To clarify, this thread isn't really intended to set up an Italian-Japanese conflict in the mid 20th Century just because they have almost no overlapping spheres of interest or points of conflict. Instead, I wanted to explore the relative qualities of the IJA and Fascist Italy's Army in a hypothetical conflict. Clearly, the Imperial Japanese Navy was larger and more skilled than the Royal Italian Navy but both of their respective land forces cut a poor figure compared to the Anglo-American, Soviet, or German armies during World War II. Both were primarily infantry forces with relatively few advanced or heavy weapons and cut a poor figure against any other Great Power army. So how would they fare in battle against each other?
Imperial Japanese Army vs Royal Italian Army
- Thread starter Marius Mazzini
- Start date
Why fight for a dictatorship you probably dont really suport when the alternative is going to work on farms in Australia probably with better food than you get in the army? Surendering to IJA might get different results.....(unless you go back in time to RJW)
And with an ally you just fought a brutal war against 20 years ago which is starting to look ever more suspicious.
Depends on which version of each we're talking about, isn't it? For the purposes of this discussion, though, I'm assuming we're going for the WW2 Axis versions, and that we're exclusively talking about the land forces.
The biggest and worst problem plaguing the Italians was the rapid over-expansion Mussolini carried out during the 1920s and 1930s and its continuing consequences. It resulted in a big, intimidating looking army to allow him to throw his weight around in the interwar period, but it bit him in the ass during the war, as it revealed major operational weaknesses. While the Italian Army of WW1 was a good, reliable force that just suffered from bad morale and poor commanders at the start, it quickly turned the war around, eventually proving pivotal to Entente victory once Austria-Hungary collapsed and the Italians were on the road to Vienna. Mussolini threw away this army's strengths by massive conscription, resulting in a massive block of conscripts with little to no training, little equipment beyond rifles and bullets, and an officer cadre of middle-class and nobility that neither knew nor cared about the rank-and-file's problems. No real effort to my knowledge was made to bridge the gap, nor to engage in advanced combat training for anyone besides the elite units like the Alpini. As a result, the only times the Italians did well in the war was under commanders who appreciated their potential and gave them proper training and discipline, like the Italians under Rommel, who formed the majority of his African theater forces.
The Japanese army, by contrast, had discipline, training and motivation despite its massive size, mostly because of continuous training and discipline enforcement even during its expansion phase during the 1930s. Soldier obedience was strong, and the army could be relied on to fight and die with some degree of effectiveness. The biggest problems facing the IJA were the banzai charge mentality, and the excessive brutality in enforcing discipline and punishments. The Japanese had come out of the Meiji Restoration, suddenly rose to Industrial Power status, then fought several successive wars with clear-cut victories (First Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, WW1), giving them an inflated sense of racial superiority and national invincibility against larger adversaries. It wasn't just enough to win, there has to be no retreat or surrender; any such act would be a betrayal of Japan, and thus unacceptable. Combined with the large emphasis on death-or-glory attacks, officers leading from the front, and the tendency of junior officers to assassinate seniors who they felt didn't present "sufficiently patriotic spirit" meant that most Japanese commanders would favor the most direct brute-force approach and would try to win the day through sheer fighting spirit, regardless of logistical or support factors (or the lack thereof). They'd be go-getters when the situation called for go-getters (which was early in the war), and they'd be go-getters when the situation called for cunning and caution (which is why they got reamed later on).
Both the Japanese and Italians had a rather dismissive view of casualties. For the Italians, this was a combination of initial misplaced optimism and a lack of competent or likeable officers, which only worsened the Italian morale problem. The Japanese, as mentioned, would be excessively disciplined and brutalized to the point where a retreat or surrender would be unthinkable. This recklessness even carried over to the officers, with junior officers leading banzai charges and senior officers something getting too close to the front. By contrast, the infamous Soviet casualty rates were the result of desperation, rather than indifference, as they were fighting an existential war against a powerful, genocidal invader.
In terms of mechanized units and armor, I lack the knowledge to properly compare them. What I do know, though, is that neither side were truly skilled in armored assaults. Italy had relied on armored cars and trucks to spearhead its assaults on the Ethiopians and Libyans, but the tactic backfired in Spain where the better-prepared Spanish Republicans massacred the Italian CTV at the Battle of Guadalajara, and the Italians learned the wrong lessons from the assault (unlike the Germans, who noted that armor unsupported by infantry tends to do poorly). As a result, Italy never really properly developed its tank core, not to mention that it exhausted a massive amount of materiel in Spain and didn't take the time to replenish it properly.
