought each other with intense brutality. The nominal reason for those wars, such as “freedom”, “independence” or “equality” were often forgotten and served only to increase the power and wealth of the warlords. This was yet another reason why the war was so grey-and-grey – many of the “freedom fighters” being that in name only, using slogans to gain sympathy and cash. This projected badly on those groups who genuinely fought for grand ideals – but which had it extremely hard to prove to anyone that “they” were the “good guys”. Especially when their means of struggle weren’t different from the others. Still, solace could be found in the fact that the total casualty rate in the Ethiopian Civil War was lower than what was under Italian rule. The anarchy in the state also made it a favourable point for a lot illegal activities, such as smuggle, weapons deals, drug production, human trafficking. It was noticeable that together with Ethiopia falling into disorder, the fighting in South Sudan in Egypt grew in intensity. Without Italy to secure Egypt’s “southern flank”, it was now experiencing troubles there yet again, the civil war somewhat “spilling over” into Egypt with calls for the secession of the “black African” parts of Egypt – to which Cairo naturally objected.
The situation in Ethiopia grew worse in the late 90’s, when piracy had become a problem. The Red Sea was an extremely crucial chokepoint on the geopolitical map, through which a great deal of oil from the Persian gulf and goods manufactured in India got to Europe. With the situation in Ethiopia getting further out of control, organized bands of pirates began to harass ships there with increasing intensity. Using rubber boats, RPGs, assault rifles and all kinds of improvised equipment, they were able to successfully damage various ships or take them hostage for ransom, causing millions worth of damages in property. It was even revealed that on some occasions these pirates were hired as mercenaries to target specific ships – a new form of “corporate warfare” (though one very quickly cracked down upon by the developed states, and not having officially happened more than five times – still, these events had greatly moved the fantasies of many fiction authors, who commonly depicted “Evil Corporations” financing all kinds of wars and terrorist attacks in Africa for the purpose of eliminating competition and profits. Those “Evil Corporations” had to a large degree taken over the role of villains in movies, literatures, computer or RPG games from “evil western governments”.). One spectacular attack took place in October 1999, when the Norwegian chemical tanker “Freya” was subjected to a barrage of RPG’s, after refusing to surrender to the attacking pirates and having fought off a boarding attempt. The ship was damaged, but not to a degree to cause an environmental disaster (in fact, the ships safeties where designed to withhold such an attack and the ship was in no real danger of sinking at any point). Still, this symbolized the potential threat that the “rag-tag peasant pirates” armed with modern weaponry posed to global shipping, trade and environment. Not long after the attack, both the Royal Navy and US Navy ships were dispatched to the Red Sea to serve as “escorts”, with universal League of Nations consent. This was yet another thing that made the Ethiopian Civil War a turning point in history. Civil wars that were usually treated as “internal matters” by other countries, something that would not hurt them. But with the economy having become globalized, information being freely spread across h world and advanced weapons having fallen in random hands, civil wars such as the one in Ethiopia had the potential to destabilize the situation in not only neighbouring countries, but those much further away; they could disrupt global trade relatively easy; and they could negatively affect the global markets without even trying to do so.
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British Royal Marines forcing a band of Somali pirates to surrender. Piracy was becoming a problem even before full Italian withdrawal from Africa, the intense traffic between India and Europe giving pirates plenty of targets.
“What to do with Ethiopia?” was a question that after ten years of civil war there finally managed to enter the cabinets of European, American, Asian and Africa governments. The only countries that it could truly be said that they never forgot about it where Egypt and the East African Federation, the two neighbours; other than that, it was India and Brazil that displayed an interest in the situation there far beyond average. The most obvious answer of sending in armies to quell rebellions and provide a great deal of funds for a reconstruction effort was not an acceptable one. The cleptocracy of African regimes, rulers and tribal leaders had overall reduced the sympathy for providing any aid for the Africans at all, not before they managed to restore order and rule of law. There was also significant objection among the post-colonial states to allow the use of foreign armies to “stabilize the situation” – as such moves were too similar to regular colonialism to them to be acceptable. Neither the League of Nations was able to find an answer, nor any of the global great powers could find a solution. Both Germany and the USSR were too busy with internal matters to even attempt to get involved there. The western states were also very hesitant to take direct action, unwilling to involve themselves militarily, not wanting to take the backlash that would come from the post-colonial world. Numerous suggestions were made, one commonly brought up being turning the country into a League of Nations mandate and handing it over on certain conditions to one of the League’s members. The East African Federation was a commonly named candidate, and there was significant support for that among the higher echelons of power in the EAF for that. But ultimately it would not come to be, as reducing an independent state back to mandate status was seen as a regression in development that should not be allowed, it being too dangerous as a precedent.
