Japanese in China: how far can they go?

[JamesBond88]

I have a fairly simple question here, and I'm curious what people's thoughts are. How much of China could Japan take without getting bogged down in a war? There can be a "brief" conflict with the KMT in order to secure some land, but nothing protracted. They don't have to hold the land forever, I think most agree that a reasonably intact China is going to be able to take on Japan eventually, but just avoid a large scale war during the WW2 era.

I'm of the opinion at the moment that they could have reached an agreement with the KMT to sign over a lot of territory after the war had begun, had they been so inclined, but I'm open to having my mind changed.

 

[M. A. Dickens]

I'm a bit scatterbrained at the moment, so my comments would be in point form:

1) The territories "signed over" by the ROC government pre-1937 were already under Japanese occupation anyway, and there was no realistic way of resisting Japanese demands by force of arms at the time;
2) By 1937, anti-Japanese sentiments within and outside the government ensured that no Chinese leadership can just give in to Japanese demands without suffering serious consequences;
3) The words "quitting while you're ahead" doesn't seem to be in the IJA dictionary throughout OTL;

In conclusion, there's no way the ROC just signs over territory that it controls to Japan without a fight; and if there's a fight, the Chinese can simply withdraw well into the hinterland, and the IJA would end up in the OTL quagmire. The only way for Japan to "win" is if they manage to defeat and completely annilhlate Chinese field armies (even simply routing them won't work - just look at OTL) within two years, and pray like hell to Amaterasu that the series of successive defeats would be enough to shock the ROC into seeking terms (and even then, there's not a lot to stop the Chinese from flipping the table and have another go at it - Japan simply doesn't have the logistical capability to go that deep into the hinterland and operate effectively, OTL was the best they can do even without the Pacific War distracting them).

Marc A

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Taking the longer view; If Japans policy is more effective in developing friendly local leaders and better administration of its occupied territories, then over a decade or more the hold on China can be solidified. This of course presents the same problem as with the nazi attempt to destroy the USSR. If they take actions that improve their situation in China then they become less Japanese Imperialists.

 

[M. A. Dickens]

Taking the longer view; If Japans policy is more effective in developing friendly local leaders and better administration of its occupied territories, then over a decade or more the hold on China can be solidified. This of course presents the same problem as with the nazi attempt to destroy the USSR. If they take actions that improve their situation in China then they become less Japanese Imperialists.

Yeah, but that's not the OP's question though...

Marc A

 

[General Tirpitz]

One scholar suggested that had the initial Japanese attack went worse, the likelihood of some sort of conclusion to the war might have been likelier than IOTL.

 

[JamesBond88]

One scholar suggested that had the initial Japanese attack went worse, the likelihood of some sort of conclusion to the war might have been likelier than IOTL.

Do you happen to remember the source? I'd really appreciate having it.

 

[JamesBond88]

Taking the longer view; If Japans policy is more effective in developing friendly local leaders and better administration of its occupied territories, then over a decade or more the hold on China can be solidified. This of course presents the same problem as with the nazi attempt to destroy the USSR. If they take actions that improve their situation in China then they become less Japanese Imperialists.

I agree, certainly the better the Japanese management of their territory the longer they'll keep it under their thumb. But do you think a different policy towards the locals will allow them to control more territory? If the Chinese see their countrymen as collaborating and being fairly well treated do you think they'd be more willing to come to terms with Japan, if Japan is willing to do the same.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Not the KMT or Communists. There will other smaller groups or important individuals who are nationalists first & won't cooperate. Even a kinder & gentler Japan will still have little room at the top among the zaibatsu, for sharing with China's billionare family groups. The latter will not want to share if they can avoid it.

 

[General Tirpitz]

Do you happen to remember the source? I'd really appreciate having it.

I think it was John Dower's biography of PM Yoshida Shigeru, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954. He mentions that only in passing, but it sounds something which could make sense.

