Barry Bull
Donor
As if PH didn't anger USA.
No one said the Japanese plan was good. But atleast PH strike did give IJA and IJN about 6 months of time to act freely in the Pacific.
As if PH didn't anger USA.
How many major naval victories did the British have against Imperial Japan during WW2? Now compare with the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse, the destruction of the ABDA fleet and invasion of the Dutch East Indies, and the way Somerville ran away from the Indian Ocean raid and still managed to lose ships. Oh yes: and as another poster mentioned, the Imperial Japanese managed to attack British shipping, at one point, as far away as Madagascar - fortunately for the British they were able to scrape together enough force with the help of South Africa to flip Madagascar over to the Free French before Imperial Japan could establish an outpost there to permanently operate from.
Now compare that with the regular beatings that the USN regularly handed out to the Imperial Japanese, once the USA got its act together and engaged brains and employed decent commanders.
The British managed to run a major submarine (and air) campaign in the Mediterranean against Axis shipping to North Africa, and to play 'incapacitate one another's battleships' quite well with the Italians. (The British raided Taranto with aircraft; the Italians raided Alexandria with frogmen.) And it took them a lot of the war, and American help, but they eventually managed to just about get on top of the German submarine problem.
But the British were also driven out of the Pacific and even at one point the Indian Ocean by Imperial Japan, and didn't come back until the USN had well and truly broken the IJN.
One word; "Pedestal". British did well under almost impossible conditions. I rank it as a bigger victory than Matapan.The USN did not participate in surface and aerial actions in Atlantic until 1941 and in the Med until 1942. The blunt of the fighting in these area was carried by RN carrier and surface fleet.
Funny how my own words are used to make untenable arguments.
1. The British were not really in a position, base-wise to mount a campaign in the Pacific. They had Singapore and Aden. Lost Singapore and it is Aden, because they were paranoid about India and did not Commonwealth them when Britain had a chance in the late 19th Century. Bad mistake. Operation TRIDENT shows what Indians can do at sea.
2. I'm not going to sugarcoat it, the British were trounced in the Indian Ocean. But it is kind of hard to fight and win when the odds are 3x to 1, the enemy IS Kido Butai, your recon ability at that stage of the war is ZERO, because your previous best in the world ability is now DEAD, the trained replacements are green and NTG and your own best flattop and SAG operators are in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean.
3. ABDA was not just the British. There were Americans, Australians and Dutch who got clobbered, too, all working at cross purposes. Again I will not sugarcoat it. The British, west of Java, ran a bit early. They had their reasons and those reasons were not good ones, then or now.
4. Britain will do parity in western Indonesia about 1945 because they fixed 2 and somewhat 3. Never could fix 1. ; because of 2.
5. The British TAUGHT the Japanese the art of naval aviation in the 1920s. Taranto was the playbook for Pearl Harbor. USN asleep on that one.
6. The British TAUGHT the Americans about WWII ASW.
7. Don't underestimate the Italians at sea. TOUGH ASW customers, tough small craft brawlers, and they ran the best SLOC operation of the war.
8. The USN was driven out of East Asian waters where it had operated since 1898 for the same exact reasons as the British. (Lost Manila and Subic Bay.). USN/Marines American army/USAAF comeback took almost 36 months to repair what the IJN/IJN took in 180 days.
9. Lack of preparation and preplaced infrastructure and mistrust of the Filipinos (Sound familiar?) was the reason that 1. happened.
10. After Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons, just where was the "invincible USNAS"? DEAD. Santa Cruz was a repeat of Tricomalee because the USN pilot replacements were green and NTG. Fletcher was on the beach with serious wounds and HALSEY (GRRR.) turned in a Halsey performance of the wrong kind at the wrong time and place. Fortunately, and I mean fortunately, Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons had torn the guts out of Kido Butai, so the IJNAS was somewhat neutered too.