The Japanese, in comparison, were heavily in favor of light infantry assaults and brave attacks, eschewing heavy logistical preparation in favor of lightning-fast assaults. Their plan was to feed their troops off the occupied lands, a major gamble that paid off in the early stages of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the early phases of the Pacific War, notably the Battle of Singapore. Such victories tainted their vision, and thus sought to force such victories even when they weren't feasible or possible. The Italian soldier would be better supplied than his Japanese counterpart, but that's not exactly a high bar to clear. Japanese armor was limited to light tanks, being easy to make and supply, and heavier tanks weren't really needed to fight the poorly-equipped Chinese forces, plus Japan wasn't exactly what you'd call 'tank-friendly territory', so they wouldn't have a lot of experience building and testing heavy armor.
Logistically, the Italians would be better-supplied than the Japanese, as the latter would prefer foraging and resupplying from enemy territory, capturing enemy ammo dumps and supplies while constantly moving forwards. The Italians had a rather skewed view of empire, where economics was a zero-sum game and the core territory would feed off its empire's resources before expanding to get more, but generally had a better established logistical system than the Japanese - but that's not exactly a high bar to clear. Bear in mind, the Italians suffered heavily due to lack of armor, heavy support, and lack of proper equipment, which meant the Germans often had to send valuable armor to support the flagging Italian forces.
The biggest and worst problem plaguing the Italians was the rapid over-expansion Mussolini carried out during the 1920s and 1930s and its continuing consequences. It resulted in a big, intimidating looking army to allow him to throw his weight around in the interwar period, but it bit him in the ass during the war, as it revealed major operational weaknesses. While the Italian Army of WW1 was a good, reliable force that just suffered from bad morale and poor commanders at the start, it quickly turned the war around, eventually proving pivotal to Entente victory once Austria-Hungary collapsed and the Italians were on the road to Vienna. Mussolini threw away this army's strengths by massive conscription, resulting in a massive block of conscripts with little to no training, little equipment beyond rifles and bullets, and an officer cadre of middle-class and nobility that neither knew nor cared about the rank-and-file's problems. No real effort to my knowledge was made to bridge the gap, nor to engage in advanced combat training for anyone besides the elite units like the Alpini. As a result, the only times the Italians did well in the war was under commanders who appreciated their potential and gave them proper training and discipline, like the Italians under Rommel, who formed the majority of his African theater forces.
The Japanese army, by contrast, had discipline, training and motivation despite its massive size, mostly because of continuous training and discipline enforcement even during its expansion phase during the 1930s. Soldier obedience was strong, and the army could be relied on to fight and die with some degree of effectiveness. The biggest problems facing the IJA were the banzai charge mentality, and the excessive brutality in enforcing discipline and punishments. The Japanese had come out of the Meiji Restoration, suddenly rose to Industrial Power status, then fought several successive wars with clear-cut victories (First Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, WW1), giving them an inflated sense of racial superiority and national invincibility against larger adversaries. It wasn't just enough to win, there has to be no retreat or surrender; any such act would be a betrayal of Japan, and thus unacceptable. Combined with the large emphasis on death-or-glory attacks, officers leading from the front, and the tendency of junior officers to assassinate seniors who they felt didn't present "sufficiently patriotic spirit" meant that most Japanese commanders would favor the most direct brute-force approach and would try to win the day through sheer fighting spirit, regardless of logistical or support factors (or the lack thereof). They'd be go-getters when the situation called for go-getters (which was early in the war), and they'd be go-getters when the situation called for cunning and caution (which is why they got reamed later on).
Both the Japanese and Italians had a rather dismissive view of casualties. For the Italians, this was a combination of initial misplaced optimism and a lack of competent or likeable officers, which only worsened the Italian morale problem. The Japanese, as mentioned, would be excessively disciplined and brutalized to the point where a retreat or surrender would be unthinkable. This recklessness even carried over to the officers, with junior officers leading banzai charges and senior officers something getting too close to the front. By contrast, the infamous Soviet casualty rates were the result of desperation, rather than indifference, as they were fighting an existential war against a powerful, genocidal invader.