 

[Kaze]

Manchuria - That is as far as they should have gone, any further and farther would bog them down in an endless war that they could never win.

 

[eltf177]

I think the Japanese thought the same of China as the German's did about Soviet Russia, a house of cards that can't stand up to a modern army. And like the German's they found out the hard way that China was no paper tiger...

 

[History Learner]

They can take it all. The Hundred Regiments Offensive nearly destroyed the CCP in 1940 and Ichi-Go, in the absence of the wider Pacific War, would've meant the KMT would've been destroyed.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Holding on the Yellow River would have probably been the best course of action. Gives the Japanese ample opportunity to flex their offensive capabilities while still maintaining a manageable front line and logistical situation.

Some better diplomacy on Japan's part (like agreeing to join the war against Germany and Italy in exchange for the British and French ending their material support for the KMT, and avoiding the scuffle with America) could make a total victory possible.

 

[BlondieBC]

Great Wall as Southern Japanese border.

 

[jerseyguy]

One scholar suggested that had the initial Japanese attack went worse, the likelihood of some sort of conclusion to the war might have been likelier than IOTL.

The National Revolutionary Army threw its best units at initial Japanese landings in central China. The Battle of Shanghai quickly became China's Stalingrad, where most of the professional German-trained troops were wiped out. The capital was right next door in Nanjing and much of the elite was based in this region, so some kind of battle was seen as crucial.

If the Nationalists had used a fighting retreat to just cover the evacuation of Nanjing rather than try to push the Japanese back into the Sea, they might have been able to trade space for time the way the Russians did. Logistical constraints quickly overwhelmed over Japanese advantages farther inland, a larger military force in Sichuan provinces might've enabled a more successful Chinese counter-offensive.

Once the western powers got involved and southern ports like Guangzhou and Hong Kong were open, the nationalists might've been able gradual retake central and northern China. It would be painstakingly slow like the Italian campaign, but a more methodical reconquest would benefit the nationalists in the long run.

The overnight collapse of the Japanese in China left a massive power vacuum filled by the communists. If a more enlightened Nationalist regime had actually been forced to reconquer Northern China bit by bit and recognize land reform along the way, they might've prevent the communist base areas of OTL.

 

[M. A. Dickens]

The National Revolutionary Army threw its best units at initial Japanese landings in central China. The Battle of Shanghai quickly became China's Stalingrad, where most of the professional German-trained troops were wiped out. The capital was right next door in Nanjing and much of the elite was based in this region, so some kind of battle was seen as crucial.

That, and the fact that a north-to-south offensive [1] would work towards Japanese strength in terms of mobility (yes, a joke compared to contemporary Western armies, but still enough to trounce the Chinese in that era); whereas an east-to-west offensive would see the Japanese bogged down by the Yangtze and attendant rivers and lakes, as well as complex terrain along the Yangtze. The Battle of Shanghai thus forced a redirection of Japanese strategy, and not just a "political" battle.

[1] Indeed, that's the traditional route of "barbarian" invaders taking on and eventually defeating the sitting dynasty a la the Mongols (vs. Southern Song) and Manchus (vs. Ming)

If the Nationalists had used a fighting retreat to just cover the evacuation of Nanjing rather than try to push the Japanese back into the Sea, they might have been able to trade space for time the way the Russians did. Logistical constraints quickly overwhelmed over Japanese advantages farther inland, a larger military force in Sichuan provinces might've enabled a more successful Chinese counter-offensive.

This... is basically OTL though. By September 1937 the Third Theatre realised it was not feasible to push the Japanese back into the sea, and instead focused on containing Japanese advances on the south bank of the Yangtze and inside Shanghai proper.

Also, Nanking was so close to the sea the IJN could (and did) send ships upriver after they cleared out the coastal batteries; but otherwise, I agree that they should've evacuated Nanjing a lot earlier (which then creates the problem of "where to send all the refugees"). [2]

And also, the Sichuan armies was perhaps the worst trained and equipped force in China at the time (which makes their showing in the battles preceding Taierzhuang all the more impressive).

