Chapter 51: Asian Strongholds – Part V: The Borneo Campaign (Dutch East Indies, January – April 1942)
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Chapter 51
Dutch East Indies Theatre
January - April 1942
Dutch East Indies Theatre
January - April 1942
The availability of Japan’s Kido Butai allowed the Imperial High Command to set its sights on Southeast Asia once more, though the Navy and Army both had diverging interests. And with the Navy’s better performance, the High Command had to concede for it to launch its own operation to secure Rabaul, before coming to support operations in the Malay Barrier.
The securing of Rabaul went overall well, the Australians having evacuated the base along with several other locations in New Britain. The delay did however cause the Japanese to push back the offensive in Malaya and their planned landings in Borneo and the Moluccas. A delay that was beneficial to them, as the Philippines still resisted, and only Davao and its outskirts had been secured by the time the High Command wished to launch its operation to take Borneo and the first Indonesian islands. This in turn delayed their plan to take Bougainville, Tulagi and make a landing in New Guinea proper, but these operations would be launched as soon as the Malay Barrier had been secured.
This delay allowed the Allied forces in the area to reinforce themselves quite considerably. The protection of the Malay Barrier was deemed by every involved nation to be paramount to the defence of South-East Asia. American naval assets had thus made their way to Bandung and Batavia, bolstering the Dutch forces there. It was planned for the first U.S division, the “Amerijav Division”, to be activated in May 1942, with it fit for operations in September [1]. It would then be joined by the 25th Infantry Division, which would cover Java, Bali and Timor. In the meantime, the Australians would bolster the Dutch defences, with U.S support being mainly confined to naval and air assets.
Because of Davao’s isolated nature, and the activity of U.S and Filipino troops in the area, the Allies kept a tight watch on the naval base, and noticed the gain in activity as soon as February. This activity prompted General ter Poorten, Commander in Chief of all land forces in the Dutch East Indies, to declare all Dutch forces on high alert. This activity prompted the transfer of U.S troops of the 1st Battalion, 148th Field Artillery Regiment, to Bandung, alongside an entire USAAF squadron, on P-40s, and a Bomber Squadron, on A-24s.
But the first landings the Japanese made were not on the Dutch side of Borneo! On March 19th, well-escorted by the Kido Butai which wished to avenge the Kuantan disaster, which happened just a week prior, Japanese forces of the 2nd Infantry Division landed at Miri. The port was chosen as it was a prime refuelling spot for the ships of the Bataan Lifeline, and a good landing area to then move to Brunei Bay, which was marked by the IJN as a potential landing base. This time, the Kido Butai came prepared. The British submarine HMS Grampus would unfortunately fall victim to the escorts, though the Dutch submarine HNLMS K-XV would manage to sink the destroyer Amagiri. The landing itself went without a hitch, and British naval forces in Singapore were powerless to stop it. Quickly, Japanese troops occupied Brunei in front of weak British resistance, leaving the Kido Butai to triumphantly withdraw. This might have led to a moment of overconfidence however, as during it, the light cruiser Kitakami was sunk by a salvo from the French submarine Ouessant.
This loss did not overly affect the operations of the Imperial Japanese Navy. On March 26th, they landed at Kota Kinabalu, once more facing weak British resistance. Four days later, it was the island of Tawi-Tawi, in the Sulu Archipelago, which saw a 100% Imperial Navy involvement, with SNLF units taking control of this strategic island, left undefended by the Allies.
The next target would be a little tougher to swallow. Kuching, in Sarawak, was the target of the Japanese planners. However, here, the British had managed to shore up defences, and benefitted from air support coming from Singapore. Maneuvering was thus risky for the Kido Butai, which did not want to risk losing units, and therefore stayed in deeper waters. The fight for Kuching lasted all day, both on land and at sea. On land, British forces conceded the city but fought heavily around the airfield, which had been duly sabotaged. At sea, the Kido Butai found itself attacked by a wave of torpedo bombers, of No. 489 Sqn RNZAF and the brand-new TBD Devastators of VLG-1 (KNIL) operating from Singkawang [2]. The air attacks made the IJN pay a hefty price: the cruiser Kinu was sunk, along with the destroyer Kikuzuki and two transports. The Dutch air arm could rejoice, which was not the case of its submarine arm, which lost the HNLMS K-VIII and K-XVI to the annoyed escort.
Despite the losses, the Kido Butai would continue to support the ground operations, forcing the British forces to withdraw on April 1st towards Singkawang. They would then retreat to Pontianak, with Singkawang falling on April 24th. The British were then evacuated to Pulau Bangka at the end of the month. With almost all of British Sarawak under Japanese control, Allied high command now saw an attack on the Dutch-held part of the island to be only a matter of time.