In terms of mechanized units and armor, I lack the knowledge to properly compare them. What I do know, though, is that neither side were truly skilled in armored assaults. Italy had relied on armored cars and trucks to spearhead its assaults on the Ethiopians and Libyans, but the tactic backfired in Spain where the better-prepared Spanish Republicans massacred the Italian CTV at the Battle of Guadalajara, and the Italians learned the wrong lessons from the assault (unlike the Germans, who noted that armor unsupported by infantry tends to do poorly). As a result, Italy never really properly developed its tank core, not to mention that it exhausted a massive amount of materiel in Spain and didn't take the time to replenish it properly.
The Japanese, in comparison, were heavily in favor of light infantry assaults and brave attacks, eschewing heavy logistical preparation in favor of lightning-fast assaults. Their plan was to feed their troops off the occupied lands, a major gamble that paid off in the early stages of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the early phases of the Pacific War, notably the Battle of Singapore. Such victories tainted their vision, and thus sought to force such victories even when they weren't feasible or possible. The Italian soldier would be better supplied than his Japanese counterpart, but that's not exactly a high bar to clear. Japanese armor was limited to light tanks, being easy to make and supply, and heavier tanks weren't really needed to fight the poorly-equipped Chinese forces, plus Japan wasn't exactly what you'd call 'tank-friendly territory', so they wouldn't have a lot of experience building and testing heavy armor.
Logistically, the Italians would be better-supplied than the Japanese, as the latter would prefer foraging and resupplying from enemy territory, capturing enemy ammo dumps and supplies while constantly moving forwards. The Italians had a rather skewed view of empire, where economics was a zero-sum game and the core territory would feed off its empire's resources before expanding to get more, but generally had a better established logistical system than the Japanese - but that's not exactly a high bar to clear. Bear in mind, the Italians suffered heavily due to lack of armor, heavy support, and lack of proper equipment, which meant the Germans often had to send valuable armor to support the flagging Italian forces.
Japan: As you’ve said, both countries surffered from having weak industrial bases relative to most of the other major powers. Only China was in a worst position in this regard and they had the backing of the United States. As such, the Japanese tried to overcome their lack of firepower and technical inferiority with elan. On more than one occasion, Japanese infantrymen charged recklessly into entrenched American artillery and machine gun positions and were cut to pieces. Training generally lasted 8 months, during which they would practice small unit tactics, night fighting, marksmanship and go on rigorous endurance marches in both freezing cold and scorching heat. The brutal training conditions were in part intendended to build up Japanese endurance and during the war they proved to be poor logisticians and staff work was generally poor. The Japanese Army had its own air arm to perform reconnaissance missions, bombing missions and strafing in support of advancing infantry, armor and artillery units. American observers of Japanese tank operations in China, noted that they lacked a clear doctrine and while they achieved notable successes, this was not in small part due to China’s ineffective antitank measures.
Italy: The Italians maintained a large army, but training was generally poor. The Italian high command tended to emphasize manpower over firepower and it was a widely held belief that intuition and personal valor counted for more than training. With the exception of the alpine units, the Italians had a national recruiting system that mixed Italians from different regions in an effort to create a national identity. While politically wise, this tended to hamper communication, coordination, unit cohesion and slowed down mobilization. The average soldier often fought bravely, but relations between officers and enlisted men were generally poor. The average soldier didn’t have much confidence in the competence of their officers and they generally received poorer uniforms, food and less leave. The creation of Italy’s independent Airforce, killed the army’s air arm and coordination between ground and air units was notoriously poor. By the 1930’s the Italians had developed an armor doctrine (Guerra di Corso Rapido) that called for the use of armoured cars and motorcycle units for reconnaissance on the ground and concentration of armor to penetrate, exploit and encircle enemy units. Their armoured doctrine was tested in Spain and they achieved initial successes of in Malaga, a defeat in Guadalajara and went on to play a major role in the victories at Santander, Catalonia, Aragon and Madrid. Supplies were delivered to troops by motorized collpumns as well as aircraft to bypass inhospitable terrain and American observers felt that their airdrops were worth studying.
I’d rank the Japanese army above the Italian Army generally. The Japanese were on average, better lead, more motivated and had superior coordination between the various combat arms. The Italians had a superior armoured doctrine and better logistics though.
Sources.