11. Surface brawls: 19 of them. Record = 9/6/2 in favor of the IJN. If those had been British admirals and captains in those night fights, the results would have been a bit better for the allies. The British were much better night fighters at that stage of the war than the Americans with better torpedoes and gunline drills. Won't see comparable USN performance until the Americans learn how to use radar and the destroyer ambush (Burke, McMorris and Lee... November 1942, which is fast, but the Americans still take pastings until Kolombangara.)
One word; "Pedestal". British did well under almost impossible conditions. I rank it as a bigger victory than Matapan.
I am Chinese-Canadian myself and i have been mistaken for being Korean or Japanese before.
And this is the 21st century with all it's globalization.
I doubt the US inspectors can tell the difference, especially with all the racism back then.
No one said the Japanese plan was good. But atleast PH strike did give IJA and IJN about 6 months of time to act freely in the Pacific.
Snip.
The important thing is FDR listened to his admirals and he would have vetoed "Through Ticket to Manila" if someone like Wilkie had yammered for it.
And right there 'the enemy IS Kido Butai' you emphasise how enormous the gulf in training and doctrine was between the British and the Imperial Japanese. Imperial Japan were leagues ahead of the British when it came to surface operations stuff. (As we discussed in the worst commanders thread, the British were barely on a level with Germany by 1941, with what was supposedly their naval best as shown by the run-in with Bismarck. They misread German intentions, botched their surveillance/reconnaissance in terms of losing track of Bismarck, lost Hood, saw Prince of Wales put in the repair yard (and if Prince of Wales hadn't needed time out for yard repairs, would the crew and ship have maybe worked better and lasted a few hours longer in December versus IJN?), only reacquired Bismarck's location and heading by sheer good luck, almost sank one of their own cruisers by air attack trying to stop/slow the Bismarck, and without a fluke rudder hit wouldn't have been able to slow Bismarck enough anyway to catch it and zerg rush it and get the sinking in.)...But it is kind of hard to fight and win when the odds are 3x to 1, the enemy IS Kido Butai, your recon ability at that stage of the war is ZERO, because your previous best in the world ability is now DEAD, the trained replacements are green and NTG and your own best flattop and SAG operators are in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean...
I'm sure it's come up in threads before on this forum that the IJN were already honing their torpedo attack ability before Taranto. Taranto simply confirmed for the IJN that yes, what they were doing, could be really effective....5. The British TAUGHT the Japanese the art of naval aviation in the 1920s. Taranto was the playbook for Pearl Harbor. USN asleep on that one....
And right there 'the enemy IS Kido Butai' you emphasise how enormous the gulf in training and doctrine was between the British and the Imperial Japanese. Imperial Japan were leagues ahead of the British when it came to surface operations stuff. (As we discussed in the worst commanders thread, the British were barely on a level with Germany by 1941, with what was supposedly their naval best as shown by the run-in with Bismarck. They misread German intentions, botched their surveillance/reconnaissance in terms of losing track of Bismarck, lost Hood, saw Prince of Wales put in the repair yard (and if Prince of Wales hadn't needed time out for yard repairs, would the crew and ship have maybe worked better and lasted a few hours longer in December versus IJN?), only reacquired Bismarck's location and heading by sheer good luck, almost sank one of their own cruisers by air attack trying to stop/slow the Bismarck, and without a fluke rudder hit wouldn't have been able to slow Bismarck enough anyway to catch it and zerg rush it and get the sinking in.)
I suppose you know that the IJN did not even have the torpedo mods in hand in August 1941 when the first cloud cuckoo land proposal for Pearl Harbor came out Genda's and Fuchida's fevered imaginations? Those were not ready until early OCTOBER 1941. The Kido Butai's torpedo plane crews got barely a month to train with these new NOSE CONTROL Type 91 torpedoes before the fleet had to sortie. Almost a year after the British had demonstrated positive nose control cable retarded drop at Taranto. (11 November 1940.)I'm sure it's come up in threads before on this forum that the IJN were already honing their torpedo attack ability before Taranto. Taranto simply confirmed for the IJN that yes, what they were doing, could be really effective.