The Allies would not have to wait long. Informed by USAAF personnel in Mindanao of the sailing of a convoy towards the south on April 11th, all forces in Dutch Borneo were put on high alert. The Japanese high command had in fact organized a double strike. The first was aimed at Manado, in Sulawesi. This area was deemed essential as the Dutch operated two airfields there, which needed to be destroyed. An airborne assault was thus organized, which had mixed results. Thanks to the advanced warning, the Dutch did manage to sally out and defend the air assault, but lost a great deal of their number, with the outdated Buffalos not managing to do much against the much more powerful Zeros. Still, four Japanese bombers were shot down, causing more than fifty casualties. The airborne assault was combined with a landing of SNLF forces, which the Dutch had a hard time in containing. After four days of struggle, Major Schilmöller ordered the troops to scatter inland. A small group of Dutch troops, surrounded in the airfield, chose to surrender. The Japanese, though, were in a foul mood. They had seen about 400 killed in the assault, and were not prepared to give mercy to their adversaries. The commander of the Dutch forces defending the airfield, Lt. Wielinga, was beheaded on April 16th. Sixteen other Dutch soldiers (four Dutch and twelve Menadonese) were bayoneted and killed [3]. About 1,000 troops made their way into the jungle, to carry on the fight there.
On the other side of the strait, Japanese forces landed in force at Tarakan, where they were met with a wall of black smoke: the Dutch had duly sabotaged and destroyed the oilfields. As for the fight: it was rough for the Japanese, which struggled in the area. Worse, sporadic Allied air attacks made progress difficult, and Dutch submarines had managed to sink three transport ships. In addition, two minesweepers were sunk by coastal batteries, and five Japanese aircraft were shot down. As a result, the fight lasted five long days, at the end of which the Dutch finally surrendered. The Japanese had suffered almost 500 killed, a number equalled by the Dutch. 600 more were taken captive, but the men of the coastal batteries would not be spared. The Navy, furious, took the 219 men to the spot where they had sunk their minesweepers and threw them into the sea where they would drown to the last [4].
With the fall of Tarakan, it now became obvious for the Allies that the next target would be Balikpapan, the only question was when the Japanese would launch their assault. Dutch and American naval assets were put on high alert, with Allied planes being committed when possible. The Japanese had until then tried to neutralize Bandung airfield and Surabaya naval base, without success. The island of Java had seen a massive increase in its air defence, with flak and extra RAF, RAAF and USAAF squadrons lending a hand to the overwhelmed ML-KNIL aircraft. On April 21st, for example, a massive raid hit Bandung airfield, with more than 50 Japanese aircraft committed. This one was answered by 15 ML-KNIL Buffalos, 12 USAAF P-40s, 6 RAF Hurricanes and 20 RAAF P-40s. Overall, the Japanese saw the loss of 12 bombers (7 “Nell” and 5 “Betty”) and 8 fighters (all “Zeke”), while the Allies saw the loss of 17 fighters overall (7 Buffalo, 8 P-40, 2 Hurricane). These numbers highlighted the sheer ferocity of air combats over Java, which would reach its zenith during the invasion of Java, in June 1942 [5].
On April 23rd, the fears of the Allied High Command realized themselves: the Japanese struck Balikpapan. Here, just like in Tarakan, the oilfields were sabotaged, and the Japanese were welcomed with a thick wall of black smoke. Resistance around Balikpapan was extremely strong, however, with much of the Borneo Garrison being deployed in the area. To this end, it was decided to have the Dutch fleet attempt a sortie, once reconnaissance had confirmed that the carriers had left the area, having chickened out after a Dutch submarine had sunk two cargo ships in the bay.
Karel Doorman put his flag up on the light cruiser HNLMS De Ruyter, and had a strong force with him. He was accompanied by the CL Java, the CLAA Jacob van Heemskerk, the DDs Banckaert, Evertsen, Kortenaer, Piet Hein, Van Ghent, Van Nes and Witte de With. In addition to the Dutch force, the Americans contributed the heavy cruisers Houston and Minneapolis, along with the destroyers John D. Ford, Peary, Pillsbury, Pope, Alden, Edsall, John D. Edwards, Hammann and Morris. The Australians also committed a token force, with the cruiser HMAS Perth alongside the destroyers Vendetta and Vampire. Their plan was to intercept the main Japanese fleet with the cruisers while the destroyers would wreak havoc amongst the transports.
Opposite them, Admiral Takagi was in charge of the defence of Balikpapan, and was aware of an Allied fleet having left Bandung by IJN reconnaissance planes. Adhering to the doctrine of decisive battle, Takagi did not refuse combat, and instead sallied out with his fleet, which he thought could easily dispatch the Dutch. Takagi however did not factor in the presence of the Americans or Australians, though he still outnumbered them in large units.
The heavy cruisers Nachi and Myoko were the first to spot the Allied fleet, at around 6PM on April 24th, prompting the Allied fleet to immediately return fire. Doorman, in order to attack the fleet at anchor, tasked several destroyers to run towards Balikpapan while the cruisers and most destroyers would draw Takagi’s fleet so that they would not be bothered. This worked a little too well, as the Japanese executed several torpedo attacks, though only the USS John D. Edwards was hit, sinking quickly afterwards. Additionally, the Myoko found a hit on the Houston, which saw its speed brought down to 10 knots [6].