Hitlers Italian Allies by MacGregor Knox
Military Effectiveness by Alan Millett
Mobility, Shock, and Firepower: The Emergence of US Army's Armor Branch 1917-1945 by Robert S. Cameron
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BobTheBarbarian
Banned
The Japanese Army was vastly more powerful than the Italians.
That said, I would much rather be a prisoner of the Italians than the Japanese!
That said, I would much rather be a prisoner of the Italians than the Japanese!
Mussolini wanted numbers. He had dreams about an army with a million men. To get the numbers everything else was discarded, mixing conscripts with "squadristi" the party thugs, but when even numbers don't add up, cheated and to get more divisions on paper cut down battallions from 12 to 9, so no surprise the bohemian corporal copy the trick later and go fight with paper divisions.
As the numbers were important weapons were not, the army was wrongfooted changing it's main caliber from 6,5 mm to 7,35 mm, not best way to enter a war, no new guns (some dated from 1870) except some heavy guns, only the smg made by Beretta and Brixia small support mortar (mu grandad told me about it in Spanish Civil War) were first class equipment but they were expensive to made both in money and work, and a lot of stuff was wasted in Spain.
Japanese equipmente was no better, some of the worse weapons were theirs but their skills made for the difference versus low morale and bad tactis enemy, as soon as the enemy got the tune and morale it's no better.
One final note, the mere numbers got some kind of fixation in all these clown tin pot dictators, 1939, just after de Civil War ended, with the country and economy in ruins, Franco planned an army with 150 divisions, more than 1 and a half million of combat men plus nearly another million as auxiliar corps. I can only guess he brougth back from Morocco some stuff best used for medical pourposes
As the numbers were important weapons were not, the army was wrongfooted changing it's main caliber from 6,5 mm to 7,35 mm, not best way to enter a war, no new guns (some dated from 1870) except some heavy guns, only the smg made by Beretta and Brixia small support mortar (mu grandad told me about it in Spanish Civil War) were first class equipment but they were expensive to made both in money and work, and a lot of stuff was wasted in Spain.
Japanese equipmente was no better, some of the worse weapons were theirs but their skills made for the difference versus low morale and bad tactis enemy, as soon as the enemy got the tune and morale it's no better.
One final note, the mere numbers got some kind of fixation in all these clown tin pot dictators, 1939, just after de Civil War ended, with the country and economy in ruins, Franco planned an army with 150 divisions, more than 1 and a half million of combat men plus nearly another million as auxiliar corps. I can only guess he brougth back from Morocco some stuff best used for medical pourposes
marathag
Banned
While most Armies went from 'Square' to 'Triangular' the Moose did one better, went to 'Binary'
That way he could have a lot more patronage from all the Generals who commanded those now tiny Divisions.
And that, ladies and gentlemen, is why you shouldn't let a sergeant take absolute command of your armies (IIRC, Mussolini never rose above Lance-Sergeant in WW1, and was mostly a military reporter).
Basically something Paul von Hindenberg said about Adolph Hitler when he met him after the latter got elected Chancellor.
Why did Paul von Hindenburg wrongly call Adolf Hitler "Bohemian corporal"?
Paul von Hindenburg didn't like Adolf Hitler because he was a low-ranked individual from the poor/low class. He called him mockingly "Bohemian corporal". However in reality Adolf Hitler was not Bo...
history.stackexchange.com
Basically something Paul von Hindenberg said about Adolph Hitler when he met him after the latter got elected Chancellor.
Why did Paul von Hindenburg wrongly call Adolf Hitler "Bohemian corporal"?
Paul von Hindenburg didn't like Adolf Hitler because he was a low-ranked individual from the poor/low class. He called him mockingly "Bohemian corporal". However in reality Adolf Hitler was not Bo...
Oh. Interesting.
Never heard it before.
Was really confused because I thought either I missed an important person or it was some Austrian White-washing. "Oh that Hitler fella? He's Bohemian not Austrian."
Makes sense now.
Pretty sure Hindenburg meant a different sense of Bohemian than the region itself.
Many of their failures can be largely blamed on Mussolini, but this one wasn’t his decision.
Cry Havoc
Did the arms race of the 1930s cause the Second World War? In Cry Havoc, historian Joseph Maiolo shows, in rich and fascinating detail, how the deadly game of the arms race was played out in the decade prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. In this exhaustively researched account, he...
books.google.ca
It’s also worth noting that Mussolini was in officer training.