Although past a point, this doesn't get us closer to the destruction of lock gates on the Pacific side of the Panama Canal.
Do you have any data on what warships, reconnaissance aircraft (and for that matter, radar, I suppose), and anti-submarine measures the USN had in place there on December 8th/7th 1941?
So there's what? The 'Panama mobile force' - infantry in trucks, I'd guess - the 'aircraft warning' at Fort Clayton (some sort of aircraft detecting radar on the Caribbean side of the Isthmus is that?), 'Coast Artillery' at each end, plus maintenance, bakery, and logistics and that's it?...Yes I do. It was mostly an American army show, though.
Immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the War Department instructed its department commanders to put the Rainbow 5 plan into effect. This was the Orange Plan, which identified the Japanese as the primary aggressor, and singled out the Panama Canal as one of the key defense initiatives.
By the time the build-up was complete, defenses consisted of nine airbases and airdromes, 10 ground forces posts, 30 aircraft warning stations, and 634 searchlights, antiaircraft gun positions and miscellaneous tactical and logistical installations. Twelve outlying airbases were also constructed in Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. An outer defense parameter of 960 nautical miles from the Canal was established and patrolled by air and sea.
When the United States found itself enmeshed in a two ocean war, the Panama Canal suddenly became the most strategic point on the globe. The convergence of naval and merchant fleet traffic at this point offered German U-boats a vital and tempting target. As a result, it became necessary to ring the canal's ocean approaches with protective bases. Agreements with the governments of Caribbean, Central American, and South American countries made it possible to secure sites for new bases throughout the area. The Lend Lease Agreement, consummated with Great Britain in September of 1940, yielded still other possible bases in this crucial locale. Not only were new base sites rapidly acquired, but United States bases already in existence were enlarged. Under the Greenslade Program of 1940, the three pre-1939 naval installations located in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Panama Canal Zone were all expanded.
So you're saying that the United States government felt, after the war had already started that the defences of the Panama Canal were inadequate, and started to build them up. (possibly including the 'Howard Field' Wikipedia mentions.)Ignoring the fact that the Japanese could not even reach that far... an examination of the OOB would reveal;
Let's see further...
So you're saying that the United States government felt, after the war had already started that the defences of the Panama Canal were inadequate, and started to build them up. (possibly including the 'Howard Field' Wikipedia mentions.)
At this point the limitation on Imperial Japanese ambitions, you seem to be indicating, for an attack on the canal (to sabotage/damage) on the 8th/7th of December 1941 seems to me to be solely whether they (Imperial Japan) can get anything capable of dealing serious damage in range.
(Of course: even if Imperial Japan do manage to shut the Canal down in December 1941 they still lose the war in the end anyway; it's just that it may be at the wrong end of more atomic bombs than they took in the original timeline, if they manage to slow the progress of the USN in the Pacific sufficiently...)
(Off topic I found the article on torpedoes you linked to in the previous post interesting... especially the fact that it said that due to their military spending and ability to carry out live-fire exercises, Imperial Japan were actually one of the leading developers of torpedoes in the 1930's, and that the Italians and Americans at least (possibly also the British) subsequently adopted some features (such as wooden stabilizing fins on aerial torpedoes) in the 1940's which the Imperial Japanese had already devised and implemented.)
At this point the limitation on Imperial Japanese ambitions, you seem to be indicating, for an attack on the canal (to sabotage/damage) on the 8th/7th of December 1941 seems to me to be solely whether they (Imperial Japan) can get anything capable of dealing serious damage in range.
Let's imagine a larger and more prepared force for the Panama Canal.
I've already quoted part of this from this website regarding the Alert of 1941:So you're saying that the United States government felt, after the war had already started that the defences of the Panama Canal were inadequate, and started to build them up. (possibly including the 'Howard Field' Wikipedia mentions.)