[2] And to be fair, no one could've anticipated the Rape of Nanking...

Once the western powers got involved and southern ports like Guangzhou and Hong Kong were open, the nationalists might've been able gradual retake central and northern China. It would be painstakingly slow like the Italian campaign, but a more methodical reconquest would benefit the nationalists in the long run.

Unless the IJN spent the war twiddling their thumbs and was content to let the Army Pukes take all the glory [3], I highly doubt they wouldn't at least blockade said southern ports, if not siccing the SNLF on China as well. Hell, even IJA recognised the importance of cutting off supply lines to the outside world, and captured Guangzhou in 1938 towards the end of the Wuhan Campaign.

The only way I can see China retaking territories before the A-Bombs dropped was if the Burma Road stayed open. [4]

[3] The IJA-IJN rivalry was basically the Mother of All Rivalries, so yeah...
[4] IOTL the Chinese Army was well on its way of launching counterattacks in southern China before Japan surrendered

The overnight collapse of the Japanese in China left a massive power vacuum filled by the communists. If a more enlightened Nationalist regime had actually been forced to reconquer Northern China bit by bit and recognize land reform along the way, they might've prevent the communist base areas of OTL.

More accurately, the Communists secured the IJA 's virtually-ungarrisoned rear areas [5] (and underwent massive expansions by subsuming NRA stay-behind forces) [6] while the IJA stared down the multi-million NRA on the front lines.

[5] [Overlord Tank voice] China is big. [/Overlord Tank voice]
[6] And when I say "subsume", I don't mean peacefully...

Marc A

 

[trurle]

They can take it all. The Hundred Regiments Offensive nearly destroyed the CCP in 1940 and Ichi-Go, in the absence of the wider Pacific War, would've meant the KMT would've been destroyed.

The effective garrison for policing the entire China was about 2 millions of Japanese (assuming standard ratio of 1 policeman per 200 locals, good if no organized resistance present). This amount the Japanese state can sustain for several years, if (as History Learner mentioned) the aftermath of operation Ichi-Go in 1945 proceed to the full collapse of China, without been interrupted by surrender of Japan.

 

[James Ricker]

What they can take and what they can actually hold on to are two totally different things. They could pretty much control the coasts and Nanking. Japan would have a serious problem in the future when Mao comes knocking.

 

[jerseyguy]

That, and the fact that a north-to-south offensive [1] would work towards Japanese strength in terms of mobility (yes, a joke compared to contemporary Western armies, but still enough to trounce the Chinese in that era); whereas an east-to-west offensive would see the Japanese bogged down by the Yangtze and attendant rivers and lakes, as well as complex terrain along the Yangtze. The Battle of Shanghai thus forced a redirection of Japanese strategy, and not just a "political" battle.

[1] Indeed, that's the traditional route of "barbarian" invaders taking on and eventually defeating the sitting dynasty a la the Mongols (vs. Southern Song) and Manchus (vs. Ming)



This... is basically OTL though. By September 1937 the Third Theatre realised it was not feasible to push the Japanese back into the sea, and instead focused on containing Japanese advances on the south bank of the Yangtze and inside Shanghai proper.

Also, Nanking was so close to the sea the IJN could (and did) send ships upriver after they cleared out the coastal batteries; but otherwise, I agree that they should've evacuated Nanjing a lot earlier (which then creates the problem of "where to send all the refugees"). [2]

And also, the Sichuan armies was perhaps the worst trained and equipped force in China at the time (which makes their showing in the battles preceding Taierzhuang all the more impressive).

[2] And to be fair, no one could've anticipated the Rape of Nanking...



Unless the IJN spent the war twiddling their thumbs and was content to let the Army Pukes take all the glory [3], I highly doubt they wouldn't at least blockade said southern ports, if not siccing the SNLF on China as well. Hell, even IJA recognised the importance of cutting off supply lines to the outside world, and captured Guangzhou in 1938 towards the end of the Wuhan Campaign.