Mussolini and His Generals
This is the first authoritative study of the Italian armed forces and the relationship between the military and foreign policies of Fascist Italy from Mussolini's rise to power in 1922 to the catastrophic defeat of 1940. Using extensive new research, John Gooch explores the nature and...
books.google.ca
It's true that both were infantry heavy, but they were infantry heavy in different ways.
The IJA was really optimized for a war in areas with poor or even non-existent infrastructure. Disciplined infantry with relatively light encumberment made for a very mobile and versatile force in such an environment.
Now, while the Royal Italian Army did have a handful of elite divisions (like the Alpini and Bersaglieri) which were similarly set up with low encumbrance in mind, on the whole they had a mobile combined arms doctrine, not even a particularly bad one at that. However it's industry just wasn't strong enough to produce trucks and tanks as fast as Moose could mail out conscription notices. The result was that, outside of a few elite divisions, the army was largely unmotorized.
Which force was better? The one that was properly equipped and trained for the planned war.
Was the IJA better in every way? No, the Italians were much more mechanized and IIRC had much more substantial artillery support. Despite not being well equipped for an ETO-style battle they were certainly much better equipped than the IJA for such an engagement.
History Learner
Banned
The idea that the IJA and Royal Italian Army were "bad" isn't supported by the historical evidence and is actually a pop culture meme.
BobTheBarbarian
Banned
From what I've read of Italy, the Japanese were more mechanized and had more (and better) artillery. The Japanese also had more will to fight and were much more capable in battle; I would bet on a single Japanese division to defeat an entire Fascist corps.
The capabilities of the IJA are sometimes underrated by eurocentrists, but the Italian army really did under-perform and suffered a number of lopsided defeats, most egregiously in North Africa; before that France and even Albania were red flags.
IDK, iirc a Japanese Infantry division had nothing better than their 75mm guns where as Italian Infantry divisions had a battalion of 100mm howitzers (in addition to two battalions with 75mm guns).
With regards to mechanization, admittedly I know next to nothing of the Chinese/Manchurian theatre, but I don't know of the Japanese ever fielding a mechanized corps (or "army" in IJA terminology).
edit:
Italian willingness to fight depended a lot on their perception of the enemy. On the Eastern Front and in Yugoslavia their battles were tooth and nail affairs. Their battles in and around Stalingrad show how resilient and dogged they could be when faced with a less merciful opponent than the British.
So wrt to a Japanese division vs an Italian corps (manpower-wise the two would be about equal assuming only 2 divisions in the corps), the deciding factor could be if the Italians are aware of Japan's treatment of POWs.
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McPherson
Banned
More properly, imperialist Italy under the Moose and the Spiritualist faction of the IJA.
1. WWI Esercito was a rifleman and artillery based force that developed after an incredibly steep learning curve the tools and techniques of mountain warfare. They had considerable French and British help. At the time they were frankly considered an Entente liability by 1917.
2. Interwar the Italians lacked the economic strength to modernize their army to the degree that they modernized their navy and air force. Benny the Moose did not help matters with his politicization of the otherwise professional Italian military from 1927 onward.
3. The Italian mid-grades and junior officers were very conscious of their men's problems, but there was not a whole lot they could do about it with Commando Supremo and the top field slots filled by political appointees and incompetents and with so little budget for equipment, training and troop factors.
4. Pfui on Rommel. He abused the Italians worse than any German I've researched. What the Italians accomplished after they got their act together in North Africa was in spite of Rommel, not because of him.
5. Italian performance when they were out from under Bagladaccio and Grazziani was "fair to good". Artillery was excellent. Mountain troops and paratroopers probably as good or better than their German counterparts. Blackshirt units were garbage. Italians fought HARD when they chose to fight, and that is the difference. When they understood they were being misused, like the French or ANY sensible soldiers, they would defend up to a point, but not attack. And they refused to fight for a corrupt regime unlike the Germans or the Japanese.
1. The Japanese have a group consensus tradition. You are not going to see a lot of rugged individualists like ADM "King Kong" Hara or GEN Yamashita. Once the group has a theory and a consensus it will take a huge effort to change minds.
2. Death or glory attacks (banzai charges) were last gasp efforts to inflict maximum damage before the Americans inevitably massacred them. The Pacific War was a racist war on both sides with no quarter asked or given. This colored fighting attitudes by BOTH militaries. No prisoners except for intelligence purposes was the norm until the Japanese finally broke. It took a LOT of effort to break them. Refer to 1. .