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Ethnic map of the Horn of Africa, 1996
With all the commotion about Ethiopia, one person was remarkably detached from it for a long time: Amha Seljase, the son of the former Emperor of Ethiopia, Hajle Seljase. Amha was never in Ethiopia since his exile in 1936, having lived in France from his youth, and migrated to the USA a few years after his father’s death in 1975. There he remained almost completely outside politics, other than occasionally speaking out against fascist expansionism and brutality, as well as sometimes participating in Black Civil Rights movements. He would occasionally be used as a tool of Black nationalists, proof of an “African civilization” having existed and being old (to counter claims made by white nationalists about Africa never having developed any civilization), and that the plight of the black people across the world was solely the result of the actions of white peoples. But Amha never made any mention of his desire to return to power or follow a career in politics of any kind. Not even when the Italian Empire was collapsing did he suggest the possibility of him reclaiming his throne. That Amha could be the “right” person for bringing peace back to Ethiopia was something of a wild speculation, a theory made by journalists and political sciences students. Among the many answers to the “What to do with Ethiopia?” question, the concept of restoring the monarchy and re-establishing the Empire of Abyssinia as a federal construct, with Amha as a powerless head of state was one that was thrown around – but with the crown prince showing no desire, or even being opposed to the idea of returning to the throne or taking any power, these plans couldn’t go anywhere. Amha Seljase would die in exile in 1997, never returning home, leaving behind his son and a new heir apparent - Zera Selassie.
Zera Selassie kept himself mostly outside politics like his father, but was more renown among the African-Americans for his greater participation in the civil rights struggle in the USA. Still, he never made mention of having ambitions to claim the throne to which he was an heir. That changed In 2001, when Zera Selassie finally, to the surprise of the world, declared his willingness to “submit himself to the wishes of the League of Nations, and any other countries who think his persona could help bring peace back to his homeland”. This was an unexpected announcement, made in just another interview that was conducted with him in the USA, rather than any glamorous press conference – in fact, that interview only appeared on the 16th page of The Washington Times. The interview was quickly forgotten about though, until 2002, when in June that year Zera appeared in the East African Federation, accompanied by a “Royal Guard” unit. A military coup took place yet again that month, the new “President” Meles Zenawi officially inviting Zera to take the throne. On June 26th 2002 Zera arrived in Addis Abeba by helicopter where he met with Zenawi on the helicopter landing platform of the Presidential Palace, who officially renounced his power as president to him. This was confirmed by the Ethiopian National Assembly two days later. The Ethiopian military would then swear an oath of loyalty to the new Emperor. And while nominally Zera would give back power to Zenawi now his Prime Minister, leaving himself a powerless figure, he would realistically have power in the new establishment that was forming. The “Empire of Ethiopia” would officially be proclaimed on the 4th of July 2002 – the name of the country not being changed back to Abyssinia.
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Emperor Zera Selassie, signing the decree on the restoration of the Empire of Ethiopia.
Zera’s arrival to Ethiopia did not mean an introduction of peace. In fact, the warlordism continued for years. But under Zera and Zenawi the country would be able to finally unify itself, the last of the warlords being killed in 2007. That still did not mean peace, as many of the tribes continued their struggle – but were gradually destroyed in following years. Much of this was achieved thanks to the involvement of the western powers, who financed Zera and his army – naturally, in return for numerous concessions and rights. In 2003, Ethiopia officially submitted a plea to the League of Nations asking for foreign military involvement in the civil war. After much debating, it was ultimately agreed upon, that the Armed Forces of the British Commonwealth of Nations would be dispatched to north Ethiopia to “secure the coastline” – 4000 BCoN soldiers being sent there, and doing so not only with the consent of the BCoN and Ethiopia, but also with the consent of the entire Leagure. They were accompanied by 800 soldiers of the French Foreign Legion, who would not only help in “securing the coastline”, but also be used in combat operations in the Ethiopian interior.