The only way I can see China retaking territories before the A-Bombs dropped was if the Burma Road stayed open. [4]

[3] The IJA-IJN rivalry was basically the Mother of All Rivalries, so yeah...
[4] IOTL the Chinese Army was well on its way of launching counterattacks in southern China before Japan surrendered



More accurately, the Communists secured the IJA 's virtually-ungarrisoned rear areas [5] (and underwent massive expansions by subsuming NRA stay-behind forces) [6] while the IJA stared down the multi-million NRA on the front lines.

[5] [Overlord Tank voice] China is big. [/Overlord Tank voice]
[6] And when I say "subsume", I don't mean peacefully...

Marc A

Thanks for the explanation, I don't have much background knowledge on the Sino-Japanese War. So would an ATL Sino-Japanese war where either: A) The Burma Road stays open, or B) a naval power allies with China and somehow keeps the southern ports open enable the NRA to launch more counter-attacks, leading to less communist base areas? This might require getting rid of Operation Ichigo as well. How would the war have changed if the Nationalists hadn't flooded the Yellow River in '38?

The massive power vacuum created by the Japanese surrender seemed to be a major contributing factor, but changing that requires differences in the war that may be difficult or impossible. No matter how well the Chinese nationalists played their hand, the hand they were dealt was a poor one that constrained their options. I'm trying to figure out how the communists would either A) lose the civil war or B) be too weak to start one without boiling everything down to muh land reform.

I should specify that by Sichuan troops I meant some scenario where a portion of the best equipped, German-trained divisions that were sacrificed at Shanghai OTL somehow made a fighting retreat to the KMT base area in Sichuan intact, then formed the core of a more battle hardened NRA that retook territory faster than OTL.

 

[M. A. Dickens]

Thanks for the explanation, I don't have much background knowledge on the Sino-Japanese War. So would an ATL Sino-Japanese war where either: A) The Burma Road stays open, or B) a naval power allies with China and somehow keeps the southern ports open enable the NRA to launch more counter-attacks, leading to less communist base areas?

a) Tricky, since by that point the ROC were pushed back to the western and southwestern part of the country, and most of the bigger Communist Base Areas were in the north; however, with the Burma Road open, you could very well see stiffer Chinese resistance during Ichi-Go (if that still happens) and a counterattack that probably reaches Guangzhou by the time Japan surrenders; [1]

b) Hooo boy, if a naval power's ballsy enough to force the Japanese blockade before 1941, you just might butterfly away the entire Pacific War...

[1] I am of course basing this on the assumption that Chiang Kai-shek would want to recapture a southern port to enable easier resupplying after the IJN lost offensive capabilities post-Philippines Sea.

How would the war have changed if the Nationalists hadn't flooded the Yellow River in '38?

IOTL the subsequent floods turned a good portion of Henan Province into impassable terrain for mechanised forces, which delayed Japanese advances by at least three months as they reorient their offensive.

Without breaking the dykes, they would lose Wuhan much earlier, and with it most of their (meagre) industry and combat-effective field formations.

The massive power vacuum created by the Japanese surrender seemed to be a major contributing factor, but changing that requires differences in the war that may be difficult or impossible. No matter how well the Chinese nationalists played their hand, the hand they were dealt was a poor one that constrained their options. I'm trying to figure out how the communists would either A) lose the civil war or B) be too weak to start one without boiling everything down to muh land reform.