At this point the limitation on Imperial Japanese ambitions, you seem to be indicating, for an attack on the canal (to sabotage/damage) on the 8th/7th of December 1941 seems to me to be solely whether they (Imperial Japan) can get anything capable of dealing serious damage in range.
(Of course: even if Imperial Japan do manage to shut the Canal down in December 1941 they still lose the war in the end anyway; it's just that it may be at the wrong end of more atomic bombs than they took in the original timeline, if they manage to slow the progress of the USN in the Pacific sufficiently...)
(Off topic I found the article on torpedoes you linked to in the previous post interesting... especially the fact that it said that due to their military spending and ability to carry out live-fire exercises, Imperial Japan were actually one of the leading developers of torpedoes in the 1930's, and that the Italians and Americans at least (possibly also the British) subsequently adopted some features (such as wooden stabilizing fins on aerial torpedoes) in the 1940's which the Imperial Japanese had already devised and implemented.)
So the potential use of torpedoes or sabotage to get to the Canal would not be happening after July 1941. Also from the same website it describes the searching and the provision of armed guards on ships going through the Canal since August 1939 in case of saboteurs hiding in merchant ships. So this whole concept of any attack on the Panama Canal in late 1941 is unrealistic at best.The Alert of July 1941
Although the command was now organized along theater lines, the safety of the Panama Canal was still the chief concern. Rumors and fears of a Japanese attempt against the Canal had developed at the beginning of July when affairs in the Far East began to edge toward a crisis. The Navy Department's bulletin to the President on 3 July reported the probability of a Japanese move against Russia "about 20 July" and the fact that the Japanese Government was beginning to divert shipping out of the Atlantic. One shipping company, it was stated, had ordered its vessels to be west of the Panama Canal by 25 July regardless of passengers or cargo; another had instructed its ships to discharge all their cargo at west coast ports. Among numerous other memorabilia, the bulletin further reported the following: "Possible torpedo attack on Panama Canal between 1st and 15th of July is reported from a reliable source . . . ." This information was sent to the War Department at once and was immediately relayed to General Van Voorhis as follows: "Report from questionable source indicates torpedo attack on Canal between July 1 and 15. In Washington, much more significance was attached to the news of Japanese shipping diversions. General Van Voorhis was directed to take added measures of protection against sabotage and to tighten up the surveillance of ships in transit. He was to delay all Japanese ships, ostensibly for the purpose of searching them, until he received further instructions from the War Department.22 General Van Voorhis tended to discount much of what had been reported. Japanese ship movements were normal, he radioed Washington, and in fact on 3 July a large Japanese freighter had passed through the Canal into the Atlantic, bound for Baltimore. As for a torpedo attack, he had been given a similar report by the military attaché at Bogota, and it was clear he did not put much stock in it. However, he immediately placed a series of defensive measures into effect. War channels through the mine fields at both ends of the Canal were put in use instead of the usual straight channels; antisubmarine and torpedo nets were placed in operation in front of the locks; and a vigilant guard was maintained. The only unusual activity was a concentration of small boats on the Pacific side of the Isthmus, possibly fishing craft, reported General Van Voorhis, and in order to maintain surveillance over them he requested that he be provided with two high-powered speed boats. Meanwhile, someone in Washington had figured out that Japanese shipping movements were scheduled so as to place one or more vessels in the Canal each day during the period 16-22 July. Although the War Department was unaware of its purpose, the schedule looked definitely suspicious and countermeasures were considered imperative. The result was that General Marshall and Secretary Stimson decided to restrict Canal traffic for an indefinite period "for the purpose of effecting repairs." What this amounted to was an exclusion of Japanese shipping; all other vessels were permitted to pass through. When the Japanese Ambassador inquired about the seeming discrimination, he received a very noncommittal reply from Acting Secretary of State Welles, who had been informed by the War Department of its intentions and who was in complete accord with them.
So the potential use of torpedoes or sabotage to get to the Canal would not be happening after July 1941