But Doorman had managed to close the distance, now being able to bring the guns of the light cruisers to bear. The Java managed to score a hit on the destroyer Yamakaze, which sunk shortly thereafter. Takagi, realizing that he was losing the initiative, ordered two massive torpedo runs in order to sink the Houston. However, with fading light and poor coordination and aim, none of the 90 torpedoes found their mark [7]. The destroyers which had launched had thus found themselves in a bad spot, now under fire from the Allied light cruisers. The De Ruyter scored a hit on the Sazanami, which would also sink an hour later. The Japanese destroyer was avenged by the heavy cruisers, which repeatedly struck the light cruiser Java, which stopped, in flames.
With night now upon both sides, Doorman attempted one last sally before withdrawing. This one had mixed results to say the least. The Americans and Australians did not fully understand Doorman’s orders, and were thus left to dry when the Dutch column suddenly accelerated [8]. With the Japanese hot on their trail, the USS Edsall and HMAS Vampire were sunk by a torpedo salvo, with the Perth only damaging the light cruiser Naka. As for Doorman’s attack, it was mostly ineffective: he lost the HNLMS Van Ghent to a torpedo, but succeeded in sinking the destroyer Harusame and crippling the heavy cruiser Nachi.
Both sides then disengaged, with the Allied fleet taking the time to withdraw to collect survivors (the Java had sunk by the time Doorman came back). Unfortunately, it wouldn’t all be smooth sailing for either fleet. The Houston was finished off by an air attack launched from Tarakan as it approached Surabaya, taking the USS John D. Ford with it; and the Nachi was struck by Beauforts of No. 458 Sqn RAAF as it rounded Kuching. Overall, numbers seemed to favor the Japanese: they had lost one light cruiser and three destroyers for the sinking of one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser and six destroyers. But unfortunately for them, the main effort of the Allied fleet had succeeded: a task force of American and Dutch destroyers descended upon the anchorage at Balikpapan, sinking six transport ships (including a munitions transport ship), one tanker and three minesweepers, for the loss of the sole Peary, which had to be scuttled after it was hit by a torpedo launched from one of the Japanese destroyers left behind. Later, in the morning hours of April 25th, the American submarine USS Snapper would come and sink the seaplane tender Sanuki Maru, as a last middle finger to the Japanese Navy on this fateful night. These losses would only be partially avenged as the submarine I-22 crippled the HNLMS Kortenaer, which had to be scuttled, while an air attack damaged the Van Nes, which could be repairable [9].
This naval victory left a very sour taste in the Japanese mouths. Balikpapan would not be a new Kuantan or Kota Bharu, of course, these were Navy men, not the incompetent Army! [10] But it meant that the battle for the control of the oilfields would be much longer than planned. The battle would in fact last until May 3rd, when the Dutch commander, Cornelis van den Hoogenband, ordered the Dutch troops to withdraw inland, towards the Samarinda II airfield. Exhausted, the Japanese did not pursue.
Japan thus continued to extend its hold over the Indonesian islands, but the price was become heavier to pay by the day (and Bandjarmasin had yet to be secured!). On April 29th, SNLF elements fought dearly to take Kendari, in the Celebes, postponing the landings at Ambon and Makassar until the units that had fought in Borneo and Manado could be sufficiently rested. And in the meantime, the Allies kept pouring in troops, equipment and ships. None were so important than the arrival, on May 4th, of the aircraft carrier USS Lexington, at Tjilatjap naval base, escorting men of the new “Amerijav Division” to the island that would soon find itself in the frontlines [11].
[1] Goodbye Americal, hello Amerijav.
[2] A Borneo Campaign in 1942 means the ML-KNIL get some recent units, though they're pretty much at the bottom of the list for reinforcements. Most of their squadrons still fly on old B-10s.
[3] As OTL, the Japanese did not cope well with losses at Manado.
[4] Unfortunately as OTL.
[5] This is still relatively exceptional in terms of numbers both for the attackers and defenders. Most raids will not have as many aircraft devolved to them. It is just there to illustrate the losses both sides are taking.
[6] Houston gets Exeter'd.
[7] Amazingly, as OTL.
[8] Instead of a language issue, this was a communications issue. Doorman spoke perfect English, but wasn't on the same frequency as the Australians. The Americans thus had to play middle-man for the entire battle (which happened in OTL at Java Sea). One moment where the Americans don't understand what you want to do and suddenly it all falls apart.
[9] The Japanese "win" the battle by sinking twice as many ships as their opponent, but in practice it's a really tough blow. This is essentially a "better-case" Java Sea which still ends in a tactical Allied defeat.
[10] But really mostly because the ML-KNIL did not have the manpower, firepower and air support the Commonwealth divisions could enjoy in Malaya...
[11] No Guadalcanal, Bougainville or New Guinea Campaign means no Battle of the Coral Sea...but that doesn't mean Lexington won't see carrier on carrier action before Summer! The reasoning will be explained on the Singapore Express chapter, but it essentially has to do with Bataan becoming a point of national pride with the U.S, which leads them to invest heavily into the defence of Java and Singapore.
Note: Map of the South-East Asian Front on May 1st, 1942
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