There are a few contributing factors for the CPC victory, so I guess we can work our way backwards:

a) Manchuria: as soon as August Storm halted, Mao sent a massive amount of his available forces and a host of cadres into the former Manchukuo, with the Soviets turning a blind eye on that and doing everything they can to block the National Revolutionary Army out. This allowed the CPC to take over IJA warehouses and a MASSIVE amount of supplies (I'm talking stuff like tonne upon tonnes of rifles, MGs, artillery pieces, ammunition, even a squadron or more of IJAAF warplanes), as well as a huge pool of recruits in the form of the former Manchukuo Defence Force. [1]

b) the Soviets ran a lot of interference for them i.e. blocking the National Revolutionary Army from entering Manchuria until the CPC's set up shop, as well as providing crucial training for the CPC about how to operate army-sized formations (prior to 1946, most of the forces loyal to CPC were guerrillas specialising in small-unit actions);

c) American negligence and disinterest: i) cultural differences, coupled with heavily-biased reports by people like John Service and Joseph Stilwell, turned the American leadership against Chiang; [2] ii) a misguided attempt to foster inter-party cooperation between the KMT and CPC, without realising CPC ain't interested in anything but total domination; iii) George Marshall's interference came at the worst possible time - another month of NRA offensive, and Lin Biao would've been force out of Manchuria proper and into the USSR;

d) the KMT government was so desperate to rebuild the country they unilaterally demobilised a significant portion of their force quickly, without properly planning the whole thing. [3] It led to a dangerous drop in troop morale and unit cohesiveness; as well, many of the pro-NRA wartime guerrillas were let go without proper compensation, and the former Collaborationist Army were shunned by NRA leadership; the CPC, of course, weren't as scrupulous about that, so...

e) ROC government incompetence and corruption: much as I'd loathe to admit it, it's a thing, and some of the officials [4] acted like utter assholes during the takeover of formerly-occupied territories; this turned a lot of the intelligentsia to the CPC (which, of course, they'll come to regret come 1957)...

f) "muh land reform": in actuality, it's less an economic move than a political one; what they did was to make the peasants participate in violence against former landowners, then threaten them with consequences of what would happen should the KMT win; it's essentially a Proof of Loyalty that dates back to the classic novel The Water Margin. [5]

g) when the IJA in China was ordered to lay down their arms, they were also ordered to assemble along railway lines and transportation hubs; this created a vacuum in the countryside which the CPC took full advantage of

[1] I don't have statics on me right now, but former MDF personnel were basically the muscle of Lin Biao Northeast Field Army (later Fourth Field Army) that conquered everything from Manchuria to southwestern China
[2] I'll be the first to admit Chiang is not the most pleasant of man to deal with, and corruption and incompetence is in fact a problem within the ROC government; however, it is also important to remember that up until 1937, the ROC government in Nanjing only have effective control over a few provinces in Central China and on the eastern coast, and that until 1950, the NRA (later the ROC Army) was more a coalition of the (not necessarily) willing than a lean mean fighting machine...
[3] Contrary to the whole "dem mad KMT capitalist dogs will not stop waging war on muh proletariat" CPC propaganda; yeah, I know, I was surprised too;
[4] The so called "High Fives", named so because they get these five things: positions (inside the government), nice houses, cars, women and gold bars;
[5] Like when you join the Mob, the bosses might make you kill a cop to make sure you're not an undercover cop or something;

I should specify that by Sichuan troops I meant some scenario where a portion of the best equipped, German-trained divisions that were sacrificed at Shanghai OTL somehow made a fighting retreat to the KMT base area in Sichuan intact, then formed the core of a more battle hardened NRA that retook territory faster than OTL.

While saving more of the German-trained divisions earlier on may further delay the IJA, and the personnel from said divisions were, on average, better trained than their counterparts, ultimately it wouldn't matter once Germany cut off arms shipments; indeed, prior to the Burma Campaign (1942), Chinese corps (their basic tactical unit) were mostly Soviet- or indigenous-armed; and as the war drew to its conclusion, the Five Great Hosts (TM) of the NRA gradually received American training and equipment (SUN Li-jen's New I Corps and LIAO Yaoxiang's New VI Corps) [1] or at least American equipment (QIU Qingquan's V Corps, HU Lien's XVIII Corps and ZHANG Lingfu's LXXIV Corps).

[1] aka. X Force in India

Marc A