The 2002 coup of Zenawi was not a spontaneous event though, and neither was Zera Seljasse’s return to power. As would be revealed in mere weeks after the coup, it was orchestrated by the British, French and American intelligence agencies. The financing of Zera’s “Royal Guard” that helped him take power in the capital, and later, the military that was sworn to him came from those three western great powers. The entire plan involved bringing Zera as a figurehead to provide legitimacy for the new western-friendly regime, while allowing it to take power in place of the former pro-Chinese or pro-Russian ones that were there. The west did not intend to dirty its own hands with another colonial war, and had no qualms against using the Ethiopians to fight for a “stability” that was to provide them with profits. Only this time, the central government of Ethiopia would have a better armed and trained military to back it – with the cold war coming to an end, the huge stockpiles of weapons that the west accumulated were thought to be better put to use by sending them to “new allies” rather than allowing them to rust. This wasn’t much different that had been practiced in Congo in past decades. Only this time, the entire affair was revealed very quickly, and not based on “speculations” “rumours” or “unidentified sources”. Documentation on the preparation of “Operation Skip” was leaked out, photographs of the Royal Guard were used to identify them using western weaponry and equipment (such as French trucks meant only for military use, specifically for desert conditions), invoices bills and documents of western corporations involved in the operation’s financing, and those that were to be granted rights and concessions along with investments allowed for the “culprits” to be identified. This created a scandal, though a short lasting one – the overall attitude that it was something that “had to be done” proving stronger than the disgust for such “cloak and dagger” tactics. Besides, that things were revealed so fast and with so much clarity, was yet another thing that made the Ethiopian Civil War an event that marked a grand change in the world – the coming of the information age, where governments were finding it increasingly more difficult to pull off such “cloak and dagger” stuff without the public realising, and without political backlash. No longer could politicians plot their schemes with such ease without worrying of the public learning about, as new technologies made it very easy for information to be acquired, moved, combined and analysed – allowing for example to determine who stood behind things like military-royal coups.
That western soldiers were allowed to enter Ethiopia with the consent of the League, and that the new government was accepted and recognized across the world despite being one obviously installed by the western states was a remarkable occurrence, and a sign of change that was occurring in the world. In the past, post-colonial countries would not allow for such a thing to take place, seeing it as “neo-colonialism”, not even those associated in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Neither would the USA allow for such a thing. But this time, apart from a handful of African regimes, the world was remarkably unanimous in their decision, the entire security council of the LoN agreeing to those actions. This set up a precedent of the BCoN armed forces becoming the de facto “military wing” of the league, something that the UK long desired. It also marked an end to the “solidarity of the post-colonial states” – as post-colonial countries commended the decision. It was interpreted as a great change in the attitudes of those countries who no longer identified themselves as “post-colonial”, a sign of the world entering the “Post – post-colonial” phase. The term “post-colonial state” was overall being phased out in the global dictionaries, replaced with the more common “developing state” – “mentally” placing countries like Ethiopia among the “regular” countries like those of Latin and South America for example.
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BCoN soldiers in Ethiopia.
Yet another social change that took place because of the Ethiopian Civil War was the deterioration of the “black solidarity” sentiment. For the duration of the cold war, the African countries and people had shown a great deal of solidarity too each other, both among the independent countries, and those still on the road towards independence. These sentiments were further joined by the black minority in the USA, who also advocated decolonization in Africa and greater American involvement on the dark continent. The African countries typically did form various “united fronts” in diplomacy in regard to the opposition of the interests of other states. Such examples included for example Nigeria, which for some time struggled with foreign pressures to join the BCoN, or to allow for greater exploration and excavation rights for other countries – something countries like the EAF objected to (though also used as an opportunity to take those rights for themselves). The wars in Portuguese Africa, the bad situation in Equatorial Africa and West Africa, the apartheid in South Africa – all these things generated a lot of sympathy for those unfortunate to experience them. The EAF and the local governments of the African mandates of the UK typically had shown their solidarity by pressuring the UK and other BCoN members into providing relief for them, as well as agreeing to harbouring refugees. The EAF was the most common destination, though the British mandates on the atlantic coast had their own share of them. When the Ethiopian Civil War was waging, the idea of having the country incorporated into the EAF, either as a number of new federal members, or as LoN mandate given to the EAF was seriously considered. But in never went anywhere, in part due to the negative popular sentiment among the peoples of the EAF.