3. If Italian field grades were concerned about their men, the IJA field grades were concerned about their NATION. They were thoroughly indoctrinated in the necessity to think about the Japanese polity as being surrounded and threatened by Western Imperialism. The example they had was CHINA next door. As such the Japanese mid-grades were highly self-politicized and had a two competing theories that drove their radical politics. One was China must be rationalized and added to Japan to strengthen East Asia so that the foreign barbarians could be thrown out. Asia for Asians so to speak. The other political problem/solution/fight was how to bring China into the firm in spite of the West. In military terms this was a fight between the "materialists" and the "spiritualists" or more properly, "the human factors" and "the mechanistic factors" factions. One IJA group wanted to train the soldier and use him attritionally to overcome equipment deficiencies in main force against the West. The other group wanted to use equipment as well as training and NIBBLE the China problem one small bite at a time and try to sneak up on the solution. The political assassinations and coups the majors and colonels staged were the policy disputes inside the IJA spilling over into whichever IJA faction put their man into the national government as war minister. Tojo was a spiritualist and he was the train-wreck.
4. Both military organizations had learned the Isonzo and Mukden lessons. Machine guns and artillery = lots of dead for the attackers. Both militaries would LOVE to find ways around this problem. The IJA thought they found it in infiltration and small unit maneuver tactics through difficult terrain. They were right. Right until the end of the war, as long as the Japanese could find a gap, seam or flank they were dangerous attackers, who outfought and outthought their allied opponents. The only way to make sure of them was to continuous front them and keep the pressure on by constant recon patrols and small unit brawling at the line of contact.
5. By contrast the Esercito was far more conventional (very Austro Hungarian) in tactics and doctrine, relying on massed leg infantry and artillery in the attack and trenched camps and infantry boxes in the defense. Against a motorized enemy this fighting scheme is going to fail.
6. Oh, hello, no. Yamashita and Homma understood tank warfare quite well. They handed Perceival and MacArthur respectively their asses with armored operations not too dissimilar to France 1940 only on a smaller scale. Similarly at Khalkin Gol, the Japanese found it was lack of numbers and the quality of gear that failed them against the Russians who out-died them and defeated them through numbers, better bulk logistics and Zhukov who pulled a surprise flank assault on them when they overextended.
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7. Uhm, no. The island defense was an IJA/IJN misread of how airpower works as a denier of use. They thought RIKKOs would be like a wall instead of as an attrition sponge that makes the enemy bleed but does not keep him from slicing into an island airfield system defense. Also the IJA/IJN did not realize as the Americans did, that the Pacific Ocean is a supply desert. Everything has to be shipped forward including fresh water.
8. China is HORRIBLE tank country as the Americans found out when they tried to armor up the nationalist Chinese. Armored trains and motorized and pack mule supported infantry is the norm. Infantry is a premium and artillery beyond the railroads and supply heads almost impossible to supply cross country. The IJA had the trucks and the railroad logistics advantage right to the end of the China war.
10. The Chi He was by 1940 world definition a MEDIUM tank. It was the main battle tank of the IJA. There were just never enough of them.
11. Tell that to Littorio or Ariete who had to pull Rommel's carcass out of the fire on numerous occasions. Might remark that Italian tanks of the 1940 and 1941 period were competitive with British cruisers. Just never enough of them. Semoventes (Stugs Italian style.) were DEADLY with Italian infantry support.
12. Might add that 90% of the Axis logistics effort in North Africa was ITALIAN. DAK logistics? What is logistics? The Germans were the clown club, not the Italians.
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13. IJA/IJN staff work was generally outstanding.
14. American observers in China came to exactly the opposite conclusions. Japanese armor operations were restricted by logistics handicaps and the small size of forces available. When used the IJA armor was well used.
15. The IJNAS provided fully half of the IJA CAS and recon support, especially in the southern resources area and the coastal regions of China.
16. Generally accurate except the field grades seem to know what they did. Add that Italian artillery and engineers and quartermaster units were good to excellent. Logistics was often lacking in supply items available, but what was there got to the front intact and not missing parts or training manuals or such as sabotage as one finds with the British.
17. Fair with the caveats I noted.
Good sources. Mine are Hyperwar, and the USAWC studies series on the Pacific war. Generally in agreement, with the caveats I specified.