Simply put, the Africans of the “developed” African countries (or mandates) were simply fed up with the endless floods of immigrants that the Africa generated. The continent was experiencing an enormous population boom since the 50’s, mostly thanks to the developments in medicine that prolonged the average length of life and greatly reduced infant mortality. The economic difficulties and wars did not reduce the number of births, but did lead to a great number of people being displaced or sent fleeing. With Europe being mostly closed to African immigration, due to economic, social and racial reasons, the direction those refugees and emigrants took were usually towards the other Black African countries that offered a better future (later on, also Brazil). Black solidarity for a long time allowed for a mutually beneficial relationship to develop. But even that racial solidarity had its limits. While those “better off” countries of Africa were “better off” than the rest of the continent, they were still worse off than the European countries. But they still aspired to be like them. With social development taking place, national sentiment forming, tribal association becoming an important “Haimat-like” sentiment for those people – animosity against outsiders grew. That these “immigrants” were “stealing jobs” that otherwise would go to the “local people”, at a time where those “local people” were still suffering from perpetual poverty – that caused an opposition towards such a policy. The experiences of European nationalisms kicked in in Africa, with “our people first” sentiment gradually overcoming “racial unity”. Tribal conflicts were also present. As entire villages or tribes would be fleeing countries like Congo, Mozambique or Ethiopia, their ways and customs would not always find acceptance among the tribes of the countries they moved to. Fighting over land, tribal grudges, women, governmental aid or foreign relief would take place. The multi-cultural status of the African countries were a hazard even before these mass-migration movements that intensified in the 80’s and 90’s due to the wars and economic collapse of many areas. In those new circumstance, that became an even greater danger. Since the European metropolises were usually the ones to be given the bill for the costs of the new immigrants, they too started to object towards being left with such a burden. Effectively this started to create a situation, where the emigrants from the non-European afflicted African countries were not only unwelcome in Europe, but in the European afflicted African countries as well. And the Europeans supported that sentiment, preferring to harbour a better relation with the people in their African colonies – providing quotas for immigration to Europe to the locals rather than the newcomers, offering to give out their aid to the local people of their colonies rather than the refugees that moved in there just recently. And the Africans of the European colonies were more and more eager to accept that – the financial benefits of association with Europe being too good to abandon, or to share with “newcomers”. European liberals arguing for opening borders and allowing for more cheap labour to arrive to Europe to “provide cheap services and revitalize industry” were usually answered by pointing out the European states could acquire that by tapping into the available manpower in the colonies, peoples who at the very least were more knowledgeable of European culture or language.
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Refugee protest against mistratment in British Somaliland. As much of the African refugees came from countries where communist militias were numerous, and the refugees often had numerous social demands or were seen as having them, it wasn’t uncommon for people in both Europe and the European-associated states in Africa to accuse the refugees of being communists, or other subverters.
Thus the Ethiopian Civil War was an important part in breaking the “African solidarity” sentiment that existed between the European-afflicted African countries, and the “post-colonial” ones. It marked a point where the division between the “developed north” and “undeveloped south” was no longer accurate on a cultural level. For the peoples of Algeria, Gambia or even Kenya the situation of the Somalis was as alien and irrelevant as that of the Eskimos. While racial solidarity was strong and popular among the African countries not associated with European powers, the people in the “remaining colonies” felt that sentiment weakening. It was being replaced by a modern national sentiment, or a stronger tribal sentiment, or both – the “tribal sentiment” of the Africans becoming akin to the “Haimat sentiments” of Europe. This went along with the “tribes” being often granted a status similar to how national minorities were treated in Europe - all the way with “personal autonomy” being granted to them, their tribe specified on their ID cards and such. The “No Tribal Secessionism” rule was also becoming increasingly questioned as a result of the war. This was especially true due to the manner how the Empire of Ethiopia would be reformed administratively, with the country being given a federal structure, both the settled and the nomadic tribes inhabiting it given their own enclaves. It wasn’t enough to secure peace, but it bring a betterment of the situation – and questioned on whether the right way of solving the problems of endless conflicts in Africa wouldn’t be the “Balkan Way” of dissolving multinational creations and replacing them with smaller homogenous creations, forced movements being an auxiliary means to achieve the latter. It was noted that the entire “No Tribal Secessionism” rule was created not for any reason that made it “objectively right”, but in opposition to the fascist means used in central Europe and the Balkans, along with it being a means of “divide and conquer” tactics. With the Cold War coming to an end, the people began to wonder, if such cold war means and tactics should still have a place in a post-cold war world.
 
I have to say that this timeline is one of the best stories I've read on the site. The very in-depth writing makes the world seem very realistic and facinating.

Is there any way to read the TL till the end to the collapse of the fascist and communist systems? I know that that the last post is from 2014 and the author was banned... But do you know?
 
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